Are They All Like Bill, Mark, and Steve? The Education Premium for Entrepreneurs

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Bocconi & EIEF

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Introduction

Two questions:

Do entrepreneurs with higher education get higher returns?

② How have these differences evolved over time?

Relation between skill premium of workers and entrepreneurs

The answer is not obvious.....



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Are They All Like Bill, Mark, and Steve?

- Their case is all but exceptional: John Rockefeller, Ray Kroc and Walt Disney did not even complete their high school studies.
- Many recent entrepreneurs with postgraduate education:
 - Sergey Brin and Larry Page, Elon Reeve Musk, Scott McNealy hold Master's degrees
 - The three leading biotechnology companies (Amgen, Gilead Sciences, and Celgene) founded by PhD graduates.
 - Even Peter Thiel who founded a fellowship programm to encourage dropouts to startup businesses, holds a Juris Doctor degree from Stanford Law School.

- An index to measure the return from entrepreneurship using the **Survey of Consumers Finances** over period 1989-2013 Expected yearly income from entrepreneurial venture due to labor income, dividend payments, and realized capital gains
- Issues with index and corrections
- Analyze evolution of return for different educational groups
- The skill premium to post-graduate education has increased substantially for entrepreneurs
- And particularly so in the **right tail** of the distribution of returns
- Test for possible explanations
- Note: we do no identify causal effects of education, just returns to skills *related to* higher education

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An index for the entrepreneurial return

- An infinitely lived, risk-neutral entrepreneur in continuous time τ who can run at most one business in his life.
- Entrepreneur makes initial investment k. Entrepreneurial income comes from: l : labor income; d : dividend payments; (income y = d + l); and (realized) capital gains.
- The entrepreneur's discount rate is $\rho > r; r$ is market rate.
- With arrival rate λ, the entrepreneur can sell the business at its market value M = d/r.
- The entrepreneur's human capital has value $W = \frac{w}{a}$

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Return from entrepreneurship

• The value to the entrepreneur of the business:

$$\rho U = y + \lambda \left(M + W - U \right)$$

• The net value of becoming entrepreneur is:

$$S = U - k - W$$

• The excess return from entrepreneurship ϕ (Chisini mean):

$$\displaystyle rac{\phi}{
ho+\lambda}=S$$
 which yields $\displaystyle \phi= heta-w$

where θ is the **total expected return**

$$\theta = d + l + \lambda \left(M - k \right) - \rho k$$

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Measurement

- Cross-sectional data in discrete time, t = 1, 2, 3... with $t = \frac{\tau}{h}$
- Information on:
 - Market value of business M:
 - 2 Per period income flow y (dividends dh plus labor income lh)
 - Oiscretized age of (current) entrepreneurial experience t
 - Initial investment k of the entrepreneur
 - **(5)** Exit rate λ is calculated using inflows and outflows
- The total return from entrepreneurship θ is measured by

$$\tilde{\theta} = d + l + \tilde{\lambda} \left(M - k \right) - \left[R(0, ht)^{\frac{1}{ht}} - 1 \right] k$$

Three extensions

• Valuation bias: Business fail, so $\lambda \equiv \delta + \mu$. Excess return is $\phi_v = \theta_v - w$ where

$$\theta_{v} = d + l + \lambda \left[\mathbb{E}_{x}\left(V\right) - k\right] - \rho k$$

② Composition bias: Heterogeneity in λ (due to μ or δ)

$$heta^* = \sum_{i=1}^N lpha_i heta_i$$
 but we observe $ilde{ heta}^* = \sum_{i=1}^N \sigma_i heta_i$

where

$$\sigma_i = \frac{\frac{\alpha_i}{\lambda_i}}{\sum_{j=1}^n \frac{\alpha_j}{\lambda_j}}$$

$$\varphi(\nu) = \frac{\rho + \lambda}{\rho + \lambda \left(1 - \nu\right)}$$

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Key cross-sectional data from Survey of Consumer Finances


- Entrepreneur: An individual who, as a main job, owns business [X3103], which is actively managed [X3104]
- Labour income: "Earnings in main job" [X4112]
- **Dividend payments:** "Earnings from the business in addition to regular salary" [X4131]
- Initial Investment: "Original investment or value when received it (cost basis for tax purposes)" [X3130]
- Firm's value: "What is the net worth of (your share of) this business?; Probe: If Respondent says the business is worth nothing, this is the cost to buy a similar asset" [X3129]
- Firm age: Current date minus date of initial investment
- Entrepreneur's opportunity cost of capital: Real value of the S&P500 Total Return Index (with dividend payments)
- Entry flows into entrepreneurship: Census data from LBD

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Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)

- Representative triennial cross-sectional survey of around 4,000 households (6,000 in the last two waves)
- Period: 1989-2013
- Focus on head of household
- All statistics are weighted
- Multiple implicates to deal with measurement error

Educational attainments of employees and entrepreneurs




Descriptive stats: entrepreneurs by educational groups

| | High schoo | ol graduates | College graduates | | Postgraduates | |
|-------------------------|------------|--------------|-------------------|---------|---------------|---------|
| Variable | mean | sd | mean | sd | mean | sd |
| | | | | | | |
| θ | 62.24 | 532.00 | 138.94 | 916.64 | 229.16 | 1059.82 |
| d | 35.84 | 264.38 | 71.61 | 453.27 | 146.45 | 605.93 |
| l | 26.20 | 59.13 | 50.32 | 146.41 | 79.77 | 217.40 |
| M | 532.48 | 3603.50 | 1149.18 | 6324.73 | 1274.85 | 7359.26 |
| k | 301.90 | 3349.39 | 551.25 | 6017.42 | 634.33 | 6086.35 |
| $\lambda(M-k)$ | 19.36 | 317.67 | 52.54 | 488.33 | 44.63 | 500.13 |
| $\lambda(M-k) - \rho k$ | 0.21 | 445.16 | 17.01 | 727.53 | 2.95 | 741.56 |
| Unlimited liability | 0.70 | 0.46 | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0.54 | 0.50 |
| Agriculture | 0.07 | 0.26 | 0.03 | 0.17 | 0.02 | 0.13 |
| Mining and Construction | 0.29 | 0.45 | 0.13 | 0.34 | 0.02 | 0.15 |
| Manufacturing | 0.09 | 0.29 | 0.09 | 0.29 | 0.04 | 0.20 |
| Trade | 0.16 | 0.37 | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0.07 | 0.25 |
| Finance and Services | 0.17 | 0.37 | 0.25 | 0.43 | 0.14 | 0.35 |
| Transportation, Commun | 0.21 | 0.41 | 0.31 | 0.46 | 0.71 | 0.46 |
| and Utilities | | | | | | |

Note: Pooled SCF data over 1989-2013 period. Constant 2010 prices.

Return of Entrepreneurs θ and Employees w




Time profile of returns by education

- Stable for high school graduates
- Similar in the beginning for college and post graduate, but now postgraduates earn 100,000\$ more than collage graduates


- Education premium has increased for employees as well, but less than for entrepreneurs
- Similar evolution for entrepreneurs with Master's (MA, MS, MBA) and those with PhD, MD, JD

Excess Returns: $\phi = \theta - w$




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Entrepreneurs returns θ , Master's vs PhD




Total returns θ at different percentiles of the return distribution



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Decomposition of θ over time



See Exit Rate λ and Net Capital Gains $\lambda(M-k) - \rho k$

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Decomposition of total returns

- Dividends plus labor income drive most of the differences
- Both the value of the business and of initial investment increase for college and postgraduates, stable for no college
- Value upon exit is substantial
- Smaller effects of gross capital gains and net capital gains, also because exit rate has decreased

Regression analysis

- We check for statistical significance of the effects and investigate their potential sources
- Run:

$$\begin{split} \theta_{it} = & \mathsf{College}_{it} + \mathsf{PostGR}_{it} + \mathsf{Post}_{2000} + \mathsf{Post}_{2000} \times \mathsf{College}_{it} + \\ & + \mathsf{Post}_{2000} \times \mathsf{PostGr}_{it} + \mathsf{Controls}_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \end{split}$$

- Also run with time trends and with year dummies interacted with education dummies
- Results extremely robust
- Increase not present at the 25th percentiles, stronger at higher percentiles

Regression analysis

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| | θ | φ | d+l | M | (3) k | GCG | NCG |
| College | 56.2*** | 36.2*** | 50.4*** | 318.7*** | 154.9** | 18.2*** | 5.8 |
| | (12.7) | (12.6) | (8.3) | (82.5) | (62.5) | (7.0) | (9.3) |
| Postgraduates | 94.4*** | 54.3*** | 107.3*** | 175.2* | 115.0 | 1.4 | -12.9 |
| | (17.2) | (17.1) | (10.7) | (100.2) | (91.6) | (9.3) | (15.3) |
| $College \times Post$ | 26.8 | 19.5 | 11.8 | 477.8*** | 169.8* | 22.9** | 14.9 |
| Postgraduates × Post | (16.7) 112.7*** | (16.6) 84.6*** | (10.0) 82.7*** | (115.5) 737.6*** | (92.9) 216.6* | (9.8) 34.5*** | (13.3) 30.0* |
| Age | (24.2) 16.7*** | (24.1) 16.7*** | (16.8) 10.3*** | (134.8) 36.3*** | (120.6) -25.9 | (11.6) 4.7*** | (18.2) 6.4*** |
| Age ² | (2.6) -0.2*** | (2.6) -0.2*** | (1.0) -0.1*** | (13.9) -0.1 | (18.8) 0.5** | (1.5) -0.0*** | (2.3) -0.1*** |
| Female | (0.0) -49.0*** | (0.0) -48.6*** | (0.0) -44.1*** | (0.1) -435.8*** | (0.2) -201.0*** | (0.0) -18.1*** | (0.0) -4.9 |
| White | (10.6) 33.3*** | (10.5) 33.2*** | (8.2) 31.5*** | (67.2) 161.2** | (52.2) 86.4* | (4.5) 6.0 | (6.3) 1.8 |
| Married | (9.5) 27.8*** | (9.5) 28.2*** | (6.3) 34.7*** | (72.1) 354.1*** | (46.6) 249.0*** | (4.9) 9.1* | (6.6) -6.8 |
| | (10.3) | (10.3) | (6.7) | (63.6) | (50.8) | (4.9) | (6.7) |
| Obs. | 7,250 | 7,250 | 7,250 | 7,250 | 7,250 | 7,250 | 7,250 |
| H_0 : College × Post = F | Postgrad \times P | ost | | | | | |
| F-stat | 12.680 | 7.330 | 14.680 | 3.215 | 0.161 | 0.978 | 0.701 |
| P-value | 0.000 | 0.007 | 0.000 | 0.073 | 0.688 | 0.323 | 0.402 |

What explains the increase in returns to education?


- Increased not fully explained by:
 - **1** Valuation see, composition see, and recycling biases see
 - Sectoral composition: sector dummies interacted with time dummies, see regression and pattern
 - Vintage effects: cohort dummies at start-up date interacted with education dummies see
 - Financial constraints: collateral dummies see and changes in dividends age profiles see
 - **Intergenerational transmission of businesses: see**
 - Span of control: firm employment size and number of business see picture and regression
 - **Risk**: legal form see
- We conclude that more sophisticated skills associated with higher education embodied in entrepreneur have become increasingly important

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Span of Control



Summing up


- The return to postgraduate education has increased for entrepreneurs: "Mark, Bill and Steve" have been exceptional
- Today an entrepreneur with a postgraduate degree earns
 100k\$ more than one with a college degree, up from basically zero in the late eighties
- Education advantage comes from general effect of entrepreneurial skills embodied in entrepreneur, rather than specific channels (sectoral composition, vintage effects, access to finance...)
- We do not account for **selection**. But evidence suggest that skills of highly educated people have become more important
- There might be some indication that entrepreneurial skills associated with higher education have become scarcer. Why?



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


Quantile Regressions

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------------|------------|----------|--------|-------------------|
| | θ | ϕ | d + l | M | k | GCG | NCG |
| Panel A: Pre-Post | specificatio | n | | | | | |
| 25^{th} pct | | | | | | | |
| $College \times Post$ | -3.2 | -5.6 | -1.7 | 6.4 | 2.0 | -0.1 | -1.2 |
| | (4.4) | (4.3) | (5.0) | (5.3) | (1.7) | (0.2) | (1.0) |
| $Postgrad \times Post$ | -8.7 | -14.8** | -8.6 | 13.9 | 1.3 | 0.0 | `3.7 [´] |
| - | (6.6) | (7.0) | (7.4) | (9.8) | (1.5) | (0.3) | (4.6) |
| 50 th pct | () | () | () | () | () | . , | . , |
| $College \times Post$ | -4.5 | -10.0 | 2.6 | 35.6 | 16.5** | -0.1 | -0.6 |
| | (6.5) | (6.8) | (5.5) | (25.6) | (6.6) | (1.0) | (0.4) |
| $Postgrad \times Post$ | 32.6*** | 1 5.9 | 32.0** | `59.3*́ | 16.5 | 1.1 | 0.2 |
| - | (12.6) | (11.8) | (13.0) | (34.7) | (13.6) | (1.0) | (0.5) |
| 75 th pct | · · · | . , | () | · · · | () | . , | . , |
| $College \times Post$ | 6.7 | -1.9 | 9.6 | 86.7 | 71.2** | 0.9 | 0.0 |
| - | (16.0) | (16.0) | (12.8) | (86.1) | (31.8) | (8.0) | (5.2) |
| $Postgrad \times Post$ | 66.1*** | 36.0 | 51.3* [*] | 399.0*** | 141.2*** | 6.8 | 4.2 |
| - | (25.1) | (22.5) | (21.1) | (86.9) | (52.6) | (4.3) | (4.2) |
| 90 th pct | () | . , | () | () | () | . , | () |
| $College \times Post$ | 131.9*** | 117.7** | 42.4 | 1,452.4*** | 336.0** | 28.4 | 10.7 |
| | (50.0) | (51.9) | (36.1) | (355.0) | (169.7) | (26.9) | (24.9) |
| $Postgrad \times Post$ | 183.4*** | 128.6** | 153.2*** | 1,715.7*** | 566.0*** | 47.7** | 40.5** |
| - | (54.1) | (52.0) | (52.7) | (367.1) | (137.4) | (22.5) | (16.6) |
| | . , | . , | . , | . , | . , | . , | . , |
| | | | | | | | |


Introduction Theory Data Evidence Conclusions

Dividends plus labor income




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Gross capital gains




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Net capital gains




Value of business




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Initial investment




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
Exit rate λ




Valuation bias



Composition bias



Recycling bias




Sectoral specialization and skill premium

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|---------|-----------|-----------|---------|---------|
| | θ | ϕ | d+l | \hat{M} | k | ĠĊĠ | ŃĆĠ |
| College | 52.9*** | 32.9** | 48.4*** | 296.6*** | 148.9** | 16.5** | 4.5 |
| | (13.7) | (13.6) | (8.5) | (85.9) | (69.1) | (7.8) | (10.6) |
| Postgraduate | 93.6*** | 53.4*** | 97.6*** | 350.6*** | 153.3* | 13.7 | -4.0 |
| | (16.6) | (16.4) | (12.0) | (117.0) | (87.2) | (9.0) | (13.1) |
| $College \times Post$ | 22.2 | 15.0 | 6.5 | 508.2*** | 182.6* | 24.6** | 15.7 |
| | (18.3) | (18.3) | (10.2) | (121.7) | (105.4) | (10.9) | (15.2) |
| Postgraduate $	imes$ Post | 107.6*** | 79.6*** | 87.4*** | 865.4*** | 354.7*** | 31.1*** | 20.3 |
| | (24.1) | (23.9) | (18.2) | (158.7) | (121.3) | (11.8) | (16.9) |
| Agriculture \times Post | 7.3 | 7.5 | -32.3* | -364.8** | -384.8* | 8.9 | 39.6 |
| | (38.2) | (38.2) | (19.2) | (161.8) | (226.2) | (17.5) | (34.1) |
| Manufacturing \times Post | -38.2 | -38.7 | `-4.7´ | -146.5 | `69.0´ | -29.1 | -33.4 |
| | (34.0) | (34.0) | (21.7) | (252.7) | (134.3) | (19.6) | (21.7) |
| $Trade \times Post$ | -26.7 | -27.1 | 4.8 | -77.8 | 169.9 | -22.5 | -31.5 |
| | (29.0) | (29.0) | (11.7) | (184.3) | (213.1) | (17.5) | (26.7) |
| Finance \times Post | 55.9** | 55.2** | 52.8*** | 452.5*** | 255.8* | 10.6 | 3.1 |
| | (24.8) | (24.8) | (13.8) | (159.0) | (146.1) | (12.6) | (19.5) |
| TCU \times Post | -2.4 | -2.8 | -12.0 | -391.0*** | -286.9*** | -4.9 | 9.6 |
| | (21.0) | (21.0) | (12.5) | (134.5) | (108.1) | (10.6) | (14.7) |
| Agriculture | -39.3 | -39.4 | 12.3 | 69.5 | 279.0 | -21.5 | -51.6* |
| | (32.5) | (32.6) | (15.3) | (125.7) | (206.3) | (14.5) | (30.4) |
| Manufacturing | 99.5*** | 100.1*** | 41.4*** | 658.2*** | 23.7 | 61.7*** | 58.0*** |
| | (24.5) | (24.4) | (14.6) | (180.8) | (87.1) | (15.4) | (16.9) |
| Trade | 21.1 | 21.2 | 5.9 | 284.7** | 70.9 | 20.3* | 15.2 |
| | (16.2) | (16.1) | (8.2) | (115.5) | (95.0) | (10.7) | (14.5) |
| Finance | 14.8 | 15.0 | 13.4 | 276.1*** | 131.2 | 14.2* | 1.5 |
| | (15.8) | (15.8) | (9.0) | (85.6) | (91.4) | (8.3) | (13.0) |
| тси | 20.3 | 20.5 | 29.0*** | -133.9 | -14.1 | -10.0 | -8.7 |
| | (15.9) | (15.9) | (9.0) | (94.1) | (79.1) | (8.0) | (11.4) |

Introduction Theory Data Evidence Conclusions

Differences in patterns of sectoral specialization $S(e_1, e_2)$



Financial constraints and the age profile of dividends

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|--|----------|----------|----------|---------|---------------|
| | d+l | M | θ | d | $\frac{d}{M}$ |
| College | 23.4** | 100.3 | 54.1** | 11.3 | -11.2 |
| | (11.9) | (150.2) | (25.5) | (10.6) | (8.5) |
| Postgraduate | 104.9*** | 583.2*** | 96.0*** | 60.2*** | -11.7 |
| | (14.9) | (132.0) | (23.5) | (11.4) | (8.3) |
| $College\timesPost$ | 36.9** | 277.2 | 21.7 | 18.5 | 17.3 |
| | (14.9) | (199.7) | (31.3) | (12.4) | (15.5) |
| Postgraduate 	imes Post | 72.9*** | 165.8 | 111.2*** | 56.0*** | 11.8 |
| | (21.6) | (192.6) | (33.0) | (17.0) | (7.8) |
| Age \times College | 2.7** | 24.5 | 0.4 | 1.7** | 0.2 |
| | (1.1) | (17.8) | (2.9) | (0.8) | (0.2) |
| Age	imesPostgrad | 0.3 | -30.7*** | -0.3 | 0.5 | 0.2 |
| | (0.9) | (11.7) | (1.7) | (0.7) | (0.2) |
| $Age \times College \times Post$ | -2.4** | 7.9 | 0.1 | -1.1 | -0.4 |
| | (1.1) | (19.3) | (3.3) | (0.9) | (0.5) |
| $\textbf{Age} \times \textbf{Postgrad} \times \textbf{Post}$ | 0.8 | 46.3*** | 0.4 | 0.8 | -0.1 |
| | (1.2) | (14.1) | (2.6) | (1.0) | (0.2) |
| Age 	imes Post | 0.8 | -21.7** | -2.3 | 0.7 | 0.2 |
| | (0.5) | (10.1) | (2.0) | (0.5) | (0.1) |
| Age | 1.7*** | 40.2*** | 2.0 | 0.9** | -0.2 |
| | (0.4) | (9.3) | (1.3) | (0.4) | (0.1) |

Some explanations

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|-------------|-----------|----------|----------|
| | θ | ϕ | d + l | M | k | GCG | NCG |
| Panel A: Vintage Effects | | | | | | | |
| $College \times Post$ | 21.2 | 14.3 | 13.6 | 686.3*** | 326.1** | 28.5** | 7.6 |
| | (21.4) | (21.4) | (11.4) | (144.3) | (133.1) | (12.9) | (18.1) |
| $Postgrad \times Post$ | 110.1*** | 84.1*** | 97.5*** | 842.2*** | 375.3** | 31.8** | 12.7 |
| | (29.6) | (29.6) | (19.6) | (156.5) | (165.6) | (14.6) | (23.2) |
| Panel C: Collateral | | | | | | | |
| College \times Post | 30.7* | 23.4 | 8.0 | 373.7*** | 63.8 | 23.3** | 22.7 |
| | (17.8) | (17.8) | (9.8) | (109.4) | (96.5) | (10.0) | (14.1) |
| $Postgrad \times Post$ | 115.2*** | 87.0*** | 80.3*** | 672.7*** | 150.2 | 34.8*** | 34.9* |
| | (24.4) | (24.3) | (16.7) | (132.8) | (118.4) | (11.6) | (18.0) |
| Collateral dummy | 29.1 | 29.1 | 0.0 | 308.6*** | 9.0 | 26.1*** | 29.0* |
| | (19.9) | (19.9) | (7.4) | (82.9) | (117.3) | (9.2) | (17.2) |
| Value of collateral | -0.0 | -0.0 | 0.0*** | 0.9*** | 0.8*** | 0.0 | -0.0* |
| | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.1) | (0.2) | (0.0) | (0.0) |
| Panel D: Legal Form | | | | | | | |
| $College \times Post$ | 23.7 | 16.5 | 9.7 | 439.1*** | 153.5* | 21.1** | 14.1 |
| | (16.7) | (16.7) | (10.0) | (112.7) | (93.2) | (9.7) | (13.3) |
| Postgrad × Post | 106.5*** | 78.4*** | 78.2*** | 658.1*** | 183.1 | 30.8*** | 28.3 |
| | (24.3) | (24.2) | (16.8) | (137.2) | (123.0) | (11.7) | (18.3) |
| Unlimited Liability | -86.0*** | -85.8*** | -62.0*** | -1,103.6*** | -464.0*** | -52.0*** | -23.9*** |
| Panel E: Inherited | | | | | | | |
| College \times Post | 27.6* | 20.3 | 12.5 | 494.3*** | 177.3* | 23.7** | 15.1 |
| | (16.7) | (16.6) | (9.9) | (112.8) | (92.7) | (9.7) | (13.3) |
| Postgrad 	imes Post | 111.8*** | 83.6*** | 82.0*** | 719.5*** | 208.3* | 33.7*** | 29.8 |
| | (24.1) | (24.0) | (16.6) | (132.5) | (119.3) | (11.6) | (18.1) |
| Business inherited? | 44.6 | 44.7 | 34.6* | 862.9*** | 392.0*** | 37.9*** | 10.0 |
| | (28.1) | (28.0) | (17.9) | (184.3) | (120.3) | (13.3) | (17.6) |

Span of control

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|--|--------------|---------|---------|------------|----------------------|---------|--------|
| | θ | ϕ | d+l | M | k | GCG | NCG |
| $College \times Post$ | 22.3 | 15.0 | 8.8 | 475.5*** | 179.8* | 22.0** | 13.5 |
| | (16.9) | (16.9) | (10.0) | (119.1) | (92.6) | (10.0) | (13.4) |
| $\mathbf{Postgrad} \times \mathbf{Post}$ | 98.4*** | 70.3*** | 69.4*** | 510.6*** | 92.1 | 26.0** | 29.1 |
| | (24.2) | (24.2) | (16.0) | (141.3) | (123.3) | (12.0) | (18.5) |
| Employment | Ò.5*** | Ò.5*** | Ò.4*** | 4.4*** | 1.7*** | Ò.2*** | 0.1 |
| | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (1.0) | (0.4) | (0.1) | (0.1) |
| Nr. of businesses | 1 5.6 | 15.6 | 32.0*** | 1,344.4*** | 915.8 ^{***} | 36.2*** | -16.4 |
| | (11.4) | (11.4) | (4.8) | (118.9) | (98.6) | (6.9) | (10.1 |