For Whom is the Corporation Managed?
- 06 December 2019
- •
- NYU School of Law
***This event was by invitation only***
***Click here to for event programme***
Hosted by
Organiser
Edward Rock, NYU Law and ECGI
Schedule
09:00: Breakfast
09:30: Welcome
09:45 - 11:00: Session 1
11:00 - 11:15: Coffee break
11:15 – 12:30: Session 2
12:30 - 13:30: Lunch
13:30 – 14:30: Session 3
14:30 - 14:45: Coffee break
14:45 – 16:00: Session 4
Contact
Programme queries should be directed to Edward Rock (edward.rock@nyu.edu)
Practical queries should be directed to Ryan Gibson (ryan.gibson@nyu.edu)
Information
Friday, 6 December
Breakfast
Welcome and Introduction
Speakers:
Restatement of Corporate Governance, Section 2.01 (DRAFT)
Speakers:
Discussant:
Coffee Break
Session 2
Lunch
Session 3
Panel 1: Balancing Stakeholder Interests in the Boardroom
Moderator:
Panelists:
Coffee Break
Session 4
Panel 2: What do Investors Expect from Portfolio Companies?
Moderator:
Panelists:
Close
Speakers
Presentations
Welcome and Introduction
Welcome and Introduction
Speakers
Anti-Activist Poison Pills
Hedge funds have become active in corporate governance. They push for changes in strategy and the adoption of specific business plans. Their tactics...
Read more
For Whom is the Corporation Managed in 2020?: The Debate over Corporate Purpose
A high profile public debate is taking place over one of the oldest questions in corporate law, namely, “For whom is the corporation managed?” In...
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Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control
Hedge funds have become critical players in both corporate governance and corporate control. In this article, we document and examine the nature of...
Read more
Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let Shareholders be Shareholders
Index funds and indexed ETFs managed by the “Big Three” – BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street – have grown to be the largest investors in the...
Read more
Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?
Directors have traditionally been elected by a plurality of the votes cast. This means that in uncontested elections, a candidate who receives even a...
Read more
Does Common Ownership Explain Higher Oligopolistic Profits?
A stylized fact that lurks in the background of the recent literature on common ownership is the parallel increase in the profitability of oligopolistic...
Read moreRestatement of Corporate Governance, Section 2.01 (DRAFT)
Restatement of Corporate Governance, Section 2.01 (DRAFT)
Speakers
Discussants
Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?
Directors have traditionally been elected by a plurality of the votes cast. This means that in uncontested elections, a candidate who receives even a...
Read moreAnti-Activist Poison Pills
Hedge funds have become active in corporate governance. They push for changes in strategy and the adoption of specific business plans. Their tactics...
Read more
Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let Shareholders be Shareholders
Index funds and indexed ETFs managed by the “Big Three” – BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street – have grown to be the largest investors in the...
Read more
Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control
Hedge funds have become critical players in both corporate governance and corporate control. In this article, we document and examine the nature of...
Read more
MOM Approval in a World of Active Shareholders
Majority of Minority (MOM) approval is a common mechanism used in many jurisdictions to control conflicts of interest in related party transactions....
Read more
The Emergence of Welfarist Corporate Governance
Corporate governance may be on the verge of entering a new stage. After the managerialism that dominated the view of the corporation into the 1970s and the...
Read moreManaging for the Long-Term
Managing for the Long-Term
Speakers
Discussants
Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Law and Governance
This paper, which will be the basis for a chapter in the forthcoming OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey Gordon and Georg Ringe,...
Read more
Principles of Financial Regulation
Inadequate regulation of the financial system is widely thought to have contributed to the financial crisis. The purpose of the book is to articulate a...
Read more
Bank Resolution in Europe: the Unfinished Agenda of Structural Reform
This chapter argues that the work of the European Banking Union remains incomplete in one important respect, the structural re-organization of large...
Read more
Agency Capitalism: Further Implications of Equity Intermediation
This chapter continues our examination of the corporate law and governance implications of the fundamental shift in ownership structure of U.S. public...
Read morePanel Discussions
Panel 1: Balancing Stakeholder Interests in the Boardroom
Panel 1: Balancing Stakeholder Interests in the Boardroom
Moderator
Panelists
Panel 2: What do Investors Expect from Portfolio Companies?
Panel 2: What do Investors Expect from Portfolio Companies?
Moderator
