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Finance Working Paper N° 752/2021
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Keywords: M&A, IPO, merger, public listing, listing peak, listing gap

JEL Classifications: G15, G34

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January 20, 2022

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1 Introduction

Since reaching a peak in 1996, the number of firms listed on the three major U.S. stock exchanges has declined by 50%. This dramatic listing decline, which coincides with a similar-sized reduction in initial public offerings (IPOs), has triggered debates and concerns on multiple levels.[1] In this paper, we present a novel empirical investigation of whether the listing decline is driven not only by a decline in IPOs but more broadly by a net outflow of firms from public to private ownership. To answer this question, we start with the simple observation that private and public targets of public acquirers become or remain publicly owned, respectively, as divisions of their listed parents after a takeover transaction. As the actual listing count ignores these targets, we proceed to form a simple merger-adjusted count. The resulting merger-driven listing dynamics provides new and important empirical insights into the ability of stock markets around the world to both attract and retain firms under public ownership.

Broadly speaking, our focus on merger-driven listing dynamics is related to the well-documented relationship between merger waves and industrial reorganization and growth. While previous research recognizes that merger activity affects the listing count,[2] our contribution is to directly track the merger activity of individual listed firms, which allows us to accurately quantify this impact at the firm level. To motivate our merger adjustment procedure, recall that the actual listing count decreases when a public firm exits the exchange (voluntarily or due to bankruptcy) *and* when it merges with a public acquirer (henceforth, a public-to-public merger). In the latter case, since the firm does not exit the stock exchange—it is retained on the exchange as a division of the public parent—we backfill the listing count by the public-to-public target. As it turns out, this adjustment alone generates most of the core insights from our analysis.

[1] For discussion of the decline in IPOs, and how young companies have increasingly turned to private equity and other financial institutions to fund themselves, see Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013), Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2013), Dambra, Casares Field, and Gustafson (2015), Ewens and Farre-Mensa (2020), Kwon, Lowry, and Qian (2020), and Dathan and Xiong (2021). There is also the concern that "[w]hen...our most exciting young companies...raise private capital rather than go public, retail investors are left out of a significant part of the Nation's economic growth"—SEC Commissioner Robert J. Jackson Jr., *The Middle-Market IPO Tax*, 2018.

[2] See, e.g., Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008), Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2017), Lattanzio, Megginson, and Sanati (2021).

Furthermore, we adjust the actual listing count for private targets (private-to-public mergers) subject to a minimum firm size based on year- and industry-matched listed companies. These targets self-selected to become publicly owned under the umbrella of their public acquirers. While firms merge for a variety of reasons (including opportunities for synergy gains), these targets also derive certain listing benefits typically associated with firms going public via the IPO channel: improved access to acquisition currency, external debt markets, employee stock-option plans, etc. At the margin, in addition to synergistic opportunities, such listing benefits may help to induce selling out to a public acquirer.[3]

Our empirical contribution starts by providing direct and hitherto unreported evidence on the full anatomy of actual U.S. listing dynamics over the period 1980–2020. We show that new lists are primarily driven by IPOs and uplists from over-the-counter (OTC) markets, while delists primarily reflect public-to-public mergers, bankruptcy filings, and public-to-private acquisitions. Most important, while the actual listing count increased by 10,567 firms that went public via IPO and were valued at $5.9 trillion, the actual listing count decreased by 6,108 public targets of public acquirers with a total transaction value of $10.7 trillion—almost twice the value of IPOs. Moreover, the actual listing count also ignores 9,481 private targets in private-to-public mergers valued at $2.5 trillion. These targets were by selection large enough to be listed but ended up as divisions of the public acquirers.

As further background information, we also show that, notwithstanding the decline in the number of listed companies by almost 4,000 after 1996, the remaining listed firms have maintained the pre-1996 contribution of public markets to U.S. aggregate employment and gross domestic product (GDP), and even expanded the contribution to research and development expenses (R&D) and patents. It is reasonable to attribute at least part of this increased level of contribution per listed firm to the merger activity itself—by channeling both private and public target companies

[3]While all of our private targets by selection are large enough to be independently listed, a subsample may also have considered an IPO as an alternative to a sell-out. For discussions of the decision to go public via an IPO versus a sell-out, see Poulsen and Stegemoller (2008), Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani (2010), Bayar and Chemmanur (2012), Chemmanur, He, Ren, and Shu (2020), Ewens and Farre-Mensa (2020), and Bowen, Fresard, and Hoberg (2022).

into public acquirers—hence the merger adjustment that is the main focus of this paper.

We develop four major findings of importance for the listing debate. First, the merger-adjusted listing count in 2020 is the same as it was at the listing peak in 1996—effectively eliminating the post-peak listing decline. Second, examining the listing dynamics of 74 advanced and developing countries (producing 96% of world GDP) shows that nearly four out of five countries at some point experience a listing peak. Specifically, the U.S. listing pattern—a peak followed by a sharp decline—is the norm rather than the exception internationally, with peaks distributed widely across time and characterized by sustained listing count declines. Third, we examine the international listing peaks in event time. The event-time analysis shows that while adjusting for public targets eliminates the U.S. listing peak, this is not the case for other countries on average. In other words, while the U.S. post-peak decline largely reflects mergers between public firms, declines elsewhere instead tend to move firms out of public markets.

Fourth, we revisit the important U.S. 'listing gap' estimates of Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2017) using our merger-adjusted listing series. In their estimation, U.S. stock markets have developed significantly fewer listings per capita than predicted by an international trend line. We replace their dependent variable (the scaled actual listing count) in the listing-gap regressions with our scaled merger-adjusted listing count. Notably, this replacement allows us to draw direct and causal inferences about the impact of merger activity at the firm level on the listing-gap estimates. We show that, with this replacement, the significance of the listing gap estimates is eliminated—a result that is robust to adjusting for domestic public-to-public mergers only. In sum, after adjusting for mergers involving public acquirers around the world, there is no evidence that U.S. firms are leaving the stock market at a higher rate than firms in other countries.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the merger-adjustment procedure, which we apply to the U.S. listing dynamics in Section 3. In Section 4, we present the frequency and shapes of listing peaks around the world in both calendar time and event time (centered on the peak). Section 5 shows the results of our merger adjustment of the international listing counts. Using this adjusted listing-count series, Section 6 first explains our listing-gap

regression specification and then shows our merger-adjusted estimates of the U.S. listing gap. Section 7 concludes the paper. Appendix A provides details of the data collection, while the Internet Appendix contains additional information on international listings and comparative listing gap econometrics.

2 The merger-adjustment procedure

The merger-adjustment procedure described in this section uses a complete listing anatomy constructed with data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and merger transactions in Refinitiv's SDC Platinum M&A database (SDC).

2.1 Anatomy of the actual listing change

Let ΔL denote the annual net change in the actual listing count, i.e., new lists minus delists of stand-alone companies. The following components, which are further defined in Table 1, describe ΔL:

$$\Delta L = \begin{cases} Newlists\ (+): & IPO + Spin + Misc_{New} \\ Delists\ (-): & Merge_{Public-to-Public} + Merge_{Public-to-Private} + Misc_{Del} \end{cases} \tag{1}$$

New lists arise from initial public offerings (IPO), public-company divisional spinoffs into new public companies ($Spin$), and miscellaneous new listings ($Misc_{New}$). The latter includes new lists without raising capital (in particular uplists from smaller exchanges and over-the-counter markets), relistings following leveraged buyouts and emergence from bankruptcy, and firms that change status from foreign-domiciled to U.S.-domiciled.

Delists arise from public-to-public and public-to-private mergers, where the subscript indicates the direction of the flow of the target firm, and miscellaneous other reasons. In $Merge_{Public-to-Public}$ a public target is acquired by another public company, while in $Merge_{Public-to-Private}$ the public target is acquired by a private firm. The private acquirer may be U.S.-domiciled or a foreign

company.[4] The miscellaneous other delistings $Misc_{Del}$ include delistings that are voluntary, for cause, or for unknown reasons. A delisting for cause occurs when a firm fails to uphold certain exchange-listing requirements, such as when the firm files for bankruptcy or its stock falls below a minimum price.

2.2 The merger-adjusted listing change

Let ΔL_A denote the net change in the merger-adjusted listing count. It is the sum of the following six components:

$$\Delta L_A = \begin{cases} Newlists_A\ (+): & IPO + Merge_{Private-to-Public} + Misc^N_{New} \\ Delists_A\ (\text{-}): & Merge^N_{Public-to-Private} + Divest_{Subsidiary-to-Private} + Misc^N_{Del} \end{cases} \tag{2}$$

While $Newlists_A$ is affected by IPO in the same way as $Newlists$, it adds $Merge_{Private-to-Public}$ and excludes $Spin$. In $Merge_{Private-to-Public}$, which is also not part of $Newlists$, a public company is acquiring a non-public (private or foreign) firm. $Spin$ is excluded since a divisional spinoff into a separate public firm does not change corporate resources under public ownership. Comparing the actual and adjusted delists, $Delists_A$ is not lowered by $Merge_{Public-to-Public}$. However, $Divest_{Subsidiary-to-Private}$ now subtracts from the listing count when the subsidiary of a public parent is sold to a private firm.

The superscript N in Eq. (2), refers to the acquisition tracking index N_{it} in Eq. (3) below. For internal consistency, as we continually add the targets of public acquirer i to ΔL_A, we must also lower the merger-adjusted count by the same number of targets whenever firm i leaves the stock exchange for reasons other than being acquired by another public company. Beginning in 1980,

[4] We designate the acquirer as 'private' even if it trades over-the-counter or on a minor exchange in the U.S. or on a public exchange in a foreign country.

N_{it} is updated by one if target j is a private firm and by $N_{j,t-1}+1$ if target j is a public company:

$$N_{it} = \begin{cases} N_{i,t-1}+1 & \text{if target } j \text{ acquired in period } t \text{ is a private firm} \\ N_{i,t-1}+1+N_{j,t-1} & \text{if target } j \text{ acquired in period } t \text{ is a public firm} \end{cases} \tag{3}$$

where $N_{j,t-1}+1$ is the value of the public target's acquisition index. We reiterate that N_{it} is only used to adjust ΔL_A for public companies, and primarily when a public company leaves the stock exchange for reasons other than being acquired by another public company. The one exception is when a firm with $N_{it} > 0$ relists after having exited the exchange, as covered by $Misc^{N}_{New}$.

In the following, we proceed by first singling out the effect of public targets on the listing dynamics in a public-to-public merger-adjusted listing count. This involves adjusting Eq. (2) by excluding $Merge_{Private-to-Public}$ from the new lists and $Divest_{Subsidiary-to-Private}$ from the delists, and using N_{it} to track public targets only. The purpose of this separation is to highlight the impact of mergers between listed firms alone, without involving private targets. We then report results with the full merger-adjustment in Eq. (2)—also referred to as the all-merger-adjusted listing count.

Finally, it is worth pointing out that all targets included in this paper self-selected to sell out to public acquirers over the alternatives of selling to private acquirers or continuing as stand-alone companies (public or private). Whatever the firm-specific motivation and expected valuation consequence of this choice, it suffices for private or public targets to be counted in our merger adjustment. The same goes for firms that add to the actual listing count through an IPO.

3 U.S. merger-driven listing dynamics

In this section, we apply the above merger-adjustment procedure to the three major U.S. stock markets, 1980–2020. We begin with an examination of how the merger adjustment affects the 1996 listing peak, followed by an overview of the merger-related transaction values (net inflows and outflows). This addresses the merger-driven impact on listing dynamics both in terms of the

number of firms and their market values. Moreover, in light of our evidence of a substantial impact of merger activity on the listing dynamics, we end this section by briefly showing how listed firms contribute to the U.S. macro-economy in the post-peak period.

3.1 Absence of a merger-adjusted listing peak

In this section, we compute ΔL and ΔL_A using the variables defined in Table 1. The data sources are fully described in the Appendix A.1, which also explains our choice of a minimum threshold value for a private target (or a subsidiary) to be included in the analysis. This threshold value equals the year-end 1^{st} percentile of the market capitalization of all publicly listed firms in the target's Fama-French-12 industry. This minimum firm-size threshold means that any private target of a public acquirer is at least as large as actual listed firms in the industry and year of the acquisition.[5]

Figure 1 shows the actual listing count (the lowest of the three curves), the public-to-public merger-adjusted count (the middle curve), and the full merger-adjusted listing count (top curve), 1980-2020. Table 2 summarizes the total number of transactions driving ΔL and ΔL_A over both the total sample period and the post-peak period (1996–2020), with the annual counts of the different transaction types tabulated in Appendix tables A.1 and A.2.

Focusing first on the actual listing series in Table 2, over the 1980–2020 period, the values of *Newlists* and *Delists* sum to 17,837 and 18,919, respectively, for a net decline ΔL(1980-2020) of -1,083 listed firms. This net decline is the result of the 10,567 IPOs (59% of *Newlists*) and the 6,799 miscellaneous additional new listings being offset by 18,919 delistings. The delistings are due to 10,063 acquisitions of public targets plus 8,856 other delistings, of which 7,063 or 70% are due to cause. Over the post-1996 period, *Newlists* amounts to 7,004 and *Delists* to 10,696, which result in a much larger net decline ΔL(1996-2020) of -3,692 listed firms by 2020. This decline is primarily caused by a reduction in IPOs to 4,173 over the post-peak period, as well

[5]To avoid a downward bias due to financial distress, we require the firms used to identify this size threshold to be listed also in year $t + 1$. See Appendix Figure A.2 for the size thresholds across IPOs, listed firms, and listed firms with survivorship bias. Our benchmark has the desirable property of being stable while also capturing the general trend toward a larger minimum firm size to survive as an independently listed firm.

as the continued high merger activity involving public targets (3,721 public-to-public and 2,524 public-to-private transactions).[6]

Turning to the merger-adjusted series in Table 2, ΔL_A(1980-2020) totals 7,436 listed firms. This increase, which contrasts with the decline ΔL(1980-2020) of -1,083 companies, is the difference between $Newlists_A$ (28,448 firms) and $Delists_A$ (20,712 firms). For $Newlists_A$, the main addition comes from 9,481 private-to-public mergers—amounting to as much as 90% of the number of IPOs. In the post-1996 period, the merger-adjustment almost entirely eliminates the 1996 listing peak: ΔL_A(1996-2020) amounts to -98 firms only. In other words, while the actual listing in 2020 is down by 50% from the 1996-level, the adjusted count is down by less than one percent.

The elimination of the listing peak caused by the merger-adjustment has two main components. First, backfilling public targets in 3,721 public-to-public mergers after 1996, while tracking public targets only in the adjustment via the acquisition index (N_{it}), restores as much as two-thirds of the post-peak decline. The remaining third comes from the inflows of private targets net of subsidiary divestitures (with N_{it} including private targets as well).

Yet another perspective on the magnitude of the merger adjustment is seen by inspecting year 2020 in Figure 1 and Appendix tables A.1 and A.2. In 2020, the total merger-adjusted listing count is 12,152, while the actual count is 3,633. The difference of 8,519 firms are targets of public acquirers that operate under the ownership of their respective acquirers. Of these targets, about half were publicly traded before the merger. While all of these 8,519 firms have de facto entered into or remained under public ownership through the merger channel, none are included in the actual listing count.

In sum, while the actual listing count is a useful metric for examining changes in the size of stand-alone listed companies, it substantially underestimates the actual number of firms that flow into and are retained by public acquirers.

[6] A little noticed fact: As much as 28% of *Newlists* are uplists from minor exchanges and OTC markets. Of the public-to-private transactions where the acquirer is a U.S. private firm, leveraged buyouts account for roughly one-third of the transactions, 1980–2020.

3.2 Transaction values of inflows and outflows

Figure 2 shows the contribution of each of the listing channels in terms of the annual transaction net value inflow to public markets, ΔV_A (inflation-adjusted to 2020). Since the market value of a public firm that delists directly accounts for any value-implications of the firm's acquisition history, ΔV_A is constructed using $Merge_{Public-to-Private}$ and not $Merge^N_{Public-to-Private}$. Over the period 1980–2020, total inflow amounts to $Newlists_A$ = \$11.1 trillion, while total outflow is $Delists_A$ = \$8.2 trillion. The difference of \$2.9 trillion is also shown in the left-side vertical axis for the solid curve in Figure 2. \$1.2 trillion of the net inflow is added between 1980–1996 and the remaining \$1.7 trillion is added *after* the listing peak.

While we noted above that the number of private-to-public acquisitions number as much as 90% of the number of IPOs, switching to dollar values changes this picture because the average private-to-public target is smaller than the average IPO firm. In terms of dollar values, $Merge_{Private-to-Public}$ constitutes 28% of $IPO + Merge_{Private-to-Public}$ (\$2.5/8.7 trillion). Also interesting, on the delist side, $Merge_{Public-to-Private}$ accounts for as much as 80% (\$6.6/8.2 trillion) of the total transaction value of delisting outflows. Moreover, while not shown, the value of $Merge_{Public-to-Public}$—which reflects the reshuffling of assets already on the exchange—is 1.6 times that of $Merge_{Public-to-Private}$ (\$10.7 trillion versus \$6.6 trillion).

Beyond the substantial (\$10.7 trillion) transaction value of public-to-public mergers, it is also interesting to note that the \$2.9 trillion net transaction-value inflow shown in Figure 2 represents no more than 8% of the total market-value increase of \$34.9 trillion on NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq from 1980–2020. In other words, as much as 92% of the total market-value increase during this period is generated on the stock exchange: a combination of organic growth (internal investments and revaluation of assets in place) and synergies generated by public-to-public merger activity. To our knowledge, this evidence is also new to the literature, and made possible by our measurement of the complete anatomy of transactions causing listing changes.

Figure 3 further breaks down net listing value inflows by industry, where high-tech firms are identified by the American Electronic Association as in Eckbo, Makaew, and Thorburn (2018).

Panel A of the figure shows that, by far, the primary source of the net firm value inflow over the total sample period 1981–2020 is the high-tech industry, which totals $1.5 trillion over the five-year period 1995 to 2000 alone. The net inflows in the other three industries add up to just a quarter of this value ($0.39 trillion) over the same period. Note that the relatively large number of defaults among high-tech companies following the market crash in 2000 does little to drive down the net asset flow of the industry over the 2000–2002 period. This is because delists due to default have a near-zero market value of equity.

Finally, in Panel B of Figure 3, we further break down the high-tech net asset flow into six two-digit SIC industries. From 1995–2000, roughly half of the net high-tech inflow is concentrated in business services and electronics, while during 2008–2020 the industry with the largest net outflow is chemicals and allied products (mostly pharmaceuticals).

3.3 Post-peak activity of listed firms

In this section, we briefly address three questions of relevance for how to interpret the underlying economic relevance of our merger-adjustment: What triggered the merger wave of the 1990s? Did this merger wave increase shareholder value? Did the post-1996 listing decline slow economic activity of listed firms? As to the first question, the most powerful answer in the literature is given by Harford (2005). He shows that six of eleven industry-specific deregulatory events between 1981 and 1996 took place after 1990. The resulting increase in product market competition appears to have triggered several rival firms to merge with the objective of lowering operating costs. Also important, the evidence in Harford (2005) and other studies rejects the alternative notion that the merger wave of the 1990s was 'market driven' (bidder opportunism) in the vernacular of Shleifer and Vishny (2003).[7]

We use Panel A of Figure 4 to briefly address the second question concerning shareholder wealth effects of the merger wave. Focusing on the 49 industries defined in Fama and French

[7]See also Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005), Phillips and Zhdanov (2013) and Eckbo, Makaew, and Thorburn (2018) for evidence on how U.S. merger waves correlate with the relative market-to-book ratios (M/B) of bidder and target firms.

(1997), it addresses whether the industry-specific merger waves involving public-to-public mergers were 'synergistic' in the sense of increasing the combined market values of bidder and target firms. We follow John, Kadyrzhanova, and Lee (2021) and classify an industry-year as experiencing a 'synergy wave' if the number of deals with positive combined bidder and target wealth effect (CWE) is one standard deviation above the time-series industry median. We calculate CWE as the value-weighted average of the bidder and target's seven-day cumulative abnormal return, CAR(-3,3), where day zero is the first public announcement of the merger given by SDC.[8] As Panel A shows, synergistic merger waves occur to a higher degree during the second half of the 1990s than during any other period, 1980–2020. This evidence supports the hypothesis that the merger activity that drove much of the post-1996 U.S. listing decline predominantly increased the combined value of the merging firms.

Panel B of Figure 4 addresses the third question concerning the post-1996 economic activity of listed firms. It shows the time series from 1982 through 2018 of the annual percent contribution of U.S. domestic listed firms to aggregate labor employment, GDP, R&D spending, and patents. As detailed in Appendix A.3, we generate the figure using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Compustat, IMF, OECD, University of Virginia Darden Global Corporate Patent Dataset, and U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. We follow Schlingemann and Stulz (2022) and measure GDP (employment) as the sum of value added (employment) generated both domestically and by majority-owned foreign affiliates. While they do not study patents and R&D, we adjust R&D for foreign affiliates in a similar fashion.

As shown in Panel B, notwithstanding the post-1996 drop in the actual listing count, there is little evidence that the remaining listed firms contribute less to the macroeconomic time series. Specifically, in the post-1996 period, the ratio of U.S. workers employed by public firms is 25.5% in 1996 and 23.8% in 2018 (the last year of information on foreign affiliates in BEA), while the value added by public firms to U.S. GDP is 26.7% in 1996 and 28.5% in 2018. Also important, there is a substantial increase in innovation activity of U.S. listed firms as a fraction of all U.S. entities

[8]CAR is the difference between the realized and the value-weighted market returns from CRSP. The pre-announcement market value of the bidder and the target is measured one month before the deal announcements.

(public and private firms, governmental agencies, universities, and individuals): R&D spending increases from 54.5% to 68.7% (1996–2018), while granted patents relative to all entities increases from 40.8% to 49.7% (1996–2016). We conclude from Panel B that, notwithstanding the large post-1996 merger-driven listing decline, the remaining listed firms have been able to deliver the same or even higher level of macroeconomic contribution to the U.S. economy.

In the remainder of the paper, we apply our merger-adjustment procedure to stock markets around the world. We first document the properties of international listing dynamics to see whether the U.S. pattern with a listing peak followed by a dramatic decline is unique internationally. This is followed by a merger adjustment of the international listing series, which allows us to test whether merger activity involving publicly listed companies affects international listing dynamics differently than in the U.S., and which we explore in our revisit of the debate over the U.S. listing gap.

4 International listing peaks

This section provides evidence on the frequency and shapes of listing peaks around the world. The net benefit of public listing can be expected to vary across countries and time, not least because it responds to country-specific regulatory events and changes in business cycles, which may themselves trigger industry-specific merger waves. Moreover, the benefit of stock as acquisition currency depends on how a country's legal and financial system supports complex stock-financed mergers. We begin by providing evidence of a surprisingly high frequency of international listing peaks in calendar time. Conditional on observing a listing peak, we then examine how merger activity affects the speed of decline during the five years following the peak. This five-year period typically covers the bulk of the post-peak decline across countries. Finally, we examine whether merger activity affects the post-peak rate of decline differently in the U.S. than in foreign stock markets.

4.1 Country selection and data sources

As detailed in Appendix A.4, we start the country selection process with the 100 countries and territories with highest GDP as of 2020 per the IMF. Of these 100, 26 are not included due to insufficient data, leaving a final sample of 74 countries. Using the IMF's classification, 33 of these 74 countries are advanced economies, representing 59% of global GDP. The remaining 41 countries are classified as developing and emerging economies, and represent 37% of world GDP.

The non-U.S. listing counts are identified from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI), World Federation of Exchanges (WFE), ISI Emerging Market Group's CEIC database (CEIC), and individual stock exchange home pages. We count the number of listings on a country's major stock exchanges and only count cross-listed firms once (in the country where they are incorporated). Finally, we identify public-to-public and private-to-public (including cross-border) mergers for each country using SDC. To maximize SDC's data coverage of international mergers, we limit the sample to 1990–2020 when applying our merger adjustment.

While the above data sources track a country's aggregate listing counts and the number of mergers, it does not provide information on the identity of each listed company. Hence, when a foreign listing count decreases by one for reasons other than a public-to-public acquisition, that country's merger-adjusted listing count is also lowered by one ($N_{it} = 0$), while it is lowered by $1 + N_{it} \geq 1$ when a U.S. listed firm exits. By setting $N_{it} = 0$ across foreign stock markets, we overstate foreign merger-adjusted listing counts in the comparison with the U.S. below. We later illustrate the magnitude of this difference, which implies a relative U.S. listing penalty, after estimating the U.S. listing gap in Section 6.

4.2 Listing peaks in calendar time

In our definition, a listing peak occurs if the country's unadjusted listing count is lower in 2020 than in a previous year during our sample period, where the listing-peak year is the year with the highest listing count. Figure 5 plots the number of countries that experience a listing peak in each year from 1975–2019. It shows that listing peaks are not only numerous, but also distributed

throughout the sample period—a pattern common to both advanced and developing/emerging economies.

Figure 6 further details these peaks by showing how the listing count has decreased from peak until 2020 for each of the 74 countries. In Table 4 we also order countries according to listing-peak year and divide the sample into four non-overlapping categories: advanced/non-advanced countries with/without a peak. Columns (2) and (3) if this table show the number of listed firms at peak and the listing count in 2020, while Column (4) shows the total percent change in the listing count between the peak year and 2020, with the average annual percent change in Column (5). As discussed next, this international listing-peak information yields five important and surprising facts.

First, experiencing a listing peak is the norm rather than the exception: Among the 33 advanced economies alone, as much as 82% (27 economies) exhibit a listing peak—five before the U.S. and another 21 in 1996 or later. A similar proportion of developing and emerging countries also experience a listing peak: 31 of 41 (76%). In sum, more than three-quarters (58 of 74) of all sampled countries have fewer listed firms in 2020 than in the past. Second, the total number of listing peaks is widely distributed across the period 1985–2019, with the greatest number of peaks in 1998. The average peak year for the advanced countries is 2000 with a standard deviation of 8 years. For the developing and emerging economies, the average peak year is 2001 with a standard deviation of 10 years. The substantial international variation in the year of the listing peak is interesting as it suggests that these peaks are largely driven by country-specific factors rather than global macroeconomic shocks common to all countries. While identifying these factors goes beyond the purpose of this paper, we examine certain country-level macroeconomic variables in Section 5.2 below.

Third, just as the U.S. experiences a 50% post-peak decline in the listing count, the average decline across all advanced economies with a listing peak is 49%, with fifteen advanced countries experiencing an even greater overall decline than in the U.S. Fourth, while the annual percent decline in the number of lists since the peak year is 2.1% for the U.S., the average rate of decline

for advanced economies is slightly higher: 2.5%. More than half (16 of 27) of advanced countries experiencing a higher rate of decline than the U.S. Similar results hold for developing and emerging economies, with an average decline of 33% at an annual rate of 2.2%. Fifth, the earlier in the sample period that a country peaks, the lower is the 2020 listing count relative to the peak count. The correlation between number of years passed since the peak and the percent decline is 65%, which suggests that the post-peak listing decline tends to persist over time.

4.3 Listing peaks in event time

Conditional on experiencing a listing peak, Panel A of Figure 7 (enumerated in the Internet Appendix) shows the average listing pattern over the eleven-year event period (-5,5) centered on the peak year (year 0). It reveals that the shapes of the three U.S., non-U.S. advanced, and developing/emerging listing patterns are surprisingly similar both in terms of the pre-peak incline and post-peak decline. Focusing first on the pre-peak runup period for advanced countries, the U.S. experiences a 24% runup over the (-10,0) period and a 29% runup over the shorter (-5,0) event period. For other advanced (developing/emerging) economies, the runup averages 65% (87%) over the (-10,0) period and 51% (40%) for the (-5,0) period. This shows that, as in the U.S., these pre-peak runups are on average large and concentrated in the (-5,0) event period for advanced and developing/emerging economies alike.

Turning to the post-peak event period, the actual U.S. listing count declines -24% over the (0,5) period and -37% over the longer (0,10). For advanced (developing/emerging) economies, the decline over these two event periods average -24% (-22%) and -32% (-30%) and for the 11-year and 21-year event periods, respectively. This shows that the average annual rate of listing decline is also similar across the U.S. and other countries, and that the bulk of the decline occurs quickly—within the event period (0,5) for four-fifths of the countries. In sum, the (-5,5) event period catches the bulk of the listing runups and declines around the peaks. Next, we present a cross-country analysis of the impact of mergers on the rate of post-peak listing decline that focuses on the (0,5) event window.

5 International merger-driven listing dynamics

In this section, we implement our merger-adjustment procedure across our sample of 74 economies and examine the merger-adjusted listing dynamics, including the impact on the rates of post-peak listing decline.

5.1 Merger-propensities and merger-adjusted listing counts

We begin by illustrating international differences in merger propensities. Panel A of Figure 8 shows the international average annual merger rate per listed firm where at least one of the two parties to the transaction is a public company, while Panel B further restricts the mergers to deals between two public firms. In both panels, the U.S. likelihood of a merger is noticeably higher than the likelihood in any other country in our sample. Moreover, this difference is even more pronounced for the public-to-public mergers in Panel B. This suggests that the effect of mergers on listing dynamics will be stronger in the U.S. than in other countries, which is confirmed below.

In Figure 9, we plot the public-to-public merger-adjusted (Panel A) and all-merger-adjusted (Panel B) event-time average listing patterns with the window (-5, 5) around the peak year. Panel A shows that the public-to-public merger-adjusted listing count on average declines by 22% for non-U.S.-advanced and by 21% for developing and emerging economies in the five years following the listing peak. This contrasts with the U.S. public-to-public merger-adjusted series, which declines by 5% only. In other words, while the U.S. post-peak listing decline is to a great extent driven by a reallocation of corporate resources among public firms, declines elsewhere are far less attenuated by public-to-pubic mergers. Instead, these declines represent outflows of listed firms from public markets.

The all-merger-adjusted series in Panel B of Figure 9 also includes private-to-public mergers. This incremental adjustment reduces the decline in the non-U.S. advanced (developing/emerging) economies from an average of 22% to 10% (21% to 18%). This means that, internationally, targets entering public markets via private-to-public mergers significantly outnumber targets retained

via public-to-public mergers. In the U.S., the addition of private-to-public mergers changes the adjusted listing count from a 5% decrease to a 13% increase. As Figure 8 suggests as well, this shows that the marginal impact of private-to-public mergers on the listing dynamics is also greater in the U.S. than elsewhere.

5.2 Determinants of the post-peak rate of listing decline

To examine the U.S.-specific effect on the post-peak decline speed, let $Decline_{Ti}$ denote the average annual rate of decline (in percent) in the number listed firms for country i in the $T = 5$ years (alternatively, $T = 3$) after that country's listing peak. $Decline_{Ti}$ is either the unadjusted listing count, the public-to-public merger-adjusted listing count, or the full merger-adjusted count. We run the following cross-sectional regression:

$$Decline_{Ti} = \alpha + \beta D_{US} + \lambda Z_{Ti} + \epsilon_{Ti}, \quad i = 1, ..., N, \tag{4}$$

where D_{US} is a dummy taking a value of one if the country is the U.S. and zero otherwise. The vector Z_{Ti} is a set of pre-peak country-specific control variables using data from the World Bank and IMF. Each variable is computed as the annual T-period average prior to the listing-peak year of country i. The pre-peak growth variables are *Listing count runup* (the percent growth in the unadjusted listing count) and *GDP growth*. The GDP-scaled variables are *Trade* (the sum of exports and imports) and *FDI net inflows* (foreign direct investment). Finally, population-scaled variables are *Patent applications* and *GDP*. The patent applications are restricted to those filed by domestic firms and residents. We use patents to measure innovation activity because they are more consistently recorded across countries than are data on R&D expenditures.

The regression results are reported in Table 5. Odd-numbered columns use all available countries, while the even-numbered columns are based on advanced economies only. In columns (1)–(4), the dependent variable is the rate of decline of the unadjusted listing count. Note first that D_{US} is insignificant in Column (1) (all countries) and in Column (2) (advanced economies). This

implies that the U.S.-specific five-year average annual rate of post-peak decline is statistically indistinguishable from other countries. The same holds for columns (3) and (4), in the three-year post-peak period.

Columns (5)–(8) of Table 5 show the regression results when $Decline_{Ti}$ is the post-peak annual average rate of decline of the public-to-public merger-adjusted listing series. Most important, D_{US} now receives a negative and statistically significant coefficient estimate—implying a significantly slower rate of post-peak decline in the merger-adjusted listing series. The coefficient on D_{US} is estimated at -2.2 to -2.6 percentage points for the five-year event window and from -4.2 to -4.9 for the three-year window. Importantly, the fact that the merger adjustment *lowers* the coefficient estimate of D_{US} when going from columns (1)–(4), means that there is a U.S.-specific effect of public-to-public mergers that reduces the speed at which listed firms leave the stock exchange. Between columns (1)–(4) and columns (5)–(8), the U.S.-specific effect of public-to-public merger activity decelerates the speed of decline by 3.5 pps, relative to other countries.

It is worth reemphasizing the above interpretation of the coefficient estimates on D_{US}. They show that U.S. public-to-public merger activity reallocates target firms *within* the stock exchange to a greater extent than in other countries. This interpretation follows because, when going from, say, columns (1) to (5), we are *only* changing the dependent variable $Decline_{Ti}$. As a result, the significant decline in the coefficient estimate on D_{US} means that public-to-public merger activity slows down the post-peak rate of decline relative to other countries.

In columns (9)–(12), $Decline_{Ti}$ is measured using the full merger-adjusted listing count series. Again focusing on D_{US} and the total sample of countries, recall that the full merger adjustment adds private-to-public acquisitions to the listing count. The marginal decline in the coefficient estimate for D_{US} by 1.4 pps to 2.2 pps when going from columns (5)–(8) to (9)–(12) is evidence that the U.S.-specific effect of private-to-public acquisitions is smaller than the case is for public-to-public mergers. Furthermore, it confirms that what distinguishes the post-peak U.S. merger activity is less an inflow of private targets than the effective retention of listed targets through public-to-public mergers. This result is also noticeable by comparing Panels A and B of Figure

9, which shows a somewhat similar private-to-public effect on U.S. and non-U.S. advanced, but a noticeably different public-to-public effect.

Finally, we test whether role of post-peak merger activity documented above for the U.S. is unique. In Table 6, we estimate country-by-country regressions where we replace the U.S. dummy D_{US} in Eq. (4) with a dummy for each respective non-U.S. country. In the sample of advanced economies, this replacement fails to produce a significantly negative country dummy when using the merger-adjusted listing series (columns 5–12) for all non-U.S. countries with insignificant or positive unadjusted dummy estimates (columns 1–4). This reinforces the notion that the significant effect of merger activity on the rate of post-peak listing decline is uniquely strong in the U.S.—primarily due to public-to-public mergers.

6 Is there a merger-adjusted U.S. listing gap?

As shown by Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2017), the actual U.S. listing count has developed a listing gap relative to an international listing trend line estimated from 1990. In this section, we revisit their listing gap estimation using our merger-adjusted listing series. The evidence in Section 3 above suggests that inferences about a relative U.S. listing gap may well differ when adjusted for merger activity. To address this issue, we replace the actual listing count for all countries with our merger-adjusted count as the dependent variable in the list-gap estimation. This replacement allows us to draw causal inferences about the impact of firm-level merger activity on the listing-gap estimates. We first describe the econometric specification of our listing-gap regression, and then present the gap-parameter estimates.

6.1 Econometric specification

The U.S. listing gap in year t is defined as the difference between two conditional expected listing counts. The first difference is the expected number of U.S. listings in year t relative to the base year 1990. Let D_{US} denote a dummy variable with a value of one if the country is the U.S. and

zero otherwise. The first difference is then

$$E(Y_{it} \mid D_{US} = 1, year = t) - E(Y_{it} \mid D_{US} = 1, year = 1990). \tag{5}$$

The second difference is between the expected number of listings in a non-U.S. country in year t and that in 1990:

$$E(Y_{it} \mid D_{US} = 0, year = t) - E(Y_{it} \mid D_{US} = 0, year = 1990). \tag{6}$$

We estimate the listing gap parameter (the two differences in conditional means) across a total of 30 years and N countries using the following panel regression:

$$ln(Y_{it}) = \alpha + \delta_i + \tau_t + \beta D_{US} + \Gamma(D_{US} \times \tau_t) + \lambda X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \quad t = 1990, .., 2020, \quad i = 1, .., N. \tag{7}$$

The dependent variable Y_{it} is country i's listing count (L) per capita (Pop) or per GDP in year t, and δ_i and τ_t are country and year fixed effects, respectively. X_{it} is a vector of three country-specific control variables: country i's anti-self-dealing index (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008), log(GDP/Pop) and annual GDP growth.

Hence, ignoring the country-specific parameters λ_i and δ_i (since these cancel out in the difference below), the gap-parameter in year t is:

$$\begin{aligned} [E(Y_{it} \mid D_{US} = 1, year = t) &- E(Y_{it} \mid D_{US} = 1, year = 1990)] \\ -[E(Y_{it} \mid D_{US} = 0, year = t) &- E(Y_{it} \mid D_{US} = 0, year = 1990)] \\ &= [(\alpha + \tau_t + \beta + \gamma_t) - (\alpha + \beta)] - [(\alpha + \tau_t) - \alpha] \\ &= \gamma_t, \end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

where γ_t—the annual parameter in the vector Γ—captures the U.S.-specific residual in year t. For a given γ_t, we then compute the U.S. listing gap in year t (expressed as the number of firms) as

follows:

$$\text{US gap computation, year } t\text{:} \quad \begin{cases} Y_{US,1990} \times Pop_{US,t} \times (e^{\gamma_t} - 1) \text{ for } L \text{ scaled by population} \\ Y_{US,1990} \times GDP_{US,t} \times (e^{\gamma_t} - 1) \text{ for } L \text{ scaled by GDP} \end{cases} \tag{9}$$

In other words, computing the U.S. listing gap for year t in terms of the total number of firms involves multiplying three items: the U.S. listing count per capita or GDP in 1990, the corresponding population or GDP scaling variable in year t, and the antilogarithm of γ_t minus one.[9]

To show clearly the marginal impact of our novel listing count adjustment, we fix the right-hand-side of Eq. (7) and gradually develop the following three listing gaps:

$$\text{Gap} \quad \begin{cases} \text{G1:} & Y_{it} \textit{ is} \text{ unadjusted (the actual listing gap).} \\ \text{G2:} & Y_{it} \textit{ is} \text{ public-to-public merger-adjusted only, with } N_{it} = 0 \text{ for non-U.S. countries.} \\ \text{G3:} & Y_{it} \textit{ is} \text{ merger-adjusted, with } N_{it} = 0 \text{ for non-U.S. countries.} \end{cases} \tag{10}$$

In G1, the numerator of the dependent variable Y_{it} is the actual (unadjusted) listing count for all countries. For the U.S., G2 adjusts the actual listing count for public-to-public mergers and spinoffs and, therefore, the acquisition index N_{it} tracks public targets only. Moreover, for the U.S., G3 fully tracks inflows and outflows of all firms—both public and private—to and from U.S. public markets using the full Eq. (2) and an acquisition index N_{it} in Eq. (3) that tracks both public and private targets.

6.2 Listing gap estimates

Figure 10 plots the annual U.S. listing gap estimates for all three gap definitions G1–G3 in Eq. (10) using the full set of 74 countries. A complete set of annual coefficient estimates for the gaps, each with four different regression specifications, is listed in Table 7. In the discussion below, we

[9] Our econometric specification of the U.S. listing gap differs somewhat from that of Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2017). We provide a detailed explanation of this econometric differences in the Internet Appendix.

primarily focus on the regression specification with the listing count scaled by population and including country fixed effects (columns 2, 6, and 10). Table 7 also reports three alternative regression specifications: (i) the dependent variable scaled by population and without country fixed effects, (ii) the dependent variable scaled by GDP and with country fixed effects, and (iii) the dependent variable scaled by GDP but without country fixed effects (the GDP-based listing gap estimates with country fixed effects are further illustrated in the Internet Appendix).

6.2.1 The unadjusted listing gap (G1)

We begin with the U.S. unadjusted listing gap (G1), which is shown as the solid black line in Panel A of Figure 10. The gray shaded area is the 90% confidence interval around the annual gap estimates (with standard errors clustered by country). The coefficient estimates corresponding to the black line are shown in Column (2) of Table 7, where $ln(Y_{it})$ is natural logarithm of the actual listing count scaled by population and including country fixed effects. Using Eq. (9), the estimate of γ_t in Column (2) of Table 7, and population data from the IMF, the estimated G1-gap in year 2020 is $Y_{US,1990} \times Pop_{US,2020} \times (e^{\gamma_t} - 1) = 22.78 \times 330.01 \times (e^{-0.636} - 1) = -3,538$ listed companies. In 2012, which is the final sample year in Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2017), $G1 = Y_{US,1990} \times Pop_{US,2012} \times (e^{\gamma_t} - 1) = 22.57 \times 314.12 \times (e^{-0.631} - 1) = -3,348$ listed companies.

Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2017) instead report a listing-gap estimate of -5,436 listed firms for 2012. In terms of the regression parameters in our Eq. (7), their regression specification is equivalent to using $\gamma_t + \tau_t$ to estimate the listing gap G1 (see Internet Appendix for proof). In other words, the difference between our G1-gap for 2012 of 2,088 listed firms and the larger number reported by Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2017) emerges primarily because we subtract out the common component (the time trend τ_t) in the listing dynamic before computing G1. By netting out the time trend in the panel estimation, our gap estimate is restricted to the portion of the international time trend that is unique to the U.S. As shown in the Internet Appendix, the time trend parameter estimates of τ_t become negative and statistically significant after 2009, hence causing the gap-estimates in Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2017) to have larger negative values.

6.2.2 The merger-adjusted listing gaps (G2, G3)

Panel A of Figure 10 also shows the full merger-adjusted listing gap, which is again computed using our main regression specification, this time with the γ_t coefficient estimates shown in Column 10 of Table 7). Adjusting for both public-to-public and private-to-public merger activity causes G3 to be positive and statistically significant in years 1993–1999, and insignificant in all sample years thereafter. In year 2020, the estimated G3-gap is $Y_{US,1990} \times Pop_{US,2020} \times (e^{\gamma_t} - 1) = 22.78 \times 330.01 \times (e^{0.005} - 1) = +38$ listed companies (a statistically insignificant listing surplus). The absence of a listing gap 1991–2020 holds across the three alternative regression specifications for G3.

The broken line in Panel B of Figure 10 shows G2, the public-to-public merger-adjusted listing gap, from 1991–2020. This broken line is based on the γ_t coefficient estimates shown in Column (6) of Table 7. Recall that, while all countries are adjusted for public-to-public mergers, the acquisition index N_{it} (which, in G2, accumulates public targets only) is applied exclusively to U.S.-listed firms when these firms leave the exchange, which lowers the merger-adjusted U.S. listing count relative to other countries. Nevertheless, the estimates of G2 are statistically insignificant at conventional levels in all sample years 1991–2020. In year 2020, the estimated G2-gap is $Y_{US,1990} \times Pop_{US,2020} \times (e^{\gamma_t} - 1) = 22.78 \times 330.01 \times (e^{-0.138} - 1) = -966$ listed companies. Also important, G2 is statistically insignificant at conventional levels in all years, and across almost all years of the three alternative regression specifications in columns (5), (7), and (8) of Table 7.

In sum, we have shown that the merger-adjusted listing gap is statistically insignificant for both gap definitions G2 and G3. Importantly, since a public-to-public merger does not rely on the supply of private equity capital, it is not necessary to appeal to the contemporaneous growth in private equity funding or decline in IPOs to explain the actual U.S. listing gap G1. Rather, our evidence is consistent with the notion that the extraordinary propensity of U.S. stock exchanges to effectuate large merger transactions between public companies is sufficient to explain G1. Since these transactions require a high level of capital market functionality in terms of contracting technology and legal protection of minority shareholders, they may provide U.S. listed firms with

a comparative advantage in terms of realizing scale economies through external growth strategies.

6.3 Robustness

In this section, we examine several robustness issues. The first is whether the statistical insignificance shown for the merger-adjusted listing gap (G2 and G3) also holds for the subsample of 28 advanced economies. Table 8 shows the parameter estimates restricted to this subsample. Note first that the unadjusted gap G1 is now somewhat larger in size and remains significant at the 1% level or higher. Moreover, the merger-adjusted gaps G2 and G3 are also larger (more negative) than for the full sample of 74 countries. Most important, G2 and G3 remain insignificantly different from zero in nearly all years up through 2020. In other words, the merger-adjusted U.S. listing gap is statistically insignificant also when measured relative to the subgroup of other advanced economies, which contain the most internationally competitive stock exchanges.

Second, we address SDC as a source of merger data, which may be more comprehensive for the U.S. than for some foreign exchanges. While not tabulated, we re-estimate Eq. (7) after artificially multiplying the annual number of public-to-public mergers outside of the U.S. The result of this experiment is that most estimates of G2 and G3 remain statistically insignificant even after *quintupling* non-U.S. public-to-public mergers. Furthermore, when we in addition nearly triple the foreign private-to-public acquisitions (which include cross-border mergers), the all-merger-adjusted gap G3 continues to be similarly insignificant. We conclude from this that our main finding of a statistically insignificant merger-adjusted U.S. listing gap is robust to any reasonable level of missing data on foreign mergers in SDC.

Third, recall from Section 4.1 that, since our data sources on the international listing counts do not track the names of the listed firms, we necessarily set the acquisition tracking index to zero ($N_{it} = 0$) for non-U.S. countries. It is worth pointing out that this differential treatment of N_{it} substantially penalizes the U.S. merger adjustment. Specifically, for U.S. listed firms that exit the stock exchange over the period 1991–2020, the tracking index amounts to $\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{t=1991}^{2020} N_{it} =$

4,459 additional delists.[10] With 1990 as base year, this penalty lowers the 2020 merger-adjusted U.S. listing count by as much as 42% (from 10,700 firms when $N_{it} = 0$ to 6,241 firms). Our finding of a statistically insignificant merger-adjusted listing gap withstands this U.S.-specific penalty.

7 Conclusion

We adjust the actual listing count for private and public targets of public acquirers to better understand merger-driven listing dynamics around the world. Focusing first on the U.S., these targets substantially exceed stock market entries via IPOs both in number and transaction value. In fact, primarily due to mergers between public firms, our merger adjustment eliminates the dramatic post-1996 drop in the actual listing count. Our use of the full anatomy of stock market inflows and outflows also shows that the transaction value of firm net inflows increased after 1996. Moreover, notwithstanding the 50% drop in listed firms since 1996, we show that the contribution of the remaining listed companies to employment and GDP has not declined over the period 1996–2020, while their share of R&D and patents has increased.

Turning to international listing dynamics, we first document that as much as four-fifths of the 74 countries in our sample exhibit a listing peak followed by a decline, with peak-years widely distributed across four decades. Panel estimation shows that mergers involving public acquirers impact the post-peak listing declines in foreign countries differently than in the U.S.: While public-to-public mergers in the U.S. explain much of the sharp listing decline—effectively retaining the targets within their listed parents—there is much less evidence that public-to-public mergers explain the post-peak rate of decline in foreign countries. Rather, these listing declines tend to reflect de facto outflows of assets from public markets. While, in addition to targets of public acquirers, our analysis controls for country-level differences in macroeconomic growth, trade, and innovation activity, additional research is required to explain the timing of these international listing peaks.

[10] Breaking the total of 4,459 firms into public and private targets, respectively, this treatment effectively cancels out as much as 21% (1,286 of 6,108) of public-to-public mergers and 33% (3,173 of 9,481) of private-to-public mergers.

Finally, we revisit the significantly negative U.S. listing gap estimates (relative to an international trend line) reported in the extant literature by replacing the actual listing count with our merger-adjusted listing series as the dependent variable. This replacement, which allows identification of the direct causal impact of merger transactions on the listing gap estimates, produces statistically insignificant U.S. listing gap estimates for all years 1991–2020. This result holds also if we restrict the merger-adjustment to public-to-public mergers only. In sum, after adjusting for mergers involving public acquirers around the world, there is no evidence that U.S. firms are leaving the stock market at a higher rate than firms in other countries.

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Table 1: Definition of variables representing actual and merger-adjusted new lists and delists

Definition	Data sources (further details in Appendix A.1)
A: New lists	
IPO Initial public offering on NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq.	Matched to IPO data from SDC and Jay Ritter's webpage, counting U.S. operating companies only.
Spin Divisional spin-off from a U.S. public company.	Identified in CRSP (distribution code 3763) and SDC (acquirer name 'shareholders'). Spin-off parent is confirmed as U.S. public using CRSP. Includes equity carve-outs (for cash).
$Misc_{New}$ Relist, uplist, CRSP reorganization (when a merger of equals results in the creation of a new firm), CRSP form change (to U.S. common stock and/or U.S. incorporation, and also when a SPAC acquisition is completed), or unidentified new list.	Relists, reorganizations, and form changes are identified in CRSP. Remaining new lists are classified as uplists, and verified when possible using OTC data from WRDS, SDC (by identifying 'follow-on' listings that occur simultaneously with a new listing), and manual web searches.
$Merge_{Private-to-Public}$ Private-to-public merger: acquisition in which a U.S. public company acquires a non-public corporation (foreign, private, or OTC firm). Does not include SPAC acquisitions, since SPACs (with other investment vehicles) are not counted as 'public'.	Mergers are completed transactions that are identified in SDC using the deal forms 'merger', 'acquisition', and 'acquisition of remaining-, partial- and majority interest', and result in 100% ownership. Targets must have a greater market value than the first percentile of same-industry (using Fama-French 12 industry definitions) public firms that remain listed one year later. Percentiles are determined using data from CRSP.
B: Delists	
$Merge_{Public-to-Public}$ Public-to-public merger: a merger between two publicly listed U.S. companies.	Merger delistings are identified in CRSP using acquiring PERMCO and PERMNO (delisting codes 200-399). Acquirer identity is found in SDC, CRSP, and manually with web searches.
$Merge_{Public-to-Private}$ Public-to-private merger: merger in which a U.S. public firm is acquired by a foreign, private, or OTC firm.	Same as above.
$Misc_{Del}$ Delist due to cause, voluntarily, or for unknown reasons.	Cause delists are identified in CRSP using delisting codes 400-569 and 574-999, and voluntary delists with codes 570-573. Unknown delistings are not marked in CRSP by a delisting code, but occur when the firm leaves the CRSP sample of U.S. public firms for more than two weeks for reasons other than trading suspensions.
$Divest_{Subsidiary-to-Private}$ Subsidiary-to-private divestiture: acquisition of a U.S. public-owned subsidiary by a private, foreign, or OTC firm.	Takeovers are identified in SDC (excludes deals with acquirer name 'shareholders'). Minimum target size threshold is calculated using CRSP and is the same as that of $Merge_{Private-to-Public}$. Subsidiary parent is confirmed as U.S. public using CRSP. The subsidiary itself must not be publicly listed.

Table 2: Summary of actual and merger-adjusted U.S. listing counts, 1980–2020

Listing counts are given by equations (1) and (2) in the text and are replicated in the expressions shown below. The merger-adjusted listing count also uses the cumulative acquisition index in Eq. (3). ΔL is the change in the actual listing count, ΔL_A is the change in the merger-adjusted listing count, IPO counts initial public offerings, $Spin$ counts spinoffs, $Misc_{New}$ counts miscellaneous new listings, and $Misc_{Del}$ counts miscellaneous delists. The subscript in $Merge$ indicates the direction of the change in the target's public/private status. Thus, in $Merge_{Public-to-Public}$ and $Merge_{Public-to-Private}$ a public target merges with a public or a private acquirer, respectively, while a private target merges with a public acquirer in $Merge_{Private-to-Public}$. In Panel B, the acquisition index N tracks all public and private targets. See also Table 1 for variable definitions. The annual distribution of all variables in this table is found in Appendix Table A.1 for Panel A and Appenix Table A.2 for Panel B.

A: Actual listing count

A.1 Total sample period (12/31/1980–12/31/2020)

$$\Delta L = -1,083 \begin{cases} 17,837\ Newlists = 10,567\ IPO + 471\ Spin + 6,799\ Misc_{New} \\ 18,919\ Delists = 6,108\ Merge_{Public-to-Public} + 3,955\ Merge_{Public-to-Private} + 8,856\ Misc_{Del} \end{cases}$$

A.2 Post-peak sample period (12/31/1996–12/31/2020)

$$\Delta L = -3,692 \begin{cases} 7,004\ Newlists = 4,173\ IPO + 302\ Spin + 2,529\ Misc_{New} \\ 10,696\ Delists = 3,721\ Merge_{Public-to-Public} + 2,524\ Merge_{Public-to-Private} + 4,451\ Misc_{Del} \end{cases}$$

B: Merger-adjusted listing count

B.1 Total sample period (12/31/1980–12/31/2020)

$$\Delta L_A = +7,436 \begin{cases} 28,148\ Newlists_A = 10,567\ IPO + 9,481\ Merge_{Private-to-Public} + 8,100\ Misc^N_{New} \\ 20,712\ Delists_A = 7,943\ Merge^N_{Public-to-Private} + 613\ Divest_{Subsidiary-to-Private} + 12,156\ Misc^N_{Del} \end{cases}$$

B.2 Post-peak sample period (12/31/1996–12/31/2020)

$$\Delta L_A = -98 \begin{cases} 13,498\ Newlists_A = 4,173\ IPO + 5,756\ Merge_{Private-to-Public} + 3,569\ Misc^N_{New} \\ 13,596\ Delists_A = 5,970\ Merge^N_{Public-to-Private} + 392\ Divest_{Subsidiary-to-Private} + 7,234\ Misc^N_{Del} \end{cases}$$

Table 3: Listed firms' employment, GDP, R&D spending, and patents granted, 1982–2018

This table shows the total annual amount of employment (in millions of people), value added (in USD trillion), research and development spending (in USD billion), and patents granted (in thousands) for U.S. public firms, all U.S. organizations or entities (public and private firms, government, universities, and individuals), and majority-owned foreign affiliates (MOFAs). To calculate the series shown in Figure 4, U.S. public firm output is divided by the sum of output from all U.S. firms and all MOFAs (except for patents). All monetary values are expressed in 2020 USD. MOFA R&D spending prior to 1989 is estimated and marked with * below. Data are from the BEA, BLS, Compustat, GCPD, IMF, OECD, and USPTO. Details in Appendix A.3.

	Employees (m)			Gross product (USD tn)			R&D spending (USD bn)			Patents granted (k)	
Year	U.S. pub. firms	All U.S. org.	All MOFA	U.S. pub. firms	All U.S. org.	All MOFA	U.S. pub. firms	All U.S. org.	All MOFA	U.S. pub. firms	All U.S. ent.
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
1982	26.9	89.4	5.0	2.7	8.9	0.6	95.8	216.4	13.1*	12.5	33.9
1983	27.0	92.9	4.9	2.7	9.4	0.6	102.9	233.5	12.3*	12.3	32.9
1984	28.0	96.8	4.8	2.9	10.0	0.5	114.7	254.7	12.0*	14.5	38.4
1985	28.0	99.4	4.8	2.9	10.4	0.5	118.1	275.5	11.6*	14.8	39.6
1986	27.4	101.3	4.7	2.8	10.7	0.5	123.4	282.9	12.0*	13.5	38.1
1987	27.7	104.5	4.7	2.9	11.0	0.6	126.0	286.8	13.5*	15.3	43.5
1988	27.5	107.7	4.8	3.1	11.4	0.6	133.1	291.9	14.3*	14.3	40.5
1989	27.3	109.7	5.1	3.0	11.7	0.7	137.0	295.1	14.6	17.3	50.2
1990	27.4	110.0	5.4	2.9	11.7	0.7	138.6	300.0	20.1	16.3	47.4
1991	27.5	109.1	5.4	2.8	11.6	0.7	142.3	304.8	17.7	18.2	51.2
1992	28.1	110.3	5.3	2.9	12.0	0.7	149.9	304.0	20.3	19.5	52.3
1993	28.6	113.1	5.2	3.1	12.2	0.6	153.2	295.9	19.5	20.8	53.2
1994	29.5	117.0	5.7	3.3	12.6	0.7	157.8	294.4	20.6	21.9	56.1
1995	30.7	119.1	5.9	3.6	12.9	0.8	179.2	310.7	21.2	22.2	55.7
1996	32.7	122.0	6.1	3.8	13.2	0.8	189.4	324.4	23.0	24.9	61.1
1997	34.6	125.4	6.5	4.1	13.7	0.8	215.4	340.9	23.4	26.1	61.7
1998	35.6	128.4	6.8	4.1	14.3	0.8	229.0	358.1	23.1	34.4	80.3
1999	36.3	131.6	7.8	4.4	14.9	0.9	227.2	379.2	28.0	35.4	83.9
2000	36.8	133.5	8.2	4.5	15.3	0.9	255.1	402.6	30.6	37.5	85.1
2001	36.1	131.8	8.2	4.1	15.4	0.9	259.7	407.1	28.6	40.0	87.6
2002	35.5	131.2	8.3	4.0	15.6	0.9	243.3	400.3	30.1	40.8	87.0
2003	35.2	131.4	8.2	4.2	16.0	1.0	242.1	410.9	31.9	42.7	87.9
2004	36.3	133.4	8.7	4.5	16.6	1.1	252.9	416.3	35.2	42.5	84.3
2005	36.6	136.0	9.1	4.7	17.2	1.2	255.5	432.2	36.4	37.8	74.6
2006	37.5	138.1	9.6	5.3	17.6	1.3	282.6	450.9	37.7	44.9	89.8
2007	37.1	139.3	10.0	5.4	17.9	1.4	288.9	471.8	42.7	39.5	79.5
2008	36.1	135.7	10.0	4.6	17.6	1.4	290.1	486.6	49.8	40.2	77.5
2009	34.1	130.7	10.8	4.2	17.3	1.4	247.9	473.4	47.0	41.9	82.4
2010	35.1	131.6	11.3	4.9	17.7	1.5	269.4	465.7	47.1	54.3	107.8
2011	36.3	133.7	11.9	5.2	17.8	1.6	283.1	472.9	51.1	55.6	108.6
2012	36.8	135.9	12.1	5.2	18.1	1.6	295.6	466.8	50.4	62.0	121.0
2013	37.3	138.3	12.4	5.3	18.5	1.5	304.6	479.8	54.4	70.0	133.6
2014	38.2	141.3	14.1	5.8	19.0	1.6	326.0	491.6	60.1	76.6	144.6
2015	39.0	144.0	14.1	5.8	19.8	1.5	341.0	510.4	60.9	71.3	141.0
2016	38.1	146.3	14.3	5.8	20.1	1.4	355.0	521.4	58.2	71.4	143.7
2017	38.5	148.5	14.4	6.1	20.5	1.5	377.7	535.1	60.7	–	151.0
2018	39.2	150.8	14.4	6.4	21.1	1.5	420.5	552.3	59.7	–	144.4
Avg.	33.3	124.3	8.3	4.2	14.9	1.0	225.0	383.7	32.2	35.0	79.8

Table 4: **International listing counts and peak years**

This table provides an overview of country-specific listing peaks, sorted by year of peak. A country's listing-peak year is defined as the year with the highest listing count between 1975–2019. Columns (4) and (5) show each country's change in listing count from the peak year to 2020. Advanced and developing/emerging economies are defined by the IMF. Data are from CRSP, WDI, WFE, CEIC, and stock exchange homepages.

Country	Peak listing year (1)	Listing count at peak (2)	2020 listing count (3)	Change since peak (4)	Annual change (5)
A: Advanced countries that have peaked					
Denmark	1986	274	127	-54%	-1.6%
New Zealand	1986	339	122	-64%	-1.9%
Luxembourg	1987	347	27	-92%	-2.8%
Portugal	1988	158	37	-77%	-2.4%
Austria	1992	112	68	-39%	-1.4%
Ireland	1996	93	38	-59%	-2.5%
United States	1996	7,325	3,633	-50%	-2.1%
Canada	1998	1,991	764	-62%	-2.8%
Czech Republic	1998	92	20	-78%	-3.6%
Estonia	1998	25	18	-28%	-1.3%
Latvia	1998	67	18	-73%	-3.3%
Lithuania	1998	60	25	-58%	-2.7%
Belgium	1999	278	110	-60%	-2.9%
Finland	2000	158	126	-20%	-1.0%
France	2000	1,185	417	-65%	-3.2%
Israel	2000	664	429	-35%	-1.8%
Netherlands	2000	392	98	-75%	-3.8%
Slovenia	2001	151	29	-81%	-4.3%
Greece	2003	339	167	-51%	-3.0%
Switzerland	2003	289	220	-24%	-1.4%
Singapore	2005	564	458	-19%	-1.3%
United Kingdom	2006	2,913	1,601	-45%	-3.2%
Germany	2007	761	438	-42%	-3.3%
Norway	2008	209	174	-17%	-1.4%
Slovakia	2009	16	12	-25%	-2.3%
Spain	2015	3,623	2,695	-26%	-5.1%
Australia	2017	2,013	1,901	-6%	-1.9%
Average (N = 27)	2000	905	510	-49%	-2.5%
B: Advanced countries that have not peaked by 2020					
Hong Kong	–	–	2,360	–	–
Italy	–	–	374	–	–
Japan	–	–	2,808	–	–
South Korea	–	–	2,323	–	–
Sweden	–	–	335	–	–
Taiwan	–	–	948	–	–
Average (N = 6)	–	–	1,525	–	–

Continued on next page

Table 4: **Continued (page 2 of 2)**

Country	Peak listing year (1)	Listing count at peak (2)	2020 listing count (3)	Change since peak (4)	Annual change (5)
C: Developing/emerging countries that have peaked					
Argentina	1975	321	91	-72%	-1.6%
South Africa	1988	754	259	-66%	-2.1%
Brazil	1989	592	345	-42%	-1.3%
Mexico	1990	390	140	-64%	-2.1%
Costa Rica	1994	31	10	-68%	-2.6%
India	1996	5,999	5,579	-7%	-0.3%
Pakistan	1996	782	540	-31%	-1.3%
Chile	1997	294	207	-30%	-1.3%
Colombia	1997	128	65	-49%	-2.1%
Peru	1998	246	199	-19%	-0.9%
Romania	1998	126	81	-36%	-1.6%
Hungary	1999	64	45	-30%	-1.4%
Panama	2000	151	33	-78%	-3.9%
Egypt	2002	1,150	238	-79%	-4.4%
Iran	2005	408	368	-10%	-0.7%
Oman	2005	235	111	-53%	-3.5%
Malaysia	2006	1,021	925	-9%	-0.7%
Croatia	2007	359	107	-70%	-5.4%
Bahrain	2008	45	42	-7%	-0.6%
Bulgaria	2008	404	259	-36%	-3.0%
Morocco	2008	77	75	-3%	-0.2%
Jordan	2010	277	180	-35%	-3.5%
Nigeria	2010	215	177	-18%	-1.8%
Kuwait	2011	215	171	-20%	-2.3%
Russia	2012	292	213	-27%	-3.4%
Poland	2015	872	784	-10%	-2.0%
Turkey	2015	392	366	-7%	-1.3%
Ghana	2016	37	31	-16%	-4.1%
Kenya	2016	65	60	-8%	-1.9%
Tunisia	2017	82	80	-2%	-0.8%
Sri Lanka	2018	297	265	-11%	-5.4%
Average (N = 31)	2003	526	389	-33%	-2.2%
D: Developing/emerging countries that have not peaked by 2020					
Bangladesh	–	–	628	–	–
China	–	–	4,186	–	–
Indonesia	–	–	716	–	–
Kazakhstan	–	–	97	–	–
Philippines	–	–	268	–	–
Qatar	–	–	48	–	–
Saudi Arabia	–	–	207	–	–
Thailand	–	–	744	–	–
United Arab Emirates	–	–	74	–	–
Vietnam	–	–	751	–	–
Average (N = 10)	–	–	772	–	–

Table 5: Determinants of post-peak listing count rate of decline

This table shows coefficient estimates from the following regression specification:

$$Decline_i = \alpha + \beta D_{US} + \lambda Z_i + \epsilon_i, \quad i = 1, ..., N,$$

where $Decline_i$ is the average annual rate (percent) of decline in listed firms for country i in the five years (columns 1–2, 5–6, 9–10) or three years (columns 3–4, 7–8, 11–12) after that country's listing peak. $Decline_i$ is calculated from the unadjusted listing count in columns (1)–(4), the public-to-public merger-adjusted listing count in columns (5)–(8), and the full merger-adjusted listing count in columns (9)–(12). D_{US} is a dummy taking a value of one if the country is the U.S. and zero otherwise. Z_i is a set of pre-peak country-specific control variables. Each is an annual average value from the five or three years (depending on the sample) before the listing peak in country i. Pre-peak growth variables are *Listing count runup* (percent growth in unadjusted listing count) and *GDP growth*. GDP-scaled variables are *Trade* (exports plus imports) and *FDI net inflows* (foreign direct investment). Finally, population-scaled variables are *Patent applications* (filed by domestic firms and residents) and *GDP*. The sample starts with the full list of countries that experience a peak between 1975 and 29 (45 countries). Several countries are dropped due to missing data. Additionally, Croatia, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, and Portugal are excluded due to outliers. Odd-numbered columns use all available countries and even-numbered columns only sample advanced economies. U.S. listing count data are from CRSP, foreign listing count data are from WDI, WFE, CEIC, and exchange homepages, and merger data are from SDC. Control variables are from the World Bank and IMF. Advanced economies are classified by the IMF. Parentheses display robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

	$Decline_i$: **Unadjusted listing count**				$Decline_i$: **Public-to-public merger-adj. listing count**				$Decline_i$: **All-merger-adj. listing count**			
Event time:	±5 years		±3 years		±5 years		±3 years		±5 years		±3 years	
Sampled countries:	All	Adv.	All	Adv.	All	Adv.	All	Adv.	All	Adv.	All	Adv.
Regressors	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Constant	0.037**	0.066***	0.048***	0.084***	0.035**	0.061***	0.045***	0.076***	0.039**	0.058**	0.047***	0.073***
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.018)
D_{US}	0.013	0.009	-0.014	-0.007	-0.022**	-0.026**	-0.049***	-0.042***	-0.036***	-0.041**	-0.068***	-0.064***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Pre-peak growth variables												
Listing count runup	0.054	0.081	-0.003	-0.055	0.052	0.075	0.000	-0.043	0.031	0.034	-0.001	-0.028
	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.033)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.033)	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.068)	(0.029)	(0.038)
GDP growth	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
GDP-scaled variables												
Trade	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
FDI net inflows	0.001	0.007	-0.001	0.005	0.001	0.005	-0.001	0.003	0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Population-scaled variables												
Patent applications	-42.484	-56.537	-25.328	-41.370	-42.241	-56.212	-28.794	-42.922	-64.222	-78.406	-50.286	-63.089
	(26.046)	(38.165)	(45.646)	(55.951)	(27.253)	(41.474)	(42.428)	(53.336)	(41.504)	(50.980)	(41.629)	(48.308)
GDP	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
R^2	0.079	0.468	0.025	0.134	0.103	0.570	0.076	0.275	0.175	0.607	0.212	0.521
N	30	15	35	17	30	15	35	17	30	15	35	17

Table 6: Country-specific effects on post-peak listing count rate of decline

This table shows β coefficient estimates from the regression specification:

$$Decline_i = \alpha + \beta D_{country} + \lambda Z_i + \epsilon_i, \quad i = 1, ..., N,$$

where variable definitions are as in Table 5 except for $D_{country}$, which replaces D_{US}. Each row shows the β coefficient estimates that results from setting $D_{country}$ to equal one if country i is the country indicated in the first column. Columns (1)–(12) and data sources are as in Table 5. Regression standard errors are robust but not shown in the table. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

	$Decline_i$: **Unadjusted listing count**				$Decline_i$: **Public-to-public merger-adj. count**				$Decline_i$: **All-merger-adj. listing count**			
Event time:	±5 years		±3 years		±5 years		±3 years		±5 years		±3 years	
Sampled countries:	All	Adv.	All	Adv.	All	Adv.	All	Adv.	All	Adv.	All	Adv.
Regressors	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Advanced economies												
Australia			-0.052*	-0.075**			-0.053*	-0.074**			-0.049*	-0.064*
Canada	0.032***	0.040***	0.070***	0.073***	0.023**	0.029*	0.058***	0.059***	0.007	0.002	0.039***	0.034**
Finland	-0.017	-0.031*	-0.008	-0.033	-0.017	-0.029	-0.010	-0.032	-0.042*	-0.050*	-0.020	-0.030
France	0.026***	0.019*	0.062***	0.063***	0.029***	0.024**	0.064***	0.066***	0.035***	0.034**	0.066***	0.066***
Germany	0.003	0.027	-0.019	0.003	0.026	0.058**	0.004	0.027	0.055*	0.077*	0.030	0.045
Greece	-0.020	-0.033*	-0.002	-0.020	-0.021*	-0.034**	-0.004	-0.021	-0.024*	-0.048***	-0.004	-0.028
Israel	-0.009	-0.013	0.000	-0.015	-0.000	-0.003	0.010	-0.003	0.014	0.007	0.029**	0.017
Latvia			-0.096	-0.189*			-0.094	-0.172*			-0.065	-0.111
Netherlands	0.024**	0.018	0.067***	0.062***	0.024**	0.021	0.065***	0.061***	0.021	0.027	0.057***	0.057***
Norway	-0.034	-0.040	-0.094*	-0.074	-0.021	-0.023	-0.077*	-0.047	0.005	-0.000	-0.053	-0.007
Singapore	-0.067	0.011	0.050	-0.025	-0.081	-0.057	0.033	-0.083	-0.092	-0.114	0.014	-0.141
Slovakia	0.014	0.002	0.008	-0.018	0.017	-0.002	0.012	-0.004	0.028	0.011	0.029	0.027
Slovenia	0.004	0.004	-0.025*	-0.037	0.008	0.016	-0.021*	-0.032	0.041	0.054	-0.008	-0.029
Spain	0.000	-0.012	0.009	-0.013	0.007	-0.002	0.013	-0.006	0.014	0.012	0.020	0.003
Switzerland	-0.033***	-0.029**	-0.015	-0.019	-0.025*	-0.019*	-0.009	-0.013	-0.022*	-0.014	-0.003	-0.005
UK	0.028***	0.014	0.038***	0.040	0.026***	0.014	0.033**	0.037	0.009	0.012	0.008	0.009
U.S.	0.013	0.009	-0.014	-0.007	-0.022**	-0.026**	-0.049***	-0.042***	-0.036***	-0.041**	-0.068***	-0.064***
Developing/emerging economies												
Bulgaria	-0.048*		-0.091*		-0.046*		-0.088*		-0.042		-0.078*	
Chile	0.002		-0.014		0.003		-0.012		-0.001		-0.016	
Colombia	-0.007		0.103***		-0.014		0.100***		-0.013		0.099***	
Costa Rica			0.040*				0.042**				0.047**	
Egypt	0.091***		0.075***		0.093***		0.078***		0.095***		0.078***	
Hungary	0.008		0.046***		0.011		0.048***		0.016		0.052***	
India	-0.057***		-0.042**		-0.055***		-0.040**		-0.051**		-0.040***	
Iran	-0.033*		-0.000		-0.029*		0.001		-0.028*		0.002	
Jordan	-0.007		-0.000		-0.008		-0.000		-0.005		0.004	
Kenya			-0.021				-0.024				-0.023	
Malaysia	-0.035		-0.041**		-0.038		-0.042**		-0.052		-0.055***	
Morocco	-0.034**		-0.043***		-0.035**		-0.045***		-0.041***		-0.052***	
Pakistan	-0.032*		-0.046***		-0.030*		-0.043***		-0.030*		-0.043***	
Panama	0.131***				0.130***				0.134***			
Peru	0.011		0.011		0.008		0.007				0.002	
Poland	-0.025**		-0.031***		-0.022*		-0.028**		-0.022*		-0.028**	
Russia			-0.003				-0.002				-0.012	
Tunisia			-0.044***				-0.043***				-0.040***	
Turkey	-0.029**		-0.038***		-0.031***		-0.037***		-0.032**		-0.038***	
Average R^2	0.112	0.508	0.057	0.215	0.128	0.532	0.065	0.268	0.186	0.535	0.166	0.413
N	30	15	35	17	30	15	35	17	30	15	35	17

Table 7: Estimates of U.S. unadjusted and merger-adjusted listing gaps, all countries 1990–2020

The table reports coefficient estimates from the following regression specification:

$$ln(Y_{it}) = \alpha + \delta_i + \tau_t + \beta D_{US} + \Gamma(D_{US} \times \tau_t) + \lambda X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \quad t = 1990, .., 2020, \quad i = 1, .., N,$$

where the dependent variable for country i in year t (Y_{it}) varies by column: actual listing count (G1) per capita (1–2) or per GDP (3–4), public-to-public merger-adjusted listing count (G2) per capita (5–6) or per GDP (7–8), or all-merger-adjusted listing count (G3) per capita (9–10) or per GDP (11–12). G1, G2, and G3 are defined in Eq. (10). δ_i and τ_t are country and year fixed effects, respectively. Country fixed effects are only included in even-numbered columns below. D_{US} is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the country is the U.S. and zero otherwise, and X_{it} is a set of country-specific control variables (anti-self-dealing index, log(GDP/capita) and GDP growth) in year t. For each year t after 1990, the size of the U.S. listing gap is computed as $Y_{US,1990} \times Pop_{US,t} \times (e^{\gamma_t} - 1)$ or $Y_{US,1990} \times GDP_{US,t} \times (e^{\gamma_t} - 1)$ (depending on the Y_{it} scaling variable), where γ_t is the annual parameter in the vector Γ. The regressions are run on the full sample of 74 countries. U.S. listing count data are from CRSP, foreign listing count data are from WDI and exchange homepages, and merger data are from SDC. Parentheses display country-clustered standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

	Y_{it}: **Unadjusted listing count (G1)**				Y_{it}: **Public-to-public merger-adjusted listing count (G2)**				Y_{it}: **All-merger-adjusted listing count (G3)**			
	Per capita		Per GDP		Per capita		Per GDP		Per capita		Per GDP	
Regressors	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Constant	0.176	1.571***	-0.812**	-0.031	0.109	1.592***	-0.835**	-0.045	-0.086	1.838***	-0.853***	-0.107
	(0.362)	(0.310)	(0.330)	(0.102)	(0.360)	(0.310)	(0.327)	(0.103)	(0.359)	(0.327)	(0.312)	(0.109)
Anti-self-dealing index	1.375***		1.180**		1.425***		1.242**		1.489***		1.340***	
	(0.479)		(0.510)		(0.472)		(0.501)		(0.454)		(0.472)	
Log(GDP/capita)	0.634***	0.299**			0.652***	0.282**			0.717***	0.146		
	(0.085)	(0.135)			(0.084)	(0.135)			(0.084)	(0.143)		
GDP growth	-0.003	-0.001	0.004	-0.004***	-0.004	-0.001	0.003	-0.004***	-0.005	0.000	0.000	-0.004***
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)
U.S. dummy	-0.401**		-0.695***		-0.434**		-0.712***		-0.533***		-0.758***	
	(0.181)		(0.187)		(0.179)		(0.185)		(0.173)		(0.179)	
U.S. 1991 dummy	0.043	0.012	-0.027	0.074	0.059	0.019	-0.009	0.083	0.084	0.015	0.029	0.091
	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.055)	(0.057)
U.S. 1992 dummy	0.068	0.002	0.009	0.060	0.098*	0.025	0.042	0.084*	0.151***	0.047	0.105*	0.118**
	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.062)	(0.050)	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.061)	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.048)	(0.059)	(0.050)
U.S. 1993 dummy	0.162*	0.080	0.010	0.118	0.209**	0.114	0.061	0.154*	0.297***	0.168*	0.177*	0.215***
	(0.092)	(0.085)	(0.107)	(0.079)	(0.092)	(0.084)	(0.105)	(0.079)	(0.090)	(0.084)	(0.099)	(0.079)
U.S. 1994 dummy	0.034	0.063	-0.143	0.072	0.103	0.117	-0.075	0.129	0.196**	0.177**	0.052	0.191**
	(0.099)	(0.088)	(0.116)	(0.091)	(0.096)	(0.086)	(0.115)	(0.090)	(0.097)	(0.086)	(0.114)	(0.092)
U.S. 1995 dummy	0.069	0.069	-0.035	0.127	0.151	0.144	0.052	0.205**	0.273***	0.227**	0.193*	0.299***
	(0.097)	(0.091)	(0.111)	(0.092)	(0.098)	(0.090)	(0.111)	(0.092)	(0.100)	(0.090)	(0.112)	(0.095)
U.S. 1996 dummy	0.182	0.076	-0.008	0.144	0.295**	0.173*	0.112	0.243**	0.456***	0.277***	0.308**	0.360***
	(0.116)	(0.095)	(0.136)	(0.094)	(0.117)	(0.094)	(0.136)	(0.095)	(0.118)	(0.096)	(0.135)	(0.099)
U.S. 1997 dummy	0.086	-0.009	-0.183	0.040	0.236*	0.121	-0.023	0.172*	0.432***	0.259***	0.221	0.320***
	(0.131)	(0.094)	(0.162)	(0.097)	(0.132)	(0.094)	(0.162)	(0.098)	(0.134)	(0.095)	(0.159)	(0.103)
U.S. 1998 dummy	-0.047	-0.131	-0.364**	-0.151	0.150	0.045	-0.156	0.027	0.380***	0.235**	0.132	0.213*
	(0.135)	(0.095)	(0.163)	(0.105)	(0.136)	(0.094)	(0.163)	(0.106)	(0.139)	(0.096)	(0.162)	(0.111)
U.S. 1999 dummy	-0.232*	-0.277***	-0.562***	-0.343***	0.026	-0.040	-0.304*	-0.116	0.273*	0.182*	0.005	0.092
	(0.138)	(0.093)	(0.168)	(0.106)	(0.142)	(0.093)	(0.169)	(0.107)	(0.146)	(0.095)	(0.167)	(0.113)

Continued on next page

Table 7: Continued (page 2 of 2)

	Y_{it}: Unadjusted listing count (G1)				Y_{it}: Public-to-public merger-adjusted listing count (G2)				Y_{it}: All-merger-adjusted listing count (G3)			
	Per capita		Per GDP		Per capita		Per GDP		Per capita		Per GDP	
Regressors	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
U.S. 2000 dummy	-0.355**	-0.369***	-0.697***	-0.458***	-0.051	-0.094	-0.401**	-0.201*	0.208	0.152	-0.076	0.026
	(0.141)	(0.094)	(0.174)	(0.105)	(0.144)	(0.094)	(0.172)	(0.107)	(0.149)	(0.096)	(0.170)	(0.113)
U.S. 2001 dummy	-0.502***	-0.456***	-0.844***	-0.576***	-0.149	-0.129	-0.496***	-0.265**	0.114	0.131	-0.168	-0.030
	(0.139)	(0.096)	(0.170)	(0.108)	(0.142)	(0.096)	(0.170)	(0.108)	(0.148)	(0.097)	(0.169)	(0.115)
U.S. 2002 dummy	-0.556***	-0.504***	-0.851***	-0.639***	-0.199	-0.166*	-0.492***	-0.304***	0.067	0.106	-0.171	-0.058
	(0.131)	(0.100)	(0.152)	(0.109)	(0.132)	(0.099)	(0.152)	(0.109)	(0.138)	(0.101)	(0.152)	(0.115)
U.S. 2003 dummy	-0.580***	-0.547***	-0.769***	-0.632***	-0.195	-0.177*	-0.389***	-0.266**	0.073	0.092	-0.085	-0.014
	(0.123)	(0.103)	(0.138)	(0.109)	(0.123)	(0.102)	(0.138)	(0.109)	(0.128)	(0.104)	(0.139)	(0.114)
U.S. 2004 dummy	-0.485***	-0.532***	-0.676***	-0.549***	-0.117	-0.147	-0.301**	-0.166	0.170	0.119	0.020	0.097
	(0.127)	(0.105)	(0.146)	(0.110)	(0.128)	(0.105)	(0.146)	(0.111)	(0.134)	(0.107)	(0.147)	(0.116)
U.S. 2005 dummy	-0.452***	-0.511***	-0.657***	-0.482***	-0.042	-0.114	-0.239	-0.082	0.257*	0.148	0.097	0.185
	(0.135)	(0.110)	(0.158)	(0.114)	(0.136)	(0.109)	(0.158)	(0.114)	(0.142)	(0.111)	(0.159)	(0.119)
U.S. 2006 dummy	-0.421***	-0.491***	-0.595***	-0.423***	0.002	-0.082	-0.165	-0.010	0.294**	0.165	0.159	0.251**
	(0.137)	(0.112)	(0.159)	(0.116)	(0.139)	(0.112)	(0.159)	(0.116)	(0.146)	(0.114)	(0.162)	(0.123)
U.S. 2007 dummy	-0.433***	-0.506***	-0.513***	-0.376***	-0.000	-0.087	-0.076	0.049	0.288**	0.145	0.227	0.307**
	(0.136)	(0.117)	(0.151)	(0.119)	(0.137)	(0.116)	(0.152)	(0.119)	(0.143)	(0.119)	(0.155)	(0.125)
U.S. 2008 dummy	-0.421***	-0.529***	-0.479***	-0.321***	0.035	-0.093	-0.021	0.125	0.333**	0.124	0.287*	0.384***
	(0.138)	(0.122)	(0.152)	(0.119)	(0.139)	(0.121)	(0.153)	(0.120)	(0.145)	(0.125)	(0.158)	(0.127)
U.S. 2009 dummy	-0.429***	-0.569***	-0.620***	-0.351***	0.048	-0.122	-0.137	0.104	0.361**	0.090	0.211	0.359***
	(0.158)	(0.126)	(0.185)	(0.122)	(0.161)	(0.125)	(0.186)	(0.122)	(0.168)	(0.129)	(0.190)	(0.131)
U.S. 2010 dummy	-0.451***	-0.585***	-0.542***	-0.365***	0.039	-0.118	-0.048	0.110	0.332**	0.086	0.261	0.357***
	(0.144)	(0.126)	(0.164)	(0.123)	(0.145)	(0.125)	(0.165)	(0.124)	(0.153)	(0.129)	(0.169)	(0.132)
U.S. 2011 dummy	-0.447***	-0.617***	-0.499***	-0.342***	0.053	-0.138	0.004	0.145	0.344**	0.051	0.304*	0.388***
	(0.144)	(0.130)	(0.162)	(0.126)	(0.146)	(0.130)	(0.163)	(0.126)	(0.152)	(0.133)	(0.167)	(0.135)
U.S. 2012 dummy	-0.448***	-0.631***	-0.594***	-0.343***	0.072	-0.140	-0.070	0.156	0.371**	0.045	0.257	0.397***
	(0.158)	(0.134)	(0.187)	(0.128)	(0.160)	(0.132)	(0.188)	(0.129)	(0.168)	(0.136)	(0.192)	(0.138)
U.S. 2013 dummy	-0.436***	-0.611***	-0.547***	-0.332**	0.086	-0.114	-0.021	0.173	0.368**	0.061	0.281	0.403***
	(0.155)	(0.135)	(0.177)	(0.131)	(0.156)	(0.134)	(0.179)	(0.131)	(0.164)	(0.136)	(0.183)	(0.139)
U.S. 2014 dummy	-0.387**	-0.577***	-0.528***	-0.307**	0.093	-0.095	-0.048	0.184	0.370**	0.075	0.256	0.407***
	(0.156)	(0.136)	(0.180)	(0.131)	(0.162)	(0.134)	(0.187)	(0.131)	(0.170)	(0.137)	(0.191)	(0.140)
U.S. 2015 dummy	-0.464***	-0.638***	-0.718***	-0.431***	0.027	-0.148	-0.224	0.067	0.304	0.031	0.100	0.286*
	(0.171)	(0.134)	(0.205)	(0.134)	(0.178)	(0.132)	(0.213)	(0.134)	(0.186)	(0.134)	(0.215)	(0.144)
U.S. 2016 dummy	-0.567***	-0.686***	-0.760***	-0.527***	-0.030	-0.164	-0.217	0.000	0.222	0.015	0.070	0.211
	(0.152)	(0.131)	(0.174)	(0.133)	(0.160)	(0.128)	(0.183)	(0.134)	(0.169)	(0.130)	(0.188)	(0.143)
U.S. 2017 dummy	-0.531***	-0.672***	-0.681***	-0.511***	-0.019	-0.149	-0.167	0.019	0.219	0.022	0.099	0.222
	(0.149)	(0.131)	(0.171)	(0.133)	(0.154)	(0.129)	(0.177)	(0.134)	(0.162)	(0.131)	(0.181)	(0.143)
U.S. 2018 dummy	-0.511***	-0.667***	-0.674***	-0.495***	0.005	-0.142	-0.155	0.039	0.237	0.019	0.107	0.233
	(0.153)	(0.134)	(0.175)	(0.135)	(0.158)	(0.132)	(0.181)	(0.136)	(0.166)	(0.134)	(0.185)	(0.145)
U.S. 2019 dummy	-0.530***	-0.657***	-0.742***	-0.493***	0.013	-0.135	-0.191	0.034	0.238	0.018	0.072	0.219
	(0.162)	(0.136)	(0.189)	(0.137)	(0.165)	(0.133)	(0.190)	(0.137)	(0.173)	(0.135)	(0.194)	(0.146)
U.S. 2020 dummy	-0.506***	-0.636***	-0.706***	-0.497***	0.013	-0.138	-0.180	0.007	0.218	0.005	0.061	0.176
	(0.163)	(0.135)	(0.189)	(0.136)	(0.165)	(0.133)	(0.191)	(0.137)	(0.174)	(0.134)	(0.195)	(0.146)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
R^2	0.490	0.933	0.151	0.892	0.503	0.935	0.140	0.888	0.553	0.938	0.133	0.867
N	1,775	2,057	1,775	2,057	1,791	2,079	1,791	2,079	1,791	2,079	1,791	2,079

Table 8: Estimates of U.S. unadjusted and merger-adjusted listing gaps, advanced economies 1990–2020

The table reports coefficient estimates from the following regression specification:

$$ln(Y_{it}) = \alpha + \delta_i + \tau_t + \beta D_{US} + \Gamma(D_{US} \times \tau_t) + \lambda X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \quad t = 1990, .., 2020, \quad i = 1, .., N,$$

where the dependent variable for country i in year t (Y_{it}) varies by column: actual listing count (G1) per capita (1–2) or per GDP (3–4), public-to-public merger-adjusted listing count (G2) per capita (5–6) or per GDP (7–8), or all-merger-adjusted listing count (G3) per capita (9–10) or per GDP (11–12). G1, G2, and G3 are defined in Eq. (10). δ_i and τ_t are country and year fixed effects, respectively. Country fixed effects are only included in even-numbered columns below. D_{US} is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the country is the U.S. and zero otherwise, and X_{it} is a set of country-specific control variables (anti-self-dealing index, log(GDP/capita) and GDP growth) in year t. For each year t after 1990, the size of the U.S. listing gap is computed as $Y_{US,1990} \times Pop_{US,t} \times (e^{\gamma_t} - 1)$ or $Y_{US,1990} \times GDP_{US,t} \times (e^{\gamma_t} - 1)$ (depending on the Y_{it} scaling variable), where γ_t is the annual parameter in the vector Γ. The regressions are run on the subsample of 33 advanced economies. U.S. listing count data are from CRSP, foreign listing count data are from WDI and exchange homepages, and merger data are from SDC. Parentheses display country-clustered standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

	Y_{it}: **Unadjusted listing count (G1)**				Y_{it}: **Public-to-public merger-adjusted listing count (G2)**				Y_{it}: **All-merger-adjusted listing count (G3)**			
	Per capita		Per GDP		Per capita		Per GDP		Per capita		Per GDP	
Regressors	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Constant	-0.284	3.273***	-1.564***	-0.477***	-0.372	3.475***	-1.567***	-0.496***	-0.845	3.985***	-1.558***	-0.542***
	(1.000)	(0.587)	(0.378)	(0.109)	(1.000)	(0.608)	(0.374)	(0.108)	(0.975)	(0.615)	(0.352)	(0.115)
Anti-self-dealing index	2.063***		1.997***		2.089***		2.024***		2.128***		2.089***	
	(0.549)		(0.561)		(0.534)		(0.549)		(0.484)		(0.497)	
Log(GDP/capita)	0.644**	-0.107			0.668**	-0.173			0.802***	-0.338*		
	(0.262)	(0.174)			(0.259)	(0.180)			(0.249)	(0.180)		
GDP growth	0.003	0.001	0.006	-0.002	0.002	0.002	0.005	-0.002	0.000	0.003*	0.002	-0.001
	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.002)
U.S. dummy	-0.431**		-0.478**		-0.452**		-0.493**		-0.518**		-0.543***	
	(0.209)		(0.206)		(0.209)		(0.206)		(0.206)		(0.197)	
U.S. 1991 dummy	-0.068	-0.073	-0.090	-0.010	-0.050	-0.072	-0.072	-0.005	-0.014	-0.079	-0.028	-0.003
	(0.086)	(0.046)	(0.091)	(0.039)	(0.085)	(0.046)	(0.092)	(0.039)	(0.080)	(0.048)	(0.086)	(0.041)
U.S. 1992 dummy	-0.030	-0.051	-0.047	0.040	0.003	-0.038	-0.014	0.058	0.066	-0.027	0.056	0.083*
	(0.092)	(0.056)	(0.097)	(0.045)	(0.092)	(0.055)	(0.099)	(0.045)	(0.087)	(0.055)	(0.093)	(0.047)
U.S. 1993 dummy	-0.072	-0.011	-0.153	0.017	-0.020	0.014	-0.099	0.043	0.081	0.053	0.034	0.087
	(0.167)	(0.068)	(0.180)	(0.068)	(0.166)	(0.068)	(0.183)	(0.069)	(0.154)	(0.068)	(0.170)	(0.076)
U.S. 1994 dummy	-0.027	0.013	-0.084	0.005	0.038	0.062	-0.018	0.054	0.143	0.135	0.110	0.126
	(0.104)	(0.086)	(0.104)	(0.088)	(0.103)	(0.085)	(0.105)	(0.088)	(0.096)	(0.082)	(0.100)	(0.093)
U.S. 1995 dummy	0.097	0.034	0.102	0.122	0.181**	0.105	0.185**	0.198**	0.313***	0.200**	0.316***	0.306***
	(0.081)	(0.087)	(0.081)	(0.092)	(0.081)	(0.086)	(0.081)	(0.094)	(0.081)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.098)
U.S. 1996 dummy	0.056	-0.028	-0.028	0.019	0.172	0.058	0.091	0.107	0.334**	0.159	0.285	0.215
	(0.149)	(0.101)	(0.182)	(0.120)	(0.150)	(0.101)	(0.185)	(0.123)	(0.150)	(0.101)	(0.179)	(0.135)
U.S. 1997 dummy	-0.060	-0.084	-0.199	-0.107	0.094	0.036	-0.040	0.011	0.285	0.166	0.205	0.138
	(0.214)	(0.104)	(0.247)	(0.126)	(0.215)	(0.104)	(0.252)	(0.130)	(0.209)	(0.107)	(0.243)	(0.144)
U.S. 1998 dummy	-0.214	-0.200*	-0.368	-0.296**	-0.017	-0.027	-0.164	-0.130	0.199	0.154	0.111	0.038
	(0.197)	(0.099)	(0.230)	(0.123)	(0.199)	(0.099)	(0.235)	(0.126)	(0.197)	(0.105)	(0.229)	(0.139)
U.S. 1999 dummy	-0.346*	-0.302***	-0.519**	-0.476***	-0.113	-0.084	-0.277	-0.269**	0.105	0.125	0.007	-0.086
	(0.188)	(0.100)	(0.231)	(0.124)	(0.189)	(0.100)	(0.235)	(0.127)	(0.187)	(0.106)	(0.226)	(0.141)

Continued on next page

Table 8: **Continued (page 2 of 2)**

	Y_{it}: **Unadjusted listing count (G1)**				Y_{it}: **Public-to-public merger-adjusted listing count (G2)**				Y_{it}: **All-merger-adjusted listing count (G3)**			
	Per capita		Per GDP		Per capita		Per GDP		Per capita		Per GDP	
Regressors	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
U.S. 2000 dummy	-0.521**	-0.411***	-0.733***	-0.654***	-0.248	-0.153	-0.449*	-0.411***	-0.023	0.071	-0.143	-0.223
	(0.222)	(0.104)	(0.257)	(0.117)	(0.223)	(0.103)	(0.263)	(0.119)	(0.218)	(0.110)	(0.255)	(0.136)
U.S. 2001 dummy	-0.643***	-0.517***	-0.850***	-0.800***	-0.326	-0.206*	-0.522**	-0.506***	-0.112	0.030	-0.229	-0.312**
	(0.194)	(0.110)	(0.228)	(0.117)	(0.195)	(0.109)	(0.232)	(0.117)	(0.194)	(0.114)	(0.228)	(0.129)
U.S. 2002 dummy	-0.645***	-0.572***	-0.801***	-0.812***	-0.308**	-0.233*	-0.455**	-0.487***	-0.097	0.011	-0.185	-0.278**
	(0.141)	(0.116)	(0.180)	(0.121)	(0.143)	(0.115)	(0.182)	(0.121)	(0.151)	(0.117)	(0.181)	(0.129)
U.S. 2003 dummy	-0.589***	-0.639***	-0.665***	-0.747***	-0.226*	-0.274**	-0.297*	-0.387***	-0.013	-0.037	-0.055	-0.165
	(0.117)	(0.120)	(0.148)	(0.126)	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.146)	(0.125)	(0.127)	(0.118)	(0.148)	(0.129)
U.S. 2004 dummy	-0.492***	-0.667***	-0.524***	-0.632***	-0.171	-0.291**	-0.234	-0.281**	0.071	-0.073	0.033	-0.060
	(0.147)	(0.122)	(0.154)	(0.128)	(0.144)	(0.119)	(0.175)	(0.128)	(0.152)	(0.118)	(0.177)	(0.133)
U.S. 2005 dummy	-0.521***	-0.624***	-0.609***	-0.574***	-0.117	-0.247*	-0.201	-0.194	0.138	-0.045	0.088	0.016
	(0.177)	(0.132)	(0.201)	(0.134)	(0.180)	(0.128)	(0.204)	(0.133)	(0.187)	(0.127)	(0.207)	(0.139)
U.S. 2006 dummy	-0.488**	-0.615***	-0.562***	-0.537***	-0.075	-0.229*	-0.145	-0.146	0.166	-0.045	0.124	0.051
	(0.180)	(0.132)	(0.200)	(0.139)	(0.183)	(0.129)	(0.204)	(0.138)	(0.192)	(0.127)	(0.210)	(0.144)
U.S. 2007 dummy	-0.465***	-0.689***	-0.466**	-0.509***	-0.045	-0.293**	-0.047	-0.101	0.182	-0.124	0.181	0.095
	(0.169)	(0.129)	(0.172)	(0.140)	(0.171)	(0.125)	(0.175)	(0.140)	(0.179)	(0.121)	(0.182)	(0.144)
U.S. 2008 dummy	-0.482**	-0.756***	-0.471**	-0.476***	-0.040	-0.350**	-0.030	-0.052	0.199	-0.207	0.205	0.133
	(0.186)	(0.133)	(0.185)	(0.140)	(0.189)	(0.129)	(0.189)	(0.139)	(0.199)	(0.124)	(0.198)	(0.145)
U.S. 2009 dummy	-0.617**	-0.797***	-0.686**	-0.562***	-0.153	-0.385***	-0.221	-0.136	0.090	-0.265**	0.050	0.020
	(0.237)	(0.137)	(0.268)	(0.141)	(0.243)	(0.132)	(0.276)	(0.140)	(0.251)	(0.128)	(0.278)	(0.148)
U.S. 2010 dummy	-0.592***	-0.793***	-0.629***	-0.578***	-0.118	-0.358**	-0.155	-0.130	0.097	-0.239*	0.075	0.021
	(0.200)	(0.138)	(0.223)	(0.143)	(0.205)	(0.133)	(0.228)	(0.142)	(0.217)	(0.127)	(0.234)	(0.149)
U.S. 2011 dummy	-0.556***	-0.814***	-0.552***	-0.544***	-0.076	-0.371**	-0.073	-0.084	0.128	-0.262*	0.130	0.065
	(0.190)	(0.143)	(0.192)	(0.146)	(0.194)	(0.138)	(0.196)	(0.145)	(0.204)	(0.130)	(0.205)	(0.151)
U.S. 2012 dummy	-0.649**	-0.829***	-0.715**	-0.598***	-0.146	-0.377**	-0.212	-0.131	0.064	-0.286**	0.025	-0.006
	(0.236)	(0.147)	(0.265)	(0.147)	(0.242)	(0.142)	(0.272)	(0.145)	(0.250)	(0.136)	(0.275)	(0.154)
U.S. 2013 dummy	-0.594***	-0.789***	-0.635***	-0.575***	-0.095	-0.329**	-0.136	-0.103	0.085	-0.244*	0.060	0.014
	(0.207)	(0.152)	(0.228)	(0.154)	(0.212)	(0.146)	(0.233)	(0.152)	(0.221)	(0.138)	(0.239)	(0.158)
U.S. 2014 dummy	-0.581**	-0.755***	-0.635**	-0.553***	-0.092	-0.307**	-0.146	-0.093	0.079	-0.232	0.047	0.012
	(0.217)	(0.154)	(0.241)	(0.158)	(0.222)	(0.148)	(0.247)	(0.156)	(0.232)	(0.139)	(0.253)	(0.162)
U.S. 2015 dummy	-0.731**	-0.768***	-0.880***	-0.695***	-0.230	-0.312**	-0.373	-0.234	-0.064	-0.239	-0.149	-0.151
	(0.277)	(0.156)	(0.316)	(0.158)	(0.282)	(0.149)	(0.325)	(0.155)	(0.285)	(0.143)	(0.324)	(0.165)
U.S. 2016 dummy	-0.782***	-0.789***	-0.878***	-0.763***	-0.209	-0.290*	-0.308	-0.259	-0.083	-0.209	-0.143	-0.174
	(0.194)	(0.156)	(0.223)	(0.158)	(0.208)	(0.149)	(0.239)	(0.156)	(0.218)	(0.144)	(0.246)	(0.163)
U.S. 2017 dummy	-0.689***	-0.769***	-0.776***	-0.721***	-0.173	-0.275*	-0.256	-0.224	-0.063	-0.207	-0.112	-0.149
	(0.198)	(0.159)	(0.225)	(0.161)	(0.202)	(0.153)	(0.230)	(0.160)	(0.213)	(0.146)	(0.237)	(0.167)
U.S. 2018 dummy	-0.673***	-0.764***	-0.754***	-0.690***	-0.155	-0.270*	-0.232	-0.192	-0.054	-0.218	-0.100	-0.129
	(0.202)	(0.165)	(0.227)	(0.169)	(0.206)	(0.159)	(0.232)	(0.167)	(0.216)	(0.151)	(0.239)	(0.173)
U.S. 2019 dummy	-0.705***	-0.747***	-0.827***	-0.706***	-0.189	-0.261	-0.306	-0.217	-0.097	-0.226	-0.167	-0.176
	(0.238)	(0.168)	(0.267)	(0.172)	(0.243)	(0.161)	(0.274)	(0.170)	(0.250)	(0.153)	(0.279)	(0.177)
U.S. 2020 dummy	-0.657***	-0.698***	-0.771***	-0.681***	-0.169	-0.233	-0.277	-0.215	-0.105	-0.209	-0.169	-0.188
	(0.219)	(0.169)	(0.246)	(0.173)	(0.224)	(0.162)	(0.252)	(0.171)	(0.233)	(0.154)	(0.258)	(0.177)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
R^2	0.390	0.912	0.318	0.874	0.396	0.915	0.304	0.868	0.450	0.921	0.309	0.846
N	927	975	927	975	930	979	930	979	930	979	930	979

Figure 1: **Actual and merger-adjusted U.S. listing counts, 1980–2020**

This figure plots the (monthly) U.S. actual and merger-adjusted counts of listed firms on NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq from 12/31/1980-12/31/2020. The change in the actual (ΔL) and all-merger-adjusted (ΔL_A) listing counts are as follows:

$$\Delta L = \begin{cases} Newlists: & IPO + Spin + Misc_{New} \\ Delists: & Merge_{Public-to-Public} + Merge_{Public-to-Private} + Misc_{Del} \end{cases}$$

$$\Delta L_A = \begin{cases} Newlists_A: & IPO + Merge_{Private-to-Public} + Misc^N_{New} \\ Delists_A: & Merge^N_{Public-to-Private} + Divest_{Subsidiary-to-Private} + Misc^N_{Del} \end{cases}$$

The dotted curve in the middle of this figure is the merger-adjusted listing count when adjusting for mergers involving public targets only. All variables defined in Table 1. Data are from CRSP and SDC.



Figure 2: Inflows and outflows of firm value classified by (de)listing channel

The figure shows the annual values (V_A) of firm inflows (merger-adjusted new lists) and outflows (merger-adjusted delists) in U.S. public markets from 12/31/1980 to 12/31/2020. The annual change in V_A (ΔV_A) is measured using individual transaction values as follows:

$$\Delta V_A = \begin{cases} Newlists_A: & IPO + Merge_{Private-to-Public} + Misc_{New} \\ Delists_A: & Merge_{Public-to-Private} + Divest_{Subsidiary-to-Private} + Misc_{Del} \end{cases}$$

The right axis shows annual values for each channel in 2020 USD billion (bars), while the left axis shows the cumulative net new listing value in 2020 USD trillion (line). The new lists and delists in Table 1 that have an effect on the actual, but not merger-adjusted, listing count are not included. The vertical dotted line indicates the date of the U.S. listing peak. Variable definitions are as in Figure 1 except that, in this figure, transactions are measured by market value. Data from CRSP and SDC.



Figure 3: Net inflows of listing value by industry

This graph breaks down the net new listing value in Figure 2 by industry according SIC codes. In Panel A, firms are divided into four categories. Financial firms are those with SIC codes 6000-6999 and utilities those with 4900-4999. High tech firms are defined by the American Electronic Association, as in Eckbo, Makaew, and Thorburn (2018). Remaining non-government firms are classified as industrial (non-high tech). Panel B further breaks down high tech firms by two-digit SIC codes. All values are inflation-adjusted to 2020 USD. The vertical dotted line indicates the date of the U.S. listing peak.



Figure 4: 'Synergistic' merger waves and economic contribution of listed firms

Panel A shows the share of industry-years undergoing a synergistic merger wave for our sample of public-to-public mergers, 1980–2020, using the 49 industries in Fama and French (1997). Following John, Kadyrzhanova, and Lee (2021), industry-years are considered to undergo a synergy wave if the number of deals with positive bidder and target combined wealth effect (CWE) in that year is one standard deviation above the industry time-series median. CWE is the value-weighted average CAR for the event period (-3,3), where (0) is the announcement date. CARs are calculated as the difference between the realized and value-weighted market return. Pre-announcement market value of the bidder and target is measured one month before the deal announcement. Both acquirer and target must be U.S. public firms, with the bidder holding less than 50% of target shares before announcement and seeking to hold at least 50% after the transaction. Panel B shows the time series of public firms' percent contribution to aggregate U.S. employment, GDP, R&D spending, and patents, with data from the BEA, BLS, Compustat, GCPD, IMF, OECD, and USPTO. Construction and data series are detailed in Appendix A.3.

A: Share of industry-years with synergistic public-to-public merger waves



B: Contribution of listed firms to economic activities



Figure 5: **Annual number of global listing peaks, 1975–2019**

This figure shows the annual number of listing peaks (economies with fewer listed firms in 2020 than earlier, at peak) around the world. The peak in 1975 is Argentina. Blue bars designate advanced economies and grey bars designate developing and emerging economies. 57 of 74 sampled countries and territories are represented in the figure. The U.S. listing count is from CRSP and consists of firms with common stock listed on NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq. Non-U.S. listing counts are found using data from WDI, the WFE, CEIC, and individual stock exchange home-pages. Investment companies, mutual funds, real estate investment trusts, and other collective investment vehicles are excluded. See Appendix A.4 for further details on data selection. The vertical dotted line in 1996 marks the year of the U.S. listing peak.



Figure 6: **Country-specific listing peak years and subsequent listing decline, 1975–2020**

This figure shows the decline in the number of listed firms from the listing peak year to 2020. Light bars are countries that have not experienced a peak, and dark bars indicate countries that have peaked (have fewer listed firms in 2020 than at peak). The listing peak year is shown in parentheses. 74 countries are sampled: 33 advanced (Panel A) and 41 developing/emerging (Panel B). Data are from CRSP, WDI, WFE, CEIC, and stock exchange homepages. Advanced and developing/emerging economies are classified by the IMF. The vertical dotted line shows the U.S. decline of 50% from 1996 to 2020.



Figure 7: Listing peaks in event time, 1975–2020

Conditional on experiencing a listing peak, this figure plots the percent change in listing count over the eleven-year event window (-5,5) centered on the peak year (year 0) in Panel A, and 21-year window (-10,10) in Panel B. Countries with listing peaks are drawn from the period 1975–2020. The percent change is relative to the country's listing count in year 0. The portfolios of 23 non-U.S. advanced and 30 developing/emerging economies are equal-weighted. Four countries are excluded due to outliers: Croatia, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, and Portugal. Economic development is classified by the IMF. Data are from CRSP, WDI, WFE, CEIC, and stock exchange home pages.



Figure 8: **International merger rates, 1990–2020**

This figure shows the average annual merger likelihood for listed companies by country or territory. Panel A shows the likelihood for a listed company to be the target or acquirer in a completed merger. Panel B shows the likelihood for a listed company to be acquired by another domestic listed firm. Blue bars indicate advanced economies and grey bars indicate developing/emerging economies. Merger data are from SDC, listing counts are from CRSP, WDI, WFE, CEIC, and stock exchanges, and economic development status is classified by the IMF.

A: All mergers where at least one party is a public firm



B: Public-to-public mergers only



Figure 9: Merger-adjusted peaks in event time, 1990–2020

For countries with a listing peak, Panel A plots the percent change in public-to-public merger-adjusted listing count over the eleven-year event window (-5,5) centered on the peak year (year 0). Panel B plots the all-merger-adjusted listing count during the same event window. The countries in this event-period sample are required to have a peak in 1995 or later to allow for full event-period data coverage. Croatia and Czech Republic are excluded due to outliers. The percent change is relative to the country's adjusted listing count in year 0.

A: Public-to-public merger-adjusted listing counts in event time



B: All-merger-adjusted listing counts in event time



Figure 10: **Population-scaled unadjusted and merger-adjusted U.S. listing gaps**

This figure shows the unadjusted (G1, black line) and two merger-adjusted U.S. listing gaps, estimated as follows:

$$ln(L/Pop_{it}) = \alpha + \delta_i + \tau_t + \beta D_{US} + \Gamma(D_{US} \times \tau_t) + \lambda X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \quad t = 1990, .., 2020, \quad i = 1, .., N.$$

$ln(L/Pop_{it})$ is the natural logarithm of the unadjusted or merger-adjusted listing count of country i in year t, scaled per capita and specified as follows. In Panel A, the listing count is adjusted by adding one to the listing count for each public- and minimum-sized private-to-public merger (G3, blue line). In Panel B, the listing count is adjusted by adding back one for each domestic public-to-public merger (G2, broken red line). Additionally, the U.S. merger-adjusted listing series tracks net firm outflows via the acquisition index N_{it}, as well as spinoffs and subsidiary divestitures. Listing gaps G1, G2, and G3 are defined in Eq. (10). δ_i and τ_t are country and year fixed effects, respectively. D_{US} is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if country i is the U.S. and zero otherwise, and X_{it} is a vector of three country-specific control variables: country i's anti-self-dealing index, log(GDP/capita) and GDP growth. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level. The U.S. listing gap in year t is computed as $L/Pop_{US,1990} \times GDP_{US,t} \times (e^{\gamma_t} - 1)$, where γ_t is the annual parameter in the vector Γ. The sample consists of 74 countries and covers 1990–2020. U.S. listing data are from CRSP, non-U.S. listing data are from WDI, WFE, CEIC, and exchange homepages, and merger data are from SDC. The vertical dotted line indicates the year of the U.S. listing peak. The shaded grey area displays 90% confidence intervals.

A: Unadjusted and merger-adjusted listing gaps (G1, G3)



B: Public-to-public merger-adjusted listing gap (G2)



A Data sources and additional listing information

A.1 Data on U.S. listing anatomy

In the paper, we define U.S. public firms in CRSP and require them to be domestic companies with common stock (share codes 10 or 11) that are listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq (exchange codes 1, 2, 3, 31, 32, and 33). We further exclude investment funds and trusts (SIC codes 6722, 6726, and 6798–6799). We also exclude firms that are listed for only one day. Appendix Figure A.1 Panel A shows the number of U.S. public firms listed on each individual stock exchange from 1980–2020.

New lists are recorded when a firm first appears in the sample of CRSP public firms, or when it is relisted after at least two weeks off public markets (thus excluding SEC trading suspensions of a listed firm, which may last no more than ten days). To categorize new lists, we first identify IPOs using data from SDC and Jay Ritter's website.[11] Spinoffs are identified either in CRSP, with distribution code 3763 (Vijh, 1994), or SDC, using acquirer name "shareholders" or spinoff, splitoff, and carve-out dummies. For each spinoff new list, we match the parent company to a U.S. public firm at the time of listing. Relistings occur after a U.S. public firm has been delisted for at least two weeks (not including suspension periods). Reorganizations are cases in which a merger between two public companies results in the creation of a new firm and removal of the old firms (as defined by PERMCO). We identify form changes when a firm that already exists in CRSP but did not meet the U.S. public criteria does so.[12]

Delists are recorded when a firm ceases to be publicly listed for at least two weeks. To classify delists, we follow Fama and French (2004) and use CRSP delisting codes: merger (delisting codes 200–399), cause (codes 400–569 and 574–999), and voluntary (codes 570–573). In CRSP, every PERMNO has one and only one delisting code observation (if a PERMNO has never been delisted, it will have a delisting code of 100 on the last day of available CRSP data). This means that if

[11] https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/

[12] Examples of form changes include when a company relocates from another country to the U.S., changes the form of its listed equity to common stock, or a SPAC completes an acquisition and changes SIC code from investment vehicle to operating company.

a firm is delisted and later relisted, no CRSP delisting code is provided for the first delisting. Furthermore, no delisting code is provided if a PERMNO fails to uphold the public-firm criteria listed above but still remains in CRSP. If no CRSP delisting code is available, we classify the delisting reason as unknown. Finally, for CRSP merger delistings we identify the acquiring firm using SDC, CRSP variables 'acquiring PERMNO' and 'acquiring PERMCO', or by hand using web searches.

The value of a new listing is the CRSP market cap on the day of the listing. If this value is unavailable, we use the earliest available market value within two weeks. To estimate the value of a firm at delisting, we use the CRSP variable 'amount after delisting'. If this is missing or equal to zero, we use CRSP delisting price instead. If the delist is not marked in CRSP (i.e., an unspecified delist), or if both amount after delisting and delisting price are missing, we use market cap on the day of delisting. If no market cap data are available on that day, we use the closest available data no more than two weeks before the delisting. If a firm (PERMCO) has two or more U.S. public PERMNOs (usually different share classes) simultaneously, we sum the value of these when calculating market cap.

A.2 Choice of minimum size threshold for private targets

It is necessary to impose a minimum firm-size threshold for a private target (and a subsidiary) to be reasonably classified as a *bona fide* listable firm and included in our merger-adjusted count. Our threshold is the year-end 1^{st} percentile of the market capitalization of all publicly listed firms in the target's Fama-French-12 industry. To avoid a downward bias due to financial distress, we also require the firms used to identify this size threshold to be listed also in year $t+1$. Appendix Figure A.2 Panel A plots this size threshold (solid black line) as well as the same threshold without a one-year survivorship requirement (dotted black line). As shown, eliminating the one-year survivorship requirement has a negligible impact on the size threshold.

For comparison purposes, the grey bars in Appendix Figure A.2 Panel A also show the annual distribution of the 1^{st} percentile of the market value of IPO firms, using the firm's closing price

at the end of the first trading day and averaged across industries. Note that the industry-specific minimum size of a private target of a public acquirer may well be smaller than the minimum size of a firm that goes public via an IPO. The reason is that the two channels for entering the stock market are very different. For example, a firm may select a sell-out to a public acquirer when the IPO channel is particularly costly, e.g. in terms of investment banking fees and disclosure requirements. A private negotiation resulting in a sell-out may also be preferable when the target assets are particularly difficult to value based on public information. Therefore, for our purposes, we do not impose an IPO-based size threshold on the acquisition channel. Note also that our chosen benchmark has the desirable property of being stable relative to the 1^{st} percentile of IPOs, while also capturing the general trend toward a larger minimum firm size to survive as an independently listed firm.

Appendix Figure A.2 Panel B shows the large number of post-1996 merger transactions that qualify as drivers of the wedge between the actual and merger-adjusted U.S. listing counts L and L_A. Of these, the most numerous are $Merge_{Private-to-Public}$ and $Merge_{Public-to-Public}$. Also shown are the total outflows (net of relistings) from the acquisition index N_{it} when public firms leave the exchange. The dark shaded area restricts N_{it} to public targets only, while the lighter shaded area also includes private targets. As shown, N_{it} is substantial and, naturally, lags both $Merge_{Private-to-Public}$ and $Merge_{Public-to-Public}$.

A.3 Data on economic contribution of listed firms

Table 3 shows the annual amount of employment, gross product, R&D spending, and patents generated by U.S. public firms, the U.S. economy as a whole, and majority-owned foreign affiliates (MOFAs), explained below. To calculate the contribution of public firms to U.S. employment, we follow the methodology of Schlingemann and Stulz (2022). For U.S. public firms, we collect the Employees (EMP) variable from CRSP/Compustat Merged Fundamentals Annual (CCM) database from WRDS. We only keep firms that can be matched to our CRSP sample of end-of-year public firms described above. If a firm is missing EMP in one year but not in adjacent years

before and after, we replace the missing value with the average of the adjacent values. To find U.S. aggregate employment, we use non-farm employment in December of each year (not seasonally adjusted) as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (series ID: CEU0000000001). Since Compustat does not distinguish between the employment and gross product generated by U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) in the U.S. versus abroad, it is necessary to adjust aggregate U.S. employment to also include output generated by MOFAs of U.S. MNCs.We therefore add MOFA employment from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to U.S. employment reported by the BLS.

Schlingemann and Stulz (2022) also provide the methodology that we use to calculate the fraction of U.S. gross product (value added) attributable to public firms. Firm-level gross product is found by summing Operating Income Before Depreciation (OIBDP) and Staff Expense Total (XLR). To fill in missing values of XLR, we find the median ratio of XLR to EMP for industries with at least 20 non-missing observations (firms) in each year. For firms with missing XLR but non-missing EMP, EMP is multiplied with this median ratio to estimate labor expenses. Four industry classifications are used, in order of descending preference: Fama-French 17, Fama-French 12, 2-digit SIC, and finally BLS Supersectors. At the aggregate U.S. level, GDP is from the IMF and MOFA gross product is from the BEA.

To analyze the role of U.S. public firms in innovation, we look at both research and development (R&D) expenditure and patents. Firm-level R&D spending is found in CCM using the Research and Development Expense (XRD) variable. U.S. aggregate R&D spending is reported by the OECD (series name: GERD-SOF) and includes the source of funding. We include all sectors with funding from domestic sources. We also add MOFA R&D spending to the U.S. aggregate with data from the BEA. The BEA does not report MOFA R&D prior to 1989, so we estimate these values by assuming that the ratio of MOFA R&D to value added is the same in 1982–1988 as in 1989. Firm-level patents are from the University of Virginia Darden School of Business Global Corporate Patent Dataset (GCPD) (Bena, Ferreira, Matos, and Pires, 2017). The GCPD reports the annual number of utility patents granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

to publicly listed firms around the world, with complete coverage from 1980–2016. After matching GCPD data to our CRSP sample of public firms and aggregating patent grants by year, we divide by the annual count of USPTO utility patent grants of U.S. origin.

A.4 Data on non-U.S. listings and mergers

To select which countries are included in our international sample, we start with the top 100 countries and territories by GDP per the IMF and as of 2020. For each country, we require listing count data to be available from WDI, WFE, CEIC, or stock exchange homepages. We also require the 2020 listing count to be reported and the country to have at least 10 years of listing count observations. The full list of countries and territories included in each step of the sample selection procedure is available in the Internet Appendix.

U.S. listing data are from CRSP as per above. For non-U.S. countries, the number of listed firms is sourced from WDI and supplemented when necessary with data from the WFE, CEIC, and foreign stock exchange homepages themselves. Data from the following stock exchange's homepages are used: Borsa Italiana, Boursa Kuwait, Bratislava Stock Exchange, Cambodia Securities Exchange, Central Africa Securities Stock Exchange (BVMAC), Euronext, Ghana Stock Exchange, Japan Exchange Group, Nairobi Securities Exchange, Nasdaq Baltic, Nasdaq Nordic, Pakistan Stock Exchange, Prague Stock Exchange, and TMX Group. In some cases, older versions of a stock exchanges homepage are accessed via The Wayback Machine.

The WDI data source raises some issues due to the merging of smaller local stock exchanges within a country. To account for this, we use the data sources listed above to record a consistent set of stock exchanges for each sampled country.[13] As in the U.S., we exclude investment companies,

[13]For example, the WDI Canadian listings includes only the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) prior to 2003, and the sum of the TSX and TSX Venture Exchange (TSXV) afterward (resulting in a one-year jump in the number recorded listed firms from 1,252 to 3,578). The TSXV was formed in 1999 by combining regional Canadian stock exchanges (primarily Alberta and Vancouver). The firm population in these smaller regional stock exchanges is different from that of the country's major stock exchange(s): new ventures are typically smaller and more risky than the more established firms. Based on this population difference, and in order to preserve a consistent time series within any given country, we exclude changes in the WDI listing counts resulting from regional exchange consolidations. In the case of Canada, we therefore use the TSX listing count net of the TSXV. Similarly, for Japan, we exclude listings on the Osaka Exchange from the Japan Exchange Group (JPX) after the exchange consolidation

mutual funds, real estate investment trusts (REITs), and other collective investment vehicles. In Panel B of Appendix Figure A.1, we show the time-series of the aggregate listing count for non-U.S. advanced economies and developing/emerging economies from 1980-2020.

We identify international merger transactions using SDC. Deals are required to be completed, result in 100% ownership by the acquirer, and take the deal form merger, acquisition, or acquisition of majority/partial/remaining interest (since the latter also results in delisting). To be counted as public, a target or acquirer must be listed on a major exchange. Targets listed on minor or OTC exchanges are counted as private.

We identify listing peaks if a country's actual listing count is lower in 2020 than earlier in the sample period. The listing-peak year is then the year of the country's listing count maximum. When a country has two identical peak years, we use the most recent year. For five non-advanced countries (Brazil, Bulgaria, Kenya, Nigeria, and Poland), there are two identical peak years. Furthermore, if a country has a second peak at least ten years after the first and with a listing count within 95% of the first peak, we use the year of the second peak. This applies to Belgium, Mexico and Norway.

in 2013. While the WDI listing count data for Spain include regional exchanges, these exchanges are consistent over time and we thus keep these data as recorded. Were we to instead use data from Spain's primary exchange (the Mercado Continuo) only, we would have observed a listing peak in 2007 instead of 2015.

Appendix Table A. 1: **New lists and delists in the U.S. by type, 1981–2020**

This table shows the total annual (year-end) number of new lists (Panel A) and delists (Panel B) on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX. The change in the actual listing count, ΔL is the sum of the following six variables, all of which are defined in Table 1:

$$\Delta L = \begin{cases} Newlists: & IPO + Spin + Misc_{New} \\ Delists: & Merge_{Public-to-Public} + Merge_{Public-to-Private} + Misc_{Del} \end{cases}$$

IPO are initial public offerings, $Spin$ are spinoffs, and $Misc_{New}$ are miscellaneous new listings. $Misc_{Del}$ are miscellaneous delists. The subscript in $Merge$ indicates the direction of the change in the target's public/private status.

A: $Newlists = IPO + Spin + Misc_{New}$

Year	Total lists (L)	$Newlists$	IPO	$Spin$	$Misc_{New}$			
					Uplists	Relist	Reorg.	Form
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
1981	5,073	646	309	0	315	14	4	4
1982	4,999	326	105	0	181	35	4	1
1983	5,571	944	635	0	258	42	5	4
1984	5,691	621	317	8	243	47	4	2
1985	5,652	570	292	11	209	49	4	5
1986	5,930	984	603	10	291	66	1	13
1987	6,222	828	449	14	291	68	5	1
1988	5,955	437	191	14	175	47	8	2
1989	5,770	419	181	14	162	56	3	3
1990	5,634	414	156	15	177	52	7	7
1991	5,672	529	345	6	124	45	3	6
1992	5,801	650	464	13	141	25	2	5
1993	6,334	894	588	16	231	52	4	3
1994	6,634	747	497	15	207	24	3	1
1995	6,861	796	514	14	217	39	8	4
1996	7,325	1,028	748	19	210	31	14	6
1997	7,315	709	490	21	164	21	8	5
1998	6,873	523	299	11	172	22	11	8
1999	6,539	633	467	20	102	30	12	2
2000	6,246	585	347	16	152	47	18	5
2001	5,550	196	75	11	57	38	6	9
2002	5,129	170	69	10	49	32	8	2
2003	4,807	192	68	9	66	44	4	1
2004	4,750	320	172	9	67	55	7	10
2005	4,684	320	160	10	95	47	6	2
2006	4,616	304	163	10	86	36	4	5
2007	4,524	349	195	14	92	41	4	3
2008	4,259	144	36	19	44	33	4	8
2009	4,005	126	44	5	52	18	2	5
2010	3,874	194	100	5	55	27	3	4
2011	3,721	150	88	11	24	23	2	2
2012	3,601	161	116	10	24	5	2	4
2013	3,594	232	173	11	31	12	4	1
2014	3,713	317	225	21	40	24	5	2
2015	3,681	219	140	23	30	21	4	1
2016	3,542	155	85	17	36	14	1	2
2017	3,515	230	140	11	57	13	5	4
2018	3,520	232	147	12	50	12	2	9
2019	3,520	231	147	6	38	14	1	25
2020	3,633	312	227	10	40	21	2	12
Total		17,837	10,567	471	5,055	1,342	204	198
Average	5,108	446	264	12	126	34	5	5

Continued on next page

Appendix Table A. 1: Continued (page 2 of 2)

B: $Delists = Merge_{Public-to-Public} + Merge_{Public-to-Private} + Misc_{Del}$

Year	Actual listing count (L)	$Delists$	$Merge_{Pub-to-Pub}$	$Merge_{Public-to-Private}$				$Misc_{Del}$		
				Acq. by U.S. priv.	Acquired by non-U.S. public	Acquired by non-U.S. private	Acq. by unknown	Cause	Voluntary	Unknown
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
1981	5,073	290	96	41	10	11	12	96	1	23
1982	4,999	397	112	53	8	8	10	162	1	43
1983	5,571	373	119	55	0	3	7	144	4	41
1984	5,691	501	125	95	9	6	4	201	15	46
1985	5,652	607	159	81	10	5	8	263	12	69
1986	5,930	708	168	96	22	3	15	317	10	77
1987	6,222	535	158	71	25	4	11	204	9	53
1988	5,955	704	162	147	36	10	13	275	15	46
1989	5,770	605	111	109	32	4	5	280	16	48
1990	5,634	550	97	58	26	6	6	307	7	43
1991	5,672	491	86	20	6	1	1	325	13	39
1992	5,801	520	115	16	2	0	1	328	21	37
1993	6,334	361	131	32	5	1	4	151	9	28
1994	6,634	449	199	29	19	0	1	157	9	35
1995	6,861	567	246	48	20	1	1	204	11	36
1996	7,325	565	303	59	25	4	0	152	6	16
1997	7,315	719	352	77	38	2	2	217	4	27
1998	6,873	967	391	99	47	7	0	368	5	50
1999	6,539	965	375	94	81	5	0	333	7	70
2000	6,246	879	371	111	74	5	0	273	8	37
2001	5,550	891	268	86	49	10	0	394	25	59
2002	5,129	590	161	50	15	4	0	286	28	46
2003	4,807	515	144	69	16	2	0	217	24	43
2004	4,750	376	161	68	14	2	0	94	17	20
2005	4,684	389	142	53	23	6	0	110	30	25
2006	4,616	369	146	82	23	7	1	76	7	27
2007	4,524	441	163	120	40	12	0	85	7	14
2008	4,259	410	105	71	40	3	0	143	25	23
2009	4,005	380	66	38	17	0	0	181	49	29
2010	3,874	326	97	71	22	3	0	105	18	10
2011	3,721	303	65	90	26	5	0	90	8	19
2012	3,601	282	80	77	16	4	0	84	5	16
2013	3,594	239	85	65	13	8	0	48	7	13
2014	3,713	197	78	42	18	3	0	36	6	14
2015	3,681	251	99	35	33	4	0	54	9	17
2016	3,542	293	100	56	27	14	0	84	2	10
2017	3,515	273	94	52	31	11	0	54	8	23
2018	3,520	211	85	42	21	6	0	42	3	12
2019	3,520	232	55	62	24	13	0	59	8	11
2020	3,633	198	38	37	21	8	1	64	13	16
Total		18,919	6,108	2,657	984	211	103	7,063	482	1,311
Average	5,108	473	153	66	25	5	3	177	12	33

Appendix Table A. 2: Merger-adjusted new lists and delists in the U.S. by type, 1990–2020

This table shows the total annual (year-end) number of new lists and delists on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX that impact the merger-adjusted listing count. The change in the all-merger-adjusted listing count, ΔL_A is the sum of the following six variables, all of which are defined in Table 1:

$$\Delta L_A = \begin{cases} Newlists_A: & IPO + Merge_{Private-to-Public} + Misc^N_{New} \\ Delists_A: & Merge^N_{Public-to-Private} + Divest_{Subsidiary-to-Private} + Misc^N_{Del} \end{cases}$$

The superscript N indicates that the count adjusts for the acquisition index (Eq. 3). IPO are initial public offerings and $Misc^N_{New}$ are miscellaneous new listings. $Misc^N_{Del}$ are misc. delists. The subscript in $Merge^{(N)}$ and $Divest$ indicates the direction of the change in the target's public/private status.

Year	All-merger-adjusted count (L_A)	$Newlists_A$	IPO	$Merge_{Priv-to-Pub}$ U.S. priv. target	$Merge_{Priv-to-Pub}$ Non-U.S. target	$Misc^N_{New}$	$Delists_A$	$Merge^N_{Pub-to-Priv}$	$Divest_{Sub-to-Priv}$	$Misc^N_{Del}$
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
1981	5,319	812	309	160	1	342	209	81	8	120
1982	5,571	553	105	224	0	224	301	84	8	209
1983	6,546	1,248	635	298	1	314	273	71	8	194
1984	7,078	951	317	330	4	300	419	142	6	271
1985	7,254	691	292	103	3	293	515	148	5	362
1986	7,720	1,082	603	99	4	376	616	175	3	438
1987	8,207	935	449	96	4	386	448	160	7	281
1988	8,075	523	191	79	9	244	655	282	8	365
1989	7,989	531	181	99	18	233	617	196	14	407
1990	7,963	563	156	108	13	286	589	162	11	416
1991	8,158	692	345	124	18	205	497	39	18	440
1992	8,541	876	464	199	30	183	493	29	27	437
1993	9,463	1,228	588	297	29	314	306	62	27	217
1994	10,285	1,150	497	360	45	248	328	68	26	234
1995	11,103	1,250	514	389	59	288	432	108	26	298
1996	12,250	1,565	748	454	68	295	418	166	19	233
1997	12,981	1,262	490	469	82	221	531	209	13	309
1998	13,330	1,177	299	501	129	248	828	259	24	545
1999	13,560	1,140	467	384	105	184	910	327	16	567
2000	13,816	1,156	347	439	100	270	900	376	15	509
2001	13,271	473	75	216	59	123	1,018	274	25	719
2002	12,891	409	69	158	54	128	789	112	15	662
2003	12,672	416	68	134	46	168	635	156	13	466
2004	12,932	647	172	198	70	207	387	175	16	196
2005	13,038	623	160	208	71	184	517	234	20	263
2006	13,093	577	163	174	59	181	522	319	17	186
2007	13,096	653	195	214	66	178	650	461	22	167
2008	12,794	347	36	134	60	117	649	307	28	314
2009	12,280	239	44	70	29	96	753	151	14	588
2010	12,268	489	100	74	60	255	501	270	19	212
2011	12,046	350	88	117	57	88	572	374	18	180
2012	11,967	327	116	110	49	52	406	199	19	188
2013	12,045	425	173	81	61	110	347	217	10	120
2014	12,261	529	225	137	48	119	313	171	16	126
2015	12,299	437	140	136	53	108	399	195	21	183
2016	12,144	314	85	88	34	107	469	290	17	162
2017	12,132	397	140	93	43	121	409	258	19	132
2018	12,223	356	147	92	20	97	265	172	3	90
2019	12,148	361	147	78	26	110	436	261	9	166
2020	12,152	394	227	58	12	97	390	203	3	184
Total		28,148	10,567	7,782	1,699	8,100	20,712	7,943	613	12,156
Average	10,874	704	264	195	42	203	518	199	15	304

Appendix Figure A. 1: **Listing count by stock exchange and around the world, 1980–2020**

Panel A shows the number of firms listed on each of the three major U.S. stock exchanges. Panel B shows the total number of domestic listed firms in 74 of the 100 countries with highest GDP in 2020 according to the IMF, with 33 classified as advanced economies and 41 as developing or emerging economies. U.S. data are from CRSP. Non-U.S. listing counts are from WDI, WFE, CEIC, and individual stock exchange home-pages. See Appendix A for further details on the data selection. The vertical dotted line in 1996 marks the year of the U.S. listing peak.



Appendix Figure A. 2: Firm size thresholds and transactions in the merger-adjusted series

The transformation from unadjusted to all-merger-adjusted listing count requires a firm size threshold for $Merge_{Private-to-Public}$ and $Divest_{Subsidiary-to-Private}$. While ignoring industry matching, Panel A shows the time series of three such alternative firm size thresholds (measured in 2020 USD million). These are the 1^{st} percentile market values of IPOs, all listed firms, and all listed firms that also survive and stay listed over the following year. In the empirical analysis, the size threshold is the 1^{st} percentile of listed firms with survivorship requirement, matched with the Fama-French 12 industry classification of the firm. Panel B shows the annual count of the transactions that differentiate the unadjusted, public-to-public merger-adjusted, and merger-adjusted listing counts after applying this size threshold. N_it net delists are delists of accumulated targets minus relists. All transactions are defined in Eqs. (1), (2), and (3) in the text. The vertical dotted line indicates the date of the U.S. listing peak. Sample period 12/31/1980–12/31/2020. Data are from CRSP and SDC.

A: Firm size thresholds for private-to-public mergers and subsidiary divestitures



B: Transactions differentiating the unadjusted and merger-adjusted listing counts



Merger-driven listing dynamics

Internet Appendix

A Further on international listings

This section provides supplemental information on our analysis of international listings and listing peaks. First, Internet Appendix Table 1 shows the countries included in each step of the international sample selection process, starting with the 100 countries and territories with the largest GDP as of 2020 per the IMF. The seletion criteria are discussed in detail in Appendix Section A.4. In our final sample of 74 countries, 53 overlap with the sample of 54 countries in Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2017), who instead construct a sample based on the 71 countries with an anti-self-dealing index in Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). The subset of advanced economies is the same in both papers. We have verified that the results of this paper are unaffected by switching to the sample in the earlier listing gap paper.

Second, Internet Appendix Table 2 shows the unadjusted listing count at five different points in time for countries with a peak: 10 and 5 years before the peak, at peak, and 5 and 10 years after the peak. At each point, the actual listing count as well as its level relative to peak is shown. Countries are sorted according to economic development group and peak year. The contents of the table are visualized in Figure 7 of the paper.

Internet Appendix Table 1: International sample selection process

This table shows the countries included in each step of the sample selection process, starting with the 100 countries and territories with the largest GDP as of 2020 per the IMF.

100 highest GDP countries and territories in 2020 according to IMF (1)	Listing count data are available (2)	Listing count data are are available for 2020 (3)	At least 10 years of listing count data are available (4)
Algeria	–	–	–
Angola	–	–	–
Argentina	Argentina	Argentina	Argentina
Australia	Australia	Australia	Australia
Austria	Austria	Austria	Austria
Azerbaijan	Azerbaijan	–	–
Bahrain	Bahrain	Bahrain	Bahrain
Bangladesh	Bangladesh	Bangladesh	Bangladesh
Belarus	Belarus	–	–
Belgium	Belgium	Belgium	Belgium
Bolivia	–	–	–
Brazil	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil
Bulgaria	Bulgaria	Bulgaria	Bulgaria
Cameroon	Cameroon	–	–
Canada	Canada	Canada	Canada
Chile	Chile	Chile	Chile
China	China	China	China
Colombia	Colombia	Colombia	Colombia
Costa Rica	Costa Rica	Costa Rica	Costa Rica
Croatia	Croatia	Croatia	Croatia
Czech Republic	Czech Republic	Czech Republic	Czech Republic
DR Congo	–	–	–
Denmark	Denmark	Denmark	Denmark
Dominican Republic	–	–	–
Ecuador	Ecuador	–	–
Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt
Estonia	Estonia	Estonia	Estonia
Ethiopia	–	–	–
Finland	Finland	Finland	Finland
France	France	France	France
Germany	Germany	Germany	Germany
Ghana	Ghana	Ghana	Ghana
Greece	Greece	Greece	Greece
Guatemala	–	–	–
Hong Kong	Hong Kong	Hong Kong	Hong Kong
Hungary	Hungary	Hungary	Hungary
India	India	India	India
Indonesia	Indonesia	Indonesia	Indonesia
Iran	Iran	Iran	Iran
Iraq	–	–	–
Ireland	Ireland	Ireland	Ireland
Israel	Israel	Israel	Israel
Italy	Italy	Italy	Italy
Ivory Coast	–	–	–
Japan	Japan	Japan	Japan
Jordan	Jordan	Jordan	Jordan
Kazakhstan	Kazakhstan	Kazakhstan	Kazakhstan
Kenya	Kenya	Kenya	Kenya
Kuwait	Kuwait	Kuwait	Kuwait
Latvia	Latvia	Latvia	Latvia

Continued on next page

Internet Appendix Table 1: **Continued (page 2 of 2)**

100 highest GDP countries and territories in 2020 according to IMF (1)	Listing count data are available (2)	Listing count data are are available for 2020 (3)	At least 10 years of listing count data are available (4)
Lithuania	Lithuania	Lithuania	Lithuania
Luxembourg	Luxembourg	Luxembourg	Luxembourg
Malaysia	Malaysia	Malaysia	Malaysia
Mexico	Mexico	Mexico	Mexico
Morocco	Morocco	Morocco	Morocco
Myanmar	Myanmar	Myanmar	–
Nepal	–	–	–
Netherlands	Netherlands	Netherlands	Netherlands
New Zealand	New Zealand	New Zealand	New Zealand
Nigeria	Nigeria	Nigeria	Nigeria
Norway	Norway	Norway	Norway
Oman	Oman	Oman	Oman
Pakistan	Pakistan	Pakistan	Pakistan
Panama	Panama	Panama	Panama
Paraguay	Paraguay	–	–
Peru	Peru	Peru	Peru
Philippines	Philippines	Philippines	Philippines
Poland	Poland	Poland	Poland
Portugal	Portugal	Portugal	Portugal
Puerto Rico	–	–	–
Qatar	Qatar	Qatar	Qatar
Romania	Romania	Romania	Romania
Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia
Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabia
Serbia	–	–	–
Singapore	Singapore	Singapore	Singapore
Slovakia	Slovakia	Slovakia	Slovakia
Slovenia	Slovenia	Slovenia	Slovenia
South Africa	South Africa	South Africa	South Africa
South Korea	South Korea	South Korea	South Korea
Spain	Spain	Spain	Spain
Sri Lanka	Sri Lanka	Sri Lanka	Sri Lanka
Sudan	–	–	–
Sweden	Sweden	Sweden	Sweden
Switzerland	Switzerland	Switzerland	Switzerland
Taiwan	Taiwan	Taiwan	Taiwan
Tanzania	Tanzania	–	–
Thailand	Thailand	Thailand	Thailand
Tunisia	Tunisia	Tunisia	Tunisia
Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey
Turkmenistan	–	–	–
Uganda	–	–	–
Ukraine	Ukraine	–	–
UAE	UAE	UAE	UAE
UK	UK	UK	UK
U.S.	U.S.	U.S.	U.S.
Uruguay	Uruguay	–	–
Uzbekistan	–	–	–
Venezuela	Venezuela	–	–
Vietnam	Vietnam	Vietnam	Vietnam
Number of countries and territories in sample			
100	84	75	74

Internet Appendix Table 2: Listing-count changes in event time around peak (0) in Table 4

This table shows the change in actual listing count L for countries with a listing peak, 10 and 5 years before and after the peak. The countries, sorting, and data sources in this table are as in Table 4.

	Peak year -10		Peak year -5		Peak year	Peak year +5		Peak year +10	
Country	L	% change	L	% change	L	L	% change	L	% change
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
A: Advanced countries that have peaked									
Denmark	247	11%	210	30%	274	260	-5%	237	-14%
New Zealand	–	–	–	–	339	139	-59%	132	-61%
Luxembourg	73	375%	88	294%	347	59	-83%	56	-84%
Portugal	38	316%	25	532%	158	89	-44%	76	-52%
Austria	62	81%	75	49%	112	101	-10%	109	-3%
Ireland	–	–	–	–	93	68	-27%	57	-39%
United States	5,930	24%	5,672	29%	7,325	5,550	-24%	4,616	-37%
Canada	1,856	7%	1,673	19%	1,991	1,239	-38%	1,409	-29%
Czech Republic	–	–	3	2,967%	92	37	-60%	19	-79%
Estonia	–	–	–	–	25	14	-44%	18	-28%
Latvia	–	–	–	–	67	56	-16%	36	-46%
Lithuania	–	–	–	–	60	45	-25%	41	-32%
Belgium	190	46%	162	72%	278	235	-15%	165	-41%
Finland	73	116%	73	116%	158	133	-16%	123	-22%
France	443	167%	710	67%	1,185	749	-37%	617	-48%
Israel	216	207%	652	2%	664	579	-13%	596	-10%
Netherlands	260	51%	184	113%	392	237	-40%	150	-62%
Slovenia	–	–	45	236%	151	100	-34%	66	-56%
Greece	135	151%	246	38%	339	289	-15%	248	-27%
Switzerland	215	34%	232	25%	289	253	-12%	236	-18%
Singapore	250	126%	328	72%	564	461	-18%	483	-14%
United Kingdom	2,041	43%	2,438	19%	2,913	2,001	-31%	1,794	-38%
Germany	700	9%	715	6%	761	665	-13%	450	-41%
Norway	214	-2%	160	31%	209	173	-17%	175	-16%
Slovakia	11	45%	14	14%	16	13	-19%	13	-19%
Spain	3,290	10%	3,310	9%	3,623	2,695	-26%	–	–
Australia	1,913	5%	1,959	3%	2,013	–	–	–	–
Average	1,003	63%	993	50%	993	698	-24%	535	-32%
(excluding Czech Republic, Luxembourg, and Portugal due to outliers)									
B: Developing/emerging countries that have peaked									
Argentina	–	–	–	–	321	277	-14%	226	-30%
South Africa	507	49%	464	63%	754	615	-18%	650	-14%
Brazil	404	47%	522	13%	592	548	-7%	478	-19%
Mexico	271	44%	188	107%	390	185	-53%	175	-55%
Costa Rica	16	94%	–	–	31	21	-32%	22	-29%
India	1,911	214%	2,556	135%	5,999	5,795	-3%	4,796	-20%
Pakistan	360	117%	542	44%	782	747	-4%	651	-17%
Chile	211	39%	244	20%	294	245	-17%	238	-19%
Colombia	–	–	83	54%	128	110	-14%	90	-30%
Peru	–	–	235	5%	246	195	-21%	201	-18%
Romania	–	–	–	–	126	57	-55%	62	-51%
Hungary	–	–	40	60%	64	47	-27%	42	-34%
Panama	–	–	97	56%	151	27	-82%	34	-77%
Egypt	–	–	654	76%	1,150	435	-62%	234	-80%
Iran	142	187%	285	43%	408	369	-10%	318	-22%
Oman	114	106%	208	13%	235	114	-51%	116	-51%
Malaysia	615	66%	804	27%	1,021	932	-9%	893	-13%
Croatia	77	366%	67	436%	359	211	-41%	155	-57%
Bahrain	38	18%	38	18%	45	43	-4%	43	-4%
Bulgaria	–	–	326	24%	404	381	-6%	–	–
Morocco	53	45%	52	48%	77	75	-3%	75	-3%
Jordan	163	70%	201	38%	277	228	-18%	180	-35%
Nigeria	–	–	215	0%	215	183	-15%	177	-18%
Kuwait	78	176%	164	31%	215	196	-9%	–	–
Russia	–	–	–	–	292	230	-21%	–	–
Poland	234	273%	570	53%	872	784	-10%	–	–
Turkey	257	53%	263	49%	392	366	-7%	–	–
Ghana	29	28%	29	28%	37	–	–	–	–
Kenya	52	25%	58	12%	65	–	–	–	–
Tunisia	50	64%	71	15%	82	–	–	–	–
Sri Lanka	235	26%	289	3%	297	–	–	–	–
Average	287	87%	354	40%	532	508	-22%	462	-30%
(excluding Croatia due to outliers)									

B Further on U.S. listing gap econometrics

In this section, we provide a detailed comparison of alternative ways to estimate the U.S. listing gap. While we use the parameter γ_t to compute the listing gap, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2017) instead employ a non-U.S. dummy in their basic listing-gap regressions and use the year fixed effect to compute the gap. In our vernacular, this alternative approach is equivalent to using $\gamma_t + \tau_t$ to compute the gap. To see why, consider the regression model in Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2017):

$$ln(Y_{it}) = \alpha' + \tau'_t + \beta' D_{non-US} + \Gamma'(D_{non-US} \times \tau'_t) + \lambda' X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \quad t = 1990, ..., 2012, \quad i = 1, .., N. \quad (1)$$

Their gap-parameter in year t is therefore

$$\begin{aligned} E(Y_{it} \mid D_{non-US} = 0, year = t) \; &- \; E(Y_{it} \mid D_{non-US} = 0, year = 1990) \\ &= \; (\alpha' + \tau'_t) - \alpha' \\ &= \; \tau'_t. \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

If we switch the country dummy back to our D_{US}, and noting that $E(Y_{it} \mid D_{non-US} = 0) = E(Y_{it} \mid D_{US} = 1)$, it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} \tau'_t = E(Y_{it} \mid D_{US} = 1, year = t) \; &- \; E(Y_{it} \mid D_{US} = 1, year = 1990) \\ &= \; (\alpha + \tau_t + \beta + \gamma_t) - (\alpha + \beta) \\ &= \; \gamma_t + \tau_t. \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

Hence, the year fixed effect (τ'_t) estimated in Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2017) equals the sum of the year fixed effect τ_t and the gap-parameter in this paper γ_t, where τ_t is the portion of the U.S. listing trend that is common to the U.S. and all other countries.

The estimates provided in Internet Appendix Table 3 illustrate the impact of the two different

econometric parameterizations of the U.S. listing gap—here and in Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2017). This table shows estimates of the listing-gap parameters γ_t, τ_t, and τ'_t when we use a U.S. dummy (columns 1 and 3, as in our analysis) and a non-U.S. dummy (columns 2 and 4, as in the earlier paper), respectively. This information allows us to isolate the impact on the U.S. listing-gap computation of the inclusion of τ_t. Columns (1) and (2), which exclude the country fixed effect δ_i in the estimation, show that $(\tau_{2020} + \gamma_{2020})/\gamma_{2020} = \tau'_{2020}/\gamma_{2020} = (-0.915)/(-0.506) = 1.81$. In columns (3) and (4), where country fixed effects are included in the regression, the corresponding ratio is smaller: 1.27. In other words, in our analysis, including the global common trend in the listing gap computation (which we do not do) would have increased the size of the gap by 27% at minimum and 81% at maximum. Finally, note that using $-\gamma_t$ as the listing-gap parameter in a regression with a non-U.S. dummy produces exactly the same listing gap estimate as using γ_t with a U.S. dummy.

The above analysis provides a basis for directly comparing the actual (not merger-adjusted) U.S. listing gaps reported by Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2017) and this paper. For year 2012—the last year in the sample period of the earlier paper—the two gaps are -5,436 and -3,289 (both significant at the 1% level), respectively. The above difference in the two listing gap estimates is primarily driven by the earlier paper's inclusion of the common listing trend τ_t in their estimate. However, the two estimates also differ because we adjust for the growth in the dependent-variable scaling factor and take the antilog of γ_t (as per Eq. 9). Other differences arise because of our inclusion of country fixed effects, somewhat different data sources for the listing count, a slightly different set of sampled countries, and a longer sample period (1990–2020 instead of 1990–2012).

Lattanzio, Megginson, and Sanati (2021) also report listing-gap estimates, but with the unscaled listing count $ln(L_{it})$ as the dependent variable—moving the scaling factor $ln(Pop)$ to the right-hand side as a regressor. As Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2017), they use the equivalent of our parameter τ'_t to compute the listing gap, and hence also do not filter out the listing trend that is common across countries. Moreover, their model adds country-level regressors aggregating stock market valuation, private equity volume, and merger activity. They show that this alterna-

tive regression specification substantially lowers the listing gap. From 1991–2019, their regression renders the U.S. listing-gap estimate statistically insignificant for the years 1992–1993 and 2011–2012. In 2019, their gap-estimate is -1,974 firms, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. Internet Appendix Table 4 shows that replacing our dependent variable with $ln(L_{it})$ and using the scaling factor as a regressor does not alter our main conclusion using either the full sample of 74 countries or the subsample of 33 advanced economies.

Finally, we plot our estimates of GDP-scaled U.S. listing gaps in Internet Appendix Figure 1. This figure corresponds to Figure 10 in the paper, except that it scales the dependent regression variable by GDP instead of by population. The three gaps (G1, G2, and G3) of Internet Appendix Figure 1 are generated using the U.S.-year dummy coefficient estimates from columns (4), (8), and (12) of Table 7 in the paper.

Internet Appendix Table 3: Listing gap estimation using a U.S. or non-U.S. dummy

The table reports coefficient estimates from the following regression specification:

$$ln(Y_{it}) = \alpha + \delta_i + \tau_t + \beta D_{(N)US} + \Gamma(D_{(N)US} \times \tau_t) + \lambda X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \quad t = 1990, .., 2020, \quad i = 1, .., N,$$

where the dependent variable for country i in year t (Y_{it}) is the actual listing count (as in G1) per capita. G1 is defined in Eq. (10). δ_i and τ_t are country and year fixed effects, respectively. Country fixed effects are included in columns (3)–(4) below. $D_{(N)US}$ is a U.S. dummy variable in columns (1) and (3) with a value of one if the country is the U.S. and zero otherwise, and a non-U.S. dummy variable in columns (2) and (4) taking a value of zero if U.S. and one otherwise. X_{it} is a set of country-specific control variables (anti-self-dealing index, log(GDP/capita) and GDP growth) in year t. The regressions are run on the full sample of 74 countries. U.S. listing count data are from CRSP, foreign listing count data are from WDI, WFE, CEIC, and exchange homepages, and merger data are from SDC. Standard errors are country-clustered (not shown). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Regressors	U.S. dummy (1)	Non-U.S. dummy (2)	U.S. dummy (3)	Non-U.S. dummy (4)
Constant	0.176	-0.226	1.571***	1.571***
Anti-self-dealing index	1.375***	1.375***		
Log(GDP/capita)	0.634***	0.634***	0.299**	0.299**
GDP growth	-0.003	-0.003	-0.001	-0.001
(Non-)U.S. dummy	-0.401**	0.401**		
(Non-)U.S. 1991 dummy	0.043	-0.043	0.012	-0.012
(Non-)U.S. 1992 dummy	0.068	-0.068	0.002	-0.002
(Non-)U.S. 1993 dummy	0.162*	-0.162*	0.080	-0.080
(Non-)U.S. 1994 dummy	0.034	-0.034	0.063	-0.063
(Non-)U.S. 1995 dummy	0.069	-0.069	0.069	-0.069
(Non-)U.S. 1996 dummy	0.182	-0.182	0.076	-0.076
(Non-)U.S. 1997 dummy	0.086	-0.086	-0.009	0.009
(Non-)U.S. 1998 dummy	-0.047	0.047	-0.131	0.131
(Non-)U.S. 1999 dummy	-0.232*	0.232*	-0.277***	0.277***
(Non-)U.S. 2000 dummy	-0.355**	0.355**	-0.369***	0.369***
(Non-)U.S. 2001 dummy	-0.502***	0.502***	-0.456***	0.456***
(Non-)U.S. 2002 dummy	-0.556***	0.556***	-0.504***	0.504***
(Non-)U.S. 2003 dummy	-0.580***	0.580***	-0.547***	0.547***
(Non-)U.S. 2004 dummy	-0.485***	0.485***	-0.532***	0.532***
(Non-)U.S. 2005 dummy	-0.452***	0.452***	-0.511***	0.511***
(Non-)U.S. 2006 dummy	-0.421***	0.421***	-0.491***	0.491***
(Non-)U.S. 2007 dummy	-0.433***	0.433***	-0.506***	0.506***
(Non-)U.S. 2008 dummy	-0.421***	0.421***	-0.529***	0.529***
(Non-)U.S. 2009 dummy	-0.429***	0.429***	-0.569***	0.569***
(Non-)U.S. 2010 dummy	-0.451***	0.451***	-0.585***	0.585***
(Non-)U.S. 2011 dummy	-0.447***	0.447***	-0.617***	0.617***
(Non-)U.S. 2012 dummy	-0.448***	0.448***	-0.631***	0.631***
(Non-)U.S. 2013 dummy	-0.436***	0.436***	-0.611***	0.611***
(Non-)U.S. 2014 dummy	-0.387**	0.387**	-0.577***	0.577***
(Non-)U.S. 2015 dummy	-0.464***	0.464***	-0.638***	0.638***
(Non-)U.S. 2016 dummy	-0.567***	0.567***	-0.686***	0.686***
(Non-)U.S. 2017 dummy	-0.531***	0.531***	-0.672***	0.672***
(Non-)U.S. 2018 dummy	-0.511***	0.511***	-0.667***	0.667***
(Non-)U.S. 2019 dummy	-0.530***	0.530***	-0.657***	0.657***
(Non-)U.S. 2020 dummy	-0.506***	0.506***	-0.636***	0.636***
Continued on right				

Regressors	U.S. dummy (1)	Non-U.S. dummy (2)	U.S. dummy (3)	Non-U.S. dummy (4)
Continued from left				
1991 dummy	-0.039	0.004	-0.013	-0.001
1992 dummy	-0.052	0.016*	0.005	0.007*
1993 dummy	-0.079	0.083***	-0.001	0.079***
1994 dummy	0.074	0.108***	0.045	0.107***
1995 dummy	0.051	0.119***	0.057	0.126***
1996 dummy	-0.016	0.166***	0.099	0.176***
1997 dummy	0.054	0.140***	0.165*	0.156***
1998 dummy	0.096	0.049***	0.205**	0.073***
1999 dummy	0.203	-0.030**	0.281***	0.004
2000 dummy	0.253*	-0.101***	0.310***	-0.059***
2001 dummy	0.269*	-0.234***	0.268***	-0.188***
2002 dummy	0.233*	-0.323***	0.227**	-0.278***
2003 dummy	0.176	-0.404***	0.191*	-0.356***
2004 dummy	0.046	-0.439***	0.148	-0.384***
2005 dummy	-0.026	-0.478***	0.097	-0.415***
2006 dummy	-0.094	-0.515***	0.047	-0.444***
2007 dummy	-0.120	-0.552***	0.029	-0.477***
2008 dummy	-0.195	-0.615***	-0.012	-0.541***
2009 dummy	-0.240	-0.669***	-0.035	-0.604***
2010 dummy	-0.256*	-0.707***	-0.061	-0.646***
2011 dummy	-0.311**	-0.758***	-0.077	-0.694***
2012 dummy	-0.353**	-0.802***	-0.105	-0.736***
2013 dummy	-0.383**	-0.819***	-0.138	-0.749***
2014 dummy	-0.417**	-0.805***	-0.152	-0.729***
2015 dummy	-0.373**	-0.837***	-0.116	-0.754***
2016 dummy	-0.328**	-0.895***	-0.118	-0.804***
2017 dummy	-0.385**	-0.916***	-0.150	-0.821***
2018 dummy	-0.421***	-0.932***	-0.165	-0.832***
2019 dummy	-0.420**	-0.950***	-0.185	-0.842***
2020 dummy	-0.409**	-0.915***	-0.171	-0.807***
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.490	0.490	0.933	0.933
N	1,775	1,775	2,057	2,057

Internet Appendix Table 4: Listing gap estimates with an unscaled dependent variable

The table reports coefficient estimates from the following regression specification:

$$ln(L_{it}) = \alpha + \delta_i + \tau_t + \beta D_{US} + \Gamma(D_{US} \times \tau_t) + \lambda K_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \quad t = 1990, .., 2020, \quad i = 1, .., N,$$

where the dependent variable for country i in year t (L_{it}) varies by column: unadjusted listing count (G1) (1–2, 7–8), public-to-public merger-adjusted listing count (G2) (3–4, 9–10), and all-merger-adjusted listing count (G3) (5–6, 11–12). G1–G3 are defined in Eq. (10). δ_i and τ_t are country and year fixed effects, respectively. Country fixed effects are only included in the even-numbered columns below. D_{US} is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the country is the U.S. and zero otherwise, and K_{it} is a set of country-specific control variables (anti-self-dealing index, log(GDP), log(population) and GDP growth) in year t. Note two differences with the regressions in Table 7 and Table 8: the dependent variable L_{it} is not scaled like Y_{it}, and the control variables K_{it} are not the same as X_{it}. The regressions are run on the full sample of 74 countries in columns (1)–(6) and 33 advanced economies in columns (7)–(12). U.S. listing count data are from CRSP, foreign listing count data are from WDI, WFE, CEIC, and exchange homepages, and merger data are from SDC. Parentheses display country-clustered standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

	Sample: All economies						**Sample: Advanced economies**					
	L_{it}: **Unadjusted listing count (G1)**		L_{it}: **Pub-to-pub merger-adj listing count (G2)**		L_{it}: **All-merger-adj listing count (G3)**		L_{it}: **Unadjusted listing count (G1)**		L_{it}: **Pub-to-pub merger-adj listing count (G2)**		L_{it}: **All-merger-adj listing count (G3)**	
Regressors	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Constant	1.520***	3.297***	1.422***	3.435***	1.127**	4.247***	0.319	3.576**	0.175	3.929**	-0.387	4.682**
	(0.464)	(0.677)	(0.468)	(0.692)	(0.478)	(0.786)	(0.925)	(1.636)	(0.935)	(1.741)	(0.941)	(2.019)
Log(Population)	0.240***	0.114	0.225**	0.088	0.169*	0.030	0.198	0.982	0.184	0.988	0.074	1.052
	(0.090)	(0.295)	(0.090)	(0.295)	(0.091)	(0.318)	(0.255)	(0.586)	(0.253)	(0.617)	(0.240)	(0.729)
Log(GDP)	0.451***	0.285**	0.474***	0.267**	0.553***	0.128	0.623**	-0.108	0.651***	-0.176	0.787***	-0.342*
	(0.097)	(0.130)	(0.097)	(0.131)	(0.097)	(0.136)	(0.227)	(0.176)	(0.227)	(0.182)	(0.225)	(0.183)
GDP growth	-0.005**	-0.001	-0.006**	-0.001	-0.007***	-0.000	-0.004	0.001	-0.004	0.002	-0.005	0.003*
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)
Anti-self-dealing index	1.631***		1.672***		1.717***		2.083***		2.109***		2.144***	
	(0.395)		(0.393)		(0.388)		(0.504)		(0.498)		(0.468)	
U.S. dummy	0.493		0.439		0.274		0.029		-0.030		-0.165	
	(0.305)		(0.307)		(0.306)		(0.359)		(0.360)		(0.352)	
U.S. 1991 dummy	0.069	0.012	0.084	0.019	0.107**	0.015	-0.005	-0.073	0.009	-0.072	0.034	-0.079
	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.044)	(0.060)	(0.046)	(0.060)	(0.046)	(0.057)	(0.048)
U.S. 1992 dummy	0.088	0.003	0.118**	0.025	0.170***	0.048	0.038	-0.050	0.067	-0.037	0.119*	-0.026
	(0.057)	(0.049)	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.067)	(0.056)	(0.067)	(0.055)	(0.064)	(0.055)
U.S. 1993 dummy	0.216**	0.081	0.261***	0.115	0.345***	0.169**	0.064	-0.011	0.106	0.014	0.187*	0.054
	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.114)	(0.068)	(0.115)	(0.068)	(0.109)	(0.068)
U.S. 1994 dummy	0.149*	0.078	0.214**	0.133	0.298***	0.198**	0.044	0.013	0.103	0.063	0.198**	0.137
	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.081)	(0.086)	(0.081)	(0.085)	(0.076)	(0.082)
U.S. 1995 dummy	0.149*	0.080	0.230**	0.157*	0.346***	0.244***	0.118	0.035	0.200**	0.107	0.330***	0.203**
	(0.088)	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.080)	(0.087)	(0.079)	(0.086)	(0.079)	(0.084)
U.S. 1996 dummy	0.297***	0.088	0.408***	0.186*	0.561***	0.294***	0.176	-0.027	0.283**	0.059	0.427***	0.160
	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.095)	(0.099)	(0.095)	(0.116)	(0.101)	(0.118)	(0.101)	(0.118)	(0.101)
U.S. 1997 dummy	0.228**	0.006	0.374***	0.137	0.559***	0.280***	0.112	-0.083	0.253	0.038	0.419**	0.169
	(0.106)	(0.095)	(0.108)	(0.094)	(0.111)	(0.095)	(0.157)	(0.105)	(0.160)	(0.105)	(0.158)	(0.108)
U.S. 1998 dummy	0.120	-0.109	0.312***	0.069	0.530***	0.265***	-0.055	-0.198*	0.130	-0.024	0.322**	0.159
	(0.115)	(0.096)	(0.116)	(0.095)	(0.121)	(0.095)	(0.149)	(0.100)	(0.153)	(0.101)	(0.155)	(0.106)
U.S. 1999 dummy	-0.050	-0.258***	0.212*	-0.020	0.444***	0.209**	-0.198	-0.300***	0.024	-0.081	0.219	0.130
	(0.118)	(0.093)	(0.125)	(0.093)	(0.131)	(0.094)	(0.141)	(0.102)	(0.145)	(0.102)	(0.149)	(0.108)

Continued on next page

Internet Appendix Table 4: Continued (page 2 of 2)

	Sample: All economies						Sample: Advanced economies					
	L_{it}: Unadjusted listing count (G1)		L_{it}: Pub-to-pub merger-adj listing count (G2)		L_{it}: All-merger-adj listing count (G3)		L_{it}: Unadjusted listing count (G1)		L_{it}: Pub-to-pub merger-adj listing count (G2)		L_{it}: All-merger-adj listing count (G3)	
Regressors	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
U.S. 2000 dummy	-0.158	-0.350***	0.145	-0.072	0.389***	0.181*	-0.343**	-0.409***	-0.084	-0.149	0.114	0.077
	(0.122)	(0.093)	(0.128)	(0.093)	(0.135)	(0.094)	(0.168)	(0.106)	(0.172)	(0.106)	(0.174)	(0.113)
U.S. 2001 dummy	-0.296**	-0.437***	0.055	-0.109	0.302**	0.158	-0.491***	-0.514***	-0.187	-0.201*	0.005	0.038
	(0.124)	(0.095)	(0.130)	(0.094)	(0.136)	(0.095)	(0.156)	(0.115)	(0.160)	(0.114)	(0.164)	(0.120)
U.S. 2002 dummy	-0.363***	-0.484***	-0.015	-0.141	0.237*	0.138	-0.550***	-0.567***	-0.221	-0.226*	-0.025	0.022
	(0.122)	(0.099)	(0.124)	(0.099)	(0.131)	(0.099)	(0.128)	(0.121)	(0.131)	(0.120)	(0.140)	(0.124)
U.S. 2003 dummy	-0.430***	-0.527***	-0.051	-0.155	0.206*	0.121	-0.556***	-0.634***	-0.197	-0.266**	0.012	-0.025
	(0.116)	(0.102)	(0.117)	(0.101)	(0.122)	(0.102)	(0.117)	(0.127)	(0.118)	(0.126)	(0.127)	(0.128)
U.S. 2004 dummy	-0.368***	-0.512***	0.018	-0.129	0.295**	0.143	-0.437***	-0.661***	-0.105	-0.283**	0.126	-0.060
	(0.119)	(0.105)	(0.118)	(0.104)	(0.124)	(0.104)	(0.150)	(0.129)	(0.141)	(0.127)	(0.146)	(0.127)
U.S. 2005 dummy	-0.312**	-0.497***	0.095	-0.099	0.383***	0.167	-0.399**	-0.619***	-0.005	-0.239*	0.232	-0.033
	(0.124)	(0.109)	(0.125)	(0.107)	(0.131)	(0.108)	(0.171)	(0.136)	(0.173)	(0.133)	(0.174)	(0.132)
U.S. 2006 dummy	-0.295**	-0.483***	0.125	-0.073	0.408***	0.177	-0.376**	-0.610***	0.029	-0.220	0.253	-0.031
	(0.127)	(0.111)	(0.128)	(0.109)	(0.135)	(0.110)	(0.176)	(0.136)	(0.179)	(0.133)	(0.182)	(0.131)
U.S. 2007 dummy	-0.346***	-0.503***	0.085	-0.085	0.367***	0.148	-0.415**	-0.682***	0.000	-0.284**	0.220	-0.109
	(0.126)	(0.116)	(0.127)	(0.114)	(0.133)	(0.115)	(0.168)	(0.135)	(0.169)	(0.132)	(0.174)	(0.129)
U.S. 2008 dummy	-0.347***	-0.534***	0.107	-0.099	0.399***	0.117	-0.407**	-0.750***	0.031	-0.341**	0.258	-0.192
	(0.126)	(0.120)	(0.127)	(0.119)	(0.133)	(0.120)	(0.184)	(0.138)	(0.186)	(0.135)	(0.191)	(0.131)
U.S. 2009 dummy	-0.318**	-0.572***	0.157	-0.126	0.462***	0.084	-0.441*	-0.791***	0.010	-0.376***	0.227	-0.251*
	(0.135)	(0.124)	(0.138)	(0.122)	(0.146)	(0.123)	(0.222)	(0.143)	(0.226)	(0.137)	(0.227)	(0.134)
U.S. 2010 dummy	-0.377***	-0.592***	0.112	-0.127	0.399***	0.074	-0.471**	-0.786***	-0.006	-0.348**	0.191	-0.224
	(0.128)	(0.124)	(0.130)	(0.123)	(0.138)	(0.123)	(0.197)	(0.145)	(0.201)	(0.140)	(0.205)	(0.136)
U.S. 2011 dummy	-0.391***	-0.628***	0.108	-0.150	0.395***	0.036	-0.472**	-0.807***	0.002	-0.360**	0.193	-0.246*
	(0.129)	(0.128)	(0.130)	(0.127)	(0.137)	(0.127)	(0.191)	(0.150)	(0.193)	(0.145)	(0.198)	(0.141)
U.S. 2012 dummy	-0.359**	-0.642***	0.159	-0.152	0.452***	0.029	-0.474**	-0.822***	0.016	-0.366**	0.200	-0.270*
	(0.136)	(0.131)	(0.138)	(0.129)	(0.146)	(0.129)	(0.224)	(0.155)	(0.227)	(0.149)	(0.227)	(0.145)
U.S. 2013 dummy	-0.360**	-0.626***	0.160	-0.131	0.437***	0.040	-0.466**	-0.781***	0.023	-0.318**	0.184	-0.227
	(0.135)	(0.133)	(0.136)	(0.130)	(0.144)	(0.129)	(0.204)	(0.160)	(0.206)	(0.155)	(0.208)	(0.150)
U.S. 2014 dummy	-0.308**	-0.595***	0.179	-0.114	0.451***	0.051	-0.439**	-0.747***	0.039	-0.296*	0.189	-0.215
	(0.138)	(0.133)	(0.140)	(0.131)	(0.149)	(0.129)	(0.212)	(0.163)	(0.215)	(0.157)	(0.217)	(0.152)
U.S. 2015 dummy	-0.338**	-0.655***	0.159	-0.165	0.426***	0.008	-0.507**	-0.761***	-0.023	-0.300*	0.110	-0.222
	(0.148)	(0.131)	(0.151)	(0.128)	(0.159)	(0.126)	(0.246)	(0.165)	(0.250)	(0.158)	(0.248)	(0.155)
U.S. 2016 dummy	-0.465***	-0.708***	0.081	-0.186	0.325**	-0.013	-0.647***	-0.780***	-0.083	-0.277*	0.021	-0.190
	(0.137)	(0.129)	(0.142)	(0.126)	(0.151)	(0.124)	(0.192)	(0.167)	(0.203)	(0.161)	(0.206)	(0.159)
U.S. 2017 dummy	-0.442***	-0.696***	0.077	-0.174	0.308**	-0.011	-0.571***	-0.760***	-0.064	-0.262	0.028	-0.187
	(0.138)	(0.130)	(0.139)	(0.127)	(0.147)	(0.125)	(0.196)	(0.169)	(0.199)	(0.164)	(0.203)	(0.161)
U.S. 2018 dummy	-0.419***	-0.694***	0.104	-0.169	0.329**	-0.017	-0.554***	-0.755***	-0.044	-0.257	0.038	-0.198
	(0.140)	(0.133)	(0.141)	(0.129)	(0.149)	(0.127)	(0.199)	(0.175)	(0.201)	(0.169)	(0.205)	(0.165)
U.S. 2019 dummy	-0.413***	-0.684***	0.128	-0.164	0.344**	-0.019	-0.540**	-0.739***	-0.036	-0.249	0.031	-0.207
	(0.146)	(0.134)	(0.147)	(0.131)	(0.155)	(0.128)	(0.224)	(0.177)	(0.228)	(0.171)	(0.229)	(0.166)
U.S. 2020 dummy	-0.383**	-0.663***	0.133	-0.167	0.329**	-0.033	-0.516**	-0.689***	-0.039	-0.220	0.004	-0.189
	(0.148)	(0.134)	(0.149)	(0.131)	(0.157)	(0.128)	(0.212)	(0.179)	(0.216)	(0.172)	(0.219)	(0.168)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
R^2	0.630	0.946	0.640	0.949	0.662	0.953	0.738	0.962	0.749	0.965	0.774	0.969
N	1,775	2,057	1,791	2,079	1,791	2,079	927	975	930	979	930	979

Internet Appendix Figure 1: **GDP-scaled unadjusted and merger-adjusted U.S. listing gaps**

This figure shows the unadjusted (G1, black line) and two merger-adjusted U.S. listing gaps, estimated as follows:

$$ln(L/GDP_{it}) = \alpha + \delta_i + \tau_t + \beta D_{US} + \Gamma(D_{US} \times \tau_t) + \lambda X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \quad t = 1990, .., 2020, \quad i = 1, .., N.$$

$ln(L/GDP_{it})$ is the natural logarithm of the unadjusted or merger-adjusted listing count of country i in year t, scaled with GDP and specified as follows. In Panel A, the listing count is adjusted by adding one to the listing count for each public- and minimum-sized private-to-public merger (G3, blue line). In Panel B, the listing count is adjusted by adding back one for each domestic public-to-public merger (G2, broken red line). Additionally, the U.S. merger-adjusted listing series tracks net firm outflows via the acquisition index N_{it}, as well as spinoffs and subsidiary divestitures. Listing gaps G1, G2, and G3 are defined in Eq. (10). δ_i and τ_t are country and year fixed effects, respectively. D_{US} is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if country i is the U.S. and zero otherwise, and X_{it} is a vector of three country-specific control variables: country i's anti-self-dealing index, log(GDP/capita) and GDP growth. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level. The U.S. listing gap in year t is computed as $L/GDP_{US,1990} \times GDP_{US,t} \times \ (e^{\gamma_t} - 1)$, where γ_t is the annual parameter in the vector Γ. The sample consists of 74 countries and covers 1990–2020. U.S. listing data are from CRSP, non-U.S. listing data are from WDI, WFE, CEIC, and exchange homepages, and merger data are from SDC. The vertical dotted line indicates the year of the U.S. listing peak. The shaded grey area displays 90% confidence intervals.

A: Unadjusted and merger-adjusted listing gaps (G1, G3)



B: Public-to-public merger-adjusted listing gap (G2)



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