Does Board Overlap Promote Coordination Between Firms?

Does Board Overlap Promote Coordination Between Firms?

Heng Geng, Harald Hau, Roni Michaely, Binh Nguyen

Series number :

Serial Number: 
803/2021

Date posted :

December 10 2021

Last revised :

December 10 2021
SSRN Share

Keywords

  • Board overlap • 
  • corporate opportunity waivers • 
  • firm coordination

We investigate how board overlap affects coordination and performance among public firms. Our identification exploits the staggered introduction of Corporate Opportunity Waivers (COWs) in nine U.S. states since 2000.

By reducing legal risk to directors serving on multiple boards, the COW legislation increased intra-industry board overlap for research-intensive firms that benefit most from coordination. We find that intra-industry board overlap results in greater sales revenues, increased operating margins, and higher firm profitability. These outcomes are achieved through reduced investment and lower R&D expenditure, greater bilateral product differentiation, and more information sharing reflected in higher rates of patent cross-citation.

Authors

Real name:
Heng Geng
Real name:
Binh Nguyen