Unfulfilled Expectations? The Returns to International Hedge Fund Activism

YEO2010 Conference

"Corporate Governance and Performance: Causation?"

New Haven, November 2010

Marco Becht Solvay Brussels School, *Université Libre de Bruxelles, CEPR and ECGI*

Julian Franks
London Business School, CEPR and ECGI

Jeremy Grant
University of Cambridge

Hedge Fund Activism Country Studies

United States

- Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas (2008), JF
 - 2001-2006 : 236 activist hedge funds, 882 unique targets, 1059 events
- Greenwood and Schor (2008) JFE
 - 1994-2006 : 177 activist funds, 990 events
- Klein and Zur (2008), Clifford (2008), Boyson & Mooradin (2007)

<u>Japan</u>

- Hamao, Kenji, Matos (2010)
 - 1998-2009 : 34 activist funds, 916 investments
- Uchida and Zu (2008) 41 interventions of two aggressive funds

Germany

- Achleitner et. al. (2010)
 - 1998-2007 : all hedge funds, 96 investments

Clinical Studies of Private Activism

United States

- Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach (1998), JF
 - TIAA-CREF letter writing campaign

United Kingdom

- Becht, Franks, Mayer, Rossi (2009), RFS
 - Clinical study of the Hermes U.K. Focus Fund

This Study

- Multi-country study of Asia, Europe and North American
- Positive returns to activism associated with activism outcomes
- Public versus private activism (Europe only)
- Does jurisdiction matter? (not explored yet)


Two Hand-Collected Datasets

- Public Engagements Database
- January 1997 to December 2008
 - 15 European countries
 - 3 Asian countries (Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong)
 - North America (Canada and the United States)
- Proprietary Fund Database
 - information on public and private engagements
 - Five funds included at the moment [but only to end 2007]
 - 57 private and 74 public engagements

Public Database Coverage

- Europe
 - 1997-2009 : 409 cases
 - 2000-2008 analyzed : 305 cases
- Asia
 - 2000-2009 : 210 cases
- North America
 - 1997-2009 : 1267 cases (not yet analyzed)

International Public Activism Cases Initiated



Source: Becht-Franks-Grant Public Activism Databases

Abnormal Returns around Activist Block Acquisition Disclosure



2:5%+ block disclosed

3 : engagement assumed to start

Date 2: European Block Disclosure CARs by Country:

	N		CAR[- 10,10]	CAR[- 20,20]
All	299	Mean	4.0%	4.4%
		T-Stat	4.70	3.66
UK	131	Mean	4.2%	2.8%
		T-Stat	3.21	1.38
Germany	40	Mean	3.8%	6.0%
		T-Stat	1.46	1.82

European Block Disclosure CARs by Country (Cont.):

	N		CAR[- 10,10]	CAR[- 20,20]
Italy	28	Mean	-0.30%	2.6%
		T-Stat	-0.26	0.94
France	22	Mean	4.9%	2.7%
		T-Stat	1.81	0.81
Netherlands	21	Mean	-0.6%	-0.8%
		T-Stat	-0.25	-0.24
Switzerland	14	Mean	7.5%	15.8%
		T-Stat	2.10	2.38

European Block Disclosure CARs by Fund Style:

	N		CAR[- 10,10]	CAR[- 20,20]
All	299	Mean	4.0%	4.4%
		T-Stat	4.70	3.66
Activist	183	Mean	5.6%	6.9%
		T-Stat	4.52	4.42
Other	116	Mean	1.7%	0.6%
		T-Stat	1.60	0.30

European Block Disclosure CARs by Engagement Approach:

	N		CAR[- 10,10]	CAR[- 20,20]
All	299	Mean	4.0%	4.4%
		T-Stat	4.70	3.66
Hostile	136	Mean	4.5%	5.0%
		T-Stat	3.0	2.55
Other	163	Mean	3.7%	4.0%
		T-Stat	3.7	2.6


Asian Block Disclosure CARs by Country:

	N		CAR[- 20,20]
All	210	Mean	7.9%
		T-Stat	4.69
Japan	183	Mean	5.6%
		T-Stat	4.32
Korea	21	Mean	23.5%
		T-Stat	2.0

Abnormal Returns around Activist Block Acquisition Disclosure

Country	Study	Number of Events \ Period	CAR
United States	Brav et. al. (2008)	1,059 targets 2001-2006	7.2% [-20,+20]
United States	Greenwood and Schor (2007)	980 targets 1993-2006	3.6% [-10,+5]
lanan	Hamao, Kenji and	916 targets	1.8% [-5,+5]
Japan	Japan Matos (2010)		7.9% for Steel Partners

Abnormal Returns around Disclosure of Activist Outcomes



4 : engagement outcomes


Date 4: European Outcome Disclosure CARs:

	N		CAR[- 10,10]	CAR[- 20,20]
All	274	Mean	5.0%	5.2%
		T-Stat	5.75	4.87
Board	83	Mean	0.4%	-0.14%
		T-Stat	0.32	0.08
Payout	34	Mean	3.0%	3.3%
		T-Stat	2.49	2.14
Restructuring				
Takeovers	64	Mean	13.0%	15.4%
		T-Stat	5.61	5.67
Others	93	Mean	4.3%	3.7%
		T-Stat	3.11	2.13

Date 4: Asian Outcome Disclosure CARs:

	N		CAR[- 10,10]	CAR[- 20,20]
All	61	Mean	3.5%	3.2%
		T-Stat	1.90	1.66
Board	16	Mean	-0.6%	1.2%
		T-Stat	-0.22	0.31
Payout	23	Mean	5.1%	4.0%
		T-Stat	1.53	1.26
Restructuring				
Takeovers	6	Mean	9.7%	5.1%
		T-Stat	1.29	0.74
Others	16	Mean	2.8%	3.3%
		T-Stat	0.92	0.9

Decomposition of Holding Period Returns



Decomposition of Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns

	N	Mean BHAR	In CAR	Sum Outcome CAR
Europe All	237	14%*	5.4%*	N.A.
With Outcomes	118	25.5%*	6.9%*	13.0%*
No Outcomes	119	2.6%	3.9%*	N.A.
	N	Mean BHAR	In CAR	Sum Outcome CAR
Asia All	N 210		In CAR 7.9%	
Asia All With Outcomes		BHAR		CAR

-6.3%*

5.3%*

N.A.


175

No Outcomes

Decomposition of Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns for Asia by Fund

	N	Mean BHAR	In CAR	Sum Outcome CAR
Murakami				
With Outcomes No Outcomes	7 28	27.5% -5.2%	22.6% 5.3%	4.7% N.A.
Steel Partners				
With Outcomes No Outcomes	8 29	20.1% -10.9%	25.0% 3.6%	12.1% N.A.

Proprietary Data: A Fully Observed Private Engagement



1 : 1st share purchase

4 : outcomes linked to activism

7: position closed

Decomposition of Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns Fund Database

	N	Mean BHAR	In CAR	Sum Outcome CAR
Public Cases	74	6.9%	7.7%*	N.A.
With Outcomes	57	12.9%	7.1%*	10.4%*
No Outcomes	17	-13.3%	9.6%	N.A.
	N	Mean BHAR	In CAR	Sum Outcome CAR
Private Cases	57	10.0%	N.A.	N.A.
With Outcomes	33	20.7%	N.A.	35.0%
	33	20.7 70		00.070

Conclusions

- There are positive returns from activism for target shareholders when there are outcomes (but more sophisticated benchmarks are required).
- Private activism can be effective, produce outcomes and positive returns.
- Is activism profitable for fund shareholders (in expected value and net of fees)?
- Does jurisdiction matter? To be explored


Disclaimer

This presentation does not provide investment advice nor recommendations to buy or sell securities. The public database results presented from Becht, Franks and Grant (2010) are based on public information only. No guarantee is given as to the accuracy of information collected from public sources.

The authors are not liable for any errors, inaccuracies or omissions in content, or for any actions taken in reliance thereon.

The copyright owners of the presentation are the authors. It may not be reproduced, redistributed, passed to any other person or published, in whole or in part, in any format, for any purpose, without the prior written consent of the authors.

Public Engagement with Block Filing or Press Information



2 : 5%+ block disclosed 6 : block falls below 5% disclosed

3 : engagement assumed to start

Holding Period Returns

Country	Study	Holding Period	Return
			Mean Raw
United States	Brav et. al. (2008)	[-1 month, exit]	42%
			Mean BHAR
United States	Greenwood and Schor (2007)	[-1 month,+18 months]	10.3%
Japan	Hamao, Kenji and Matos (2010)	[disclosure, exit]	4.6% [13.5% for "hostile"]
			Mean Raw
			-2.4%

Buy and Hold Returns (Date 2 to 6) – European Public Data Base

	Engagements 1997 to 2008		Annualised	
N=237	BHR Raw	BHR CAR	Ann. BHR Raw	Ann. BHR AR
Mean	18.4%	8.9%	18.8%	12.0%
Median	1.7%	2.2%	1.6%	1.7%
2001-2006 Date 2-30 days				
Mean	56.3%	19.5%	44.8%	21.7%
Median	27.7%	11.2%	33.6%	11.6%

Fund Data Base (Date 1 to 7): Buy and Hold Returns

	Engagements 1997 to 2008		Annualised	
N=131	BHR Raw	BHR CAR	Ann. BHR Raw	Ann. BHR AR
Mean	24.8%	8.3%	11.9%	4.0%
T-Stat	3.04	1.45	2.71	1.37
Private	22.5%	10.0%	14.8%	6.2%
T-Stat	1.91	1.11	2.77	0.39
Public	26.5%	6.9%	9.6%	2.1%
T-Stat	2.35	0.94	1.46	1.07


Abnormal Returns around Activist Block Acquisition Disclosure



2:5%+ block disclosed

3 : engagement assumed to start

Public Holding Period Returns



2:5%+ block disclosed

3 : engagement assumed to start

6: block falls below 5% disclosed

Do Engagements Produce Outcomes?




4 : engagement outcomes

2:5%+ block disclosed


6: block falls below 5% disclosed

3 : engagement assumed to start

Ex-Post Conditioning of Ex-Ante Returns




Abnormal Returns around Disclosure of Activist Outcomes




4 : engagement outcomes

Decomposition of Holding Period Returns




Coverage for U.S.



Source: Becht-Franks-Grant Public Activism Database; Greenwood and Schor

Coverage for Japan



Source: Becht-Franks-Grant Public Activism Database; Hamao, Kenji and Matos

Public Database Collection Method

- 1. Created list of activist engagement:
 - identified activist engagements through Factiva search of press mention of activist cases ('hedge fund activism', 'focus fund');
 - –generated list of activist funds:
 - searched for disclosure and press mention of funds;
 - updated list of activist funds (etc.).
- 2. Dates of block disclosure (purchase and exit) from regulatory filings and press
- 3. Checked for outcomes for each engagement using Factiva

Fund Database Collection Method

- Contacted six funds known to us and asked for clients reports [one said no].
- Cross-check fund investments with public database.
 Identified 57 private cases
- Collected purchase and sales dates.
- Checked for outcomes for each engagement using Factiva