We present the first comprehensive study of mutual fund voting in proxy contests. Among contests where voting takes place, passive funds are 10 percentage points less likely than active funds to vote for dissidents. The gap shrinks significantly when accounting for votes withheld from management nominees, settled contests, and votes by non-“Big-Three” fund families.
Passive and active funds are equally informed about firm fundamentals, although passive funds view contest- related SEC filings more often than active funds during contests, in absolute levels and incrementally relative to noncontest periods. We conclude that passive funds are engaged shareholders in high-stakes voting events.
We assemble cash flow data on all investments by Israeli pension providers in private equity and venture capital funds over nearly 20 years to evaluate...
Passively managed funds have grown to become some of the largest shareholders in publicly traded companies, but there is considerable debate about the...
Hedge fund activism refers to the phenomenon where hedge fund investors acquire a strict minority block of shares in a target firm and then attempt to...