Law Series The Poison Pill In Japan: The Missing Infrastructure Working Paper Author/Authors Ronald Gilson Columbia Law School & Stanford Law School Series number: 020/2004 Date published: 01 Jan 2004 Quick links Access Paper on SSRN Categories Poison Pill Takeovers Voting Keywords hostile bids, European takeover directive, takeover defenses, voting rights, break-through rule, corporate control, poison pill, takeover debate in the U.S., monitoring of management, Delaware Law, indipendent directors, executive compensation, courts, ownership structure, Japanese Commercial Code, legal systems, Japanese corporate governance.
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