Institutional Debt Holder Governance

Institutional Debt Holder Governance

Aneel Keswani, Anh Tran, Paolo Volpin

Series number :

Serial Number: 

Date posted :

July 15 2019

Last revised :

April 30 2020
SSRN Share


  • Corporate governance • 
  • institutional investors • 
  • agency costs of debt

Using data on the universe of US-based mutual funds, we find that two out of five fund families hold corporate bonds of firms in which they also own an equity stake. We show that the greater the fraction of debt a fund family holds in a given firm, the greater its propensity to vote in line with the interests of firm debt holders at shareholder meetings.

Voting has direct policy consequences as firms that receive more votes in favor of creditors make corporate decisions more in line with the interests of debt holders.

Published in

Published in: 
Publication Title: 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (Forthcoming)


Real name:
Aneel Keswani
Real name:
Anh Tran