Working Papers
The ECGI working paper series is a library of academic research papers produced by ECGI Research members consisting of highly qualified and renowned academics from across the globe. The papers focus on corporate governance topics in both law and finance fields.
1,995 Working Papers
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Law Series
Law and the Rise of the Firm
Yale Law School
Harvard Law School
Fordham University School of Law -
Finance Series
Why Does Corporate Governance Affect Firm Value: Evidence on a Self-Dealing Channel from a Natural Experiment in Korea
Northwestern University Law School and Kellogg School of Management Law School
Korea University Business School
Korea University Business SchoolAnd more (...)
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Law Series
Company Law Harmonization Reconsidered: What Role for the EC?
Bocconi University, Department of Legal Studies -
Finance Series
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Finance Series
Shareholder Protection, Stock Market Development, and Politics
Università di Napoli Federico II
LeBow College of Business, Drexel University -
Finance Series
Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns
UNSW School of Business, University of New South Wales
University of Delaware, Lerner College of Business and Economics -
Finance Series
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Finance Series
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Law Series
The Place for Creditor Protection on the Agenda for Modernisation of Company Law in the European Union
University of Cambridge Law Faculty and Centre for Corporate and Commercial Law (3CL) -
Law Series
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Finance Series
A Theory of Friendly Boards
University of Oxford
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) -
Finance Series
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Law Series
European Company Law and Corporate Governance: Where Does the Action Plan of the European Commission Lead?
Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law -
Law Series
A Synthetic View of Different Concepts of Creditor Protection - Or: A High-Level Framework for Corporate Creditor Protection
Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz -
Finance Series
Market Liquidity, Investor Participation and Managerial Autonomy: Why do Firms go Private?
John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University, St. Louis -
Law Series
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Finance Series
Serial CEO Incentives and the Structure of Managerial Contracts
Stockholm School of Economics