

## Bonds Lie in the Portfolio of the Beholder: Do Bonds Affect Equity Monitoring?

Finance Working Paper N° 855/2022 November 2022 Todd A. Gormley Washington University in St. Louis and ECGI

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For helpful comments, we thank the seminar participants at the "early ideas" session of the Financial Research Association conference, Georgia State University, and Washington University in St. Louis.

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#### Abstract

Institutional investors conduct more governance research and are less likely to follow proxy advisor vote recommendations when a company's bonds comprise a larger share of their assets. Bond holdings of companies with low ESG scores and where the fixed-income fund manager is more likely to be attentive and influence their institutions' voting decisions drive these findings. The findings do not concentrate on companies or shareholder proposals where creditor-shareholder conflicts are likely. Overall, the findings suggest that corporate bond holdings influence how actively institutions monitor their equity positions and contribute to institutions' overall incentive to be engaged stewards.

Keywords: bonds, governance, institutional investors, attention, voting

JEL Classifications: G23, G30, G32, G34, K22

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### Bonds Lie in the Portfolio of the Beholder: Do Bonds Affect Equity Monitoring? <sup>☆</sup>

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#### ABSTRACT

Institutional investors conduct more governance research and are less likely to follow proxy advisor vote recommendations when a company's bonds comprise a larger share of their assets. Bond holdings of companies with low ESG scores and where the fixed-income fund manager is more likely to be attentive and influence their institutions' voting decisions drive these findings. The findings do not concentrate on companies or shareholder proposals where creditor-shareholder conflicts are likely. Overall, the findings suggest that corporate bond holdings influence how actively institutions monitor their equity positions and contribute to institutions' overall incentive to be engaged stewards.

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"[I]t can be challenging for investors to consider how to adopt their stewardship practices to include fixed income... Yet in many areas of corporate governance, there can be a significant alignment of interest that supports engagement on behalf of all financial stakeholders, both creditors and shareholders."

- George S. Dallas, Policy Director at International Corporate Governance Network

#### 1. Introduction

The increasing size of institutional investors, who now own around 70% of public US firms' outstanding equity, raises questions about whether they are effective stewards for equity investors. For example, the three largest mutual fund families in terms of total net assets (Vanguard, Fidelity, and BlackRock) each hold equity positions in around 5,000 US companies, casting doubt on their ability to monitor every company in their massive portfolios. Because these institutions can be influential (e.g., Appel, Gormley, and Keim, 2016; Gormley et al., 2022), understanding when they will be attentive owners and engaged stewards is important (e.g., Fich, Harford, and Tran, 2015; Iliev and Lowry, 2015). This paper analyzes whether institutions' *corporate bond* holdings affect how actively they monitor and vote their *equity* positions.

Institutions offer various mutual fund and exchange-traded fund (ETF) options to investors (e.g., equity-only, bond-only, and mixed-asset), and corporate bond holdings often comprise a significant component of institutional investors' holdings. For example, at the end of 2020, one-fourth of US mutual funds and ETFs held corporate bonds, with more than half of those funds holding both equity and bonds. Moreover, 36.2% of institutions casting votes on contentious shareholder proposals between 2008 and 2020 also held a bond position in the underlying firm. That bond position accounted for, on average, 28.9% of the institution's exposure to the firm.

There are several reasons why bond holdings might affect how actively institutions vote and monitor their equity positions. First, there are many situations where being an engaged steward can be value-enhancing for both holdings. For example, encouraging environmental, social, and governance (ESG) improvements can bolster equity returns and positively impact bond values by reducing credit-rating agencies' risk assessments (Dallas, 2019). Second, bond owners have strong motives to encourage active voting by their equity counterparts. Bond holdings tend to be less liquid and more sensitive to long-term viability risks, making it harder to exit these positions and increasing the importance of direct engagement.<sup>1</sup> Third, fixed-income managers conduct extensive research on companies and their default risk. If shared internally within the fund family, this research could affect how informed and attentive the institution is when voting shares.<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, there are also reasons why institutions' corporate bond holdings might not affect their overall stewardship activities. For example, managers with bond holdings might be given little weight in how the fund family votes its shares, especially when the bond holdings are in bond-only funds that lack voting rights. Additionally, institutions' fiduciary duty obligations could limit the extent to which institutions allow managers with a bond holding (and hence, a potentially conflicting interest) to influence their voting decisions.

To analyze the importance of bond holdings for institutional investors' attention, we analyze whether the size of an institution's bond position is associated with various proxies for investor attention. We start by constructing a proposal-by-institution-level dataset of how institutions voted on every proposal from January 2008 to June 2020 and pair this data with institutions' aggregated holdings at the time of the vote. We then regress a proposal-level, vote-based measure of investor attention onto the share of the fund family's total net assets (TNA) held in that company's bonds. Following Iliev and Lowry (2015) and Gilje, et al. (2020), we proxy for an institution's attention using votes that go against the recommendation of the proxy advisory

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Consistent with this, the lead governance director at a prominent institutional investor described managers with bond positions as more "paranoid and pessimistic" than equity-only managers. Thus, bond managers' presence within the fund family resulted in added pressure for his governance division to monitor firms closely.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> This information spillover could occur in a variety of ways. For example, many large institutions centralize voting decisions in governance divisions that aggregate fund managers' views and information before casting votes. Interviews confirm that individuals in these governance divisions consult both bond- and equity-fund managers before voting. Moreover, in institutions where individual fund managers make voting decisions, equity managers might seek the input of managers with bond positions before voting. Analyzing investment decisions within fund families, Auh and Bai (2020) find evidence consistent with such cross-asset information spillovers.

firm Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). This investor attention proxy is theoretically motivated (Malenko, Malenko, and Spatt, 2022), and the underlying premise is that all else equal, attentive investors are less likely to rubber-stamp ISS recommendations.

To mitigate concerns about portfolio weights' endogeneity, we partial out potential confounding factors that might drive differences in attention at the investor or proposal level. Specifically, we include proposal-level fixed effects in each estimation. Their inclusion accounts for any firm- or proposal-level characteristics that affect institutions' likelihood of voting against the ISS recommendation, which allows us to isolate how votes on a given proposal vary across institutions as a function of their bond holdings. We also include institution-by-month fixed effects to control for each institution's general tendency to vote against ISS and the possibility that this might vary over time. In other words, we only use variation in how an institution voted across proposals each month as a function of how extensive its bond position was in each company.

Using this within-proposal and within-institution-by-month variation in votes, we find a positive association between an institution's bond position size and the likelihood it does not follow the ISS recommendation when voting its shares. The positive association is robust to controlling for the overall importance of the institution's equity position in that company, which also positively predicts voting against ISS (e.g., Fich, Harford, and Tran, 2015; Iliev and Lowry, 2015; Gilje, Gormley, and Levit, 2020). Moreover, the association between bond holdings and voting is economically important and similar in magnitude to that observed for equity holdings. A one percentage point increase in a bond's share of total net assets predicts a 3.1 percentage point increase in the likelihood that the institution votes against the ISS recommendation.

We next construct an alternative proxy for investor attention, whether a fund family accesses a company's proxy filings via EDGAR in the days before a shareholder meeting. Following Iliev, Kalodimos, and Lowry (2021), we construct this governance research measure by matching the IP addresses accessing each filing on EDGAR to individual fund families using a linking table that records the registered IP address owners. To proxy for investor attention, we create an indicator that flags whether the institution downloaded a company's filings from 30 days before the proxy statement release and continuing through the shareholder meeting date.

Providing further evidence that bond holdings influence a fund family's attention level, the size of an institution's bond holdings positively predicts whether the institution views a company's proxy filings before voting. The association is robust to controlling for the size of the institution's equity position, meeting-level fixed effects, and institution-by-month fixed effects. Estimates are also similar in magnitude to what we observe when using our vote-based attention proxy. A one percentage point increase in a bond's share of total net assets is associated with a 6.1 percentage point increase in the likelihood of accessing the company's proxy filing.

We next analyze whether the observed patterns concentrate among companies where fixedincome managers are more likely to be attentive. For example, because fixed-income managers tend to focus on capital preservation, they might be more likely to focus on firms with lower ESG scores, where sustainability considerations are more significant and shareholder pressure has more potential to improve ESG factors and correspondingly, risk assessments (Nuzzo, 2019).

Consistent with bondholders' likely focus on capital preservation, the association between bond holdings and voting concentrates among firms with low ESG scores. Splitting the sample into votes that occur at firms with an above- or below-median ESG score, as assigned by Sustain Analytics, we find that the size of a fund family's equity position is associated with voting in both subsamples. However, the size of the bond position only matters in the subsample where firms have low ESG scores. Governance proposals, rather than proposals connected to socially responsible investing (SRI), drive the association between bond holdings and voting.

The observed association between bond holdings and voting also varies across funds in ways consistent with the influence of bond holdings on institutional investors' attention. A survey of fixed-income practitioners suggests that their engagement is greater when they can leverage an equity counterpart's ownership to exert influence (Russell Investments, 2020), and such leverage might be more significant in mixed-asset funds, which include both equity and fixed-income positions. Consistent with fixed-income managers being more active and likely to exert influence in such funds, we find that bonds held in mixed-asset funds drive our findings for institutional investors' voting patterns. The positive association between portfolio weights and investor attention also concentrates on bonds held in actively managed funds, where monitoring is more likely to occur (e.g., Brav, Jiang, Li, and Pinnington, 2021; Iliev, Kalodimis, and Lowry, 2021).

Our findings also suggest that bond holdings play an important role in the engagement of the "The Big Three" indexers (BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard). When we separately analyze the importance of bonds for The Big Three, which collectively account for about 40% of all institutional bond holdings, we find that The Big Three's bond holdings even more strongly predict increased investor attention. This finding is consistent with these institutions allocating their limited attention to their most significant holdings, both equity and debt.

Shareholder-creditor conflicts arising from institutions' dual holdings do not drive our findings. The association between institutions' bond holdings and voting patterns remains largely unchanged when excluding firms in financial distress, where a wedge in the interests of shareholders and creditors is more likely to occur. Nor do we find evidence that the association varies in magnitude with measures of firms' expected default risk, and the association concentrates among institutions' investment grade bond holdings, where default risk is low. Our findings also hold for a subset of shareholder proposals where creditor-shareholder conflicts are unlikely to be relevant. Shareholder-creditor conflicts also do not explain our findings regarding institutions' governance research, as measured using EDGAR viewings. Overall, the evidence suggests that bond holdings systematically affect institutional investor attention and monitoring.

These findings have important implications for corporate governance and the monitoring of companies. Institutional investors are not fully attentive (e.g., Ben-Rephael, Da, and Israelsen,

2017; Fang, Peress, and Zheng, 2014; Lu, Ray, and Teo, 2016; Schmidt, 2019), particularly when it comes to their smaller equity positions (Fich, Harford, and Tran, 2015; Iliev and Lowry, 2015; Iliev, Kalodimos, and Lowry, 2021). This lack of attention affects managers' incentives and destroys shareholder value (e.g., Kempf, Manconi, and Spalt, 2017; Liu, Low, Masulis, and Zhang, 2020; Gilje, Gormley, and Levit, 2020). However, our findings show that corporate bond holdings predict greater investor attention, suggesting that the popularity of mixed-asset funds and institutions' tendency to hold bond positions in companies can enhance investor stewardship.

Our findings also contribute to the nascent literature that quantifies institutions' incentive to be engaged monitors. Existing estimates of institutions' motive to monitor consider how improvements in their equity positions' value will increase fund fees and flows (Lewellen and Lewellen, 2021). However, this focus on institutions' equity positions ignores that active monitoring can also improve the value of institutions' bond holdings, providing many institutions an additional motive to be engaged owners. Our findings suggest that institutions' *combined* debt and equity holdings and the type of funds holding those positions should be accounted for when proxying for institutions' overall incentive to be engaged stewards.

Finally, our results contribute to the ongoing discussion regarding the conflicting interests of institutions holding dual debt and equity positions. Debt and equity owners can have different views regarding the value implications of dividends, equity issuances, takeover defenses, and acquisitions, which could influence how an institution that holds debt and equity votes on specific proposals. Consistent with this, evidence suggests that institutions holding both debt and equity in a firm vote differently on proposed mergers (Bodnaruk and Rossi, 2016) and are more likely to cast creditor-friendly votes, especially when the firm is in financial distress (Keswani, Tran, and Volpin, 2021). We instead analyze the importance of debt holdings for an institution's overall likelihood of being an engaged monitor, which can positively influence the value of both debt and equity positions. We find evidence that these dual holdings influence institutions' stewardship

more generally and in ways that do not necessarily forgo equity investors' interests.<sup>3</sup>

We organize the paper as follows. Section 2 describes our data. Section 3 presents our empirical specification, and Section 4 reports our main findings. Section 5 analyzes heterogeneity in the importance of bonds across firms, proposals, and funds, and Section 6 examines alternative explanations for our findings. Section 7 concludes.

#### 2. Data and Summary Statistics

To assess the association between an institution's bond holdings and its level of attention to individual companies, we combine various datasets, including mutual funds' holdings, mutual fund voting records, and SEC log files of institutions' EDGAR downloads.

#### 2.1. Mutual fund holdings data

To calculate how significant each company's equity or bonds are in a fund family's overall portfolio, we use the CRSP Mutual Funds Database. The SEC requires mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) to disclose their holdings quarterly during their fiscal year using Forms N-CSR and N-Q. Many funds, however, voluntarily report holdings on other dates as well.<sup>4</sup> We restrict our analysis to holdings starting in 2008 because the CRSP database contains inaccurate information before that year (Schwarz and Potter, 2016).<sup>5</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> In this regard, our findings also differ from papers using the dual debt and equity holdings of banking institutions and investors to study the effects of shareholder-creditor conflicts on investment, risk-shifting, loan spreads, debt covenant use, and financial distress resolution (e.g., Chava, Wang, and Zou, 2019; Chu, 2018; Chu, Diep-Nguyen, Wang, Wang, and Wang, 2020; Jiang, Li, and Shao, 2010; Yang, 2019).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Because most funds' fiscal year align with the calendar year, mandated disclosures typically occur on the last days of March, June, September, and December each year. On other dates, some funds also make additional voluntary disclosures to significant databases, like CRSP, Morningstar, and Thomson Reuters. However, most of these voluntary disclosures also occur at the end of March, June, September, and December (Gormley, Kaplan, and Verma, 2022). Institutions already having to disclose their aggregated holdings to the SEC on Form 13F on these same dates likely drives these additional disclosures (Schwarz and Potter, 2016).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> In 2008, CRSP migrated to using Lipper data instead of Morningstar data, which has resulted in an increase in its coverage of SEC-mandated disclosures (Schwarz and Potter, 2016). We use the CRSP mutual fund holdings rather than the other commonly used dataset for such holdings, Thomson Mutual Fund Holdings (Thomson), as it is easier to merge with our voting outcomes, resulting in a smaller loss of observations. Moreover, Schwarz and Potter (2016) document that the CRSP Mutual Fund Database has better coverage than Thomson after 2007.

To analyze how holdings correlate with subsequent institution-level measures of attention, we aggregate security holdings to the institution (i.e., fund family) level for each month. To construct this monthly measure, we aggregate all the most recent fund reports of a particular institution going back three months. Because funds are required to report quarterly, this 3-month window will capture each fund's holdings within the larger fund family.

To aggregate holdings to the institution level, we manually match funds to fund families using their fund name while accounting for subsidiaries within each institution. For example, Allianz purchased both Nicholas-Applegate Capital Management and Pacific Investment Management Company (PIMCO) in 2000, and in 2008, it invested \$2.5 billion in Hartford Financial Services Group. Because our sample begins in 2008, we assign all funds with names containing "Allianz," "Nicholas-Applegate," "PIMCO," and "Hartford" to the Allianz fund family. When aggregating to the institution level, we exclude positions with a negative value. Our subsequent findings are similar if we instead keep these negative positions or use their absolute value when aggregating. Finally, we use WRDS's CUSIP-PERMCO link table to assign a PERMCO to each security in our sample, where each PERMCO identifies a unique firm.

Because the CRSP database does not directly flag whether reported securities are a bond, we classify securities as a "bond" using two methods. First, we classify securities that report a value in the "Date of Bond Maturity" field as bonds. Because this field is missing for some bonds, we also flag a security as a bond if the security's name includes a "%", ".", "-", "/", or any number. These symbols and numbers appear in a security name for bonds to indicate a maturity date and yield rate. For example: "RAYTHEON CO., 7.20%, 8-15-2027" has a blank maturity date in the CRSP database but refers to Raytheon's 7.2% domestic bond expiring in 2027. We classify all other securities as "equity," and a manual review of the resulting security classifications confirms that this approach accurately flags bond and equity securities.

Bond holdings comprise a sizable component of institutions' portfolios. In June 2020, mutual fund families held about \$1.35 trillion in corporate bonds, accounting for 10% of their total net assets. Figure 1 provides a breakdown of bond holdings across fund families. Of this \$1.35 trillion, Vanguard held \$357 billion, while BlackRock held \$161 billion.

There is also considerable variation in the importance of corporate bond holdings across fund families. Table 1, which provides a breakdown between equity and corporate bonds for some of the most prominent mutual fund families, shows this variation. For example, after excluding government bond holdings, 16.8% of Prudential's \$218 billion in assets is held in corporate bonds, compared to just 3.5% of T Rowe Price's \$474 billion in assets. There is also variation in bond holdings among The Big Three indexers. For example, BlackRock holds 13.2% of its assets in corporate bonds, while corporate bonds only account for 4.0% of State Street's assets.

Fund-level summary statistics also show the importance of bonds for mutual fund families. Most mutual fund families offer a range of funds, including equity-only, bond-only, and mixed-asset mutual funds, which hold both corporate debt and equity securities. Table 2, columns 1-3 provides a yearly breakdown of such funds. While bond-only funds account for 6% of funds in 2008, they have grown in popularity since, accounting for 12% of funds by 2020. Mixed-asset funds are also relatively common, accounting for 9–21% of mutual funds and ETFs per year between 2008 and 2020. Moreover, corporate bond holdings are an important component of mixed-asset funds. In 2020, mixed-asset funds held 50% of their assets in corporate bonds (column 4). On average, about 56–66% of a fund family's corporate bond holdings each year are held in mixed-asset funds (column 5).

#### 2.2. Mutual fund voting data

We use the ISS Voting Analytics dataset to analyze how institutions' votes vary as a function of their bond holdings. The database includes fund voting records obtained from the mandated N-PX forms that institutions file with the SEC every year. While the voting records are available from July 2003 to June 2020, we start our sample in 2008 to match the time for which we have fund holdings data and to match when the coverage of Voting Analytics is better. Before 2007, ISS only collected voting records of the top 100 fund families, but after 2007, it collected the top 300 (Brav, Jiang, Li, and Pinnington, 2021). The ISS data also includes a description of each proposal and the ISS recommendation on how investors should vote.

For our analysis, we follow Iliev and Lowry (2015) and Gilje, Gormley, and Levit (2020) and focus on shareholder-sponsored proposals. During our sample, there were 11,523 proposals sponsored by shareholders, and of these, 5,944 (or 51.6%) were contentious, as defined by when ISS and management gave conflicting vote recommendations. We exclude non-contentious proposals because they are typically not well-thought-out (Gantchev and Giannetti, 2019) and because investors do not appear to focus on them (Iliev, Kalodimos, and Lowry, 2021). A similar logic applies to excluding management proposals, which are primarily perfunctory and less revealing about investor attention (Iliev and Lowry, 2015; Gilje, Gormley, and Levit, 2020).

We aggregate the fund-level votes to the institution (i.e., fund family) level using the same approach to aggregate mutual fund holdings and then merge the voting data with the holdings data. When merging in the holdings data for each proposal-by-institution observation, we use the aggregated holdings across all the most recent fund reports of the institution in the three months before the proposal vote. After this merger, we have 373 unique institutions in our sample, and, on average, 55 institutions and their funds cast votes for each proposal. In total, our sample includes 327,266 proposal-by-institution observations across 13 years.

We follow Iliev and Lowry (2015) and proxy for investor attention using an indicator for whether an institution's votes on a proposal fail to follow the ISS recommendations. Iliev and Lowry (2015) and Malenko and Malenko (2019) posit that if fund families devote more resources towards becoming informed, they will be less likely to follow proxy advisory firm recommendations indiscriminately. Malenko, Malenko, and Spatt (2021) also show that voting against ISS is the equilibrium outcome for more attentive investors when ISS uses its vote recommendations to create controversy. Consistent with this possibility, Iliev and Lowry (2015) observe a greater likelihood of disagreeing with ISS for mutual funds where the net benefits of being attentive are greater. Moreover, Iliev, Kalodimos, and Lowry (2021) find that this voting behavior positively correlates with an institutional investor becoming informed before a vote.

To create a proposal-by-institution voting measure of investor attention, we calculate the share of an institution's funds that do not follow the ISS recommendation, *Against ISS*. We start by following Gilje, Gormley, and Levit (2020) and code fund-by-proposal vote decisions of "Against," "Abstain," and "Withhold" as "Against," and "For" as "For." We then compare how each fund voted to the ISS recommendation of either "For" or "Against" and flag those where the fund did not follow the ISS recommendation. We then calculate *Against ISS* as the share of an institution's funds that did not follow the ISS recommendation for that proposal. For 83.5% of our proposal-by-institution observations, *Against ISS* equals either zero or one, as most funds within a fund family vote in the same direction on individual proposals.

For the contentious shareholder proposals we analyze, there is considerable variation across institutions on whether they follow ISS. Table 3 provides summary statistics for our final proposal-by-institution sample. For an average proposal, 47.8% of institutions cast at least one vote that does not agree with ISS, and 40.4% of funds cast a vote that does not agree with ISS. While not tabulated, we find that the average likelihood of voting against ISS is considerably lower for management proposals (7.8%) and non-contentious shareholder proposals (10.5%), consistent with these excluded proposals being routine and less likely to require investors' attention.

The summary statistics provided in Table 3 further highlight the potential importance of institutions' bond holdings. In 36.2% of observations, the voting institution held a non-zero bond

position in the company. On average, these bond holdings accounted for about 0.081% of the institution's total net assets and 28.9% of their overall exposure to the firm.

#### 2.3. Mutual funds' accessing of company filings on EDGAR

As an additional proxy of investor attention, we use whether an institution accessed the company's proxy filings before a shareholder meeting, which previous papers use as a measure for corporate governance research (e.g., see Bauguess, Cooney, and Hanley 2018; Loughran and McDonald, 2017; Iliev, Kalodimos, and Lowry, 2021). We use the publicly available EDGAR log files to measure whether an institution accessed a company's proxy filings. The SEC's Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (DERA) assembles information on internet search traffic for EDGAR filings through SEC.gov, covering February 14, 2003, through June 30, 2017. The log file contains the first three octets of the IP address accessing each filing and a time stamp on when the file was accessed. To assign these IPs to institutional investors, we use a linking table purchased from Digital Elements, an IP geolocational technology provider, containing names of the organizations registering each IP address as of December 31, 2016. We then follow the approach recommended by Iliev, Kalodimos, and Lowry (2021) to match these organization names to specific institutional investors. See Appendix A for details of this matching process.

To create our second proxy for investor attention, we use an indicator for whether the institution accessed a prior or current proxy filing of the company in the days before its shareholder meeting. We use accession numbers provided by the SEC to identify proxy filings, and our window includes the 30 days before the current proxy statement date and continues through the shareholder meeting date. Typically, proxy statements are released 45 days before the shareholder meeting, resulting in an average window of 75 days.

During our sample period, January 2008 to June 2017, we obtain log files for 41,996 shareholder meetings and can identify 141 unique institutions. After limiting our sample to

institutions with non-zero equity holdings on the meeting date, our final sample includes 1.22 million institution-by-meeting observations. On average, 8.5% of institutions with a non-zero equity position access a proxy filing before the shareholder meeting.

#### **3. Estimation Strategy**

To analyze the association between an institution's level of attention and the importance of a particular bond position in an institution's overall portfolio, we start by estimating

$$Against \, ISS_{ijkm} = \beta(\frac{Bond \ holdings}{TNA})_{ikm} + \gamma(\frac{Equity \ holdings}{TNA})_{ikm} + \alpha_j + \delta_{im} + \varepsilon_{ijkm}, \tag{1}$$

where Against ISS is the share of institution *i*'s funds that voted against the ISS recommendation on proposal *j* for firm *k* in month *m*, Bond holdings/TNA and Equity holdings/TNA are the proportion of institution *i*'s total net assets (TNA) held in firm *k*'s bonds and equity as of month *m*, and  $\alpha_j$  and  $\delta_{im}$  are proposal and institution-by-month fixed effects, respectively. To ensure outliers do not unduly influence our findings, we winsorize Bond holdings/TNA and Equity holdings/TNA at the one percent level. Furthermore, to ease the estimates' interpretation, we scale both variables (and subsequent explanatory variables) by their sample standard deviation. Thus, each variable's coefficient reflects the change in the outcome for a one standard deviation increase in that variable. Because the estimation errors,  $\varepsilon$ , might exhibit serial correlation and be correlated within institutions, we cluster the standard errors at the institution level.

Our main identification concern is that of omitted variables. Suppose *Bond holdings/TNA* correlates with proposal-, firm-, or institution-level characteristics that affect an institution's likelihood of actively voting its shares (i.e., not blindly following the ISS recommendation). In that case, our estimate of interest,  $\beta$ , could reflect these omitted variables rather than an effect of bond holdings on investor attention. For example, if institutions tend to hold larger bond positions in better-run companies and such companies are also those where institutions are more likely to vote against ISS recommendations, a positive correlation between *Bond holdings/TNA* and *Against* 

ISS could exist even if bond holdings do not affect institutions' monitoring.

However, including proposal and institution-by-month fixed effects allows us to control for a number of these potential omitted factors. The proposal-level fixed effects control for any proposal-level characteristics that could affect institutions' likelihood of following ISS, including the proposal's type and content. The proposal fixed effects also control for any firm characteristics (e.g., profitability and size) at the time of the vote that might matter for how institutions vote on a particular proposal. The institution-by-month fixed effects control for any differences in an institution's overall tendency to be "pro-management" (e.g., Brav, Jiang, Li, and Pinnington, 2021; Kedia, Starks, and Wang, 2020), while allowing for this tendency to change over time. Hence, our coefficient of interest,  $\beta$ , is identified using variation in how votes for a given proposal vary as a function of each institution's bond holdings in each month.

These fixed effects do not control for other factors that exhibit cross-sectional variation across an institution's holdings at a particular point in time that both affect the likelihood of an institution voting against ISS and correlate with *Bond holdings/TNA*. One such factor is how significant that firm's equity is in the institution's overall portfolio, which could correlate with *Bond holdings/TNA* and affect institutions' monitoring (e.g., Fich, Harford, and Tran, 2015; Iliev and Lowry, 2015). For this reason, we also include the proportion of an institution *i*'s TNA held in firm *k*'s equity as of month *m*, *Equity holdings/TNA*, as an additional control.<sup>6</sup>

#### 4. Baseline Results

This section analyzes the association between bond holdings and institutions' voting using the specification in eq. (1). We also test our findings' robustness to using an alternative proxy for investor attention—whether an institution accesses the company's proxy filings via EDGAR.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> While previous papers tend to measure the importance of an equity position relative to the overall equity portfolio, we scale an institution's equity holdings by its TNA to ensure that we are scaling bond and equity holdings in the same way and to make the coefficients on the two regressors more comparable. However, our subsequent findings are robust to instead scaling *Equity holdings* using the total value of an institution's equity portfolio.

#### 4.1. Voting against ISS

To assess how bond holdings might influence institutions' level of attention, we start by estimating a version of eq. (1) that excludes the *Equity holdings/TNA* control. This estimation determines the baseline association between an institution's bond holdings in a company and the share of an institution's funds that vote against ISS for a company's proposals after controlling for proposal and institution-by-month fixed effects. Table 4, column 1 reports the findings.

We find that institutions where a firm's bonds represent a larger proportion of their portfolio are more likely to vote against the ISS recommendation. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the share of an institution's portfolio held in a firm's bonds (0.20%) is associated with a 0.651 percentage point increase in the likelihood of voting against ISS (Table 4, column 1). This estimate corresponds to a 1.41% increase relative to the sample standard deviation.

Like prior work analyzing how investors' attention varies with their equity holdings, the association between bond holdings and institutions' votes against ISS is concave. To illustrate this, we follow Gilje, Gormley, and Levit (2020) and plot the point estimates from a regression of *Against ISS* onto dummy variables for each quintile of *Bond holdings/TNA*, proposal fixed effects, and institution-by-month fixed effects. Figure 2 reports the findings using a linear extrapolation between point estimates. The observed concavity indicates that an increase in attention for a given increase in bond holdings diminishes as the portfolio weight increases.

The positive association between bond holdings and voting is robust to controlling for the proportion of institutions' portfolios held in the firm's equity (Table 4, column 2). Consistent with the prior literature, we find a positive association between the importance of a stock in an institution's portfolio and the likelihood of that institution disagreeing with ISS (e.g., Iliev and Lowry, 2015; Gilje, Gormley, and Levit, 2020). A one standard deviation increase in *Equity holdings/TNA* (0.78%) predicts a 1.66 percentage point increase in the likelihood of voting against

ISS. However, the coefficient on *Bond holdings/TNA* remains mostly unchanged and is still statistically significant at the one percent level. In other words, after controlling for proposal and firm characteristics at the time of the vote (as done by including the proposal fixed effects), an institution's overall tendency to disagree with ISS (as done by including institution-by-month fixed effects), *and* the institution's equity position size, institutions are more attentive voters when that firm's bonds represent a larger proportion of the institution's portfolio.

The association between bond holdings and voting behavior is also economically significant and similar in magnitude to that of equity holdings. Controlling for *Equity* holdings/TNA, a one percentage point increase in a bond's share of TNA is associated with a 3.1 percentage point increase in the share of an institution's funds voting against ISS. For equity, the comparable shift in voting against ISS is 2.1 percentage points.

#### 4.2. An institution's EDGAR viewings of company filings

Because voting against ISS need not always indicate an attentive investor, we also assess the association between bond holdings and an alternative proxy for investor attention—whether an institution accesses the company's proxy filings via EDGAR. Because we measure this proxy at the meeting- rather than proposal-level, we estimate

Non – zero EDGAR views<sub>iklm</sub> =  $\beta(\frac{Bond \ holdings}{TNA})_{ikm} + \gamma(\frac{Equity \ holdings}{TNA})_{ikm} + \alpha_l + \delta_{im} + \varepsilon_{iklm}$ , (2) where *Non-zero EDGAR views* is an indicator equal to one if institution *i* accessed a proxy filing of firm *k* before shareholder meeting *l* held in month *m* (see Section 2.3 and the Appendix for more details on how we construct this variable), and  $\alpha_l$  and  $\delta_{im}$  are meeting and institution-by-month fixed effects, respectively. We continue to cluster the standard errors at the fund family level.

Table 5 provides summary statistics for our meeting-by-institution-level sample. On average, 8.5% of institutions with a non-zero equity position download a proxy filing before the shareholder meeting. In 10.1% of observations, an institution also holds a bond position in the

company. That bond position accounts for, on average, 0.027% of the institution's overall portfolio and 29.9% of the fund family's overall position in that company.<sup>7</sup>

Bond holdings also positively predict whether an institution will view a company's proxy filing in the days before the meeting. Table 6 reports our estimates. When excluding the control for *Equity holdings/TNA*, a one standard deviation increase in the share of an institution's overall portfolio held in a particular firm's bonds is associated with a 0.286 percentage point increase in the likelihood of accessing the proxy filing (column 1). The point estimate remains mostly unchanged when including *Equity holdings/TNA* as a control (column 2). Moreover, like Iliev, Kalodimos, and Lowry (2021), we find a positive association between institutions' equity holdings and accessing a firm's SEC filings, consistent with institutions conducting more governance research on stocks that account for a larger proportion of their portfolio.

The association between bond holdings and the proxy for investor attention is again similar in magnitude to that of equity holdings. Controlling for *Equity holdings/TNA*, a one percentage point increase in a bond's share of TNA is associated with a 6.1 percentage point increase in accessing the proxy filing. For equity, the comparable increase is 3.1 percentage points.

A drawback of using EDGAR views as our outcome variable is that it does not allow us to focus on the shareholder proposals that are more likely to require investor attention. The sample in columns 1-2 of Table 6 includes many meetings with only routine proposals. To mitigate this weakness, we assess whether the observed association varies when a meeting includes a contentious shareholder proposal. Table 6, columns 3-4, conducts this test.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> A combination of factors drives the lower proportion of observations with non-zero bond holdings in our meetingby-institution sample (10.1%) relative to our proposal-by-institution sample (36.2%). First, the meeting-by-institution sample covers all meetings, not just those with contentious shareholder proposals. In a proposal-by-institution sample that includes all proposals, the proportion of observations with non-zero bond holdings drops from 36.2% to 16.6%. This drop is because ISS is more likely to recommend voting against managers for larger companies, which are more likely to have publicly traded bonds. Second, the institutions to which we can match IP addresses are less likely to hold bonds relative to the institutions in the proposal-by-institution sample.

Meetings that include a contentious shareholder proposal drive the association between bond holdings and EDGAR views. When restricting the sample to meetings with a contentious shareholder proposal (which accounts for about 11% of all observations), we find a large and positive coefficient on *Bond holdings/TNA* (column 3; p < 0.05). When using meetings without a contentious shareholder proposal, the point estimate is almost 50% smaller and no longer statistically significant (column 4). The lack of a statistically significant association between bond holdings and EDGAR views for meetings without a contentious shareholder proposal is consistent with such meetings including only routine proposals that require less attention.

#### 5. The Importance of ESG and Heterogeneity Across Funds and Institutions

Overall, the above findings are consistent with bond holdings influencing institutions' level of attention. Larger equity and bond positions both increase the likelihood of observing behaviors indicating greater investor attention: voting against ISS and downloading SEC filings. These findings suggest that while only equity investors vote, an institution's holding of bonds might increase its attention to individual companies. This increased attention might occur for a variety of reasons. For example, because credit rating agencies increasingly factor in a company's activities on ESG issues, bond managers might encourage more active voting and monitoring by their equity counterparts. Moreover, bond managers might possess additional information that influences an institution's decision on how to vote their shares.

We next assess whether the observed importance of bond holdings differs across firms and proposals based on their connection to ESG-related matters that could be important to bond investors. We also assess whether bond holdings' importance varies based on the type of fund holding the bond (e.g., bond-only versus mixed-asset) and for The Big Three institutions (i.e., BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard), which account for about 40% of all institutional investors' corporate bond holdings. For this analysis, we restrict our attention to our first proxy for attention, disagreeing with ISS, because it allows us to limit our sample to contentious shareholder proposals, where we observe more meaningful variation in attention.

#### 5.1. Heterogeneity by ESG score

We first examine whether the association between bond holdings and institutions' votes differs with ESG factors. Fixed-income managers tend to focus on capital preservation, and lower ESG scores for a firm can reflect less sustainable operations and greater long-term risks to debtholders.<sup>8</sup> Hence, bondholders are likely more attentive to companies that perform poorly in ESG metrics, where shareholder pressure has more potential to improve ESG factors and, correspondingly, risk assessments (Nuzzo, 2019). To test this possibility, we repeat our voting analysis for firms with above- and below-median ESG scores, as obtained from Sustain Analytics. Because the ESG data is unavailable for some observations, we first repeat our baseline analysis on the subsample of observations with non-missing ESG scores. In this sample, about 70% of our original sample, we continue to find a positive association between the institutions' bond holdings and the likelihood that institutions vote against ISS (Table 7, column 1).

Consistent with bondholders being focused on firms with low ESG scores, we find that votes occurring at companies with below-median ESG scores drive the association between institutions' bond holdings and voting. Columns 2-3 of Table 7 show this finding. In contrast, equity holdings correlate with voting for both high- and low-ESG firms, indicating that the importance of equity holdings for investor attention does not vary with firms' ESG scores.

We also find that governance- rather than SRI-related shareholder proposals drive the association between bond holdings and voting. In column 4, we repeat our baseline analysis on the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Consistent with this view, S&P began incorporating firms' ESG scores into their determination of risk ratings in January 2020, while Moody's began doing so in June 2022. See

https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/research/articles/200120-enel-esg-and-credit-ratings-11311565 and https://www.esgtoday.com/moodys-integrates-esg-into-credit-analysis-for-pharma-medical-devices-us-states-cities/ for more details.

subsample of observations with non-missing, ISS-defined proposal types. In this sample, which is about 80% of our original sample, we continue to find a positive association between institutions' bond holdings and institutions' voting. However, when splitting the sample into ISS's two proposal classifications, "governance" and "SRI," we see that much of the positive association is coming from governance-related proposals (column 5) instead of the socially responsible investing proposals (column 6). The association between equity ownership and voting is statistically significant and of similar magnitude for both proposal types.

#### 5.2. Heterogeneity by type of fund

Next, we assess whether the positive association between how important a firm's bonds are in an institution's overall portfolio and that institution's voting behavior depends on which type of funds hold those bonds. As Table 2 shows, an institution might have a bond position because of holdings in bond-only funds and because of holdings in mixed-asset funds.

The type of fund that holds the bonds might matter for a couple of reasons. First, there could be differences in the relative amount of attention paid to shareholder proposals by managers of bond-only and mixed-asset funds. For example, mixed-asset fund managers might pay more attention because they must decide how to vote their shares (or what recommendation to give to their institution's proxy voting committee). If true, their bond holdings might matter more for how attentive the institution is when voting.<sup>9</sup> Second, there could be differences in the relative influence of managers within the institution. Mixed-asset fund managers might have more influence over votes if only funds with an equity position have a "seat at the table" when making institution-level vote decisions. However, bond-only funds could also matter for institution-level attention if the managers of those funds volunteer their opinions or are consulted before votes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Consistent with this possibility, a 2019 Annual ESG Manager Survey by Russell Investments finds that 89% of fund managers with both equity and bond offerings discuss ESG topics when they interface with firms they are invested in, while only 71% of fund managers with bond-only offerings do so. For more details, see https://russellinvestments.com/uk/blog/engagement-in-fixed-income.

To test for heterogeneity across fund types, we repeat our estimation of eq. (1) after replacing *Bond holdings/TNA* with two measures of how important a company's bonds are in the institution's portfolio. The first, *Bond holdings [in bond-only funds]/TNA*, measures the proportion of an institution's overall TNA held in the company's bonds using bond-only funds. The second, *Bond holdings [in mixed-asset funds]/TNA*, reflects the share of an institution's TNA held in the company's bonds, using only mixed-asset funds. By construction, the sum of these two bond measures equals the original *Bond holdings/TNA* for each observation.

Consistent with mixed-asset fund managers being more attentive to votes or more influential in institutions' voting decisions, bonds in mixed-asset funds drive the positive association between bond holdings and institutional investors' voting patterns. Table 8 shows this finding. A one standard deviation increase in *Bond holdings [in mixed-asset funds]/TNA* (0.13%) predicts a 0.516 percentage point increase in the likelihood of the institution voting against ISS (p < 0.05). We find less evidence that holdings in bond-only funds predict institutional investors' voting patterns. The coefficient on *Bond holdings [in bond-only funds]/TNA* is 33% smaller and not statistically significant at the ten percent level.

If bond holdings affect institutions' monitoring, the importance of these holdings might also depend on the type of mixed-asset fund—indexed or actively managed. Suppose institutions are more attentive to their actively managed holdings. In that case, bonds held in indexed mixedasset funds (e.g., target-date funds that include both bond and equity holdings) could matter less for institutions' monitoring than bonds held in actively managed, mixed-asset funds.

To assess this possibility, we subdivided institutions' mixed-asset holdings into bonds held in index funds and bonds held in actively managed funds. To assign a mixed-asset fund as either indexed or actively managed, we follow Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016, 2019) and classify a fund as "index" if either CRSP classifies the fund as indexed or if the fund name contains words that would indicate an index fund. All other funds are classified as actively managed. About 85% of the mixed-asset funds in our sample are actively managed.

Consistent with actively managed funds being more attentive to shareholder proposals, we find that the positive association between bond holdings and the likelihood of voting against ISS is limited to actively managed mixed-asset funds (Table 8, column 2). The size of bond holdings held in actively managed, mixed-asset funds is positively associated with the likelihood of disagreeing with ISS (p < 0.01). The amount of bonds held in mixed-asset index funds exhibits no association with whether an institution is likely to vote against ISS.

#### 5.3. Bond holdings and The Big Three

We next assess whether bond holdings predict how actively The Big Three vote their shares. Because The Big Three account for 75% of all indexed equity mutual fund and ETF assets, the growing popularity of indexing has resulted in them becoming some of the largest stock owners in US companies. In 2017, The Big Three cast 25% of S&P 500 firms' votes, which account for about 75% of the total market capitalization for US public firms (Bebchuk and Hirst, 2019).

This growth of indexing and the importance of The Big Three has raised questions about how index investing affects corporate governance and whether The Big Three are motivated monitors. Although the monitoring of firms can help increase the value of these institutions' portfolios (Kahan and Rock, 2019; Lewellen and Lewellen, 2021), some argue that these institutions lack the incentive or firm-specific information required to monitor effectively (e.g., Schmidt and Fahlenbrach, 2018; Bebchuk and Hirst, 2019; Gilje, Gormley, and Levit, 2020). Despite this, evidence suggests these institutions exert influence over the companies they own (e.g., see Appel, Gormley, and Keim, 2016; Gormley, Gupta, Matsa, Mortal, and Yang, 2021).

The Big Three institutions are also significant owners of bonds. Collectively, The Big Three accounted for about 40.1% of corporate bonds held in mutual funds and ETFs at the end of

June 2020, and corporate bonds accounted for, on average, 10.0% of their total net assets. If bond holdings increase investor attention, then The Big Three's sizable bond holdings might also contribute to their incentive to be engaged monitors. We assess this possibility in Table 9, where we repeat our estimation of eq. (1) and allow the importance of bonds to differ for The Big Three by including an interaction between *Bond holdings/TNA* and an indicator that equals one if the voting institution is one of The Big Three institutions, *Big Three*. Because of the additional interaction, the *Bond holdings/TNA*'s coefficient now captures the importance of bond holdings/TNA and *Bond holdings/TNA* and the sum of the coefficients on *Bond holdings/TNA* and *Bond holdings/TNA* × *Big Three* captures the importance of bond holdings for The Big Three. We also include an interaction term for *Equity holdings/TNA* and *Big Three* for completeness. We do not include *Big Three* on its own as it is collinear with our institution-by-month fixed effects.

The proportion of an institution's overall portfolio held in bonds is an even stronger predictor of voting against ISS for The Big Three institutions. For all other institutions, a one standard deviation increase in *Bond holdings/TNA* predicts a 0.525 percentage point increase in the institution's likelihood of disagreeing with ISS (Table 9; p < 0.05). For The Big Three, the same change in *Bond holdings/TNA* predicts an increase nearly five times larger (0.525+2.600 = 3.125 percentage points) and significant at the one percent level.

A Big Three institution's likelihood of disagreeing with ISS is also more sensitive to *Equity holdings/TNA* changes than other institutions. For all other institutions, a one standard deviation increase in *Equity holdings/TNA* predicts a 1.52 percentage point increase in the institution's likelihood of disagreeing with ISS (p < 0.01). For The Big Three, the same change predicts a 217% larger increase (1.52+3.30 = 4.82 percentage points).

The greater importance of *Bond holdings/TNA* and *Equity holdings/TNA* for The Big Three's voting could reflect their portfolios' relative size and diversity. Because of their greater focus on indexed investment strategies, these institutions tend to hold more securities overall, and each security typically represents a relatively small proportion of their overall portfolio. Absent some economies of scale in monitoring, these institutions might focus their limited resources on monitoring companies representing the largest proportion of their portfolio. Our findings in Table 9 are consistent with this possibility, which, to our knowledge, has not been shown before.

Overall, these findings suggest that The Big Three's extensive bond holdings contribute to their incentive to monitor companies in their equity portfolio. Prior work has documented that large institutions, including The Big Three, have strong financial motives to monitor their equity investments because of the potential effect on fund fees and fund flows (Lewellen and Lewellen, 2021). However, this work ignores the possibility that active monitoring can also influence the value of their bond positions, providing them an additional motive to be engaged owners.

#### 6. Robustness to Alternative Explanations

We next assess whether alternative mechanisms might drive the association between bond holdings and investor attention. First, we assess whether creditor-shareholder conflicts can explain our findings. Second, we assess the potential importance of reverse causality.

#### 6.1. Creditor-shareholder conflicts

Keswani, Tran, and Volpin (2021) find that institutions with dual debt and equity holdings are more likely to cast votes favorable to creditors, mainly when a firm is in financial distress. Because ISS recommendations reflect equity holders' interests, debt-holding institutions' conflicting interests provide an alternative explanation for why such institutions are less likely to follow ISS recommendations. If creditor-shareholder conflicts explain our findings, then the importance of bond holdings for voting should concentrate on firms in financial distress.

However, firms in financial distress do not drive our findings. Table 10, where we repeat our earlier estimations but exclude firms that Keswani, Tran, and Volpin (2021) define as distressed, shows this robustness.<sup>10</sup> Because the data needed to calculate financial distress is unavailable for some observations, we first repeat our baseline analysis on the subsample of observations with non-missing distress data. In this sample, which is about 90% of our original sample, we continue to find a positive association between institutions' bond holdings and the likelihood that institutions vote against ISS (Table 10, column 1), especially for bond holdings in mixed-asset funds (column 3). Dropping firms that Keswani, Tran, and Volpin (2021) define as being distressed has minimal impact on the estimates (columns 2 and 4). Moreover, we find no evidence that the importance of institutions' bond holdings varies with firms' expected default frequency (EDF), as measured using the approach of Bharath and Shumway (2008). Table 11 reports these estimates. The coefficient on the interaction between *Bond holdings/TNA* and the issuing firm's EDF is positive but not statistically significant (Table 11, column 1).

In further support that creditor-shareholder conflicts do not drive our findings, we also find no evidence that institutions' junk bond holdings drive the association between bond holdings and voting against ISS. Larger holdings in a firm's investment-grade bonds (where default risk is less) positively predict voting against ISS, while larger holdings in junk bonds (where default risk is greater) do not (Table 11, column 2). The findings also show that a possible correlation between ESG scores and default risk does not drive our earlier ESG finding (see Table 7).

Our findings also hold for a subset of shareholder proposals where creditor-shareholder conflicts are unlikely to be relevant. Table 12 reports these estimates. Keswani, Tran, and Volpin (2021) find evidence that the influence of creditor-shareholder conflicts on institutional voting is present for proposals with clear implications for creditors but not for proposals related to director elections, where the implications for creditors are typically less clear. However, we find that a larger bond position predicts an increased likelihood of casting votes against ISS for both proposals

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Specifically, we exclude observations where the Bharath and Shumway (2008) distance to default measure for the firm indicates the firm's default probability is at least 75% in the year concerned.

related to director elections (Table 12, columns 1-2) and all other proposals (columns 3-4). These findings suggest that bond holdings are affecting institutions' votes more generally.

Creditor-shareholder conflicts also cannot easily explain our findings for EDGAR viewings. While creditor-shareholder conflicts might induce a shift in voting, especially for firms in financial distress, it is unclear why it would explain the amount of governance research conducted by an institution. Consistent with this, our earlier findings for EDGAR viewings are nearly unchanged when excluding firms in financial distress (Appendix Table A1).

Overall, the evidence suggests that our findings are not merely the result of creditorshareholder conflicts and that institutions are more engaged monitors of their equity positions when they also hold a debt position. This finding provides an essential complement to the existing work on creditor-shareholder conflicts. While such conflicts might lead to votes that fail to maximize shareholder value when companies are distressed, more active monitoring can positively influence the value of an institution's debt and equity positions at other times.

#### 6.2. Reverse causality

Another possible concern with our findings is reverse causality, which could occur if knowledge of how an institution will vote influences its level of bond holdings. For example, suppose institutions planning to vote against ISS tend to think their vote will enhance the value of a firm's overall assets (increasing both equity and debt values). In that case, those institutions might seek to increase both their equity and bond holdings prior to the vote. If true, institutions' votes could influence their holdings of equity and bonds rather than vice versa.

However, reverse causality cannot easily explain our findings. First, our voting findings are nearly unchanged when we instead use institutional holdings that are lagged by six months (see Appendix Table A2). Because investors typically do not know shareholder proposals and ISS recommendations that many months in advance of a meeting, it seems unlikely that such an estimation could suffer from simultaneity bias. Second, it is unclear how our findings regarding EDGAR viewings would also be subject to concerns regarding reverse causality.

#### 7. Conclusion

Investors influence governance through a combination of voice (managerial engagement and voting; e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner, 1994) and exit (selling one's position; e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans, 2009). Lacking the ability to participate in shareholder votes, bond investors are typically not thought to play an important governance role. Nevertheless, bond investors have many reasons to be concerned about firms' governance structures, which can influence credit ratings and the likelihood of repayment. Moreover, bonds represent a large proportion of institutional investors' portfolios, providing bond investors a potential voice in how actively their institutions monitor and vote their shares.

We find evidence that institutions' bond holdings predict how attentive they are. Institutions are more likely to vote against ISS, an indication of active monitoring, and more likely to access a company's SEC filings before a shareholder meeting, an indication of governance research, when they have a larger equity position in that company, *and* when they have a larger bond position. Comparing the importance of equity and bond holdings, an increase in the size of an institution's bond position predicts a similar (if not larger) increase in active voting and governance research to what we observe for increases in an institution's equity position.

Our findings highlight how the determinants of institutional investor attention can be complicated. Institutions do not just manage increasingly large equity portfolios; they also manage large bond portfolios. These combined holdings appear to play a factor in where institutions allocate their limited attention and resources. Our findings also suggest that which type of funds hold these investments matters, as does the institution type. For example, bond positions are more correlated with institutional voting when they are part of an actively managed, mixed-asset fund, and when held by one of The Big Three, which hold about 40% of corporate bonds.

Overall, our findings suggest that institutions' bond holdings increase their incentives to be engaged monitors, providing an important counterpoint to recent concerns about how institutions' dual ownership might affect equity investors. While dual ownership of a company's bonds and equity could increase the potential for voting decisions that benefit debt holders at the expense of equity investors (e.g., Bodnaruk and Rossi, 2016; Keswani, Tran, and Volpin, 2021), an overall increase in active monitoring and engagement could improve value for both investors. How these dual holdings and their increasing frequency among firms' largest institutional investors ultimately affect firms' governance structures is an important topic for future research.

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#### Appendix A: Processing fund's information acquisition via EDGAR

The search traffic data for SEC.gov covers the period from February 2003 through June 2017. EDGAR log file data set includes information on the visitor's Internet Protocol (IP) address, date, timestamp, CIK, and filing document's accession number. The IP address in the dataset is in version 4 (IPv4) format, which defines an IP address as a 32-bit number separated into four 8-bit numbers. A dot separates each 8-bit number, and the number between the dots could be between 0 and 255 (2<sup>8</sup> -1). So, a specific IP address, let us say BlackRock's, looks like 199.253.64.128. However, the last octet of the IP addresses in the EDGAR log files is replaced with alphabets. The replacement is done to preserve the uniqueness of the IP address and not reveal the visitor's full identity. Thus, if Blackrock accesses the SEC.gov website from the IP address, the log file will show an entry 199.253.64.gjs. In essence, the EDGAR log file dataset has a 24-bit (IP3) address for each EDGAR server activity. Fortunately, most fund families register large blocks of IP addresses; for example, BlackRock owns IP addresses ranging from 199.242.6.0 to 199.242.6.255. As such, the IP3 address is a sufficiently precise representative of IPv4 addresses.


Loughran, and Mcdonalds (2017) suggests separating EDGAR requests generated by robots from server requests by regular investors. We classify an IP address as a robot if it requests more than a thousand filings in a day. We remove IP addresses classified as robots for that day. To include only valid EDGAR activities, we follow Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock (2015), and exclude activities not related to governance research. We remove index pages (index.htm), icons (.ico), XML filings (.xml), and filings that are under 500 bytes in size. We also combine views by an IP address if they are less than five minutes apart and for the same filing.

The second part of our dataset is a lookup table from Digital Element, a geolocation data and services firm containing a timestamp of IP addresses (IPv4) and registered organization name as of December 2016. We use regular expressions, such as (.\*blackrock.\*) for BlackRock Financial Management, to get IPv4 associated with fund families. To assign IP3 blocks to fund families, we use a similar procedure as Iliev, Kalodimos, and Lowry (2021). If a fund family owns all or a subset of the IP3 address and no other fund family owns an address from the IP3 block, we attribute it to the fund family. If two or more fund families own a subset of the IP3 block, we assign it to the family that contains the most IP address for the IP3 block. If two fund families own an equal number of IP addresses in an IP3 block, we drop those IP3 blocks. The chances of overestimating views from assigning an entire IP3 block to a fund family if they own a fraction of addresses is low, as it is unlikely for non-financial firms to access filings from SEC.gov.

Next, we look for the validity of IP3 blocks assigned to the fund family. The IP address to the organization name lookup table is a snapshot from December 2016. However, fund families sometimes change their underlying technology infrastructure and, in that process, register for different IP3 blocks. To ensure that we have credible IP3 blocks, we go back quarterly from December 2016 and see what fraction of holdings fund family access through the EDGAR server. We use CRSP mutual fund data to get fund family holdings. If a fund family does not access more than 1% of its holding in two consecutive quarters, we stop including the fund family before the quarter. For example, Cambiar Investors accessed 1.9%, 3.3%, 0.0%, and 0.1% of its holdings in 2015Q4, 2015Q3, 2015Q2, and 2015Q1 respectively. Therefore, we exclude Cambiar Investors from our sample before June 2015.


Subsequently, we match valid IP3 blocks from the organization lookup table with IP3 from EDGAR log files. We identify proxy filings associated with a shareholder meeting (definitive proxy statement) based on the accession number of the filing in log files and SEC's index files. To measure whether a fund family accessed definitive proxy statements before a shareholder meeting, we look at fund family views using a window starting from 30 days before the definitive proxy statement to the shareholder meeting date. Fund family's views, as measured from EDGAR log files, likely under-represents the actual views. As mentioned in Bauguess, Cooney, Hanley (2018), the EDGAR log files do not contain any SEC filings requests from EDGAR's FTP site. Moreover,

internet service providers cache frequently requested documents for future ease of reference. So, requests for the same content that have been cached may not be captured by the log file.



## Fig. 1. Corporate bond holdings by fund family, as of June 2020

This figure plots the corporate bond holdings of the top eight fund families on June 2020. The number next to the fund family indicates corporate bond holdings in USD billion. Total corporate bond holding by mutual fund institutions is annotated in the center.



#### Fig. 2. Non-Parametric Estimation of Voting Against ISS and Bond holdings

This figure plots the point estimates from the proposal-by-institution-level regression of the share of an institution's funds voting against the ISS recommendation for a given proposal, *Against ISS*, onto indicators for *Bond holdings/TNA*. The regression includes proposal and institution-by-month fixed effects, and a linear extrapolation is applied between point estimates to construct the figure, where *Against ISS* is centered at zero for *Bond holdings/TNA* = 0.

### Corporate Bond & Equity Holdings, June 2020

This table tabulates institutions' total net assets (in \$ billions) as of June 2020 and the breakdown of these assets between corporate bonds and equity for all mutual fund families, the six largest nonindex fund families, and The Big Three index fund families. We calculate holdings using the CRSP Mutual Fund data and exclude institutions' government bond holdings from total net assets.

	Total net assets (TNA) in \$ billions	Equity % of TNA	Bond % of TNA
All mutual fund families	13,404	90.0%	10.0%
Six largest, non-index fund families			
Fidelity	1,334	93.5%	6.5%
American Funds	1,170	94.5%	5.5%
T Rowe Price	474	96.5%	3.5%
Invesco	370	93.8%	6.2%
Prudential	218	83.2%	16.8%
JP Morgan Chase	213	84.3%	15.7%
The Big Three index fund families			
Vanguard	3,592	90.1%	9.9%
BlackRock	1,223	86.8%	13.2%
State Street	575	96.0%	4.0%

Mutual Fund Holdings by Year & Fund Classification

This table provides a breakdown of mutual fund holdings and fund classifications by year from 2008 to 2020. Columns 1-3 tabulate the percent of funds with equity, bond, and mixed holdings at the end of each calendar year. Column 4 tabulates the average percent of total net assets (TNA) held in bonds for funds with both bond and equity positions. Column 5 tabulates the average percent of a mutual fund family's corporate bond TNA that is held in mixed-asset funds.

	%	of funds wi	ith	Avg. % of mixed-	Avg. % of overall
	Only equity	Only bonds	Mixed assets	asset fund TNA held in bonds	bond TNA held in mixed-asset funds
Year	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
2008	85%	6%	9%	39%	57%
2009	80%	8%	12%	35%	60%
2010	73%	9%	18%	32%	66%
2011	68%	11%	22%	31%	65%
2012	68%	11%	21%	31%	65%
2013	68%	11%	21%	31%	64%
2014	68%	11%	21%	32%	64%
2015	68%	12%	20%	33%	64%
2016	69%	12%	19%	34%	63%
2017	73%	12%	15%	41%	62%
2018	75%	12%	13%	47%	59%
2019	75%	13%	12%	48%	57%
2020	75%	12%	13%	50%	56%
Average	72%	11%	17%	36%	62%

#### Summary Statistics for Proposal-by-Institution Sample

This table presents summary statistics for our proposal-by-institution-level outcome and explanatory variables. To match our later estimations, the sample is limited to contentious shareholder proposals (i.e., proposals where ISS recommended voting against management) that were voted on between January 2008 and June 2020. Against ISS is the share of institution *i*'s funds that voted against the ISS recommendation on proposal *j* for firm *k* in month *m*, Bond holdings/TNA is the share of institution *i*'s total net assets (TNA) that is held in firm *k*'s bonds as of month *m*, and Equity holdings/TNA is the share of the institution's TNA that is held in firm *k*'s stock. Bond holdings/(Bond holdings + Equity holdings) is the share of an institution's total holdings in the firm that are held in bonds.

	% of observations with non- Mean if Mean Median SD zero value non-zero Nun				Number	
Against ISS	0.40349	0	0.46025	47.8%	0.84440	327,266
Bond holdings / TNA	0.00029	0	0.00198	36.2%	0.00081	327,266
Equity holdings / TNA	0.00332	0.00074	0.00783	98%	0.00338	327,266
Bond holdings / (Bond holdings + Equity holdings)	0.10459	0	0.23887	36.2%	0.28881	327,266

Voting Against ISS

This table presents coefficients from a proposal-by-institution-level estimation that regresses share of institution funds voting against the ISS recommendation for a given proposal onto measures of how important that proposal's company's bonds are in the overall portfolio of the institution. Specifically, we estimate the following:

$$Against \, ISS_{ijkm} = \beta \left(\frac{Bond \ holdings}{TNA}\right)_{ikm} + \theta \left(\frac{Equity \ holdings}{TNA}\right)_{ikm} + \alpha_j + \delta_{im} + \varepsilon_{ijkm},$$

where Against ISS is the share of institution *i*'s funds voting against the ISS recommendation on proposal *j* for firm *k* in month *m*, Bond holdings/TNA is the share of institution *i*'s total net assets (TNA) that is held in firm *k*'s bonds as of month *m* scaled by its sample standard deviation, Equity holdings/TNA is the share of institution *i*'s TNA that is held in firm *k*'s equity scaled by its sample standard deviation, and  $\alpha_j$  and  $\delta_{im}$  are proposal and institution-by-month fixed effects (FE), respectively. The sample is limited to contentious shareholder proposals (i.e., proposals where ISS recommended voting against management) that were voted on between 2008 and 2020. *t*-statistics are reported in parentheses; standard errors are clustered by fund family; and \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* reflect statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% confidence intervals, respectively.

	Dependent variable = Against ISS		
	(1)	(2)	
Bond holdings / TNA	0.00651***	0.00623***	
	(2.84)	(2.75)	
Equity holdings / TNA		0.0166***	
		(4.68)	
Institution-by-month FE	Х	х	
Proposal FE	Х	Х	
Ν	324,346	324,346	
R2	0.562	0.562	

# Summary Statistics for Meeting-by-Institution Sample

This table presents summary statistics for our meeting-by-institution-level outcome and explanatory variables. The sample is limited to meetings that occurred from January 2008 to June 2017 and the mutual fund families that had a non-zero equity position in the company in the month of that meeting. *Non-zero EDGAR views* is an indicator equal to one if institution *i* viewed a proxy filing for firm *k* prior to meeting *l* held by that firm in month *m*, *Bond holdings/TNA* and *Equity holdings/TNA* are the proportion of institution *i*'s total net assets (TNA) that is held in firm *k*'s bonds and equity as of month *m*. *Bond holdings / (Bond holdings + Equity holdings)* is the share of the institution's total holdings in the firm that are held in bonds.

	Mean	Median	SD	% of observations with non- zero value	Mean if non-zero	Number
	ivicali	Wiedlah	30			
Non-zero EDGAR views	0.08468	0	0.27840	8.5%	1.00000	1,218,671
Bond holdings / TNA	0.00003	0	0.00043	10.1%	0.00027	1,218,671
Equity holdings / TNA	0.00067	0.00007	0.00290	100.0%	0.00060	1,218,671
Bond holdings / (Bond holdings + Equity holdings)	0.03008	0	0.13591	10%	0.29890	1,218,671

#### Governance Research Before Shareholder Meetings

This table presents coefficients from a meeting-by-institution-level estimation that regresses an indicator for whether the fund family conducted research on the company before a shareholder vote onto measures of how important that company's bonds and equity are in the overall portfolio of the fund family. Specifically, we estimate the following:

$$Non - zero \ EDGAR \ views_{iklm} = \beta(\frac{Bond \ holdings}{TNA})_{ikm} + \theta(\frac{Equity \ holdings}{TNA})_{ikm} + \gamma_l + \delta_{im} + \varepsilon_{iklm}$$

where Non-zero EDGAR views is an indicator equal to one if institution *i* viewed a proxy filing for firm *k* prior to meeting *l* held by that firm in month *m*, Bond holdings/TNA and Equity holdings/TNA are the proportion of institution *i*'s total net assets (TNA) that is held in firm *k*'s bonds and equity as of month *m* scaled by their sample standard deviation, and  $\gamma_l$  and  $\delta_{im}$  are meeting and institution-by-month fixed effects (FE), respectively. We follow Iliev, Kalodimos, and Lowry (2021) in identifying whether a fund family accessed a firm's proxy filings via EGDAR; details are provided in the appendix. In columns 1-2, the sample includes all meetings that were held between January 2008 and June 2017 where the institution held some equity in the company prior to the meeting. Column 3 further restricts the sample to meetings with at least one contentious shareholder proposal, while column 4 restricts the sample to meetings with no contentious shareholder proposal. *t*-statistics are reported in parentheses; standard errors are clustered by institution; and \*\*\* and \*\* reflect statistical significance at the 1 and 5% confidence intervals, respectively.

	Dependent variable = Non-zero EDGAR views			
	All Me	eetings	Meetings with contentious shareholder proposal	Meetings with <u>no</u> contentious shareholder proposals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bond holdings / TNA	0.00286** (2.20)	0.00262** (2.04)	0.00251** (2.21)	0.00132 (1.35)
Equity holdings / TNA		0.00904*** (4.20)	0.0101*** (4.85)	0.00760*** (3.36)
Institution-by-month FE Meeting FE	x x	x x	x x	X X
N R2	1,216,289 0.336	1,216,289 0.337	131,681 0.433	1,083,065 0.333

#### Heterogeneity by ESG score

This table presents coefficients from a proposal-by-institution-level estimation that regresses the share of an institutions' funds voting against the ISS recommendation for a given proposal onto measures of how important that company's bonds are in the overall portfolio of the institution. In column 1, the estimation is the same as in Table 4, except that the sample is limited to firms with non-missing ESG scores, as obtained from Sustain Analytics. Column 2 then restricts the sample to firms that have an above median ESG score, and column 3 restricts the sample to firms that have below median ESG scores. In column 4, the estimation is the same as in Table 4, except that the sample is limited to proposals with a non-missing ISS classification. Column 5 then restricts the sample to proposals classified by ISS as governance-related proposals, while column 6 restricts the sample to proposals classified by ISS as socially responsible investment (SRI) proposals. *t*-statistics are reported in parentheses; standard errors are clustered by fund family; and \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* reflect statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% confidence intervals, respectively.

		Dependent variable <i>= Against ISS</i>				
	All firms with non-missing ESG Score (1)	High ESG score firms (2)	Low ESG score firms (3)	All proposals with non- missing ISS classification (4)	Governance proposals (6)	SRI proposals (5)
Bond holdings / TNA	0.00437**	0.00247	0.00747***	0.00515***	0.00713***	0.00345
	(2.12)	(1.22)	(2.87)	(2.66)	(3.07)	(1.61)
Equity holdings / TNA	0.0155***	0.0139***	0.0188***	0.0153***	0.0154***	0.0148***
	(4.12)	(3.89)	(3.55)	(4.71)	(4.34)	(4.03)
Institution-by-month FE Proposal FE Sample restricted to obs. with non-missing ESG score Sample restricted to obs. with non-missing ISS classification	x x x	x x x	x x x	x x x	x x x	x x x
N	219,815	108,412	108,472	269,084	177,561	87,049
R <sup>2</sup>	0.577	0.610	0.573	0.574	0.574	0.708

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### Heterogeneity Across Fund Types

This table presents coefficients from a proposal-by-institution-level estimation that regresses the share of an institution's funds that vote against the ISS recommendation for a given proposal onto measures of how important that proposal company's bonds and equity are in the overall portfolio of the institution. Specifically, we estimate:

$$Against \ ISS_{ijkm} = \beta_1 (\frac{Bond \ holdings \ [in \ bond - only \ funds]}{TNA})_{ikm} + \beta_2 (\frac{Bond \ holdings \ [in \ mixed - asset \ funds]}{TNA})_{ikm} + \theta (\frac{Equity \ holdings}{TNA})_{ikm} + \alpha_j + \delta_{im} + \varepsilon_{ijkm},$$

where Against ISS is the share of institution *i*'s funds voting against the ISS recommendation on proposal *j* for firm *k* in month *m*, Bond [in bond-only funds]/TNA and Bond [in mixed-asset funds]/TNA are the proportion of institution *i*'s total net assets (TNA) that is held in firm *k*'s bonds by fund classification as of month *m* scaled by their sample standard deviations, Equity holdings/TNA is the share of the institution's TNA held in firm *k*'s stock scaled by its sample standard deviation, and  $\alpha_j$  and  $\delta_{im}$  are proposal and institution-by-month fixed effects, respectively. Column 2 further divides holdings in mixed-asset funds into those that are index and non-index funds. The sample is limited to contentious shareholder proposals (i.e., proposals where ISS recommended voting against management) that were voted on between January 2008 and June 2020. *t*-statistics are reported in parentheses; standard errors are clustered by institution; and \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* reflect statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% confidence intervals, respectively.

	Dependent varia	ble = Against ISS
	(1)	(2)
Bond holdings [in bond-only funds] / TNA	0.00343 (1.52)	0.00346 (1.53)
Bond holdings [in mixed-asset funds] / TNA	0.00516*** (2.70)	
Bond holdings [in non-index mixed-asset funds] / TNA		0.00508*** (3.03)
Bond holdings [in index mixed-asset funds] / TNA		-0.00107 (0.38)
Equity holdings / TNA	0.0166*** (4.65)	0.0166*** (4.65)
Institution-by-month FE Proposal FE	x x	X X
N R <sup>2</sup>	324,346 0.562	324,346 0.562

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#### The Big Three

This table presents coefficients from a proposal-level estimation that regresses the share of an institution's funds that vote against the ISS recommendation for a given proposal, *Against ISS*, onto measures of how important that proposal's company is in the overall bond and equity portfolio of the fund family but now allowing the association to vary for The Big Three institutions (Vanguard, BlackRock, State Street). Specifically, the estimations is the same as Table 4, except that we now create an indicator that flags the three largest index providers, *Big Three*, and interact it with each of the explanatory variables. The sample is limited to contentious shareholder proposals (i.e., proposals where ISS recommended voting against management) that were voted on between January 2008 and June 2020. *t*-statistics are reported in parentheses,; standard errors are clustered by fund family; and \*\*\*\*, \*\*\*, and \* reflect statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% confidence intervals, respectively.

	Dependent variable = Against ISS
Bond holdings / TNA	0.00525**
	(2.42)
Bond holdings / TNA × Big Three	0.0260***
	(5.39)
Equity holdings / TNA	0.0152***
	(4.21)
Equity holdings / TNA × Big Three	0.0330***
	(6.03)
Institution-by-month FE	Х
Proposal FE	Х
Ν	324,346
$R^2$	0.562

#### Robustness to Excluding Firms in Financial Distress

This table presents coefficients from a proposal-by-institution-level estimation that regresses the share of an institution's funds voting against the ISS recommendation for a given proposal, *Against ISS*, onto measures of how important that proposal's company's bonds are in the overall portfolio of the institution. The estimation is the same as in Tables 4 and 8, except that the sample is restricted to observations with the data necessary to calculate a firm's distance to default at the time of the vote, where distance to default is calculated using the approach of Bharath and Shumway (2008). Columns 2 and 4 further exclude firms where this distance to default measure indicates a firm's default probability is at least 75 percent, which is the threshold used in Keswani, Tran, and Volpin (2021) to flag financially distressed firms. *t*-statistics are reported in parentheses; standard errors are clustered by fund family; and \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* reflect statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% confidence intervals, respectively.

		Dependent varia	ble = Against ISS	5
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bond holdings / TNA	0.00545**	0.00510**		
	(2.36)	(2.30)		
Bond holdings [in bond-only funds] / TNA			0.00223	0.00178
			(0.95)	(0.79)
Bond holdings [in mixed-asset funds] / TNA			0.00563***	0.00575***
			(2.83)	(3.06)
Equity holdings / TNA	0.0147***	0.0148***	0.0146***	0.0148***
	(4.10)	(4.15)	(4.08)	(4.13)
Institution-by-month FE	Х	х	х	х
Proposal FE	Х	х	х	х
Sample Excludes Firms in Financial Distress		Х		Х
Sample Restricted to Obs. w/ Non-missing Distress Data	Х	х	х	Х
Ν	256,636	250,658	256,636	250,658
R <sup>2</sup>	0.564	0.565	0.564	0.565

### Default Risk of Companies and Bonds

This table presents coefficients from a proposal-level estimation that regresses the share of an institution's funds that vote against the ISS recommendation for a given proposal, Against ISS, onto measures of how important that proposal's company is in the overall bond and equity portfolio of the fund family but now allowing the association to vary with a firm's expected default risk and with the type of bonds being held. Specifically, the estimation in Column 1 is the same as Table 10, Column 1, except that we now include an interaction between an institution's bond holdings and a firm's expected default frequency (EDF) at the time of the vote, as measured by Bharath and Shumway (2008) distance to default measure. Column 2 is the same as Table 4, Column 2 except the Bond holdings/TNA variable is replaced with the share of an institution's total net assets held in that company's junk bonds (Junk bond holdings/TNA), investment grade bonds (Investment grade bond holdings/TNA), and unrated bonds (Unrated bond holdings/TNA). The sample is limited to contentious shareholder proposals (i.e., proposals where ISS recommended voting against management) that were voted on between January 2008 and June 2020, and the sample in Column 1 is further restricted to observations with the data necessary to calculate a firm's distance to default. t-statistics are reported in parentheses; standard errors are clustered by fund family; and \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* reflect statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% confidence intervals, respectively.

	Dependent variable = Against ISS		
	(1)	(2)	
Bond holdings / TNA	0.00501**		
Bond holdings / TNA × EDF	(2.21) 0.00555		
Junk bond holdings / TNA	(1.17)	0.00136 (1.18)	
Investment grade bond holdings / TNA		0.00646*** (3.47)	
Unrated bond holdings / TNA		0.00340** (2.08)	
Equity holdings / TNA	0.0147*** (4.10)	0.0166*** (4.66)	
Institution-by-month FE Proposal FE	x x	X X	
N R <sup>2</sup>	256,636 0.564	324,346 0.562	

#### **Director Elections versus Other Proposals**

This table presents coefficients from a proposal-by-institution-level estimation that regresses the share of an institutions' funds voting against the ISS recommendation for a given proposal onto measures of how important that company's bonds are in the overall portfolio of the institution. In column 1, the estimation is the same as in Table 4, except that the sample is limited to director election proposals. Column 2 restricts the sample to all other proposals. *t*-statistics are reported in parentheses; standard errors are clustered by fund family; and \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* reflect statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% confidence intervals, respectively.

	Dependent variab	le = Against ISS
	Director election proposals	All other proposals
	(1)	(2)
Bond holdings / TNA	0.0124*	0.00465**
	(1.81)	(2.36)
Equity holdings / TNA	0.0133*	0.0160***
	(1.69)	(4.50)
Institution-by-month FE	х	х
Proposal FE	Х	х
Ν	26,336	295,547
$R^2$	0.677	0.569

Appendix

#### Table A1

#### Additional Robustness to Excluding Firms in Financial Distress

This table presents coefficients from a meeting-by-institution-level estimation that regresses an indicator for whether the institution viewed a company's proxy documents via EDGAR prior to a vote onto measures of how important that company is in the overall bond and equity portfolio of the institution. The estimation and sample is the same as in Table 6, column 2, except that the sample is restricted to observations with the data necessary to calculate a firm's distance to default at the time of the meeting, where distance to default is calculated using the approach of Bharath and Shumway (2008). Column 2 further excludes firms where this distance to default measure indicates a firm's default probability is at least 75 percent, which is the threshold used in Keswani, Tran, and Volpin (2021) to flag financially distressed firms. *t*-statistics are reported in parentheses, and the standard errors are clustered by fund family, and \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* reflect statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% confidence intervals, respectively.

	Dependent variable = Non-zero EDGAR views	
	(1)	(2)
Bond holdings / TNA	0.00258* (1.96)	0.00251* (1.96)
Equity holdings / TNA	0.00943*** (4.25)	0.00942*** (4.25)
Institution-by-month FE Meeting FE Sample Excludes Firms in Financial Distress Sample Restricted to Obs. w/ Non-missing Distress Data	x x x	X X X X
N R <sup>2</sup>	943,096 0.343	923,830 0.344

# Table A2

#### Robustness to Lagging Institutional Holdings 6 Months

This table presents coefficients from a proposal-by-institution-level estimation that regresses the share of an institutions' funds voting against the ISS recommendation for a given proposal onto lagged measures of how important that company's bonds are in the overall portfolio of the institution. The estimation is the same as in Table 4, except that the explanatory variables *Bond holdings/TNA* and *Equity holdings/TNA* are lagged six months. *t*-statistics are reported in parentheses; standard errors are clustered by fund family; and \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* reflect statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% confidence intervals, respectively.

	Dependent variable = Against ISS	
	(1)	(2)
Bond holdings / TNA [measured 6 months prior to vote]	0.00581*** (2.66)	0.00563*** (2.59)
Equity holdings / TNA [measured 6 months prior to vote]		0.0146*** (4.18)
Institution-by-month FE	Х	Х
Proposal FE	Х	Х
N R <sup>2</sup>	311,079 0.562	311,079 0.562

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