



Dionysia Katelouzou, King's College London

2024 IESE – ECGI Corporate Governance Conference, 15 April 2024

Why investor stewardship matters?

- The UK asset management industry alone oversees £11 trillion of assets (FCA 2023).
- Institutional investors account for 62% (38%) of market capitalization in UK (EU) public equities (OECD 2020).
- 'Other people's money' (Kay 2015)
- Scholarly and policy circles remain deeply divided on the role of institutional investors: eg proposed changes to UK Listing Rules.
- Despite global proliferation of stewardship codes, there remains ambiguity surrounding the spectrum and implementation of investor stewardship among policymakers, investors and consumers alike.
- Pressing need for an analytical framework of investor stewardship.








Tracing the Origins

- Etymology: derived from *stiweard* or *stigweard*, meaning 'house keeper' or 'house guardian'
- Stewardship in scholarly literature
 - Varieties in understandings and terminologies
 - Corporate governance: managers as stewards building on the stewardship theory of management (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson 1997) and earlier writings on social responsibility (eg Dodd 1931).
- Shareholders as stewards(?)
- Generally minimal attention, except for the stewardship-based image of family shareholders



The principal-agent narrative

- Shareholders typically regarded as *principals* in their relationships with company managers.
- Institutional investors serve dual roles as principals for managers and *agents* for clients/beneficiaries
- Complexity of the investment chain
- Separation of ownership (of shares) from both control and nominal shareholders
- Resulting in a 'double set of agency relationships' and increased 'agency costs of agency capitalism' (Gilson and Gordon 2013)
- A focus on powers rather than responsibilities within this framework.



Crafting a triangular framework for stewardship

Exercise of power

On behalf of others

rule of law

For others

accountability
(Fukuyama 2000, 2004)

The case of shareholder stewardship

• Exercise of power • On behalf of For others others Intermediation Corporate governance side of stewardship Investment management side of Company law stewardship

- rights

ownership Investment management regulation – duties


Psychological/

active

Not just one stewardship relationship, but many...

What is the purpose of investor stewardship?

- (1): client stewardship
- (2): end-investor stewardship
- (3): asset stewardship
- (4): enlightened stewardship




Who are the others?

- Presently, regulatory duties imposed on financial intermediaries are centred on client stewardship (1) and overlook other stewardship relationships.
- For instance, asset managers' responsibilities are commonly limited to immediate contracting parties.
- The question arises: can the others extend beyond those protected by contractual and trusteeship relationships?
- The Kay Review (para 9.9) proposed non-excludable fiduciary obligations extending to end-investors.
- Dual purpose of asset management encompassing both private and public dimensions.
- End investor stewardship, asset stewardship and enlightened stewardship all embody a public purpose, yet none are primarily governed by hard law.



The Stewardship Codes Movement





- The *Anatomy of Investor Stewardship* is a testament to the emerging multi-level, multi-actor, multi-asset, multi-mean and multi-themed investor stewardship.
- However, the Varieties of Investor Stewardship bring forth notable challenges:
 - The others of whose behalf an investor steward acts are *not the* same as the others for who an investor steward acts.
 - Client stewardship aside, all stewardship relationships do not fall under the primary domain of hard law.
 - Risk of self-interest prevailing, potentially compromising the steward's role.
 - Risk that the investor steward may (re)turn to an agent serving solely clients and/or beneficiaries.

Challenges amidst varieties





Thank you!

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