Finance Series Sticks or Carrots? Optimal CEO Compensation when Managers are Loss-Averse Working Paper Author/Authors Ingolf Dittmann Erasmus Research Institute of Management - ERIM Ernst Maug University of Mannheim Business School Oliver Spalt University of Mannheim Series number: 193/2007 Date published: 01 Nov 2007 Quick links Access Paper on SSRN Categories Performance Remuneration Keywords Stock Options, executive compensation, Loss Aversion This article was published in The Journal of Finance, Volume 65, Issue 6, Pages 2015- 2050, on 31 Dec 2010 . Read the journal article here. Published in Journal of Finance Vol. 65, No. 6, pp. 2015-2050, 2010
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