Exit vs. Voice

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We thank Anat Admati, Philippe Aghion, Lucian Bebchuk, Tim Besley, Patrick Bolton, John Campbell, Mathias Dewatripont, Alex Edmans, Tore Ellingsen, Jeffrey Gordon, Daniel Green, Elhanan Helpman, Bengt Holmstrom, Harrison Hong, Robert Hughes, Louis Kaplow, Divya Kirti, Augustin Landier, Christian Leuz, Eric Maskin, Joe Ostroy, Ellen Quigley, Ben Roth, Martin Schmalz, Klaus Schmidt, Dirk Schoenmaker, Ilya Segal, Holger Spamann, Yossi Spiegel, Kathy Spier, Laura Starks, David Thesmar, Stefano Zamagni, Joseph Zechnier, Xingtan Zhang; seminar participants at Harvard, MIT, the NBER, the University of Chicago, Indiana University, University of Colorado Boulder, CUNY, Boston University, Cambridge Judge Business School, HEC, University of Zurich, Vienna University of Economics and Business; the ESSO, FOM, ECGI, Stony Brook International Game Theory, Games 2020.1, and 2021 ALEA conferences; and the editor and two anonymous referees for their very useful comments. Eleonora Broccardo gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Department of Economics and Management at the University of Trento. Luigi Zingales gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Stigler Center at the University of Chicago.

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Abstract

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Keywords: Exit, Voice, Social Responsibility, Divestment, Boycott, Engagement

JEL Classifications: D02, D21, D23, D62, D64, H41, L21

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First Version, July 2020, revised, November 2021

Abstract

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1. Introduction

In recent years, companies have come under increasing stakeholder pressure to pursue environmental and social goals. In 2019, $20.6bn flowed to funds that explicitly exclude “non-sustainable” companies, more than 10 times the level a decade earlier (CBInsights (2020)). A 2020 survey suggests that 38% of Americans are boycotting at least one company, up from 26% only the year before.¹ In the 2021 proxy season, 20% of environmental and social shareholder proposals received over 50% support, compared with only 3% in 2016.²

At the same time a growing academic literature has argued that the usual presumption that firms should maximize profit or market value is no longer valid in a world where, as result of political failures either at the national or international level, externalities are not well-controlled.³ In particular, Hart and Zingales (2017) show that, to the extent that a firm has a comparative advantage relative to individuals in producing a public good (or avoiding a public bad), a firm’s shareholders may wish it to pursue some social goals at the expense of profit. Consumers and workers may also be willing to pay a price for a firm to act in a socially responsible way.

In this paper we analyze theoretically whether pressure by stakeholders—consumers, workers, shareholders—is likely to achieve a socially desirable outcome.⁴ For concreteness we focus on the case of environmental harm caused by pollution, such as CO2 emissions. Using Hirschman’s (1970) terminology, we can describe stakeholders’ choices as exit versus voice. Investors or consumers can exercise their exit option by divesting from polluting companies or boycotting their products; alternatively, investors can use their voice by voting or engaging with management⁵. (We focus on consumer boycotts, but argue that worker boycotts are conceptually similar.)

¹ https://www.comparecards.com/blog/38-percent-boycotting-companies-political-pandemic-reasons/
⁴ Our approach should not be confused with what Bebchuk and Tallarita (2020) call “stakeholderism.” Stakeholderism refers to a situation where, in making business decisions, corporate leaders take into account the well-being of stakeholders (rather than just shareholders). In contrast, we are interested in analyzing how various stakeholders (including shareholders) can persuade companies to act in a more socially responsible manner.
⁵ We focus on voice by investors because shareholders have voting rights. Other stakeholders may exercise voice in other ways, e.g., workers or customers can complain. We do not consider other forms of voice in this paper, but see Gans et al. (2021).
We consider a situation where the harm from a polluting firm is spread globally over many individuals. Under standard assumptions that agents are purely selfish, we are faced with a severe free rider problem: the direct benefit an agent receives from any exit or voice decision is negligible. To explain social action, we assume – consistent with empirical evidence – that some investors and consumers are socially responsible in the sense that, when they make a decision, they put a positive weight $\lambda$ on the well-being of others affected by the decision. Thus, the decision to boycott, divest or engage is not based on purely deontological considerations, but on the consequences that these actions have (hence, we call such agents consequentialists).6

In our model each firm can choose to be clean or dirty. A dirty firm produces environmental damage equal to $h$.7 A firm can avoid this damage by incurring a fixed cost $\delta$ and becoming clean. Given our simple set-up, it is socially desirable for a firm to become clean if and only if $h > \delta$.

We start by computing a competitive free entry equilibrium of this economy in the absence of any environmental concerns. We then study how the equilibrium changes when environmental concerns become an issue, depending on the strategy adopted by socially responsible stakeholders.

We first consider the voice strategy. Shareholders are in a unique position to exercise voice because they have voting rights. As a starting point we abstract from any existing corporate governance rules and assume shareholders are presented with a binding vote on whether the firm they invest in should be clean or dirty. As in Hart and Zingales (2017), we assume that shareholders vote as if they are pivotal since this is the only time their vote matters (i.e., they vote in favor of the outcome they prefer). A shareholder trades off her personal capital loss resulting from the choice of the clean technology against the net social benefit from that technology, weighted by the shareholder’s social parameter $\lambda$. If shareholders are well-diversified, the personal capital loss is negligible. The net social benefit equals the reduced pollution minus the cost of generating that reduction. Thus, as long as $\lambda$ is positive, the second effect dominates and socially responsible shareholders vote in line with a benevolent planner’s goal.

6 Our approach differs from the universal ownership literature (see Quigley (2019) and Gordon (2021)). That literature argues that the externalities produced by one firm affect the profitability of other firms, so that even a purely selfish well-diversified investor will internalize some of these externalities in their decisions. While not denying this, we are interested in externalities that affect non-investors as well as investors. To analyze these we ignore interdependency among firms, and focus on social responsibility as a driver of decisions.

7 In this paper we assume $h$ to be known by everybody. In practice, there might be a wide variety of opinions on $h$. As we will see in equation (5.18), $h$ always enters multiplied by $\lambda$. Thus, differences in $h$ can be subsumed in differences in the degree of social responsibility $\lambda$. If we maintained the standard common knowledge assumption, but introduced uncertainty, we would add an interesting risk management problem, analyzed in Andersson et al. (2016).
This result continues to hold if shareholders vote simultaneously on whether all the firms they own should be clean or dirty. Now the personal capital loss is no longer negligible – it is scaled up by the number of firms each shareholder owns – but the social benefit from multiple clean technologies is also scaled up. Thus, the trade-off does not change, as long as the marginal utility an agent receives from wealth and from social benefits is constant.

The conclusion is that, if the majority of agents are even slightly socially responsible, shareholder voice achieves the benevolent planner’s solution. When the majority of agents have a $\lambda$ equal to zero, however, a voice strategy has no impact in reducing pollution.

In practice, putting proposals up for a proxy vote is expensive and it will not be in the interest of atomistic investors to incur the cost of doing so. We argue that mutual funds can use engagement as a marketing strategy and that socially responsible agents will be willing to invest in a Green fund that is committed to promoting an environmental agenda.

We then move to analyze two different exit strategies: divestment and boycotts. Both these strategies work by lowering the market value of a dirty firm, inducing some value-maximizing managers to switch to the clean technology.\footnote{For divestment to have any effect, the demand for shares must be downward-sloping, as in Shleifer (1986). Indeed, Nguyen et al. (2020) show that when a large socially responsible investor announces divestment from a targeted set of companies, the stock prices of the targeted companies drop, albeit only by a little.} However, as shown by Heinkel et al. (2001) for divestment, this effect is attenuated given that selfish agents partially offset the effects of divestment/boycotting via their increased investment/purchases in companies shunned by socially responsible agents\footnote{As an example of this, the Financial Times reports that hedge funds are scooping up shares of oil companies dumped by socially responsible divestors. \url{https://www.ft.com/content/ed11c971-be02-47dc-875b-90762b35080e}}. The magnitude of the response depends on the slope of the demand curve for shares or goods, which is driven by agents’ risk tolerance in the case of shares and by the marginal utility of consumption in the case of goods.\footnote{In practice, the effect of divestment may vary by asset class. According to a review of the literature, there appears to be little to no effect on prices of publicly traded stocks due to divestment or exclusion other than in the very short-term, whereas exit in other asset classes can affect valuations and the cost of capital (Quigley et al. (2020), Appendix IV).}

When we consider the incentive to participate in an exit strategy, we find that only those agents with a social responsibility parameter $\lambda$ above a cut-off will choose to exit (this cut-off depends on what others are doing). It turns out that, if the most socially responsible investors (consumers) are not willing to pay for most of the cost of clean-up by themselves (technically
\( \lambda_n h < \frac{3}{4} \delta \), where \( \lambda_n \) is the highest \( \lambda \), the only equilibrium is where nobody divests (boycotts) and no firms become clean. When \( \lambda_n h > \frac{3}{4} \delta \), there is a possibility of a non-zero divestment (boycotting) equilibrium, but, if there is a positive mass of investors (consumers) with \( \lambda h < \frac{3}{4} \delta \), no divestment (boycotting) equilibrium can achieve the social optimum if \( h > \delta \).

Interestingly, the possibility of a non-zero divestment (boycotting) equilibrium exists even when switching to a clean technology is socially inefficient \( (h < \delta) \), because there is no simple relationship between the individual incentive to participate and the social incentive to create clean firms.

We carry out our analysis under the assumption that exit decisions are common knowledge and agents can commit to them. As we explain in Section 7, in the absence of this assumption, both exit strategies become even less effective.

There is a vast literature on socially responsible investment (SRI). Benabou and Tirole (2010), Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012), and Christiansen et al. (2019) provide very useful overviews. On the divestment side, the first formal model is Heinkel et al. (2001). Our model of divestment is similar to theirs, but with the difference that they take as given that socially responsible investors refuse to hold shares of dirty companies, whereas we suppose that socially responsible investors make the divestment decision based on the impact this decision has. Also our model incorporates boycotts and voice as well as divestment. Pastor et al. (2020) extend the Heinkel et al. (2001) model to derive an ESG factor in an equilibrium asset-pricing model when investors have a taste for ESG (for another paper along similar lines, see Pedersen et al. (2019)). They do endogenize the divestment decision, but under the assumption that investors are purely selfish\(^{11}\). Graff Zivin and Small (2005) and Morgan and Tumlinson (2019) suppose that investors value public goods and pay more for the shares of firms that bundle private and public goods; see also Aghion et al. (2020) and Bonnefon et al. (2019). However, each investor is selfish in that he values his consumption of the public good and not the utility from the public good accruing to others. Baron (2007), Chowdhry et al. (2019), and Gollier and Pouget (2014) consider the impact of divestment, but for the case of large as opposed to atomistic investors. Landier and Lovo (2020)

\(^{11}\) Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) consider a model where the threat by a large privately-informed shareholder to divest can put pressure on management to adopt a value-maximizing strategy, under the assumption that investors are purely selfish.
study the social welfare effect of selected investment by an ESG fund that has some market power, while Oehmke and Opp (2020) and Green and Roth (2020) analyze optimal investment choices for large socially responsible investors who fund wealth-constrained entrepreneurs, exploring the complementarities between the actions of social investors and those of selfish investors.

There is also a smaller literature on consumer boycotting (see Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012) for a survey). Boycotts can be seen as a way to redistribute surplus (see Baron (2001)), or as a way to induce companies to provide a public good (see Bagnoli and Watts (2003) and Besley and Ghatak (2007)). In Bagnoli and Watts (2003) and Besley and Ghatak (2007), each consumer is selfish in that he values his consumption of the public good and not the utility from the public good accruing to others.

There is also a vast literature on corporate social responsibility. This literature argues that companies can or should have a purpose beyond profit or value maximization, including to act in a socially responsible manner (e.g., Edmans (2020), Magill et al. (2015), Mayer (2018), Schoenmaker and Schramade (2019), and Stout (2012)). In contrast, we assume that some individuals are socially responsible and derive the consequences for corporate behavior, depending on the tools these socially responsible individuals have at their disposal.

Our work is related to, but different from, the literature on private politics (Baron (2003)). As Abito et al. (2019) note, private politics refers to actions by private interest, such as activists and NGOs, that target private agents, typically firms, in the court of public opinion. The difference is that our agents are socially responsible, so they pursue the public interest, not just the private one. Other work in this area concerns “confrontational” stakeholder engagement such as protests and boycotts; see Eesley and Lenox (2006).

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our assumption on socially responsible investors and consumers. Section 3 presents the framework. Section 4 analyzes the voice strategy, Section 5 the divestment strategy and Section 6 the boycott one. Section 7 includes discussion and qualifications. Section 8 concludes.

2. Socially Responsible Investors and Consumers

Responsible investing dates back at least as far as 1758, when the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Society of Friends required its members to cease and desist from slaveholding (Brown (1988)). Consumer boycotting can be traced back even further to the vegetarianism of the Jain religion.
The rejection of slavery by the Quakers and of animal products by the Jains was on deontological grounds, and thus did not lend itself to any economic calculus. This original perspective survives in much of the contemporary socially responsible investment literature. From Heinkel et al. (2001) to Hong and Kacperczy (2009), the early literature assumes that some investors simply do not want to own certain kinds of stocks. Such an approach is appropriate for “sinful” products, like tobacco, alcohol, or prostitution, but applies less well to social concerns that are less of a moral nature. Most investors are not morally against companies that emit CO2, they would just like these companies to emit less of it. Trinity Church was not morally against Walmart, it simply wanted Walmart not to sell assault weapons, and so on.

Some of the literature on socially responsible investment and consumption departs from the purely deontological view. For example, Graff Zivin and Small (2005), Morgan and Tumlinson (2019), Bagnoli and Watts (2003), and Besley and Ghatak (2007) endogenize investor and consumer choice by assuming that an individual will value a share or good based on a combination of its private characteristics and the increased harm resulting from production. However, these authors assume that individuals consider only the personal disutility of the increased harm, ignoring the impact on others. As a result, in a large economy, there will be an extreme free rider problem, leading to a large deviation between private and social optimality. Sugden (1982) convincingly argues that such a model is inconsistent with the evidence on charitable contributions. One way to mitigate the free rider problem is to introduce a “warm glow” effect, along the line of Andreoni (1989). In a sense this is what Pastor et al. (2020) do in assuming an individual taste for green investment. However, in Pastor et al.’s approach, investors ignore their impact on others. For a recent paper in which moral individuals take into account their impact on others and act as consequentialists, see Schmidt and Herweg (2020).

In our model socially responsible individuals are altruistic in the sense that they put some weight on the utility of others. This assumption is uncontroversial for foundations that have an explicit social goal, such as the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Yet, there is growing evidence in support of this assumption also for individual agents: see Andreoni and Miller (2002), Charness

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12 In the *Wealth of Nations*, Adam Smith expressed skepticism that the Quakers would have voted to free their slaves if they had many slaves. But, according to Pack and Dimand (1996, p.268), “The Quakers of Philadelphia did make a substantial financial sacrifice when they freed their slaves.”

13 Another way is to introduce reciprocal behavior along the lines of Sugden (1984).
and Rabin (2002), Riedl and Smeets (2017), Brodback et al. (2019), and Bauer et al. (2020).\textsuperscript{14} We adopt Hart and Zingales (2017)’s formulation: we assume that, in making a decision, an individual puts weight $\lambda \in [0,1]$ on the welfare of those affected by the decision, where $\lambda$ reflects her degree of social responsibility.\textsuperscript{15} Consider, for example, the decision of a doctor to get vaccinated against Covid-19 at the beginning of the vaccination campaign, when nobody else was vaccinated. This decision has a private benefit (a reduction in the chance of becoming infected and possibly dying), but also a social one: a reduction in the probability of infecting other people, who might also die as a result. If we assume that the expected private benefit equals 20 and that on average one unvaccinated person infects 5 others, the expected benefit from vaccination for a socially responsible individual equals $20 + \lambda \cdot 100$. If the cost of vaccination is below 20, everybody will get vaccinated, regardless of their degree of social responsibility. But if the cost of vaccination equals 30, only the more socially responsible people ($\lambda > 0.1$) will decide to get vaccinated.

As in Hart and Zingales (2017), we assume that the socially responsible component enters at the time a decision is made, but not after the decision is made.\textsuperscript{16} Assuming otherwise would lead to the paradoxical result that a pandemic raises people’s utility. To appreciate this point, go back to the vaccine example and suppose that the cost of vaccination equals 30 and $\lambda = 0.5$. An individual with such a high $\lambda$ will get vaccinated, since $-10 + 0.5 \cdot 100 = 40 > 0$. Yet, it is unreasonable to think that 40 is her final utility, because she would then be better off as a result of the pandemic. By contrast, if we assume (as we do in the rest of the paper) that the social responsibility component of utility plays a role only in the decision-making process, but does not enter final utility, then the final utility of the individual is $-10$ and thus the pandemic reduces her utility.

\textsuperscript{14} Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Charness and Rabin (2002) find support for such preferences in lab experiments. A preference for socially responsible investment has also been found in field experiments in situations where this preference yields lower expected returns (Bauer et al. (2020) and Riedl and Smeets (2017)). This preference is positively correlated with the degree of altruism (Brodback et al. (2019)). Such a preference is also consistent with the lower return of impact funds (Barber et al. (2020)).

\textsuperscript{15} We suppose that the effect is linear, that is, the impact on others is multiplied by $\lambda$. For some experimental evidence that the effect may be non-linear, see Heeb et al. (2021). For formulations similar to ours, see Acquatella (2020), Besley and Ghatak (2018), and Frydlinger and Hart (2019). In contrast to Hart and Zingales (2017), we do not assume that an agent acts altruistically only when she feels responsible for a situation that has arisen; and we drop the (ad hoc) assumption that the impact on others is weighted by an investor’s shareholding.

\textsuperscript{16} Acquatella (2020) and Frydlinger and Hart (2019) make a similar assumption. Our approach has a connection to Becker and Murphy (1993), where advertising changes the marginal utility of a decision. Here moral considerations change the marginal utility of a decision.
Note that the only place in the analysis where including the socially responsible component in the utility function might change the results is in the calculation of the benevolent planner’s solution in Section 3.4.

One interesting question is how broad is the group of people whose welfare enters a socially responsible individual’s calculations: does it include people in one’s neighborhood, the whole town, the whole country, or the whole world? The answer depends on the socially responsible perspective of an individual and what she considers her relevant community. In this paper, we assume that the community includes everyone affected by the pollution. In the case of greenhouse gas emissions, this means more or less everyone. We return to this issue in Section 7.8.

3. The Economy

3.1 The case where pollution is not a problem

Consider a three-date economy, as shown in Figure 1. There are three distinct groups: entrepreneurs, investors and consumers. At date 0 entrepreneurs can set up firms at a fixed cost $F$; they have zero initial wealth and care only about date 0 money. Entrepreneurs finance the fixed cost by selling shares to investors. They put managers on an incentive scheme so that they will maximize market value in future periods (we return to this below). Investors care only about date 2 return. Production decisions are made at date 1, and production and consumption take place at date 2. Investors and consumers are socially responsible but this does not affect the equilibrium in this subsection since at date 0 pollution is not yet an issue (and is not expected to be an issue).

Each firm has a capacity constraint equal to one. There is an additional marginal cost of production $C$, incurred at date 2. The expected value of $C$ is zero, but $C$ is uncertain. We suppose

\[(3.1) \quad C = \varepsilon,\]

where $\varepsilon$ is an aggregate shock, realized at date 2, which is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance $\sigma^2$. There is symmetric information throughout. We assume that the shock is an aggregate one so that the limited risk bearing capacity of investors plays a role.
We will study a competitive free entry equilibrium. In the basic economy, we normalize the number of investors and the number of consumers each to be one (there is an unlimited number of entrepreneurs). Of course, a one investor, one consumer economy is not competitive. Therefore, in order to make the economy competitive, we will replicate it and take limits, as described below.

The investor has an exponential utility function

\[
U = -e^{-\omega},
\]

where \(\omega\) is her final wealth. The investor holds the shares until date 2, when output is sold and profit is realized. However, at date 1 there is an opportunity for portfolio rebalancing.

The product market consists of a homogenous good (whose origin can be easily determined, e.g., electricity). The consumer’s utility function is

\[
U = \rho q - \frac{1}{2} \tau q^2 - pq
\]

where the third term is the cost of buying \(q\) units of the good at price \(p\). The maximization of this utility leads to the following demand curve,

\[
p = \rho - \tau q, \quad q = \frac{\rho - P}{\tau}.
\]

Output is sold in a competitive market at date 2. At date 1 each firm decides to produce up to its capacity constraint of one since price exceeds the expected value of \(C\), which is zero. Thus total supply equals \(N\), where \(N\) is the number of firms set up at date 0, and equilibrium in the date 2 goods market is given by

\[
N = \frac{\rho - P}{\tau}.
\]

Each firm’s date 2 profit is
\[ (3.6) \quad \tilde{\Pi} = p - \varepsilon = \rho - \tau N - \varepsilon, \]
and expected profit is
\[ (3.7) \quad \Pi = \rho - \tau N. \]

Consider the investor’s date 0 portfolio decision. Assume that the investor can borrow and lend at a zero rate of interest. In a free-entry equilibrium the market value of each firm at date 0 must be \( F \) since otherwise firms would enter or exit. The total return for the investor at date 2 is therefore \( x\tilde{\Pi} - xF \), where \( x \) is her investment level (the number of firms she buys) and we normalize the investor’s initial wealth to be zero. This return has a certainty equivalent equal to
\[ (3.8) \quad CE = x(\Pi - F) - \frac{1}{2} \gamma x^2 \sigma^2. \]
The investor’s demand for shares at date 0 will be given by the \( x \) that maximizes this certainty equivalent. Thus,
\[ (3.9) \quad x = \frac{\Pi - F}{\gamma \sigma^2}. \]
(3.9) provides the total demand for firms’ shares. The total supply equals \( N \). Hence, for the stock market to clear at date 0 we must have
\[ (3.10) \quad \frac{\Pi - F}{\gamma \sigma^2} = N. \]
Using (3.7), we obtain
\[ (3.11) \quad N = \frac{\rho - F}{\gamma \sigma^2 + \tau}. \]
This is the equilibrium number of firms that will set up at date 0.\(^{17}\) From now on we assume \( \rho > F \), so \( N > 0 \). For future reference, it is useful to derive the formula for the certainty equivalent at the optimal investment level \( x \). This is obtained by substituting (3.9) into (3.8):
\[ (3.12) \quad CE = \frac{1}{2} \frac{(\Pi - F)^2}{\gamma \sigma^2} = \frac{1}{2} \frac{(\rho - \tau N - F)^2}{\gamma \sigma^2}. \]

\(^{17}\) We ignore the fact that the solution to (3.11) may not be an integer. This will become unimportant in the limit economy described below.
3.2 Replica economy

The economy as it stands is not competitive. To make it so we replicate the investor and consumer sectors \( r \) times and take limits as \( r \to \infty \). In the replica economy there are \( r \) investors with the above investor preferences and \( r \) consumers with the above consumer preferences. It is easy to see that the equilibrium number of firms will be \( N_r \), where \( N \) is given by (3.11). For large \( r \) each investor, consumer and firm is small relative to the aggregate economy and so has little influence on market prices. In other words, for large \( r \) the economy is approximately perfectly competitive, and in the limit \( r = \infty \) it is perfectly competitive.\(^{18}\)

In the equilibrium of the basic economy the single investor holds 100% of each of the \( N \) firms. In the replica economy we assume that each of the \( r \) investors holds \( 1/r \) of each of the \( N_r \) firms, i.e., each investor is fully diversified\(^{19}\).

In what follows we will have the replica or limit economy in mind even though we will not always be explicit about it. When we study the effects of individual divestment, boycott, and engagement decisions the replica economy will be particularly important.

3.3 Pollution Becomes a Problem at Date 1

Suppose that at date 1 pollution becomes a problem (to emphasize, this eventuality is unanticipated at date 0).\(^{20}\) Operating with the existing technology (which we will now label dirty), each firm produces harm \( h > 0 \) to the environment at date 2. We assume that the total harm from a single firm stays the same as the economy is replicated (replication simply makes the economy more competitive). We also suppose that this harm is spread over the whole population and so the harm an individual investor or consumer experiences from a single firm converges to zero as \( r \to \infty \).\(^{21}\) Finally, we assume that \( h \) is common knowledge.

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\(^{18}\) For details, see, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. (1995).

\(^{19}\) This assumption makes sense if the shock hitting each firm’s marginal cost at date 2 has an idiosyncratic component as well as the aggregate one.

\(^{20}\) We consider a rational expectations equilibrium in Section 7.

\(^{21}\) As an example, suppose that the environmental harm is the loss of beach space due to the rising sea level. Before pollution, there are \( B \) beach spaces available in the world. Given that there are \( N_r \) investors and \( N_r \) consumers, each individual is able to occupy a beach space for a fraction \( B/(2N_r) \) of the day. Imagine that a firm, emitting a certain number of CO2 tons, causes the sea level to rise, reducing the number of beach spaces available by a fraction \( \alpha \). If \( b \) represents an individual’s utility from a full day at the beach, and utility is linear in beach consumption, then total utility falls from \( Bb \) to \( (1- \alpha ) \cdot Bb \) for large \( r \), regardless of the size of \( r \). Hence, the damage caused by the firm is \( \alpha \cdot Bb \), which is \( h \) in our model.
A firm can avoid polluting by incurring an additional fixed cost \( \delta \) at date 1; this fixed cost comes out of date 2 profits. We call the firms that decide to pay this cost “clean”. Thus, the cost of a clean firm is

\[
C^C = \delta + \varepsilon,
\]

while the cost of a dirty firm is as before

\[
C^D = \varepsilon.
\]

We assume that

\[
\delta < F.
\]

(3.15) ensures that a firm prefers to install the clean technology rather than closing down.

If all investors and consumers are purely selfish, the existence of pollution will not change any production or investment decision significantly when \( r \) is large. The reason is that, since the pollution impact of any production and investment decision on each individual converges to zero as \( r \to \infty \), nobody internalizes the pollution externalities (as in Pastor et al. (2020)). As we will see shortly, this is not the case when people are socially responsible. In this case, the outcome depends on the strategy adopted by socially responsible investors and consumers. Before analyzing this, however, we need to consider what a benevolent planner would do, so that we have an appropriate benchmark.

### 3.4 Benevolent Planner’s Response to Environmental Damage

As a benchmark, we derive a benevolent planner’s solution in a world where all investors and consumers are purely selfish.\(^{22}\) The number of firms \( N \) that entrepreneurs have set up at date 0 is given at date 1. However, a benevolent planner can dictate what technology—clean or dirty—each firm should adopt at date 1, that is, she can choose the proportion of clean firms \( \phi = \frac{n}{N} \). Assume that this is the only instrument at the planner’s disposal. That is, the planner chooses \( \phi \) and then lets the date 1 stock market and the date 2 product market clear. The question is at what level will she set \( \phi \).

We suppose that the planner’s objective is to maximize the sum of investor and consumer surplus, net of the harm imposed by pollution. In Appendix A we show that the solution is very

\(^{22}\) The solution is the same under the assumption that investors and consumers are socially responsible but the socially responsible component does not enter their final utility. See the discussion in Section 2.
simple. If $\delta > h$, that is, the cost of avoiding pollution is bigger than the cost of pollution itself, the planner will want all firms to use the dirty technology ($\phi = 0$), while, if $\delta < h$, that is, the cost of avoiding pollution is less than the cost of polluting, the planner will want all firms to become clean ($\phi = 1$).

4. Voice

We now analyze what happens when there is no planner (or government) and social action is left to individual investors or consumers. As in Section 2, we assume that, in making a decision, an individual puts weight $\lambda \in [0, 1]$ on the welfare of those affected by the decision, where $\lambda$ reflects her degree of social responsibility. For simplicity we suppose that the distribution of $\lambda$ in the population is the same for investors and consumers. The distribution has finite support \{\lambda_1, \ldots, \lambda_n\}, where $\lambda_1 < \cdots < \lambda_n$, with associated strictly positive probabilities $\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_n$. 23 (Here $\lambda_1$ could be zero.)

We will study equilibrium in the limit economy where $r = \infty$, but in order to analyze individual exit decisions we will take limits as $r \to \infty$. We start with voice strategies. We focus on the unique ability shareholders have to exercise voice using their voting rights. To build intuition and provide another useful benchmark, we consider first the case where investors are not diversified at all. Specifically, suppose that each investor holds 100% of $N$ firms in the replica economy (rather than $1/r$ of $Nr$ firms). Suppose that, as a 100% owner, the investor can use her voice to determine what these firms do at date 1. Will the investor want her firms to be clean or dirty?

To answer this question, we consider the investor’s return under the two strategies:

Investor’s date 2 return if all firms she owns are dirty $= N (\rho - \tau N - \epsilon) - NF$,

Investor’s date 2 return if all firms she owns are clean $= N (\rho - \tau N - \delta - \epsilon) - NF$.

It follows that the investor loses $N \delta$ if she makes her firms clean. She puts 100% weight on this personal loss. Her decision has no effect on other investors or consumers (clean firms still supply one unit at date 2 and so the goods price does not change). But the environmental gain is

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23 To avoid the replica economy being stochastic, the reader can imagine that each $\lambda$ type is represented in the replica economy exactly according to its frequency.
Nh, which the investor weights by her social responsibility parameter \( \lambda \). So the investor will choose clean if and only if

\[
\lambda Nh > N\delta \Leftrightarrow \lambda h > \delta.
\]

We turn now to the more interesting case where investors are fully diversified. For the moment we abstract from any existing corporate governance rules and assume shareholders are presented with a binding vote on whether a firm they invest in should be clean or dirty (we consider institutional frictions later). As in Hart and Zingales (2017), we assume that shareholders will vote as if they were pivotal since this is the only time their vote matters, in other words they vote the outcome they would like to occur. We assume that all investors continue to buy dirty as well as clean firms. To put it another way they do not both engage and divest. For the moment, we also ignore consumer boycotts.

Suppose that a fraction \( \nu \) of the firms have chosen to become clean at date 1 in the replica economy, that is, there are \( \nu Nr \) clean firms and \( (1-\nu)Nr \) dirty firms. Given \( \nu Nr \) clean firms, the date 1 stock market equilibrium is as follows. The gross return of a clean firm is \( \delta \) less than that of a dirty firm. Thus, in order to ensure that investors stay invested in both kinds of firms, and have the same overall demand for shares as before, we must have \( VF = -dVF = \) (see also Appendix A). Applying (3.12), we see that the certainty equivalent of each fully diversified investor is

\[
CE = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{(\Pi - F)^2}{\gamma \sigma^2} - \nu N\delta \right),
\]

where the second term reflects the capital loss caused by a fraction \( \nu \) of the Nr firms the investor owns becoming clean (she owns \( 1/r \) of each one).

Assume now that a vote takes place on whether one of the remaining dirty firms should become clean. If this firm becomes clean, this will cause the investor’s CE to change by \( \frac{\partial CE}{\partial \nu} \Delta \nu \). But in the replica economy \( \Delta \nu = \left( \frac{\nu Nr + 1}{Nr} \right) - \nu = \frac{1}{Nr} \) and so the change in CE = \( -\frac{\delta}{r} \).

The point is that one firm’s becoming clean causes a total capital loss of \( \delta \), but this is spread evenly over all the shareholders of the firm, each absorbing a fraction \( \frac{1}{r} \). Note the
difference from the case where investors are not diversified. There the capital loss an investor experiences from one of the firms she owns becoming clean is $\delta$ rather than $\frac{\delta}{r}$.

The remaining effect of bringing about an extra clean firm consists of two elements: the impact on the environment and the impact on the wealth of other investors (the effect on consumers is zero, since the supply of output remains at $N$). The impact on the environment is

\begin{equation}
(4.3) \quad h \frac{\partial (\nu N r)}{\partial v} \Delta v = h.
\end{equation}

The (negative) capital gain experienced by the other investors, who own a fraction $1 - \left(\frac{1}{r}\right)$ of the firm, is

\begin{equation}
(4.4) \quad -\left(1 - \frac{1}{r}\right)\delta.
\end{equation}

The investor will vote clean if the sum of the terms in (4.3) and (4.4), weighted by $\lambda$, exceeds her personal capital loss, that is,

\begin{equation}
(4.5) \quad -\frac{1}{r} \delta + \lambda \left[ h - \left(1 - \frac{1}{r}\right)\delta \right] > 0.
\end{equation}

As $r \to \infty$, (4.5) becomes

\begin{equation}
(4.6) \quad h - \delta > 0,
\end{equation}

as long as $\lambda > 0$. This is the same criterion used by the planner. Hence, as long as the majority of investors are at least slightly socially responsible, voting will deliver the social optimum.

**Proposition 1:**

i) Suppose that the majority of investors have $\lambda > 0$. Then majority rule will deliver a socially efficient outcome.

ii) Suppose that the majority of investors have $\lambda = 0$. Then majority rule delivers a socially efficient outcome only if $h < \delta$.

Proposition 1 is highly dependent on the way social benefits enter investors’ utility. We have assumed that socially resposible investors put a positive weight on the net social benefit. If instead socially resposible investors were to weigh positively only the reduction in pollution ($h$), but not its cost ($\delta$), then diversified shareholders would vote in favor of an environmental policy that it is too aggressive from the perspective of a benevolent social planner. This is the allegation that is
often rasied against activist investors, who buy a few shares just to put some issue on the ballot (the so-called gadfly proposals).

A natural question to ask is whether Proposition 1(i) depends on investors voting on one firm at a time. What would happen if investors voted on all firms at the same time? A fully diversified investor will now experience a capital loss of $N\delta$ if every firm becomes clean (she owns $1/r$ of $Nr$ firms). The effect on the wealth of other investors is $-(1-(\frac{1}{r}))Nr\delta$, while the effect on the environment is $Nr\lambda$. It follows that an investor will vote for all firms to become clean if

$$-N\delta + \lambda \left[ Nr\lambda - \left(1-\frac{1}{r}\right) Nr\delta \right] > 0.$$  

(4.7) Dividing by $Nr$ and taking limits as $r \to \infty$ yields (4.6). In other words, although the capital loss effect on an individual investor is scaled up, so is the impact of the investor’s action on the rest of the economy.

This result is dependent on investors’ marginal utility from wealth and from social benefits being constant. If investors have diminishing marginal utility of wealth, they may vote against all the firms in their portfolio becoming clean, even if this is socially efficient. As a result, when an institutional investor picks a voting policy, it is likely to choose one that is less pro-environmental than the benevolent planner solution. Note that the bias here is the opposite of the one encountered in the so-called gadfly proposals.

To see how voting might work in practice, it is useful to consider a real-world example. In 1984 DuPont faced a choice between polluting the Ohio river with a toxic substance known as PFOA and investing in filtration. Shapira and Zingales (2017) use court case documents to calculate the present value of the cost of filtration, $350 M, and the present value of the social cost of pollution, $1,100 M (both are in 1984 dollars). Clearly, it was socially desirable to filtrate. DuPont decided not to do so. We can easily understand this decision using the logic of this section. At the time, the Bronfman family had an approximately 20% stake in DuPont. By the logic of (4.5), polluting was preferable for the Bronfman family if

$$-0.2 (350) + \lambda [1100- (1-0.2) (350)] < 0,$$

(4.8) where the first term represents the capital loss to the family if filtration occurs and the second term represents the reduction in damage minus the capital loss experienced by other shareholders,
weighted by the family’s social responsibility parameter $\lambda$. Thus, if the Bronfmans are not willing to give up $70M for a social gain of $820M, that is, $\lambda < 0.085$, the optimal decision for the Bronfman family is to pollute.

For a diversified shareholder the calculation would be quite different. Using today’s numbers, an investor who has a diversified portfolio worth $\frac{1}{2}$ million owns a fraction of the US stock market equal approximately to $10^{-8}$. As a result, she would vote for filtration if

$$\lambda > 0.5 \left(10^{-8}\right).$$

or $\lambda > 0.5 \left(10^{-8}\right)$. In other words, as long as the majority of investors are willing to give up $3.5 of their wealth for a social gain of $750M, the outcome will be filtration.

In the standard approach to corporate governance, based on the idea that firms should maximize market value, large shareholders are often thought to be beneficial because they reduce the agency costs produced by the separation of ownership and control (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). In contrast, once externalities are considered, large shareholders may be detrimental because they put too much weight on profit relative to the social good.

It is useful to relate our voice result to the literature on public goods. The private provision of public goods is challenging because of the free-rider problem. One solution to this is taxation: everyone has to pay for the public good, whether they want to or not. Corporate voting works in a similar way. If a majority votes clean, all shareholders bear the cost $\delta$, whether or not they voted for clean. In a nutshell, this is why voice can achieve the social optimum.

5. Divestment

We now put voice aside and consider an alternative strategy for investors: exit via divestment. The way this works is as follows. In our model firms do not raise capital at date 1. However, if some

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24 In this calculation we ignore the possible liability cost from pollution.
25 This is based on a stock market capitalization of $48$ trillion.
26 A natural question to ask is whether Coasian bargaining, rather than voice, could achieve a socially efficient outcome. Suppose $h > \delta$ and consider a situation where, consistent with Charness and Rabin (2002), there are some agents with $\lambda$ slightly above .25 (in a large economy, there will be many of them). Then a coalition of four of them could get together and approach a dirty firm with the following offer: We will pay you $\delta$; in return you agree to become clean. The cost $\delta$ is split equally among the four. Each agent should be prepared to do this since $\lambda h - \delta/4 > \theta$ and the firm should agree since it is no worse off. The main difficulty with this solution is that it is not clear who should be in the coalition. That is, each agent would like other agents with $\lambda$ above $\frac{1}{4}$ to form the coalition and pay the $\delta/4$: there is a classic free-rider problem. Thus the coalition may not form.
investors divest this reduces the value of dirty firms and may cause some value-maximizing managers to choose the clean technology.

Assume that a fraction $\mu$ of investors announce at date 1 that they will hold shares only in clean firms; we will see below that only investors with a $\lambda$ above a particular cut-off will choose to divest. We suppose that investors’ announcements are visible and that investors can commit to their divestment decisions (we return to the visibility and commitment issue in Section 7). Firms observe these announcements, and then decide whether to stay dirty or become clean. We want to characterize a (Nash) equilibrium. To this end we derive the product market and capital market equilibrium under the assumption that a fraction $\mu$ of investors divest. Then, we check that a fraction $\mu$ of investors do indeed want to divest. In this section we assume that there is no consumer boycott.

As noted, we suppose that at date 1 firms are run by value-maximizing managers. One can imagine that (before there were any environmental concerns) initial entrepreneurs designed an incentive scheme to encourage managers to maximize market value at date 1 in order to obtain the highest valuation at date 0 (there could be some unmodeled agency problems). Note that initial entrepreneurs are not well-diversified and so they want to maximize the value of their own company, not the joint value of all companies, as the common ownership literature suggests (see Azar et al. (2018)).

Value maximization implies that in an equilibrium where both clean and dirty firms operate they must have the same value $V$, otherwise there would be switching. Let $n_c$ be the number of clean firms and $n_d = N - n_c$ the number of dirty firms. Note that the mix of clean and dirty firms has no effect on the date 2 product market equilibrium since each firm will supply at its capacity constraint of one whether it is clean or dirty.

For divestors, the analogy of (3.9) is

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27 In this paper we do not discuss how incentive contracts can affect the ESG decision of managers; on this, see Davies and Van Wesep (2018).

28 An interesting question is whether a purely selfish investor could take advantage of the fact that clean and dirty firms have the same price, but different expected profitability, by short selling one and using the proceeds to invest in the other. The feasibility of this strategy depends on whether socially responsible investors are willing to lend shares to short sellers and whether they are willing to accept borrowed shares as “bona fide” clean shares. In our model, where socially responsible investors care about their impact, the answer to both questions is negative. A socially responsible investor, who accepts a lower return for a greater cause, would be foolish to lend his shares to a speculator who undoes his strategy without fully compensating him. The same is true for an investor buying lent shares.
\[(5.1)\]
\[x = \frac{\Pi - \delta - V}{\gamma \sigma^2},\]

since clean firms yield expected profits \(\Pi - \delta\), rather than \(\Pi\), and cost \(V\). Since divestors represent a mass \(\mu\) of investors, their demand for clean firms is

\[(5.2)\]
\[\mu x = \mu \left(\frac{\Pi - \delta - V}{\gamma \sigma^2}\right).\]

The rest of the market will not invest in clean firms since they are less profitable, but equally expensive. Hence, (5.2) represents the total demand for clean firms, and we must have

\[(5.3)\]
\[\mu \left(\frac{\Pi - \delta - V}{\gamma \sigma^2}\right) = n_c.\]

Similarly, the demand for dirty firms will be given by

\[(5.4)\]
\[(1 - \mu) \left(\frac{\Pi - V}{\gamma \sigma^2}\right),\]

which must be equal to \(n_d\):

\[(5.5)\]
\[(1 - \mu) \left(\frac{\Pi - V}{\gamma \sigma^2}\right) = n_d.\]

Adding (5.3) and (5.5) yields

\[(5.6)\]
\[\Pi - V - \mu \delta = N \gamma \sigma^2.\]

We know from (3.10) that \(N \gamma \sigma^2 = \Pi - F\), and therefore

\[(5.7)\]
\[V = F - \mu \delta.\]

Substituting back into (5.3), we obtain
A similar formula can be found in Heinkel et al. (2001). (5.8) shows that divestment will be effective when either the mass of divestors is close to 1 or the cost of the clean technology is small (the impact of $\gamma \sigma ^2$ is more complicated since $N$ depends on this—see (3.11)).

At this point it is helpful to provide some intuition. To understand (5.7), note that divestment leads to a fall in the demand for dirty firms’ shares, causing $V$ to fall. If $V$ fell by $\delta$, clean firms would have the same net return as dirty firms previously, while dirty firms would have a higher net return. As a result, the total demand for shares would exceed the supply. Hence $V$ must fall by less than $\delta$, indeed by $\mu \delta$ according to (5.7)\(^{29}\).

(5.7) also throws light on (5.8). If $V$ fell by $\delta$, the demand for clean firms’ shares would be in proportion to the number of divestors since divestors would invest as much as before. However, since $V$ falls less, the demand for clean shares is lower and the number of clean firms is less than proportional to the number of divestors. Indeed $n_c$ is quadratic in $\mu$.

(5.8) implies that the marginal impact of divestment $\frac{\partial n_c}{\partial \mu}$ is increasing in $\mu$. If $N < \frac{\delta}{\gamma \sigma ^2}$, we have a corner solution: the number of clean firms $n_c = 0$ in a neighborhood of $\mu = 0$ and, for low $\mu$, the marginal impact of $\mu$ on $n_c$ is zero. In this case it is an equilibrium for no investor to divest: starting at $\mu = 0$, nondivestors will absorb any divested stock with minimal price impact and as a result no firms will become clean.\(^{30}\)

\(^{29}\) Note that $V = F - \mu \delta > 0$ given (3.15). In other words, a value-maximizing firm prefers to adopt the clean technology rather than closing down.

\(^{30}\) Note that a similar effect occurs if a fraction of investors announce that they will divest from a single firm. Nondivestors will purchase the divestors’ shares in the targeted firm and divestors will purchase an equal number of shares in other (dirty) firms. In other words, there will be a simple exchange and there will be no effect on prices. Thus, in this case too divestment has zero impact.
Conversely, $n_c > 0$ if $N > \frac{\delta(1-\mu)}{\gamma\sigma^2}$. From now on we assume that we are at an interior solution for any $\mu > 0$, that is,

(5.9) \quad N > \frac{\delta}{\gamma\sigma^2}.

We next determine whether an investor wants to divest when (5.9) holds. As a first step, we compare the certainty equivalent of a divestor with the certainty equivalent of a nondivestor. We then bring in the environmental impact of divestment.

Since nondivestors invest only in high return dirty firms, their payoff is given by

(5.10) \quad x\Pi + (x_0 - x)V - x_0 F,

where $x_0$ is their date 0 investment.

The certainty equivalent of (5.10) is

(5.11) \quad x(\Pi - V) + x_0 (V - F) - \frac{1}{2} \gamma x^2 \sigma^2 ,

and the $x$ that maximizes (5.11) is

(5.12) \quad x = \frac{\Pi - V}{\gamma\sigma^2}.

Substituting (5.12) and (3.9) (with $x = x_0$) into (5.11) and using (5.7), we obtain the following expression for the CE of a nondivestor:

(5.13) \quad CE_{nd} = \frac{1}{2\gamma\sigma^2} \left( \Pi - F + \mu \delta \right)^2 - \mu \delta \frac{\Pi - F}{\gamma\sigma^2}.

Carrying out the same exercise for a divestor yields

(5.14) \quad CE_d = \frac{1}{2\gamma\sigma^2} \left( \Pi - F - \delta + \mu \delta \right)^2 - \frac{\mu \delta}{\gamma\sigma^2} (\Pi - F). \hspace{2cm} 31

Thus by divesting an investor loses

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31 Note that (5.9) implies $n_c > 0$, which in turn, given (5.3), implies $\Pi - F - \delta + \mu \delta > 0$. 

22
(5.15) \[ CE_{rd} - CE_d = \frac{\delta}{2\gamma\sigma^2} (2\Pi - 2F - \delta(1 - 2\mu)) \].

An investor will compare the loss in (5.15) with the effect her divestment has on the environment and on other people’s utilities (where the latter is weighted by her \( \lambda \)). We compute this effect for the replica economy and then take limits as \( r \to \infty \). In the replica economy there are \( r \) investors, \( \mu r \) of whom divest; \( r \) consumers; and \( Nr \) firms set up in the free entry equilibrium, of which \( n_c r \) choose to become clean at date 1, where \( n_c \) is given by (5.8). The effect of one investor’s divestment decision is composed of three elements: the impact on other investors, the impact on consumers, and the impact on the environment. Investors are optimizing and so, by the envelope theorem, a small change in the market value of firms caused by one investor divesting will have a second order effect on other investors\(^{32} \). Consumers will be unaffected because total supply equals \( N \), independent of the mix of clean and dirty firms. Thus, we are left with the effect on the environment.

Since \( \mu r \) investors are divesting, if one investor \textit{stops} divesting, \( \mu \) changes from \( \mu \) to \( \mu - \frac{1}{r} \), i.e., \( \Delta \mu = -\frac{1}{r} \). The number of clean firms changes from \( n_c r \) to \((n_c + \frac{\partial n_c}{\partial \mu} \Delta \mu) r \), plus some second order terms. That is, as \( r \to \infty \), the change in the number of clean firms is

\[ (5.16) \frac{\partial n_c}{\partial \mu} (-\frac{1}{r})r = -\frac{\partial n_c}{\partial \mu} = -N + \frac{\delta(1 - 2\mu)}{\gamma\sigma^2}, \]

where we use (5.8). So the damage created by the investor’s decision not to divest is

\[ \left[ N - \frac{\delta(1 - 2\mu)}{\gamma\sigma^2} \right] h, \]

which the investor weights by her socially responsible parameter \( \lambda \). She then compares this to the expression in (5.15). We may conclude that an investor will be willing to stay divested if

\[ (5.17) \frac{\delta}{2\gamma\sigma^2} (2\Pi - 2F - \delta(1 - 2\mu)) \leq \lambda h \left[ N - \frac{\delta(1 - 2\mu)}{\gamma\sigma^2} \right], \]

which can be rewritten, using (3.10), as

\[^{32}\text{See, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. (1995, pp. 657-659).} \]
Note that the left-hand side (LHS) is increasing in \( \lambda \), while the right-hand side (RHS) is constant, from which we conclude that there is a cut-off: only investors with \( \lambda \) above a critical value will divest. Also, if \( 2\lambda h < \delta \) the LHS is negative and so cannot exceed or equal the RHS, while if \( 2\lambda h > \delta \), the LHS is increasing in \( \mu \). It follows that as \( \mu \) increases the set of investors whose \( \lambda \) satisfies (5.18) becomes larger. In other words, the cutoff is decreasing in \( \mu \) (divestment decisions are strategic complements).

We can use (5.18) to characterize a divestment equilibrium for the limit economy. In the following recall that \( \lambda = \lambda_i \) with probability \( \pi_i \).

**Definition 1.** A divestment equilibrium for the limit economy \((r = \infty)\) is a \( 0 \leq \mu^* \leq 1 \), where \( \mu^* \) represents the fraction of investors who divest, such that one of the following holds:

1. \( \mu^* = 0 \), and the LHS of (5.18) is less than or equal to the RHS at \( \mu = 0 \), \( \lambda = \lambda_n \).
2. \( \mu^* = 1 \), and the LHS of (5.18) is greater than or equal to the RHS at \( \mu = 1 \), \( \lambda = \lambda_1 \).
3. \( \mu^* = \sum_{j=i+1}^{n_i} \pi_j \) for some \( i = 1, \ldots, n - 1 \), and the LHS of (5.18) equals the RHS at \( \mu = \mu^* \) for some \( \lambda_i < \lambda^* < \lambda_{i+1} \).
4. \( \sum_{j=i+1}^{n_i} \pi_j < \mu^* < \sum_{j=i}^{n} \pi_j \) for some \( i = 1, \ldots, n \), and LHS of (5.18) equals the RHS at \( \mu = \mu^*, \lambda = \lambda_i \).

To understand this definition, note that in (1) no-one divests and nobody wants to divest. In (2) everyone divests and everyone wants to divest. In (3) the cut-off is such that only those whose \( \lambda \) strictly exceeds \( \lambda^* \) want to divest and the fraction of them is \( \mu^* \). (4) is like (3) except that the fraction \( \mu^* \) of divestors is made up of those who strictly want to divest \( (\lambda > \lambda_i) \) and those who are indifferent \( (\lambda = \lambda_i) \).

**Proposition 2:** A divestment equilibrium exists.

**Proof:**

We use a fixed point argument. For each \( \lambda \geq 0 \), define the correspondence \( G(\lambda) = \{1\} \) if \( \lambda < \lambda_1 \), \( G(\lambda) = \{ \sum_{j=i+1}^{n_i} \pi_j \} \) if \( \lambda_i < \lambda < \lambda_{i+1} \) \( (i = 1, \ldots, n - 1) \), \( G(\lambda) = [\sum_{j=i+1}^{n_i} \pi_j, \sum_{j=i}^{n} \pi_j] \) if \( \lambda = \lambda_i \).
For each $\mu$, let $\lambda(\mu)$ be the unique value of $\lambda$ such that the LHS of (5.18) equals the RHS. (Here $\lambda(\mu)$ could exceed 1.) Now consider the correspondence $\xi$ from $[0,1]$ into itself, where $\xi(\mu) = G(\lambda(\mu))$. It is easy to see that $\xi$ is upper hemicontinuous and convex-valued and so by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem there exists $\mu^*$ such that $\mu^* \in \xi(\mu^*)$. It is easy to check that $\mu^*$ is a divestment equilibrium. Q.E.D.

(5.18) is informative about the nature of equilibrium. Note first that, if $\lambda_n h < \delta$, the LHS is less than the RHS at $\mu = 0$, for all $\lambda < \lambda_n$. Hence, $\mu = 0$ is an equilibrium in this case. Second, an investor with $\lambda h < \frac{3}{4} \delta$ will never divest. To see this, note that if $\lambda h < \frac{1}{2} \delta$ the LHS of (5.18) is negative. On the other hand, if $\frac{3}{4} \delta > \lambda h > \frac{1}{2} \delta$ the LHS is increasing in $\mu$, but even at $\mu = 1$ the second term of the LHS is less than the RHS (the first term is negative since $\lambda h < \delta$). Hence, if $\lambda_n h < \frac{3}{4} \delta$, $\mu = 0$ is the unique equilibrium.

Finally, suppose $h > \delta$ and $\lambda_n h < \frac{3}{4} \delta$. Then, $\mu = 1$ is not an equilibrium, that is, divesting never reaches the social optimum. To see this note that the social optimum requires $n_c = N$, which, from (5.8), can only happen if $\mu = 1$. But that means that (5.18) must hold when $\lambda = \lambda_1$. However, the first term of the LHS is negative (since $\lambda_1 h < (3/4) \delta < \delta$) while the second term is less than the RHS if $\lambda_1 h < (3/4) \delta$. Hence (5.18) cannot hold and thus it is not an equilibrium for everybody to divest.

**Proposition 3:**

1. Suppose that $\lambda_n h < \delta$. Then $\mu = 0$ is an equilibrium.
2. Suppose that $\lambda_n h < \left(\frac{3}{4}\right) \delta$. Then $\mu = 0$ is the unique equilibrium.
3. Suppose $h > \delta$ and $\lambda_n h < \frac{3}{4} \delta$. Then $\mu = 1$ is not an equilibrium, that is, no divestment equilibrium is socially optimal.
It is worth comparing Proposition 3 with the result for the case of undiversified investors considered in Section 4. We showed there that if \( \lambda h < \delta \) undiversified investors will use their voice to keep firms dirty. Proposition 3(1) tells us the same is true when diversified investors divest: there is an equilibrium with no clean firms. One obvious implication of Proposition 3 is that there can be too little divestment when \( h > \delta \). When \( h > \delta \) the social optimum is \( n_c = N \) (see Section 3.4), and so we want everyone to divest (if \( \mu = 1, n_c = N \)). Yet, if \( \lambda h < \left( \frac{3}{4} \right) \delta, \mu = 0 \) is the only equilibrium: there is no divestment at all, and \( n_c = 0 \).

To see the implications of this proposition, let us return to the DuPont case described in Section 4, where \( h = \$1,100M \) and \( \delta = \$350M \). Assume that all firms face a trade-off like DuPont’s, that is, \( h = \$1,100M \) and \( \delta = \$350M \) for all firms. Then, by Proposition 3(2), if

\[
\lambda < \frac{3}{4} \left( \frac{350}{1100} \right) = 0.24,
\]

the unique equilibrium is one where no one divests and no firm becomes clean. Also, by Proposition 3.3, even if \( \lambda > 0.24 \), as long as the least socially responsible investors have \( \lambda \) less than 0.24, that is as long as some investors are not willing to give up $3.5 for a social gain of $14.7, in every equilibrium some firms remain dirty. In contrast, we saw in Section 4 that voice would lead to a clean outcome for all firms as long as the majority of shareholders are willing to give up $3.5 for a social gain of $750M.

To obtain further insight when the assumptions of Proposition 3 do not hold, it is useful to consider the case of two types. Suppose that \( n = 2, \lambda_1 = 0, \lambda_2 > 0, 1 > \pi_2 > 0 \), that is, only one type is socially responsible. We know from Proposition 3(2) that if \( \lambda_2 h < \left( \frac{3}{4} \right) \delta \) the unique equilibrium is \( \mu = 0 \). So suppose \( \lambda_2 h > \left( \frac{3}{4} \right) \delta \). We distinguish between two cases.

**Case 1: \( \lambda_2 h > \delta \)**

In Figure 3 we graph the LHS of (5.18), with \( \lambda = \lambda_2 \), against the RHS. Figures 3 a-c illustrate the possibilities. In 3a, the LHS exceeds the RHS for all \( \mu \) and so all socially responsible investors divest: \( \mu = \pi_2 \) is the unique equilibrium. In 3b, the LHS is less than the RHS for small \( \mu \) but greater than the RHS for \( \mu = \pi_2 \), and there are three equilibria, \( \mu = 0, \mu = \hat{\mu}, \) and \( \mu = \pi_2 \). In 3c, the LHS is less than the RHS at \( \mu = \pi_2 \) and \( \mu = 0 \) is the unique equilibrium.
Comparing to our two benchmarks we see that this is a case where the benevolent planner would choose all firms to be clean \((\lambda_2 h > \delta \Rightarrow h > \delta\), and so \(n_c = N\)); undiversified socially responsible investors would use their voice to make the firms they own clean \((\lambda_2 h > \delta\) and so \(n_c = \pi_2 N\)); but divestment may lead to no firms becoming clean \((\mu = 0, n_c = 0)\).

**Case 2:** \(\left(\frac{3}{4}\right) \delta < \lambda_2 h < \delta\).

Now the LHS of (5.18) is less than the RHS when \(\mu = 0\) and may be less than or greater than the RHS when \(\mu = \pi_2\). The situation is similar to that in Figures 3b and 3c. There is always an equilibrium with \(\mu = 0\) but there may be equilibria with \(\mu > 0\) too.

Case 2 can hold even if \(h < \delta\). Hence it is possible to have a situation where a benevolent planner would choose no clean firms \((n_c = 0)\); undiversified investors would use their voice to ensure no clean firms \((n_c = 0)\); but divestment would lead some firms to become clean \((n_c > 0)\).

The case of multiple equilibria, illustrated in Figure 3b, can throw some light on when activist campaigns can have a multiplier effect. When \(\lambda_2 h < \frac{3}{4} \delta\), convincing a large investor (such as the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund) to divest will have a limited impact because it will not induce other socially responsible investors to divest. By contrast, when \(\lambda_2 h > \frac{3}{4} \delta\), convincing a large investor to divest could lead all socially responsible investors to divest. The multiplier
effect is more likely to occur when the efficiency cost of pollution \( \frac{h}{\delta} \) is high and the the degree of social resposibility \( \lambda_2 \) is high.

We close this section with a proposition that summarizes the comparison of voice and exit.

**Proposition 4:**

i) If the majority of investors have a strictly positive \( \lambda \), voice reaches the social optimum whereas divestment may not. Furthermore, if \( h > \delta \) and \( \lambda_1 h < \left( \frac{3}{4} \right) \delta \), no divestment equilibrium is socially optimal.

ii) If the majority of investors have \( \lambda = 0 \) and \( h > \delta \), divestment weakly dominates voice, but never reaches the social optimum.

iii) If the majority of investors have \( \lambda = 0 \) and \( h < \delta \), voice reaches the social optimum whereas divestment may not.

To understand this proposition, we saw in Section 4 that, if the majority of investors have a strictly positive \( \lambda \), voice reaches the social optimum. In contrast, if \( h > \delta \), divesting never reaches the social optimum as long as some investors have \( \lambda h < \left( \frac{3}{4} \right) \delta \). When \( h < \delta \), divestment may achieve the social optimum, since \( \mu = 0 \) can be an equilibrium (and this implies \( n_c = 0 \)). However, as we showed above, there can in some cases be an equilibrium with \( \mu \) positive\(^{33}\).

As we noted earlier, voice is sensitive to the social preferences of investors. If investors care only about environmental harm and not about the cost to other investors, then voice can be too aggressive. In contrast, our analysis of exit does not change if socially responsible investors

\(^{33}\) We have assumed that firms can adjust continuously to the choices of investors, in the sense that \( n_c \) is a continuous variable. If \( n_c \) has to be an integer, this can affect the incentives to divest. Suppose we are at \( \mu = 0 \) with \( N > \frac{\delta}{\gamma \sigma^2} \). According to (5.8), if one investor divests, the number of clean firms becomes positive. But maybe \( n_c \) equals 0.1. In our model this counts as a positive impact, possibly enough to motivate a socially responsible investor to divest. In reality, since a fraction of a firm is not feasible, the question is whether the new equilibrium would involve zero or one clean firm. That is, an individual divestment decision may have no impact \((n_c = 0)\) or a disproportionate impact \((n_c = 1)\). We leave the details of the integer case to future work.
care only about environmental harm. The reason is that, as we saw earlier, a divestment decision by one investor affects only the environment and has no impact on other investors and consumers.

6. Boycotts

In this section we ignore the possibility of divesting and focus on a different form of exit, starting with a consumer boycott.

6.1 Consumer Boycott

For a consumer boycott to be possible, we need to assume that consumers know the technology behind the good they buy: they can tell whether the good is produced by a clean firm or a dirty firm. We suppose that boycotting decisions are common knowledge and that consumers can commit to them (but see Section 7). As in previous sections we suppose that a boycott is not anticipated at date 0 when firms are set up, but only becomes a factor at date 1. Thus, \( N \) is predetermined at date 1 and is given by (3.11).

Boycotting works by reducing the demand for, and hence price of, dirty goods. Clean goods sell for a higher price and, in the case where both dirty and clean firms operate, this higher price offsets the increased cost \( \delta \) of producing clean goods to the point where the profits and hence market values of clean and dirty firms are the same.

As for the case of divestment, we start by assuming that a fraction \( \theta \) of consumers will boycott the dirty product and then derive the equilibrium value of \( \theta \). Arguments similar to the divestment case (see Appendix B for details) yield that the equilibrium number of clean firms is given by

\[
(6.1) \quad n_c = \theta N - \frac{\delta \theta (1-\theta)}{\tau}
\]

Note that the impact of boycotting is similar to that of divesting (compare (6.1) and (5.8)). Boycotting will be effective when either the mass of boycotters is close to 1 or the cost of the clean technology is small. As with divestors, boycotters impact the equilibrium level of clean firms less than proportionally. Also \( \tau \) plays the role that \( \gamma \sigma^2 \) played in the divestment case.

As in the previous section we focus on an interior solution by assuming \( N > \frac{\delta}{\tau} \). Comparing the utility loss from boycotting with the environmental impact achieved yields the following condition, which parallels (5.18):

\[
(6.2) \quad (\lambda h - \delta)(N - \frac{\delta}{\tau}) + \frac{\theta \delta}{\tau} (2\lambda h - \delta) \geq \frac{\delta^2}{2\tau}.
\]
A consumer will boycott if (6.2) is satisfied. Note that (6.2) is the same as (5.18) with \( \tau \) replacing \( \gamma \sigma^2 \). As a result, there is a one-to-one mapping between the results in the boycott and divestment cases. For convenience we restate the key result in Proposition 5.

**Proposition 5:**

1. Suppose that \( \lambda_n h < \delta \). Then \( \theta = 0 \) is an equilibrium.
2. Suppose that \( \lambda_n h < \left( \frac{3}{4} \right) \delta \). Then \( \theta = 0 \) is the only equilibrium.
3. Suppose \( h > \delta \) and \( \lambda_n h < \frac{3}{4} \delta \). Then \( \theta = 1 \) is not an equilibrium, that is, no divestment equilibrium is socially optimal.

### 6.2 Consumer Boycott vs. Divestment

Imagine an activist who is interested in starting a campaign to convince a certain number of socially responsible people who think \( h \) is zero that \( h \) is in fact positive. Where will her effort be more productive: if she convinces shareholders or consumers? As noted, in comparing (5.18) and (6.2), given the fraction of the group exiting, the only difference is that \( \gamma \sigma^2 \) appears in the first expression and \( \tau \) in the second. Now \( \gamma \sigma^2 \) represents the slope of the demand curve for shares and \( \tau \) the slope of the demand curve for the product. To the extent we think the demand for goods to be inelastic and the demand for shares to be elastic, \( \tau > \gamma \sigma^2 \). Remember, however, that \( N \) depends both on \( \gamma \sigma^2 \) and \( \tau \) (see (3.11)). Thus, in what follows we will vary \( \gamma \sigma^2 \) and \( \tau \), but keep the sum constant. If we keep \( \gamma \sigma^2 + \tau \) constant, the number of firms \( N \) will remain constant.

Suppose \( \gamma \sigma^2 \) is very small. Then (5.9) is violated and we are at a corner solution for low \( \mu \). In this case, a necessary condition for a divestment campaign to have any effect is that \( n_c > 0 \), that is,

\[
\mu > 1 - \frac{N \gamma \sigma^2}{\delta}. \tag{6.3}
\]

Note that the RHS of this equation converges to 1 as \( \gamma \sigma^2 \) converges to zero. In other words, for small \( \gamma \sigma^2 \) a divestment campaign has to persuade a huge fraction of investors to divest for it to be
effective. Thus, if $\gamma \sigma^2$ is small, given the choice, an activist will prefer to try to convince consumers rather than investors.

The case where $\gamma \sigma^2$ is not so low for there to be a corner solution is more complex. Consider (5.17). The RHS represents the impact of divestment and the LHS the cost. The RHS is decreasing in $\gamma \sigma^2$ as long as $\mu > \frac{1}{2}$. In other words, a reduction in $\gamma \sigma^2$ might increase the incentive to divest. There are two elements here. First, divestment decisions are strategic complements (which explains why a high $\mu$ might be important). Second, while a low $\gamma \sigma^2$ means that when one person divests others easily buy their shares, it is also the case that the person divesting has a large demand for the shares of clean firms. The LHS may also increase or decrease in $\gamma \sigma^2$ (recall that $\Pi = \rho - \tau N$ and we are keeping $\gamma \sigma^2 + \tau$ constant). Because of these various effects, signing the impact of $\gamma \sigma^2$ relative to $\tau$ is difficult in the interior case, as is comparing the effectiveness of divestment and boycott campaigns.

6.3 Labor Boycott

Our simple model does not have any labor costs, let alone the possibility of workers boycotting a firm. Yet, in a competitive labor market the effect of a labor boycott would be very similar to that of the consumer boycott we analyzed in Section 6.1. Purely selfish workers work for any firm, while socially responsible workers boycott dirty firms. The resulting equilibrium would be similar to that in Section 6.1, with workers in dirty firms being paid more than workers in clean firms and the equilibrium level of clean firms depending on the slope of the labor supply curve. Indeed, Nyborg and Zhang (2013) provide evidence that workers in socially responsible firms are paid less. To the extent that the supply of workers (especially for certain types of highly qualified workers) is less elastic than is the demand for products, a labor boycott is more likely to be successful in curbing pollution than a consumer boycott, which itself is more likely to be effective than shareholder divestment.

The situation is different if a firm has some market power. Consider, for instance, a case where there is a monopsonist and many workers. The monopsonist has the choice to stay dirty and be able to hire only from a smaller pool of workers or pay the cost $\delta$ and be able to hire all workers. As we discuss in Broccardo et al. (2020), when the market is not competitive, if the pool of
boycotters is large enough, not only will boycotters be able to turn the firm clean, but they will be able to do so without bearing any cost.

7. Discussion

7.1 Direct Engagement by Atomistic Investors

Depending on whether individuals own stock directly or through intermediaries, to succeed the engagement strategy has to overcome various challenges. Let us start first with the case where the majority of stock ownership is direct. One question is why individual shareholders vote at all and are not rationally apathetic, given that the probability their vote will be pivotal is negligible. In fact, in our world of socially responsible investors it is not so difficult to explain why people vote, since they care about the impact of their actions on others. Furthermore, empirical evidence (Brav et al. (2021)) shows that individuals investors do vote, consistent with the existence of consumption benefits from voting.

A more challenging question is why any shareholder would pay for the cost of putting a proposal on the ballot. Here an intermediary can play a role by using engagement as a marketing strategy (O’Leary and Valdmanis (2020)). To see how this works, consider the case where the majority of investors have a strictly positive \( \lambda \). Then, a Green fund can be structured as a not-for-profit, charging a fee \( \psi \) for each dollar invested to pay for the cost of putting on the corporate ballot propositions to switch to clean. An investor moving $1 into the Green fund will cause such a proposition to be put on the ballot in \( \frac{\psi}{c} \) additional companies, where \( c \) is the cost of putting a proposition on the ballot. Then, an individual will move her investment into a Green fund if and only if

\[
-\frac{\delta \psi}{r c} + \lambda \frac{\psi}{c} [h - (1 - \frac{1}{r}) \delta)] > \psi, 
\]

where the LHS is the net benefit of investing a dollar in the Green fund and having \( \frac{\psi}{c} \) companies switch to clean and the RHS is the extra fee she has to pay. As \( r \to \infty \), (7.1) can be rewritten as

\[
\lambda > \frac{c}{h - \delta}. 
\]

Thus, only investors with \( \lambda \) above this cutoff will invest in the Green fund and only if the majority of investors are socially responsible. To return to the DuPont example, if the cost of
putting a proposition on the corporate proxy is equal to 1M in 1984 dollars, then the cut-off is 1/750 or 0.0013. If the majority of investors are not socially responsible, then even investors with $\lambda$ above the cut-off will refuse to invest in the Green fund, because activism will not have any benefit.  

7.2 Engagement through Intermediaries

Let us now consider the case where the majority of stocks are held by mutual and pension funds, as is true today. In this case, an intermediary’s incentive to vote is considerable given that its vote could be decisive. In addition, since 2003 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has required asset management firms “to adopt policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the adviser votes proxies in the best interests of clients.” This regulation has been interpreted as a requirement to exercise the right to vote.

A bigger problem concerns the transmission of preferences from investors to institutions. There are three ways in which this transmission can be achieved. First, intermediaries can learn in advance of a vote about their investors’ preferences. Until recently, this would have been prohibitively costly, but now it is feasible. Indeed, Fintech asset management firm Betterment has started asking investors in the partner ETF Engine No. 1 what proxy fights they want the ETF to engage in. Second, intermediaries can delegate their voting decisions to their own investors, as BlackRock has started to do. Third, institutional investors can choose and advertise their voting behavior, “ideology” in the language of Bolton et al. (2020) (for evidence that ESG funds do this, see Curtis et al. (2021)). This is what Engine No.1 has done with the ETF, VOTE (https://etf.engine1.com/). With this knowledge, socially responsible investors can vote with their feet by picking the intermediary with the right “ideology.”

Ironically, investors voting with their feet is a form of exit to induce voice. The reason it is more likely to be effective than traditional divestment is that it works through quantities not prices. The mutual fund investor who withdraws her money from one (open-end) mutual fund and transfers it to another (open-end) mutual fund is shrinking the assets of the former and expanding...

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34 For an alternative explanation, based on stockholder politics specialists, see Tallarita (2021).
the assets of the latter. In contrast, the stock investor who sells a dirty stock and buys a clean one does not affect the asset base of either, but only relative asset prices.

7.3 Visibility and Commitment

So far we have assumed that individuals can commit to their strategy (be it divestment, or boycotting) and that this strategy is common knowledge. In practice, it is difficult for individuals to communicate and commit to their strategy. Here technology and institutions might make a difference.

In our model firms are assumed to be aware that some investors (consumers) plan to divest (boycott). But how do they know this? One way is for investors or consumers to make announcements. In a pre-internet world, the authors of this paper could have announced that they would divest, but it would have been hard for anyone to know about it. In contrast, large institutions and companies could easily publicize their divestment and boycott decisions. Today, thanks to social media, this difference has become smaller, facilitating the announcement of divestments and boycotts.

Even today it is difficult to verify whether someone has carried through their announced strategy, given the variability of demand (see Ashenfelter et al. (2007)). Verification is important because there is a commitment issue. At date 1, some investors could announce that they will divest. This announcement might, if believed, be sufficient to push some companies to switch to clean. But, after having achieved their goal, the divestors will be tempted to sell the clean companies and buy the more profitable dirty ones, which trade at the same price. If this behavior is anticipated, divestment will become ineffective.

The same problem arises in the case of boycotts. Some consumers may announce that they will buy only clean products, causing some companies to install a clean technology. But once this is done what ensures that consumers do not renge on their promise and buy cheaper dirty products?

These commitment problems can exist even in the presence of intermediaries. Suppose that investors invest through a mutual fund, e.g., Fidelity. Fidelity might have a fund that plans to invest only in clean companies and another fund that plans to invest only in dirty companies. A socially responsible investor might put all her money in the Fidelity Green fund. Seeing how much wealth has been invested in the Green fund, some companies may elect to become clean. But once
companies have made this decision what is to stop investors from switching their money from the Green fund to the Dirty fund?\textsuperscript{39}

The commitment problem is stark in our setting because we study a one-shot game: firms make their production decisions at date 1, then investors and consumers make their investment and consumption decisions, then the world ends. Reality is more complex and commitment may be easier to establish in a repeated setting.

Visibility can also help with commitment. Even today, if the authors of this paper announce that they will divest from oil companies, it would be hard for anyone to check.\textsuperscript{40} In contrast, the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund’s divestment decisions can easily be verified since they regularly disclose all their holdings. In a similar fashion, on June 26, 2020, Unilever announced that it would not advertise on Facebook or Twitter for the rest of the year, citing hate speech and divisive content on the platforms.\textsuperscript{41} Unilever’s action can easily be verified, and so Unilever is likely to stick to this commitment.

7.4 Rational Expectation Equilibrium

We have assumed that the harm at date 1 is unanticipated at date 0. Relaxing this assumption does not change the analysis very much. If all investors and consumers are purely selfish, it does not change it at all since the date 1 market value of firms will be independent of $h$, and so the incentives of entrepreneurs to set up firms at date 0 will be unaffected. On the other hand, if divestment or boycotting by socially responsible investors or consumers is anticipated to occur at date 1, then this reduces the date 1 and date 0 market value of firms, and so the equilibrium number of firms will be lower. The same is true if it is anticipated that successful engagement will cause firms to choose the clean technology since this reduces future profitability. Given this, founders of firms at date 0 may try to make engagement more difficult at date 1 through provisions in the corporate charter, for example, by putting in super-majority provisions or a dual-class voting structure.

\textsuperscript{39}One way in which a mutual fund can help increase the level of commitment is by offering only “clean” products, increasing the cost for investors to switch.

\textsuperscript{40}However, someone who makes a personal decision to divest or boycott may incur a personal cost if they deviate from this decision, which can help to sustain commitment. See, e.g., Ederer and Stremitzer (2017). Note that commitment is not an issue in the literature that assumes that people divest or boycott for moral reasons.

7.5 Social Entrepreneurs

Suppose that some entrepreneurs are socially responsible, but many (an infinite number) are not. In the free entry equilibrium the market value of a firm that does not encourage social responsibility will be $F$ and the market value of a firm that does encourage social responsibility will be below $F$. Since we have assumed that entrepreneurs have zero wealth they will not be able to finance the latter. In effect competition drives out good behavior (on this, see Aghion et al. (2020), Dewatripont and Tirole (2020) and Shleifer (2004)). The situation is different at date 1. At this point the entry cost $F$ is sunk and so firms earn rents. Therefore, firms have the ability to choose clean without being driven out of the market.

7.6 Takeovers

A natural question to ask is whether takeovers affect engagement. As Hart and Zingales (2017) show (see also Elhauge (2005)), takeovers can undermine social action to turn companies clean, creating an “amoral drift.” Here we briefly sketch the argument.

Suppose that engagement leads a company to choose clean (provisionally). This means that its market value will be $V_c = F - \delta$. A (purely selfish) bidder could make an unconditional tender offer for the company at a price $V_c < p < V_d = F$, at the same time announcing that, if more than 50% of the shares are tendered, he plans to freeze-out nontendering shareholders at a price $V_c < p' < p$.\footnote{Such a bid overcomes the free-rider problem analyzed in Grossman and Hart (1980).} Even a socially responsible investor will tender. The reason is that given that she has a very small shareholding the chance that her tender decision will be pivotal is negligible. Furthermore, by not tendering she receives $p'$ if the bid succeeds as opposed to $p$; while if the bid fails she owns shares worth $V_c$ rather than receiving $p$ (she could always buy back her shares). Thus tendering is a dominant strategy. Since everyone tenders the bid succeeds and the bidder makes a profit of $V_d - p$. This is true even if a majority of the investors are socially responsible and would have voted against the bid if given the chance. For further details, see Hart and Zingales (2017).
There is an asymmetry here. It is unlikely that a socially responsible bidder will buy a dirty company and turn it clean. The reason is that the bidder will have to pay at least $V_d$ to persuade shareholders to tender (at a lower price it would be profitable for someone, e.g., management to make a counteroffer), which means he loses $V_d - V_c$ on the transaction. There is an environmental gain of $h$, but this is weighted by $\lambda$. Thus only if $V_d - V_c = \delta < \lambda h$ will he proceed. In contrast, dispersed shareholders will vote for the company to become clean if $h > \delta$ and the majority have a positive $\lambda$.

One important qualification to the above is that, as a result of a number of legal decisions in recent years and the existence of poison pills, it has become hard to take over a U.S. company if the majority is against the bid. These developments serve to mitigate the amoral drift, and make it less likely that takeovers will interfere with socially responsible engagement.

7.7 Awareness and Social Pressure Campaigns

The biggest limitation of our analysis is that we take social preferences as given. As a result, we miss an important benefit of exit campaigns: their effect on social preferences and (more generally) political change. For an analysis of the social and political effects of divestment, see Quigley et al. (2020).

When it comes to informing and changing people’s preferences the exit strategy is superior to the voice one. A successful information campaign keeps the relevant piece of news in the media for an extended period of time. A corporate vote is not so newsworthy to begin with. The media feel compelled to cover it at most twice, when the vote is announced and when the votes are counted. By contrast, an exit campaign is newsworthy every time a famous person/institution joins the exiters. Thus, exit is more effective at communicating news.

Exit is also more effective at pressuring people into behaving socially, even if their $\lambda$ is equal to zero. It is not only peer pressure that operates, but also the pressure to join a growing and potentially successful movement (Thaler and Sunstein (2008)). Both these forces help a highly motivated minority to achieve successes it would never be able to achieve through a voice strategy. Consistent with this idea, corporate boycotts succeed mostly by affecting a target’s reputation in the media, not the demand for their product (King (2011)).
For these reasons, a highly-motivated minority might find exit a more successful strategy than voice. Yet, there is no guarantee that the ability of an exit strategy to succeed is linked to the social desirability of its goal. Thus, extending the model to incorporate information and social pressure is unlikely to change the fundamental result that voice is more aligned to social incentives than exit.

7.8 Community of Reference
We have assumed that socially responsible agents weigh the impact of their decisions on everyone on the entire planet. In practice, people are more likely to internalize the impact they have on their community than on the world at large. This local bias in social responsibility might explain some of the observed trends in corporate governance. Until the 1970s companies were owned very locally. Even during the 1990s, Huberman (2001) documents a bias in favor of owning local companies. A locally concentrated ownership favors an internalization of the externalities produced by firms, especially if production and distribution are also locally concentrated. From the 1980s we have witnessed two important trends: the globalization of firms and the indexation of individual portfolios. The combination of these two trends has led firms to become more asocial, i.e. to ignore most of the externalities they produce. We can interpret the rise of the ESG movement as a reaction to this increasing asociality of firms.

7.9 Empirical Evidence
There is plenty of evidence suggesting that divestment fails to affect the value of targeted firms. The classic study is Teoh et al. (1999), showing that divestment from South Africa during the apartheid regime had no impact on equity prices of South African companies. More recently, Berk and van Binsbergen (2021) find no detectable change in value when firms are either included or excluded from the leading socially conscious US index (FTSE USA 4Good).

The evidence on boycotts is more mixed. In his classic study of boycotts, Friedman (1985) finds that 24 of the 90 boycotts examined were (at least partially) successful in attaining the objective desired by the group who launched the boycott. Yet, Friedman does not analyze whether these boycotts worked by lowering demand or by creating negative publicity (or both). Neither do Davidson et al. (1995), who show that, unlike for divestment, consumer boycotts decrease stock prices. The first paper to find a significant effect of a boycott on sales is Chavis and Leslie (2009),
who find 26% lower sales of French wine after the boycott triggered by France’s opposition to the war in Iraq (but see Ashenfelter et al. (2007) for evidence to the contrary).

Thus, the evidence on exit is very consistent with the predictions of our model, but what about the effect of voice? Dimson et al. (2015), Barko et al. (2018), and Naaraayanan et al. (2020) show the effectiveness of behind-the-scenes engagement by socially responsible funds. While these successes are consistent with our model, they are not exactly the strategy described in our paper, which is limited to voting at the shareholder meeting. Until a few years ago, the success of shareholder propositions in the ESG space was minimal: in 2016 only 3% received a majority of votes (Smith (2021)). In the last few years, however, the tide has changed. In 2020 12% of environmental and social shareholder proposals achieved more than 50% of the votes. For meetings through June 30, 2021, that proportion rose to 20% (Smith (2021)). This is hardly surprising, since a growing number of institutions and mutual funds have started to announce a more active stand on the ESG front.

Getting a shareholder proposition approved is not enough to insure impact. Yet, by using plant-level data, Naaraayanan et al. (2020) find that firms targeted by environmental activist investors with shareholder propositions reduce their toxic releases, greenhouse-gas emissions, and cancer-causing pollution through preventative efforts.

Last but not least, the implications of our model are consistent with Krueger et al.’s (2020) survey of institutional investors, which finds that such investors consider engagement, rather than divestment, to be the better approach for addressing an externality such as climate risk.

8. Conclusions

This paper is an attempt to analyze the welfare implications of two traditional strategies aimed at impacting corporate outcomes in the presence of externalities: exit and voice. To make the problem tractable we have made a number of simplifying assumptions: identical firms with zero marginal cost up to a capacity constraint, a linear demand curve, constant absolute risk aversion, normal distribution, etc. We have also studied the three principal socially responsible strategies, divestment, boycotting and engagement, separately, without considering how they might interact with each other. Subject to these limitations, we find that when the majority of investors are socially responsible, voice achieves the socially desirable outcome, while exit does not. In fact, exit often fails to have any impact. When the majority of investors are purely selfish,
voice is impotent, and exit is the only strategy that can bring about a clean technology. However, exit is unlikely to achieve the social optimum for three reasons. First, unless there is a set of highly socially responsible investors (consumers) willing to pay for most of the cost of clean-up by themselves, the only equilibrium is one with zero exit and zero clean firms. Second, even when there are some very socially responsible investors (consumers), the impact on the environment is limited as long as some investors (consumers) are purely selfish. Finally, individual incentives to join an exit strategy are not necessarily aligned with social incentives, and so exit can lead to a less desirable outcome than the one achieved when all individuals are purely selfish.

One question raised by our paper is why social engagement is relatively rare in spite of all its desirable properties. In some cases, engagement is infeasible because somebody owns a majority of the votes, such as Mark Zuckerberg with Facebook, or the company is privately held, such as Koch Industries. We think that an important additional factor resides in the current U.S. proxy system, which tends to limit shareholders’ ability to influence corporate policy. The restrictions reflect a fear that individual shareholders are activists in the sense that they put a lot of weight on a single issue (e.g., their utility is $-Nh$). If instead individuals are socially responsible (in the way we define), this fear is unfounded. Individual shareholders have the incentive to vote on issues in a socially optimal way and their engagement can lead to more efficient outcomes. Another important limitation is represented by the interpretation of the fiduciary duty of asset managers. To the extent that the duty to vote in the interest of the beneficiaries is narrowly interpreted as the duty to vote in their financial interest, socially responsible investors have their wings clipped by the law.

Another question is what comparative advantage firms have vis-à-vis the government in addressing externalities (e.g., Egorov and Harstad (2017) and Besley and Persson (2020)). After all, our voice option is not very different from single-issue referenda, common in Switzerland and California (see Matsusaka (2020)). The corporate solution has three advantages. First, a referendum-imposed regulation has – by necessity– to be general, creating potentially large deadweight costs. A firm-by firm solution is more flexible and cost effective. Second, in the investment world there are monetary incentives for mutual funds to cater to investors’ preferences, which are not present in the political world. Mutual funds can pay for the cost of setting up a proxy, in a way that political parties cannot. Third, in the United States companies can spend massively to influence the outcomes of referenda (as Uber and Lyft did recently in California) and their
spending is constitutionally protected. By contrast, shareholders can choose to limit such spending. Thus, shareholder voice has the chance of being less prone to capture than political voice. Last but not least, regulations and referenda – while useful domestically – cannot cross borders as corporations’ operations do (for a further discussion of this, see Arnold and Bustos (2005)). Firms can avoid undesirable legislation by forum shopping. In contrast, investors’ pressure is not limited by jurisdiction, allowing for the efficient enforcement of environmental standards across varying regulatory regimes.
References


Appendix A: The Benevolent Planner’s Solution

Each firm produces one unit whether it is clean or dirty. As a result, the product market equilibrium and consumer surplus are independent of \( \phi \). To derive investor utility we need to compute the investors’ return at date 1 after the planner sets the proportion of clean firms at \( \phi \) and investors freely re-optimize their investment choices.

Let the equilibrium prices of the two types of firms be \( V_c \) and \( V_d \). The gross return of a clean firm is \( \delta \) less than that of a dirty firm. Thus, in order to ensure that (purely selfish) investors stay invested in both kinds of firms at date 1 we must have

\[
(A1) \quad V_c = V_d - \delta.
\]

The return of an investor at date 2 is

\[
(A2) \quad x(\tilde{\Pi} - V_d) + x_0[\phi V_c + (1 - \phi)V_d] - x_0 F,
\]

where \( x \) is her date 1 portfolio holding. The first term reflects the fact that the net return on her investment is \( \tilde{\Pi} - V_d = \tilde{\Pi} - \delta - V_c \). In the second and third terms \( x_0 \) is the portfolio holding chosen at date 0 (given by (3.9)). The second term reflects the fact that a fraction \( \phi \) of the firms the investor owns have become clean, and the third term is the original cost of the date 0 investment.

The certainty equivalent of this return is

\[
(A3) \quad CE = x(\Pi - V_d) + x_0[\phi V_c + (1 - \phi)V_d] - x_0 F - \frac{1}{2} \gamma x^2 \sigma^2,
\]

and so the investor’s date 1 choice of \( x \) will satisfy

\[
(A4) \quad x = \frac{\Pi - V_d}{\gamma \sigma^2}.
\]

The condition for date 1 stock market equilibrium is \( x = N \), which combined with (3.10) yields

\[
(A6) \quad V_d = F.
\]

Thus,

\[
(A7) \quad CE = \frac{(\Pi - F)^2}{2\gamma \sigma^2} - \phi \delta x_0
\]

\[
= \frac{(\Pi - F)^2}{2\gamma \sigma^2} - \phi \delta \frac{(\Pi - F)}{\gamma \sigma^2}.
\]
By choosing $\phi N$ clean firms, the planner will cause the total amount of pollution to be $(1 - \phi)Nh$.

The planner will maximize investor surplus net of harm, that is,

$$(A8) \quad \left[ \frac{(\Pi - F)^2}{2\gamma\sigma^2} - \phi \delta \frac{(\Pi - F)}{\gamma\sigma^2} - (1 - \phi)Nh \right]$$

with respect to $\phi$. Recall that $\Pi = \tau - \rho N$, which is independent of $\phi$. We obtain a bang-bang solution (either $\phi = 0$ or $\phi = 1$) depending on whether

$$(A9) \quad \delta \frac{(\Pi - F)}{\gamma\sigma^2} > or < Nh.$$ 

Using (3.10), this boils down to

$$(A10) \quad \delta > or < h.$$
Appendix B: The Consumer Boycott

We suppose that a boycott is not anticipated at date 0 when firms are set up, but only becomes a factor at date 1. Thus, $N$ is predetermined at date 1 and is given by (3.11).

Consider the replica economy where there are $r$ consumers. We start by assuming that a fraction $\theta$ of consumers will boycott the dirty product and then derive the equilibrium value of $\theta$. Boycotters buy only clean items at a price $p_c$. The other consumers are either indifferent about what they buy (if $p_c = p_d$) or buy only dirty items (if $p_d < p_c$). We will see that $p_d < p_c$. Thus, a fraction $\theta$ of the demand will be for clean products and a fraction $(1 - \theta)$ for dirty products.

Consider an equilibrium with $n_c$ clean firms and $n_d$ dirty firms, where $n_d = N - n_c$. The equilibrium in the output market requires that

$$(B.1) \quad \theta \left( \frac{p_c - p_e}{\tau} \right) = n_c, \quad (1 - \theta) \left( \frac{p_d - p_e}{\tau} \right) = n_d,$$

where $p_c$ and $p_d$ are the prices of clean and dirty goods, respectively.

Solving these equations yields,

$$p_c = \frac{\theta \rho - \tau n_c}{\theta},$$

$$p_d = \frac{(1 - \theta) \rho - \tau n_d}{1 - \theta}.$$

In an interior equilibrium the expected date 1 profit of clean and dirty firms must be the same, since otherwise the lower profit firms would have a lower market value (since investors must be induced to hold the shares), and a dirty firm would have the incentive to become clean or vice versa. Hence,

$$\Pi_c = p_c - \delta = \Pi_d = p_d.$$

Substituting the value of $p_c$ and $p$ we have

$$\Pi_c = \frac{\theta \rho - \tau n_c}{\theta} - \delta = \frac{(1 - \theta) \rho - \tau n_d}{1 - \theta},$$

and using $n_d = N - n_c$ we can rewrite this as

$$n_c = \theta N - \frac{\delta \theta (1 - \theta)}{\tau}.$$
\[ n_d = (1 - \theta)N + \frac{\delta \theta (1 - \theta)}{\tau}. \]

If \( N < \frac{\delta}{\tau} \), we have a corner solution: the number of clean firms \( n_c = 0 \) in a neighborhood of \( \theta = 0 \) and, for low \( \theta \), the marginal impact of \( \theta \) on \( n_c \) is zero. Note that this will be the case when the slope of the demand curve is low. Under these conditions it is an equilibrium for no consumer to divest: starting at \( \theta = 0 \), nonboycotting consumers will absorb any goods boycotters shun with minimal price impact and as a result no firms will become clean.

For small \( \theta \), we have an interior solution with a positive number of clean firms \( (n_c > 0) \) if and only if \( N > \frac{\delta}{\tau} \). From now on, we assume

(B.6) \[ N > \frac{\delta}{\tau}. \]

Suppose that one of the consumers stops boycotting. When she was boycotting dirty products, she was maximizing her utility \( \rho q - \frac{1}{2} \tau q^2 - p_c q \), yielding \( q = \frac{\rho - p_c}{\tau} \). This purchase generates a utility of \( (\rho - p_c) \frac{\rho - p_c}{\tau} - \frac{1}{2} \tau \left( \frac{\rho - p_c}{\tau} \right)^2 = \frac{1}{2\tau} (\rho - p_c)^2 \). When she stops boycotting she maximizes \( \rho q - \frac{1}{2} \tau q^2 - p_d q \) and so her utility becomes \( \frac{1}{2\tau} (\rho - p_d)^2 \). Thus, the change is

(B.7) \[ \frac{1}{2\tau} [(\rho - p_d)^2 - (\rho - p_c)^2] = \frac{1}{2\tau} [(2\rho - p_d - p_c)(p_c - p_d)]. \]

At the same time, the consumer bears a cost of not boycotting due to her internalizing a fraction of social welfare. As in the divestment case the effect of her stopping her boycott on other consumers’ and investors’ utility can be ignored by the envelope theorem. But there is a negative effect on the environment equal to \( h \frac{\partial n_c}{\partial \theta} \), which will have weight \( \lambda \) in her utility function. Thus, a boycott is sustainable if and only if

(B.8) \[ \frac{1}{2\tau} (2\rho - p_d - p_c)(p_c - p_d) \leq \lambda h \frac{\partial n_c}{\partial \theta}. \]

We can rewrite this as
\[ (B.9) \quad \frac{1}{2\tau} \left( 2\rho - \left[ \rho - \frac{\tau n_c}{\theta} + \rho - \frac{\tau n_d}{1-\theta} \right] \left( \frac{\tau n_d}{1-\theta} - \frac{\tau n_c}{\theta} \right) \right) \leq \lambda h \left[ N - \frac{\delta}{\tau} (1 - 2\theta) \right], \]

where we use (B.2). After some manipulation and the use of (B.5), this can be simplified to

\[ (B.10) \quad (\tau N - \delta)(\delta - \lambda h) \leq 2\theta \delta \left( \lambda h - \frac{\delta}{2} \right) - \frac{\delta^2}{2}. \]

The following definition and proposition parallel the material in the divestment section, and we state them without discussion or proof.

**Definition B.1.** A boycott equilibrium for the limit economy \((r = \infty)\) is a \(0 \leq \theta^* \leq 1\), where \(\theta^*\) represents the fraction of consumers who boycott, such that one of the following holds:

1. \(\theta^* = 0\), and the LHS of (4.28) is less than or equal to the RHS at \(\theta = 0, \lambda = \lambda_n\).
2. \(\theta^* = 1\), and the LHS of (4.28) is greater than or equal to the RHS at \(\theta = 1, \lambda = \lambda_1\).
3. \(\theta^* = \sum_{j=i+1}^{n} \pi_j\) for some \(i = 1, \ldots, n - 1\), and the LHS of (4.28) equals the RHS at \(\theta = \theta^*\) for some \(\lambda_i < \lambda^* < \lambda_{i+1}\).
4. \(\sum_{j=i+1}^{n} \pi_j < \theta^* < \sum_{j=i}^{n} \pi_j\) for some \(i = 1, \ldots, n\), and LHS of (4.28) equals the RHS at \(\theta = \theta^*, \lambda = \lambda_i\).

**Proposition B.1:** A boycott equilibrium exists.

Proposition 5 in the text parallels Proposition 3 for the divestment case.
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