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#### Gameplan

- 1. Baseline controller self-dealing regulatory framework
- 2. Why idiosyncratic vision challenges the framework
- 3. MFW cleansing and its flaws
- 4. Our proposals to improve the regulatory framework (with bonus commentary on SB21)

Baseline: No cleansing or cleansing failing:

Judicial Valuation (price and process):

- \* Expensive and complex
- \* Idiosyncratic vision: impossible to value

#### MFW Requirements:

#### Do both:

- 1. A special committee approval, and
- 2. Majority of minority approval

Get: Business judgment rule protection

Do just one:

Get: A shift of the burden of proof

#### MFW Requirements:

1. Special Committee Approval

2. Majority of Minority Approval

\* Informed

\* Uncoerced

Fixing MFW:

- 1. Special Committee Approval
- 2. Majority of Minority Approval
  - \* Informed: Only Financial/Economic Terms
  - \* Uncoerced

#### Fixing MFW:

- 1. Special Committee Approval
  - \* Corwin-style Cleansing
- 2. Majority of Minority Approval
  - \* Informed: Only Financial/Economic Terms
  - \* Uncoerced

#### MFW Requirements:

- 1. Special Committee Approval
- 2. Majority of Minority Approval

The cleansing mechanisms are treated equally

Fixing MFW: The cleansing mechanisms are not equal

- Special Committee Approval
   \* Limited Cleansing Power
- 2. Majority of Minority Approval
  - \* High Cleansing Power

Fixing entire fairness review:

If only one is used:

- Special Committee Approval
  - \* Reject claims about idiosyncratic vision
- 2. Majority of Minority Approval
  - \* Strong presumption of fair price, give little weight to comparables

Fixing amended Section 144:

#### Non-freezeouts:

- 1. Special Committee Approval Only
  - \* Significant Transactions or those with Idiosyncratic Vision No BJR
- 2. Majority of Minority Approval Only\* BJR

#### Thank you