Using a new dataset of corporate voting-rights from 1971 to 2015, we find that young dual-class firms trade at a premium and operate at least as efficiently as young single-class firms. As dualclass firms mature, their valuation declines, and they become less efficient in their margins, innovation, and labor productivity compared to their single-class counterparts.
Voting premiums increase with firm age, suggesting that private benefits increase over maturity. Most sunset provisions that dual-class firms adopt are ineffective. Our findings suggest that effective, timeconsistent sunset provisions would be based on age or on inferior shareholders’ periodic right to eliminate dual-class voting.
Voting seats at FOMC meetings rotate between Reserve Bank presidents on a yearly basis. Using detailed data on 488 FOMC meetings that took place between...
Passively managed funds have grown to become some of the largest shareholders in publicly traded companies, but there is considerable debate about the...