Should Shareholders Have a Say on Acquisitions?
Abstract
Shareholders of U.S. corporations have lost billions of dollars in acquisitions they never approved. In the United Kingdom the listing rules give shareholders a binding say when targets are large relative to acquirers. A transatlantic comparison suggests that if U.S. shareholders had a say on acquisitions, they would incur fewer losses. There is a significant difference in the difference in performance between deals subject to a vote in the United Kingdom but not in the United States and deals with no mandatory vote in either country. The United States has given shareholders a mandatory say on pay; shareholders might also wish to have a binding say on corporate acquisitions.
© Marco Becht, Andrea Polo, Stefano Rossi, 2021
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