Control
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The Effect of Minority Veto Rights on Controller Tunnelling
School of Business Administration, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem -
Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy
Harvard Law School
Boston University School of Law -
The End of “Corporate” Governance (Hello “Platform” Governance)
Tilburg University Faculty of Law and Tilburg Law and Economics Center
Tilburg University -
Powering Preemptive Rights with Presubscription Disclosure
Harvard Law School -
The Law and (Some) Finance of Related Party Transactions: An Introduction
Bocconi University, Department of Legal Studies
Leibniz Institute SAFE, Goethe University Frankfurt, LawFin Center -
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Optimally Restrained Tunneling: The Puzzle of Controlling Shareholders’ “Generous” Exploitation in Bad-Law Jurisdictions
Peking University, School of Transnational Law -
Do Founders Control Start-Up Firms that Go Public?
Harvard Law School
Vanderbilt Law School -
The Effect of Minority Veto Rights on Controller Pay Tunneling
Harvard Law School
Tel Aviv University, Buchmann Faculty of Law
School of Business Administration, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem -
Opportunity Makes a Thief: Corporate Opportunities as Legal Transplant and Convergence in Corporate Law
Fordham University School of Law
University of Oxford -
Executive Remuneration Standards and the “Conformity Gap” at Controlled Corporations
Speaker(s)
University of GenoaDiscussant(s)
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Evolution of Ownership and Control Around the World: The Changing Face of Capitalism
London Business School
Blavatnik School of Government and Saïd Business School, University of Oxford -
(GCGC 2016) Executive Remuneration Standards and the “Conformity Gap” at Controlled Corporations
University of GenoaOk-Rial Song -
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Hedge Fund Activism, Poison Pills, and the Jurisprudence of Threat
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School -
Stock Market Prices and the Market for Corporate Control
University of Oxford, Faculty of Law
Faculty of Law, Cambridge University
