There are significant divergences in financial regulation despite the similarity of market failures
Blocks held by top US investors are larger than those held by the top European investors
Commentators should focus on how to improve the present regime of state competition
There are significant divergences in financial regulation despite the similarity of market failures
Blocks held by top US investors are larger than those held by the top European investors
Commentators should focus on how to improve the present regime of state competition
There are significant divergences in financial regulation despite the similarity of market failures
Blocks held by top US investors are larger than those held by the top European investors
Commentators should focus on how to improve the present regime of state competition
The conventional view of dual-class structures assumes that the alternative to a dual-class IPO is a single-class IPO, where shareholders' voting power aligns with their economic interests. However, more often than not, the...
The fall of fascism in Italy in 1943-1944 was followed by the issuance of laws and decrees that made former fascist politicians ineligible for political office. We use this setting as a quasi-natural experiment that exogenously...
Prior research has documented a carbon premium in realized returns, which has been assumed to proxy for expected returns and thus the cost of capital. We find that the carbon premium partially represents unexpected returns and thus...
Founder-CEOs may hold power in a corporation in myriad ways: through managerial control, designating seats on the board, or holding significant voting power, which can be amplified by dual-class structures with superior voting...
The largest institutional investors have solidified their status as “universal owners,” holding almost eighty percent of the U.S. stock market. The growing influence of these investors over the companies they invest in has...
This chapter deals with fundamental issues of corporate insolvency law. Particular attention is paid to the agency problems related to “bankruptcy governance” and how these are addressed in various jurisdictions....
We study the effect of firm-level political risk on wage theft. On one hand firms exposed to political risk might engage in wage theft to lower their expenses and to improve their financial flexibility. On the other hand, political risk...
It is difficult to advance the ESG agenda using company law, especially in common law legal systems. Cases show that directors’ duties require directors to prioritise the ‘interests of the company’, which is equated with...
Many countries’ insolvency systems focus on restructuring financial liabilities, and ignore operational liabilities such as leases and long-term supplier contracts. We model insolvency procedures with and without operational...
Combining euro-area credit register and carbon emission data, we provide evidence of a climate risk-taking channel in banks’ lending policies. Banks charge higher interest rates to firms featuring greater carbon emissions, and...
This paper analyzes changes in firm value, performance, and behavior caused by CEO deaths. Many deaths trigger large stock price changes—shareholders believe that some CEOs add shareholder value, but others are seen as not...
Engage with global thought leaders & gain valuable insights on corporate purpose & modern capitalism at not one but THREE events! Join our 3-day event organised with Copenhagen Business School from 20-22 September 2023. ➡ Registrations are now open: (click on the events below to learn more) Day1️⃣: Young Scholars Workshop on Corporate Purpose | 20 September 2023 Day2️⃣: "Perspectives on Corporate Purpose" Conference |......
