THE CASE FOR AN UNBIASED TAKEOVER LAW (WITH AN APPLICATION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION)
Harvard Business Law Review
Volume 4, Issue 1 | Pages 85- 127
Poison Pill
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Crafty hostile takeovers - Professor Simon Deakin
Cambridge Judge Business School Discussions on Management Science & Operations
University of Cambridge -
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Diverse Dynamics of Korea’s Market for Corporate Control
Peking University, School of Transnational Law -
The Consequences to Directors for Deploying Poison Pills
University of Washington
Ohio State University -
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Shadow Pills, Visible Pill Policy, and Firm Value
University of Notre Dame
Price College of Business, College of Law, University of Oklahoma
University of Toronto Faculty of LawAnd more (...)
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Anti-Activist Poison Pills
New York University School of Law
NYU Law -
Hedge Fund Activism, Poison Pills, and the Jurisprudence of Threat
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School -
The Law and Finance of Anti-Takeover Statutes
NYU Law School
New York University School of Law -
Creeping Acquisitions in Europe: Enabling Companies to Be Better Safe than Sorry
Bocconi University, Department of Legal Studies
Rutgers Law School -
The Case for an Unbiased Takeover Law (with an Application to the European Union)
Bocconi University, Department of Legal Studies
Columbia Law School & Stanford Law School
Amsterdam Law School and Business School, University of Amsterdam -
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The Poison Pill In Japan: The Missing Infrastructure
Columbia Law School & Stanford Law School
