Rationalizing the Dodd-Frank Clawback
Abstract
On July 1, 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed an excess-pay clawback rule to implement the provisions of Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act. I explain why the SEC?s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback, while reducing executives? incentives to misreport, is overbroad. The economy and investors would be better served by a more narrowly targeted ?smart? excess-pay clawback that focuses on fewer issuers, executives, and compensation arrangements.
© Jesse Fried, 2016
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