Rating Design: Informing Investors or Motivating Insiders?
Key Finding
Issuer-paid financial information can eliminate short-termism: insiders' exit horizon becomes irrelevant when uncertainty is high
Abstract
Who pays for financial information determines its design: investor-paid ratings maximize informativeness about firm fundamentals to increase trading profits, whereas firm-paid ratings put more weight on firm performance to strengthen corporate insiders' effort incentives via market prices. When fundamental uncertainty is sufficiently high, firm-paid ratings achieve time horizon irrelevance: insiders exert the same effort as under commitment, regardless of their exit horizon. However, stock liquidity increases investors' willingness to pay for information, so that investor-paid ratings can displace or distort firm-paid ratings. The framework sheds light on the financing of high-uncertainty firms by venture capital funds with short horizons.
© Pierre Chaigneau, Nicolas Sahuguet, 2026
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