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Journal of Financial Economics

What makes the bonding stick? A natural experiment testing the legal bonding hypothesis

Journal of Financial Economics
Volume Issue
Volume 129, Issue 2
Page range
Pages 329-356
Date published:
By:
Jordan Siegel
Xi Li
Published Article
Working paper version
Abstract

We use a US Supreme Court case, Morrison v. National Australia Bank (2010), as a natural experiment to test the legal bonding hypothesis. By decreasing the potential liability of US-listed foreign firms, particularly due to class action lawsuits, Morrison arguably eroded their legal bonding to compliance with disclosure duties. Nevertheless, we find evidence of an increase or insignificant change in share values. Tests of longer-run effects of the legal event indicate that foreign firms’ disclosure quality and likelihood of facing enforcement actions remained stable, as did investors’ revealed preferences for trading on US markets. These results go against the legal bonding hypothesis but are consistent with reputational bonding and with market-based accounts of US cross-listing. Our results may contribute to ongoing debate about civil enforcement of securities laws through class actions.

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