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Key Finding

Regulating only traditional insider trading creates a false sense of security, allowing insiders to profit through overlooked shadow trading

Abstract

Insiders can profit from material non-public information pertaining to their own firm by trading in the shares of their own company (traditional insider trading) or in the shares of other companies (shadow trading). We show that traditional insider trading and shadow trading have the same consequences for financial markets and corporate governance, but only the former is pursued aggressively by regulators in Europe, the UK, and the US. Drawing on a variety of evidence, including a survey of 200 retail investors, we suggest that, rather than protecting unsuspecting outside investors, such an arrangement enables insiders to profit at their expense. The ban on the more salient practice of traditional insider dealing regulation lulls outside investors into a fake sense of security, thus effectively operating as a placebo, while insiders can still profit by engaging in shadow trading. We further argue that, ironically, this arrangement may nonetheless be efficient.

Published in

Forthcoming in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies

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