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Abstract

To what extent do executives and workers enjoy the upside of a firm’s performance? Matching U.S. Census Bureau wage records to executive compensation for public firms, we compare their pay growth within the same firm and year. Relative to workers, executives’ pay growth is convex in the idiosyncratic stock return, rising steeply with good performance and falling much less with bad. We detect no executive-specific asymmetry in the systematic return. These patterns hold for cash pay and for CEO to median worker pay ratios disclosed in recent years. Executive separations do not rise relative to workers’ after poor firm-specific performance. We show that such convexity to idiosyncratic firm performance can arise in a model of boards that defer to executives’ attribution of firm-specific outcomes – managers take credit for good firm-specific outcomes and blame bad ones on luck – and is stronger in firms with weak governance. Empirically, we find that this convexity is greater where shareholder lawsuits are harder, analyst coverage lower, and workers’ bargaining power weaker.

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