The ECGI Annual Members Meeting 2010Â took place in Luxembourg on 6-7 May. Â On Friday 7 May, the General Assembly and Annual Lecture was held at the University of Luxembourg. ECGI Fellow, Professor Patrick Bolton, Barbara and David Zalaznick Professor of Business, Columbia Business School, gave the Annual Lecture on the theme of Rewarding Illusory Alpha: Governance and the Crisis. The dinner took place the night before at the offices of ArcelorMittal in Luxembourg.
2010Â Working Paper Prize-giving:
The Standard Life Investments Finance Prize was won by Harald Hau from INSEAD and Marcel Thum from TU Dresden, Ifo Dresden and CESifo with:
The Allen & Overy Law Prize was won by John Armour from the University of Oxford, Simon Deakin and Priya Lele from the University of Cambridge, and Mathias Siems from the University of East Anglia (UEA) and University of Cambridge with:
Information

6 May - Day 1
Drinks and Dinner at ArcelorMittal, Luxembourg and Presentation of the 2010 ECGI Working Paper Series Prizes
7 May - Day 2
Annual General Meeting of the ECGI - University of Luxembourg
Break
Annual Lecture - Rewarding Illusory Alpha: Governance and the Crisis
Speakers:
Annual Lecture - Rewarding Illusory Alpha: Governance and the Crisis
The financial crisis has provoked an avalanche of policy prescriptions on governance and regulation. These are designed to strengthen the control of shareholders and regulators over financial institutions and markets. Both sets of policies are not only deficient but also potentially detrimental to the problems that they are trying to fix. Meanwhile the underlying failures of financial systems remain unresolved and as much a potential source of crisis as they were three years ago. This lecture will discuss what is wrong, why and what needs to be done to address the next one.
Speakers
Panel Discussion 2010
Moderator
Panelists
Speakers
Presentations
Annual Lecture - Rewarding Illusory Alpha: Governance and the Crisis
Annual Lecture - Rewarding Illusory Alpha: Governance and the Crisis
The financial crisis has provoked an avalanche of policy prescriptions on governance and regulation. These are designed to strengthen the control of shareholders and regulators over financial institutions and markets. Both sets of policies are not only deficient but also potentially detrimental to the problems that they are trying to fix. Meanwhile the underlying failures of financial systems remain unresolved and as much a potential source of crisis as they were three years ago. This lecture will discuss what is wrong, why and what needs to be done to address the next one.