Synthetic Governance
Columbia Business Law Review
Volume 2021, Issue 2 | Pages 476- 519
Boards
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THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MACHINE
Columbia Law ReviewVolume 121, Issue 8 | Pages 2563- 2634 -
Can Staggered Boards Improve Value? Causal Evidence from Massachusetts
Contemporary Accounting ResearchVolume 38, Issue 4, Winter 2021 | Pages 3053-3084 -
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Delaware and the Transformation of Corporate Governance
Delaware Journal of Corporate LawVolume 40, Issue 1 | -
Centros, California’s ‘Women on Boards’ Statute and the Scope of Regulatory Competition
European Business Organization Law ReviewVolume 20 | Pages 493-520 -
Boards and AI: Why the Governance Gap Is Structural, Not Technical
Bruno Sbardellini Cossi -
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ALIBABA: A CASE STUDY OF SYNTHETIC CONTROL
Harvard Business Law ReviewVolume 11 | Pages 279- 309 -
Corporate Technologies and the Tech Nirvana Fallacy
UC Law Journal (Hastings Law Journal)Volume 72, Issue 1 | Pages 55- 98 -
Regulatory Pressure and Bank Directors’ Incentives to Attend Board Meetings
International Review of FinanceVolume 12, Issue 2 | Pages 227- 248 -
Governance and the Financial Crisis
International Review of FinanceVolume 12, Issue 1 | Pages 7- 38 -
How corporate governance affect firm value? Evidence on a self-dealing channel from a natural experiment in Korea
Journal of Banking & FinanceVolume 51 | Pages 131- 150 -
The impact of board gender composition on dividend payouts
Journal of Corporate FinanceVolume 43 | Pages 86- 105 -
Mind the gap: The age dissimilarity between the chair and the CEO
Journal of Corporate FinanceVolume 35 | Pages 136- 158 -
What matters and for which firms for corporate governance in emerging markets? Evidence from Brazil (and other BRIK countries)
Journal of Corporate FinanceVolume 18, Issue 4 | Pages 934- 952 -
Director informativeness following board gender balancing: Evidence from insider trading
Journal of Corporate FinanceVolume 94 | Article No. 102851 -
Mandatory governance reform and corporate risk management
Journal of Corporate FinanceVolume 68 | Article No. 101935
