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Key Finding

The paper brings out lessons of classical gatekeeper theory on financial markets for role and governance of AI gatekeepers

Abstract

The paper gives an overview on what established gatekeeper theory on financial markets was designed to achieve. It moves on to introduce three groups of AI-gatekeepers: established auditors, new entrants, and publicly accredited gatekeepers. Then, the paper describes designated AI-laws and designated AI-gatekeepers, both optional and mandatory. It concludes with a preliminary roadmap for regulating AI-gatekeepers.

The paper makes three contributions to the debate. First, it shows why a transplant of the proposal to introduce a version of strict gatekeeper liability from the financial-market setting is inadequate for AI-gatekeepers. Second, it suggests a two-layer transparency regime: aggregate disclosure of testing methodologies and standards, combined with compact certifications or scores at the individual level. Third, the paper proposes ex ante governance requirements operating at two sites: At the gatekeeper itself, through accreditation and independence requirements modelled on the EU's notified-body regime. Additionally, at the interface of the gatekeeper with the client, through institutional structures analogous to the audit committee but designed for the interdisciplinary translation problem that distinguishes AI-compliance review from classical audit.

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