Law Series The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Toward a Holdup Theory Of Stakeholders in Comparative Corporate Governance Working Paper Author/Authors Martin Gelter Fordham University School of Law Series number: 096/2008 Date published: 01 Feb 2008 Quick links Access Paper on SSRN Categories Codetermination Shareholders Stakeholders Theory Keywords comparative corporate governance, Stakeholders, holdup, Managerial autonomy, codetermination, employment law
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