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For decades and decades, Delaware has been the undisputed leader in the market for corporate law. And yet, it is now clear that Delaware’s superiority is being publicly challenged. Elon Musk has vocally criticized Delaware courts, incorporated X (formerly Twitter), X.Ai, and Neuralink in Nevada, and intends to move Tesla to Texas. TripAdvisor’s shareholders claim that its controlling shareholder’s attempt to reincorporate from Delaware to Nevada amounts to a breach of fiduciary duties. And the increasing competition that Delaware faces from Nevada, Texas, and other states has captured news headlines.

This Article analyzes Nevada’s corporate law, the competitive pressures that it poses to Delaware, and the potential effects that this pressure could have on Delaware corporate law. The Article makes three main contributions. First, it provides a detailed analysis of Nevada corporate law, finding that it poses insurmountable obstacles to shareholder litigation that function to diminish important pillars of Delaware corporate law.

Second, the Article explores the judicial scrutiny of reincorporations, and draws implications for future litigation concerning moves from Delaware to Nevada, Texas, and other states. The analysis supports the recent decision in the Delaware Court of Chancery suggesting that reincorporation to Nevada constitutes a self-dealing transaction. It also explains why Elon Musk has redirected Tesla’s destination from Nevada to Texas.

Third, the Article analyzes the effects of this increasingly competitive environment on both Delaware corporate law and the market for corporate law generally. It argues that this competition could put pressure on Delaware to relax its own corporate law. Lastly, the Article argues that the proposition currently being considered by the Delaware Supreme Court in Match to relax constraints on controlling shareholders could counterintuitively contribute to a snowballing effect toward the bottom in American corporate law. The analysis exposes a rising fragility in the market for corporate law with potential ramifications for American corporate law.

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