Constraining Dominant Shareholders' Self-Dealing: The Legal Framework in France, Germany, and Italy
European Company and Financial Law Review
Volume 4, Issue 4 | Pages 491-528
Tunneling
-
-
Law and Tunneling
The Journal of Corporation LawVolume 37, Issue 1 | Pages 1- 49 -
How Does Law Affect Finance? An Examination of Equity Tunneling in Bulgaria
Journal of Financial EconomicsVolume 96, Issue 1 | Pages 155-173 -
The effect of minority veto rights on controller pay tunneling
Journal of Financial EconomicsVolume 138, Issue 3 | Pages 777-788 -
Cheap-Stock Tunneling Around Preemptive Rights
Harvard Law School
Harvard Law School -
(GCGC 2021) Tunneling Through Group Trademarks
Korea University Business School
Singapore Management University, Yong Pung How School of Law -
-
Tunneling Through Group Trademarks
Korea University Business School -
-
Powering Preemptive Rights with Presubscription Disclosure
Harvard Law School -
The Law and (Some) Finance of Related Party Transactions: An Introduction
Bocconi University, Department of Legal Studies
Leibniz Institute SAFE, Goethe University Frankfurt, LawFin Center -
Optimally Restrained Tunneling: The Puzzle of Controlling Shareholders’ “Generous” Exploitation in Bad-Law Jurisdictions
Peking University, School of Transnational Law -
Cheap-Stock Tunneling Around Preemptive Rights
Harvard Law School
Harvard Law School -
RPTs in SOEs: Tunneling, Propping, and Policy Channeling
Stanford Law School
Harvard Law School -
The Effect of Minority Veto Rights on Controller Pay Tunneling
Harvard Law School
Tel Aviv University, Buchmann Faculty of Law
School of Business Administration, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem -
Equity Tunnelling
Speaker(s)
Harvard Law SchoolDiscussant(s)
Columbia Law School & Stanford Law School -
Tunneling and RPTs in State-controlled Companies
Speaker(s)
Stanford Law SchoolDiscussant(s)
Harvard Law School -
Executive Compensation: When a Firm is a Business Group Member
Korea University Business School
