Why is Corporate Virtue in the Eye of the Beholder: The Case of ESG Ratings

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Motivation

The use of ESG information is increasing

More than \$60 trillion invested using ESG information across various strategies (PRI, 2018)

External fund managers required to incorporate responsible ESG practices in their investment process (www.pic.gov.za)

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22% of over 22,000 corporate ratings influenced by ESG factors (Fitch Ratings, 2019)

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From 2014 - 2018 spending on ESG ratings increased from \$200 to \$500 million (Gilbert, 2019) 22% of over 22,000 corporate ratings influenced by ESG factors (Fitch Ratings, 2019)

Yet, there is a lack of agreement across ESG ratings

- When ESG providers rate firms there's often little overlap. Yet, credit rating agencies are much more often in agreement (Sindreu and Kent 2018, WSJ)
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What is the extent to which a firm's <u>ESG disclosure</u> and average ESG performance affect ESG rating disagreement?

What drives the disagreement? Summary of findings

Table 5, Panel A: Mean ESG Disagreement

		ESG_Avg							
	-	Low	Medium	High	Diff				
	Low	12.91	8.93	11.46	-1.45				
ESG Disclosure	Medium	14.27	9.84	12.74	-1.53				
	High	17.91	12.09	13.70	-4.21				
	Diff	5.00	3.16	2.24					

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Contrary to evidence in other settings that disclosure mitigates disagreement in equity and debt markets, in the ESG setting, greater disclosure leads to greater disagreement

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
Hypothesis on ESG disclosure effects

- As disclosure increases, analysts have to make judgements about ESG performance of the firm
- Given the properties of ESG disclosure and evaluative practices, greater disclosure is likely to give rise to disagreement

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H1 Anecdotes - Workday Inc.

FY 2014: No CSR report (but had one in FY 2012)

- Its reports come out every 2 years
- 58 pages
- **2** FY 2015: Issued a CSR report
 - 94 pages
- **In the set of the set**
 - Bloomberg: \uparrow E & S disclosure scores
 - Thomson Reuters: \uparrow E & S ratings
 - MSCI: \downarrow E & \uparrow S ratings
 - Sustainalytics: No \triangle E & \uparrow S ratings

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Performance and disagreement in other settings

📔 Hope (2003)

Analysts forecast dispersion indicate task complexity is higher for worse performing firms

Cantor and Packer (1994)

Worse rated firms (i.e., lower average credit rating) have higher uncertainty and thus greater credit rating disagreement

lannota (2006)

The relationship between average credit ratings and credit rating disagreement is concave (i.e., it is non-linear)


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Hypothesis on ESG performance effects

- On one hand, it might be easier for ESG rating agencies to agree when the company is clearly deficient in its ESG practices
- On the other hand, it might be easier to agree on companies that adopt more policies and exhibit better ESG outcomes

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Key variables and data sources

ESG Rating Disagreement (ESG_Disagreement)

The standard deviation of a firm's ESG ratings for year t's ESG performance from MSCI, Thomson Reuters (TR), Sustainalytics

The ratings range from 0 to 100

ESG Disclosure (ESG_Disclosure)

Bloomberg score based on the extent of a firm's ESG disclosure

Ranges from 0.1 for companies that disclose a minimum amount of ESG data to 100 for those that disclose every data point collected by Bloomberg

ESG Performance (ESG_AVG)

The average ESG rating a firm receive for year t's ESG performance

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Empirical results

Effects of ESG disclosure and performance

	0	LS		OLS w	/ FFE*	Changes Model		s Model	
	Coef.	t-stat.		Coef.	t-stat.		Coef.	t-stat.	
ESG_Disclosure	0.127	16.29	***	0.094	10.23	***	0.053	5.99	***
ESG_Avg	-0.158	-19.32	***	-0.206	-18.09	***	-0.214	-18.22	***
Firm Controls	Yes			Yes					
ESG Rater F.E.	Yes		Yes			Yes			
Year F.E.	Yes		Yes				Yes		
Industry F.E.	Yes			No			Yes		
Country F.E.	Yes		No				Yes		
Firm F.E.	No			Yes		No			
Adj. R2	0.118		0.516		0.053				
Ν	30,700			30,700		24,234			

Dependent variable: ESG Rating Disagreement (Table 6)

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Industry F.E.	Yes		No				Yes		
Country F.E.	Yes		No				Yes		
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* One SD increase in ESG disclosure (ESG AVG) \rightarrow 11.4% (23.2%) increase (decrease) in ESG disagreement

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Disclosures of individual ESG pillars

	0	LS		OLS w	/ FFE		Change	s Model	
	Coef.	t-stat.		Coef.	t-stat.		Coef.	t-stat.	
E_Disclosure	0.075	10.16	***	0.047	5.95	***	0.031	4.37	***
S_Disclosure	0.018	2.82	***	0.036	5.20	***	0.012	1.93	*
G _Disclosure	0.039	3.77	***	-0.003	-0.34		0.004	0.45	
ESG_Avg	-0.158	-19.29	***	-0.207	-18.15	***	-0.214	-18.20	***
Firm Controls	Yes			Yes			Yes		
ESG Rater F.E.	Yes			Yes			Yes		
Year F.E.	Yes			Yes			Yes		
Industry F.E.	Yes			No			Yes		
Country F.E.	Yes			No			Yes		
Firm F.E.	No			Yes			No		
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Firm Controls	Yes			Yes			Yes		
ESG Rater F.E.	Yes			Yes			Yes		
Year F.E.	Yes			Yes			Yes		
Industry F.E.	Yes			No			Yes		
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Dependent variable: ESG Rating Disagreement (Table 7)

Consistent results when we regress disagreement for each individual ESG pillar on

disclosure of the respective individual ESG pillar

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ESG Ratings Disagreement

April 2019 11 / 17

Mandatory ESG disclosure shocks

Table 9

	Valid	ation		Diff-		
Dependent Variable:	ESG_Disclosure		-	ESG_Disagreement		-
	Coef.	t-stat.		Coef.	t-stat.	
Mandatory_Disclosure	1.431	5.26	***	0.432	2.14	**
ESG_Avg	0.273	21.42	***	-0.181	-15.81	***
Firm Controls	Yes			Yes		
ESG Rater F.E.	Yes			Yes		
Year F.E.	Yes			Yes		
Firm F.E.	Yes			Yes		
Adj. R2	0.885			0.511		
Ν	30,700			30,700		

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Mandatory ESG disclosure shocks

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	Valid	ation		Diff-		
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ESG_Avg	0.273	21.42	***	-0.181	-15.81	***
Firm Controls	Yes			Yes		
ESG Rater F.E.	Yes			Yes		
Year F.E.	Yes			Yes		
Firm F.E.	Yes			Yes		
Adj. R2	0.885			0.511		
Ν	30,700			30,700		

Exploits passage of broad mandatory ESG disclosure requirements, going into effect in many countries at different times during sample period (Appendix B)

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Commitment to ESG: Policies or Outcomes?

Tech giants sued over child deaths in DRC cobalt mining

Apple, Google and Tesla flout their own policies in sourcing material, says human rights group



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Refining hypotheses on ESG Performance

		$ESG_{Ratings}_{Metrics}$					
		Inputs Outputs Outcom					
	Inputs	Low	High	High			
$ESG_{-}Disclosure$	Outputs	High	Low	High			
	Outcomes	High	High	Low			

Research summary

- We investigate the extent to which ESG disclosure and performance affect ESG rating disagreement among raters
- We find that ESG disclosure increases rating disagreement:
 - **1** ESG disclosure positively associated with ESG rating disagreement
 - 2 Results driven by environmental (E) and social (S) disclosures
- We also find that ESG performance affects ESG rating disagreement:
 - **(1)** ESG performance negatively associated with ESG rating disagreement
 - The highest disagreement among firms with the lowest ESG ratings followed by firms with the highest ESG ratings

New Tests

Concluding remarks

- Overall, our findings shed light on the drivers of ESG rating disagreement
- Understanding why providers disagree helps understand the potential remedies and consequences of this disagreement
- A shared understanding of what constitutes good or bad ESG performance is critical to increasing consistency of ESG ratings

Thank You!

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