Long-Term Economic Consequences of Hedge Fund Activist Interventions
Abstract
We examine the long-term effects of interventions by activist hedge funds. Prior papers document positive equal-weighted long-term returns and operating performance improvements following activist interventions, and typically conclude that activism is beneficial. We extend prior literature in two ways. First, we find that equal-weighted long-term returns are driven by the smallest 20% of firms with an average market value of $22 million. The larger 80% of firms experience insignificant negative long-term returns. On a value-weighted basis, which likely best gauges effects on shareholder wealth and the economy, we find that pre-to-post activism long-term returns are insignificantly different from zero. For operating performance, we find that prior results are a manifestation of abnormal trends in pre-activism performance. Using an appropriately matched sample, we find no evidence of abnormal post-activism performance improvements. Overall, our results do not strongly support the hypothesis that activist interventions drive long-term benefits for the typical shareholder.
Published in
Volume 24, Issue 2, pp 536–569
© Ed deHaan, David Larcker, Charles McClure, 2018
All rights reserved. Distributed for discussion purposes only; not to be reproduced without permission.
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of ECGI or its members.
For copyright queries or takedown requests, contact wp@ecgi.org.