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Why the SEC Is Getting Sued More Than Ever
A review of the Kelley-ECGI Lecture “Suing the SEC” by Prof. Amanda Rose on 1st October 2026. The lecture is based on her paper Suing the SEC, forthcoming in Volume 105 of the Texas Law Review.
For most of its history, the Securities and Exchange Commission was rarely taken to court by the firms it regulates. A dataset compiled by Yuliya Guseva and co-authors counts only about 120 challenges between 1934 and 2024. More than half came in the last 15 years, with a further spike during the tenure of Chair Gary Gensler. Amanda Rose, Cornelius Vanderbilt Chair in Law at Vanderbilt Law School, presented her paper Suing the SEC at the Kelley School’s Institute for Corporate Governance and Ethics Lecture. She turned the usual question around. The puzzle is not only why there is so much litigation now, but why there was so little before.
That puzzle matters because the SEC is a very powerful regulator. Many of its techniques elide traditional APA accountability mechanisms, turn on agency discretion and allow micromanagement of market practices that is not obvious from the statute. Two familiar explanations for the recent wave, often shaped by political leanings, are a broad crusade against the administrative state or a reaction to an overly aggressive SEC under the Biden administration. Both may be part of the story, but neither is complete.
A firm’s calculus
A market actor facing a regulatory burden can comply, litigate, lobby for change, or avoid the burden by redesigning its transactions. Litigation makes sense if its benefits exceed its costs and beat the alternatives. Benefits are the value of victory times its probability. Value depends on how costly the rule is and how durable a win would be: a rule struck down for weak economic analysis can be re-adopted, and Congress can grant authority a court found missing. Value is also not shared equally. Public choice theory suggests that repeat players, such as financial market intermediaries and large firms, shape SEC rules and techniques more than smaller firms or new entrants, who therefore carry heavier costs. Probability shifts with how aggressively the regulator reads its own authority, how carefully it documents the costs of its rules, and how deferential courts are.
Costs come in three forms: ordinary litigation costs such as legal fees and management distraction; reputational costs, the fear of losing favour with a regulator that can block or ease future plans; and competitive costs, since rivals share the gains of a win without paying for it. This free-rider problem explains why many past challenges came through the Chamber of Commerce, the Business Roundtable or SIFMA. Firms generally prefer to act through such groups, but this is not possible in every case, in an enforcement action, the firm itself is the defendant. Trade groups can file amicus briefs, yet the firm cannot avoid the limelight. Frictions matter too: information gaps, directors and officers who may be more risk-averse than diversified shareholders, and possible conflicts with the lawyers, auditors and bankers that newer firms rely on.
What changed in fifteen years
The value of victory rose. Dodd-Frank brought a wave of rulemaking, and in the 2010s the SEC gained wider power to pursue alleged violators in an administrative forum, which raised fairness concerns and constitutional challenges. Gensler-era rules were numerous and ambitious, and they imposed costs on well-organised groups that may once have had more influence. Once such groups doubt they can steer agency discretion predictably, discretionary techniques themselves look more costly. Studies point to rising partisanship at the SEC since the 2010s, seen in the agency’s language and in commissioners more often drawn from political than industry backgrounds, along with sharper reversals of guidance between administrations. Polarisation also makes court wins more durable, because a corrective response from Congress or the agency becomes less likely.
The odds of winning rose as well. Many Gensler-era rules did not rest on explicit congressional mandates, unlike the Dodd-Frank rules before them. The pace of rulemaking may have strained the economic analysis behind them, a concern some staff shared according to an Office of Inspector General report, and comment periods were atypically short. Courts became less deferential, from the 2011 Business Roundtable decision to Loper Bright, West Virginia v. EPA and Corner Post, which allows challenges to regulations that would once have been time-barred.
Meanwhile, costs fell. Growing private markets mean firms need SEC favour less. New groups, such as the Blockchain Association, now share the burden of litigating. Firms that go public are larger, more mature and less dependent on intermediaries, and each salient win signals that the next challenge might succeed. Crypto, raised by the moderators as an example, shows how high the stakes can run: facing the question of whether its assets are securities at all, the value of victory for such firms is “exponential.”
Durable pressure, uncertain path
Some drivers can reverse quickly. Rules under Chair Atkins are likely to be less costly, and he takes a much more limited view of the SEC’s authority. Others look lasting: Supreme Court precedent, private-market growth, the new industry groups, the self-feeding cycle of wins and continued polarisation. The SEC appears to be clipping its own wings. It has stopped using its acceleration power to require things of companies, such as barring arbitration clauses in charters, and has expressed a preference for rulemaking over guidance.
The discussion then turned to trust, and to whether the SEC’s image as a technocratic body is under irreversible pressure. The framework has room for that story. Discretion had good reasons, given vague statutory terms and very large liability risk, and it worked while firms trusted it to be used sensibly. Once that trust is gone, the same techniques look very different. This cannot yet be proven, but it is a real concern, and a path back to the old model is far from clear. More specific statutes or more rules might help, though both come with trade-offs.
Testing any of this empirically is hard. The analysis is a “forest not the trees” exercise, meant to offer a way of thinking about trends rather than proof. Looking ten years ahead, much depends on who leads the agency, and a deregulatory SEC means less litigation. Even in more ordinary times, though, litigation may keep a heightened appeal, while lobbying and avoidance remain open paths.
This lecture is part of the Indiana University - ECGI Online Series, a public lecture series on corporate governance. The Kelley School of Business Institute for Corporate Governance (ICG+E), in partnership with Ethical Systems, collaborates with ECGI to deliver this ongoing initiative. As part of this public lecture series, distinguished speakers share insights on the evolving landscape of governance, finance, and market regulation.