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Key Finding

CEOs increasingly underinvest, increase leverage, and repurchase shares as their tenure progresses, driven by a CEO overhang effect that shifts value toward future executives and costs shareholders an estimated 6% of firm value

Abstract

We document that CEOs reduce investment, increase net leverage, and expand net share repurchases over their tenure. To explain these patterns, we develop a dynamic model of a firm run by a sequence of CEOs. Each CEO has a finite tenure and chooses investment, financing, and payout to maximize her utility over wealth under a contract that combines a base salary with equity-based pay. The model identifies a new mechanism, the CEO overhang effect, which arises because the CEO's horizon is truncated and future CEOs are also granted equity. As a result, over her tenure a growing share of the returns to the firm's capital and of its costs of debt shifts from current shareholders, including the CEO, to future CEOs. The incumbent CEO therefore underinvests and levers up. She also increasingly repurchases shares, because a larger stake becomes more valuable to her as turnover approaches. Calibrating the model, we infer that the resulting agency cost amounts to 6% of shareholder value.

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