Leading by Example: Can One Universal Shareholder’s Voting Pre-Disclosure Influence Voting Outcomes?

Leading by Example: Can One Universal Shareholder’s Voting Pre-Disclosure Influence Voting Outcomes?

Ruediger Fahlenbrach, Nicolas Rudolf, Alexis Wegerich

Series number :

Serial Number: 
958/2024

Date posted :

February 11 2024

Last revised :

February 11 2024
SSRN Share

Keywords

  • Pre-disclosure • 
  • Shareholder voting • 
  • institutional investors • 
  • Corporate governance

We analyze the impact of a large shareholder disclosing its voting decisions prior to shareholder meetings on final vote outcomes for management and shareholder proposals. We find that pre-disclosures of against votes lead to an average increase of 2.7 percentage points in against votes by other shareholders.

Voting pre-disclosures are more effective for proposals with a higher information demand, and if the large shareholder pre-discloses a decision that is not directly observable from its proxy-voting guidelines. The results highlight the potential for large institutional investors to use voting pre-disclosure as a tool for influencing other shareholders and, ultimately, companies.

Authors

Real name:
Nicolas Rudolf