Why are firms with more managerial ownership worth less?
Journal of Financial Economics
Volume 140, Issue 3 | Pages 699-725
Management
Management
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Managerial ownership dynamics and firm value
Journal of Financial EconomicsVolume 92, Issue 3 | Pages 342-361 -
Serial CEO incentives and the structure of managerial contracts
Journal of Financial IntermediationVolume 20, Issue 4 | Pages 633-662 -
Outside Director Liability: A Policy Analysis
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical EconomicsVolume 162, Issue 1 | Pages 5-20 -
The Real Costs of Financial Efficiency When Some Information Is Soft
Review of FinanceVolume 20, Issue 6 | Pages 2151-2182 -
Bankers on the Boards of German Firms: What They Do, What They Are Worth, and Why They Are (Still) There
Review of FinanceVolume 14, Issue 1 | Pages 35-71 -
Investor Heterogeneity, Investor-Management Disagreement and Share Repurchases
The Review of Financial StudiesVolume 26, Issue 10 | Pages 2453-2491 -
Outside Director Liability
Stanford Law ReviewVolume 58, Issue 4 | Pages 1055-1160 -
Shareholders and stakeholders: How do directors decide?
Strategic Management JournalVolume 32, Issue 12 | Pages 1331-1355 -
A Theory of Friendly Boards
The Journal of FinanceVolume 62, Issue 1 | Pages 217-250 -
Lift Not The Painted Veil! To Whom Are Directors’ Duties Really Owed?
University of Illinois Law ReviewVolume 2015, Issue 3 | Pages 1069-1118 -
