Finance Series Is Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by the Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK Working Paper Author/Authors Grzegorz Pawlina Luc Renneboog Tilburg University Series number: 069/2005 Date published: 01 Feb 2005 Quick links Access Paper on SSRN Categories Agency Capital Investment Decisions Keywords Investment-cash flow sensitivity, ownership and control, asymmetric information, liquidity constraints, agency costs of free cash flow, large shareholder monitoring, Shapley values
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