The ECGI Annual Members Meeting 2012Â took place in Stockholm on 26-27 April. On Friday 27 April, the General Assembly and Annual Lecture were held at the Royal Coin Cabinet, Stockholm. ECGI Fellow, Marco Pagano, Professor of Economics, FacoltĂ di Economia at the UniversitĂ di Napoli Federico II, gave the Annual Lecture (which was open to the public) on the theme of Market Transparency and Company Disclosure. The dinner for ECGI members and invited guests took place the night before. During the dinner, the winners of the 2012 Working Paper prizes were announced.Â
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2012Â Working Paper Prize-giving:
The Standard Life Investments Finance Prize was won by Marc Goergen, Cardiff University - Cardiff Business School, Noel O’Sullivan and Geoff Wood, University of Sheffield with:
The Allen & Overy Law Prize was won by John Armour and Wolf-Georg Ringe from the University of Oxford with:
European Company Law 1999-2010: Renaissance and Crisis (ECGI Law Working Paper No. 175/2011)
The ECGI would like to thank the Swedish Corporate Governance Forum for its sponsorship of the 2012 General Assembly and Annual Lecture
Information

26 April - Day 1
Dinner and Presentation of the 2012 ECGI Working Paper Series Prizes
27 April - Day 2
Annual General Meeting - The Royal Coin Cabinet
Break
Annual Lecture - Market Transparency and Company Disclosure
Moderator:
Annual Lecture - Market Transparency and Company Disclosure
Transparency has two dimensions that financial economists and accounting experts tend to analyse separately even though they are closely related. The first dimension concerns the process of security trading: a security market is transparent insofar as its participants are aware of each others' behaviour (e.g. know current bid and ask quotes or recent transaction prices). The second dimension of transparency instead depends on the disclosure decisions of companies: it concerns how much information investors have about company 'fundamentals'. In most cases, both forms of transparency lower transaction costs, and ultimately benefit firms via lower cost of capital and/or better access to external finance. But they may also impose some costs on firms which in some cases may opt for a degree of transparency that is socially inefficient, This in turn could create a rationale for regulatory intervention. Moreover, the two types of transparency are not independent of each other: for instance, if markets are very transparent, firms may want to be less transparent.
Moderator
Speakers
Panel Discussions
Annual Lecture - Market Transparency and Company Disclosure
Annual Lecture - Market Transparency and Company Disclosure
Transparency has two dimensions that financial economists and accounting experts tend to analyse separately even though they are closely related. The first dimension concerns the process of security trading: a security market is transparent insofar as its participants are aware of each others' behaviour (e.g. know current bid and ask quotes or recent transaction prices). The second dimension of transparency instead depends on the disclosure decisions of companies: it concerns how much information investors have about company 'fundamentals'. In most cases, both forms of transparency lower transaction costs, and ultimately benefit firms via lower cost of capital and/or better access to external finance. But they may also impose some costs on firms which in some cases may opt for a degree of transparency that is socially inefficient, This in turn could create a rationale for regulatory intervention. Moreover, the two types of transparency are not independent of each other: for instance, if markets are very transparent, firms may want to be less transparent.