Some Reflections on the Self-insider and the Market Abuse Regulation – The Self-insider as a Monopoly-Square Insider

Some Reflections on the Self-insider and the Market Abuse Regulation – The Self-insider as a Monopoly-Square Insider

Stefano Lombardo

Series number :

Serial Number: 
512/2020

Date posted :

May 05 2020

Last revised :

May 05 2020
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Keywords

  • Market Abuse Regulation • 
  • MAR • 
  • insider dealing • 
  • insider trading • 
  • self-insider • 
  • selfinsider • 
  • inside information • 
  • insider of itself • 
  • insider di se stesso; selbstgeschaffene innere Tatsachen • 
  • takeover • 
  • takeover for delisting

This article deals with the self-insider, i.e. the possible creation of the inside information by a person and its (abusive) exploitation. It describes the situation in Italy and Germany and then provides a taxonomy of the several cases of selfinsider.

The article then analyzes the case law of the ECJ and the MAR regulatory provisions for justifying/neglecting the existence of the self-insider (Article 9.5 and 9.6 MAR). Given the unclear regulatory answer regarding its sanctionability, the article proposes, based on the economics of MAR, a law and economics reason of why the self-insider sometime should be sanctioned, by describing it as a peculiar monopolistic behavior able to distort investors’ confidence and market integrity. Finally, the article suggests that the European legislator should explicitly deal with the problem.
 

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