Corporate Governance in the Presence of Active and Passive Delegated Investment

Corporate Governance in the Presence of Active and Passive Delegated Investment

Adrian Aycan Corum, Andrey Malenko, Nadya Malenko

Series number :

Serial Number: 
695/2020

Date posted :

August 26 2020

Last revised :

November 30 2023
SSRN Share

Keywords

  • Corporate governance • 
  • delegated asset management • 
  • Passive Funds • 
  • index funds • 
  • competition • 
  • Investment Stewardship • 
  • engagement • 
  • monitoring

We examine the governance implications of passive fund growth. In our model, investors allocate capital between passive funds, active funds, and private savings, and funds' fees and ownership stakes determine their incentives to engage in governance.

If passive funds grow because of easier access to index investing, governance improves, albeit only up to a point where passive funds start primarily crowding out investors' allocations to active funds rather than private savings. In contrast, if passive funds grow because of reduced opportunities for profitable active management, governance worsens. Our results reconcile conflicting evidence about the effects of passive ownership on governance.

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Authors

Real name:
Adrian Aycan Corum
Dr.
Real name:
Andrey Malenko
Research Member
Boston College, Carroll School of Management