Using a large hand-collected dataset from 2001 to 2006, we find that activist hedge funds in the U.S. propose strategic, operational, and financial remedies and attain success or partial success in two thirds of the cases. Hedge funds seldom seek control and in most cases are nonconfrontational.
The abnormal return around the announcement of activism is approximately 7%, with no reversal during the subsequent year. Target firms experience increases in payout, operating performance, and higher CEO turnover after activism. Our analysis provides important new evidence on the mechanisms and effects of informed shareholder monitoring.
We assemble cash flow data on all investments by Israeli pension providers in private equity and venture capital funds over nearly 20 years to evaluate...
This introductory chapter provides the reader with some figures about institutional investors’ role in the governance of listed companies in the US...
We analyze voting records for management proposals and find that investors today hold directors accountable for a much wider range of issues, such as...