CEO Turnover and Director Reputation

CEO Turnover and Director Reputation

Felix von Meyerinck, Jonas Romer, Markus Schmid

Series number :

Serial Number: 
942/2023

Date posted :

December 03 2023

Last revised :

December 03 2023
SSRN Share

Keywords

  • CEO turnover • 
  • director elections • 
  • director reputation • 
  • CEO succession • 
  • Shareholder voting

This paper analyzes the reputational effects of forced CEO turnovers on outside directors. We find that directors interlocked to a forced CEO turnover experience large and persistent increases in withheld votes at subsequent re-elections relative to non-turnover-interlocked directors.

Directors are not penalized for an involvement in a turnover per se but for forced CEO turnovers that are related to governance failures by the board. Our results challenge the widespread view that forcing out a CEO can generally be understood as a sign of a well-functioning corporate governance.

Authors

Real name:
Jonas Romer
Research Member
University of St. Gallen and Swiss Finance Institute (SFI)
Real name:
Felix von Meyerinck