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Key Finding

Bidder-initiated and stock-financed takeovers primarily hedge against target adverse selection

Abstract

US bidders initiate the deal process to acquire a public target only about half the time - the target is involved in initiating the rest. We control for this endogenous initiation choice to increase power to test whether bidders time deal initiations to opportunistically pay for the target with overpriced shares and possibly crowd out more efficient buyers. Under our main alternative hypothesis, bidders prefer to use their shares as acquisition currency to hedge against target adverse selection - unless the target substantially undervalues those shares. We approach this complex issue from three angles. First, and most important, regardless of who initiates, bidders are more likely to pay with stock the better informed the target is about bidder true value. Since it is more difficult to sell overpriced shares to highly informed targets, this positive association is inconsistent with bidder opportunism. Second, structural estimation shows that opportunistic bidders crowd out high-synergy rivals in 7% of target-initiated transactions and only 6% in bidder-initiated deals. Third, bidder-initiated takeovers on average trigger positive announcement returns to the bidder's industry peers, which fails to support that the bidder's industry is overpriced by the market. In sum, our evidence suggests that the deal process substantially limits bidders' ability to sell overpriced shares and distort resource allocation in the US market for corporate control.

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