Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance- Better Monitors or More Self-Dealing?
Controlling shareholders have the potential to monitor managers better than do independent directors and the capital market. However, this response to the Berle-Means problem presents a different agency cost: the potential that the controlling shareholders will extract private benefits of control. Corporate governance rules and practices in the U.S. and in EU member states make it more or less difficult to accumulate a controlling position and are more or less rigorous in their policing of private benefits of control. This meeting examined the difference in regulatory strategy both across the Atlantic and within the EU.
It took place at the Charlemagne Building, Brussels on Tuesday, 27th June 2006.
This conference was supported by:
Telecom Italia
The European Commission
Goldman Sachs
Programme
Registration and coffee
Welcome
Speaker(s)
Session 1 – The Economics of Large Shareholders and Regulation
Moderator
Speaker(s)
Briefings
Speaker(s)
Panel
Speaker(s)
Coffee
Session 2 – Keynote speech
Keynote speaker
Speaker(s)
Lunch
Session 3– Comparative Regulation
Moderator
Speaker(s)
Briefings
Speaker(s)
Panel
Speaker(s)
Session 4 – Keynote speech
Keynote speaker
Speaker(s)
Coffee
Session 5 – Oxford Union-style debate
Motion: “This House believes it is acceptable to vest different classes of shares with different voting rights“
Session 6 – Summing up
Summing up
Speaker(s)
Post-conference reception
Speakers
Alexander Schaub
Lance Liebman
David Reeb
Charlie McCreevy
William Allen
Stephen Fraidin
Cynthia A Glassman
Jacob Wallenberg
Roderick Munsters
Laura Poots
Marco Becht
Ronald Gilson
Luca Enriques
Theodor Baums
Brian Cheffins
