Tracing Ownership Changes in Europe's Private Firms

How frequently do privately owned companies change hands? At first glance, this appears to be a straightforward question. Yet, surprisingly, we lack a clear answer to it. This absence of clarity is striking, especially as privately held firms play an increasingly important role in the economy, while the number of publicly listed companies continues to decline.

Although public companies are routinely scrutinized in academic research, benefiting from greater data transparency and regulatory disclosure, private firms remain comparatively overlooked. In our new paper, Mapping Corporate Ownership and Control Changes for Public and Private Companies, we provide novel evidence to help close this critical gap.

Rather than relying solely on merger and acquisition databases to track ownership changes, we adopt a novel methodology that leverages historical firm-level ownership data. This approach enables us to trace changes in the identity of ultimate owners over time, offering a more comprehensive view of control dynamics.

A necessary first step in identifying changes in control is to determine who the owners are. Pinpointing controlling shareholders—especially across hundreds of thousands of companies—is a complex task. Ownership structures can be opaque, multi-layered, and highly variable across jurisdictions. Moreover, data inconsistencies and limited disclosure further complicate efforts to identify and classify controlling owners systematically.

While ownership structure data for private firms remain scarce at the global level, the European Union offers a valuable exception. Private firms in EU member states are required to report both shareholding and financial information to local business registers. This regulatory requirement enables us to access detailed data on listed and unlisted non-financial firms across Europe, drawing from historical databases available through Moody’s DataHub. Consistent with established literature, we define ultimate ownership as the control of at least 25% of a firm’s voting rights.

The scale of our dataset is considerable, comprising 375,634 European non-financial firms, both listed and unlisted, observed over the period from 2015 to 2022. This results in more than two million firm-year observations. Within this population, we identify 166,343 changes in ultimate control, corresponding to approximately 8.2% of the sample. We obtain these figures after a rigorous data-cleaning process aimed at reducing inconsistencies in reported ownership names and excluding short-term fluctuations or intra-group transactions that could otherwise distort the true incidence of control changes.

Our findings reveal an active and persistent market for corporate control. On average, approximately 9.5% of listed firms change ownership annually. Unlisted firms—comprising the vast majority of the sample—experience ownership transitions at a rate similar to the overall sample (8.2%). When we narrow the analysis to exclude unlisted subsidiaries of corporate groups, the frequency of control changes declines to 5.4%.

Ownership type emerges as a key determinant of control stability. We classify ultimate owners into four broad categories: families, financial institutions, industrial companies, and the State. Each ownership type exhibits distinct patterns in the frequency of control changes. Family-owned firms—accounting for 43% of the sample—are notably stable, with only 5.7% experiencing a change in control every year, reflecting a strong tendency among family owners to retain control. State-owned enterprises are even more stable, with an annual turnover rate of just 3.5%. In sharp contrast, firms controlled by financial institutions—including private equity funds and banks—display the highest rate of control turnover, at 14% per year.

Our regression analysis confirms the markedly lower likelihood of control changes in firms owned by families or the State. Notably, we also find that changes in control often involve a shift in ownership type. While family owners do not appear to have a systematic preference for selling to other families, a substantial share of firms owned by financial institutions are transferred to other financial entities—possibly reflecting the prevalence of secondary buyouts in this segment of the market.

Firm-level characteristics significantly influence control dynamics. Ownership changes are more common among larger and listed firms, as well as those with lower liquidity or higher leverage, indicating that financial distress is a key driver. Younger and more profitable firms also appear to attract more acquisition interest.

The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted control activity in 2020 but did not alter owner-type behavior overall. However, family owners became even less likely to sell under financial pressure, consistent with their long-term commitment. Notably, listing increases the likelihood of a sale for family firms, especially among larger ones.

Cross-border transactions play a notable role in Europe’s corporate control landscape, with around 3.5% of ownership changes involving a foreign acquirer. Families and state owners are particularly reluctant to sell to foreign buyers, suggesting that national or strategic considerations continue to influence international transfers of control.

This study makes several important contributions. First, it offers one of the most comprehensive empirical mappings of corporate control changes across Europe, encompassing both public and private firms. Second, it advances the methodology for accurately identifying meaningful ownership transitions. Third, it sheds light on how ownership types—mainly family and state control—influence the frequency and nature of these changes.

The broader takeaway is clear: the market for corporate control extends well beyond the spotlight of stock exchanges and headline mergers. Private firms, often overlooked, play an active role in this market. Understanding their ownership dynamics is therefore vital—not only for advancing academic knowledge but also for informing policymakers, investors, and all stakeholders concerned with economic governance and resilience in today’s complex corporate landscape.

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Ettore Croci is a Full Professor at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan.

Federica Cupelli is a PhD Student in Economics and Finance at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan.

Andrea Viola is an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Banking, Finance, and Insurance Sciences at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan.

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