# Eclipse of the public corporation or eclipse of the exchanges? 

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## 1. Issues

- The U.S. has dramatically fewer listed firms than twenty years ago and these firms are very different.
- Is the U.S. drop in listings a global phenomenon?
- How did it occur?
- How have American firms changed?
- Has the role of public markets changed?
- Why is this happening?


## 2. Fewer listings than in 1975



3000

2000

1000


## 3. Evolution of number of US listings

- End of 2018: 3,613.
- 23\% fewer listings than in 1975.
- Listing peak is in 1997 at 7,576.
- Drop from listing peak of 54\%.


## 4. What about the rest of the world?



## 5. Evolution of the rest of the world

- Since 1975, increase in listings in ROW is $318 \%$ when US listings fall by $22 \%$.
- ROW pretty stable since 2011 with peak in 2015.
- ROW in 2018 is 39,310 . Peak is 40,128.
- Western Europe peaks at 9,885 in 2006. Has fallen to 7,940.


## 6. What about Latvia



## 7. The US "listing gap"



## 8. But?

- Is the U.S. just early?
- Peak in U.K. is 2006. Since then, listings have fallen by almost 50\%.


## 9. Evolution of aggregate market cap

- It is \$21.5 trillion in 2015.
- Using constant 2015 dollars, it is 7 times market cap in 1975.
- But, roughly same as in the end of 1999.
- Since aggregate market cap increases by 7 times since 1975, but number of firms falls, mean firm market cap has to increase.


## 10. Average market cap increased sharply in constant dollars



## 11. Fraction of firms with low market cap (<\$100 million in 2015 dollars)


0.100
0.000


## 12. How did the distribution of firm size change?

- The whole distribution shifted to the right, so listed firms became larger.
- The fraction of firms with market cap less than $\$ 100$ million in 2015 dollars is 61.5\% in 1976.
- First time it falls below $30 \%$ is in 2003.
- In 2015, it is 22.6\%.


## 13. How did we get to where we are?

- Drop in new lists.
- But delists stay high.
- As a result, more delists than new lists.
- Mergers are major contributor to high delist rate.
- Voluntary delists - i.e., going private transactions - are not important to the story.


## 14. New lists, delists, and net lists

- CRSP: data for US new lists and delists



## 15. Delisting by type over time



## 16. Aging of American public firm

- In 1995, the median age of American public firms, measured since listing, is 8 years.
- It is 16.1 years in 2015.
- Mean age increases from 12.2 in 1995 to 19.5 in 2015.


## 17. Increase in concentration

- Mergers are a major contributor to the decrease in listed firms.
- Intra-industry mergers lead to an increase in concentration.


## 18. Accounting performance



Equally weighted averages

## 19. Loss-making firms

Fraction of firms with losses


## 20. The largest firms are doing well

- Define largest firms as the top decile of assets in each year.
- Average cash flow for the firms is positive every year from 1975 to 2015.
- Equally weighted average is $8.3 \%$; in 2009, it is 7.3\%.


## 21. Where is poor performance coming from?



## 22. All about 200 firms?

Percent of a variable accounted for by the top 200 firms for that variable

| Va ria ble | $\mathbf{1 9 7 5}$ | $\mathbf{1 9 9 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Earnings | $62.5 \%$ | $68.9 \%$ | $101.8 \%$ |
| Assets | $63.9 \%$ | $69.0 \%$ | $76.7 \%$ |
| Cash | $81.9 \%$ | $81.2 \%$ | $85.6 \%$ |
| Cash Flow | $65.7 \%$ | $66.5 \%$ | $78.9 \%$ |
|  |  |  |  |
| Dividends | $69.1 \%$ | $75.6 \%$ | $82.3 \%$ |
| Total Payouts | $67.8 \%$ | $75.3 \%$ | $77.8 \%$ |
|  |  |  |  |
| Total Debt | $64.9 \%$ | $78.1 \%$ | $74.9 \%$ |
|  |  |  |  |
| Capx | $70.9 \%$ | $65.3 \%$ | $74.5 \%$ |
| R\&D | $86.7 \%$ | $83.2 \%$ | $84.6 \%$ |
| Interest (xint) | $65.2 \%$ | $77.0 \%$ | $66.2 \%$ |
| Market cap | $65.7 \%$ | $58.0 \%$ | $68.8 \%$ |

## 23. Firms are different

- Fewer firms, larger average market cap.
- They are older.
- More concentration.
- Older firms are less flexible.
- Greater concentration could mean less competition.
- Both age and concentration adversely affect productivity growth and innovation.


## 24. Shrinking equity

- Listed firms are returning more capital to shareholders: net $\$ 3.6$ trillion in 2015 dollars from 1997 to 2016.


## 25. Key takeaways

- Fewer public firms than in 1975.
- Steady decrease in the number of public firms since 1997 due to mergers and low IPOs.
- The U.S. is atypical, but the rest of the world may be following.


## 26. Why? Part I

- Firms have changed: Intangible assets have become more important.
- Public markets are better at funding tangible than intangible assets.
- Easier to build intangible assets initially by being private.


## 27. Why? Part II

- Much easier to raise capital without being public.
- Dramatic growth in private equity.
- Private equity claims have become more liquid, so the liquidity advantage of markets has fallen.


## 28. Why? Part III

- Much talk about regulation.
- In U.S., drop in IPO and drop in listings starts before regulatory changes
- Does not get worse with regulatory changes
- No clear evidence of an important role for regulatory changes.
- Recent regulatory relief has not helped.
- Regulatory relief could hurt.


## 29. Why? Part IV

- Institutionalization of investment
- Institutional investors can't invest in small cap that have low liquidity.
- Less interest from analysts.
- Less market-making support.
- Unfriendly world for small caps.


## 30. Why? Part V

- Technological change.
- ICT has made scale more advantageous.
- Leads to mergers and increases in scale.
- Getting to scale may be easier relying on existing infrastructure of large firms.
- Getting to scale requires less physical assets, which decreases value of listing.


## 31. Eclipse of markets?

- It is not just about IPOs: Existing firms are returning capital massively in U.S.
- So, on net, corporate sector is not using markets to raise equity.
- Capital expenditures have fallen in the U.S. relative to assets.


## 32. Does all this matter?

- For most investors, public markets are where the investment opportunities are.
- If these markets shrink in importance, most investors are frozen out under current institutional arrangements.
- Private equity can intermediate, but then the centrality of public equity markets in U.S. capitalism is at risk.

