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Abstract

We develop a model of freeze-out merger and tender offers and test it in an economy where merger and tender regulation are extremely different. Using a relatively large sample of 329 freeze-out offers in Israel during 2000-2019, we document evidence consistent with the model. We also find that tender offers: 1) are the preferred technique; 2) offer lower premiums; and 3) suffer from a relatively large (40%) offer rejection rate. These findings deviate from U.S. evidence, and are partly due to differences in the tender offer procedures. Thus, our study illustrates that the tender offer procedure is a delicate one, and explains why Delaware has often amended it.

Published in

Journal of Law, Finance and Accounting
Beni Lauterbach, Evgeny Lyandres, Yevgeny Mugerman, Barak Yarkoni
Volume 6, Number 2, pp. 315-351, January 2021

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