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Abstract

Dynastic-controlled firms are led by founding family CEOs while the family owns an insignificant share of equity (defined as less than five percent). They represent 7.4% of listed firms in post-war Japan, include well-known firms such as Casio, Suzuki and Toyota, and are often grouped with widely-held firms in the literature. These firms differ in key performance measures from both traditional family firms and non-family firms, and evolve from the former as equity-financed growth dilutes the founding family’s ownership over time. In turn, the transition from dynastic control to non-family status is driven by a diminution of strategic family resources.

Published in

Journal of Financial Economics
Morten Bennedsen, Vikas Mehrotra, Jungwook Shim, Yupana Wiwattanakantang
Volume 142, Number 2, pp. 831-843, January 2021

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