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EU ASIA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DIALOGUE

Rise Of The Fiduciary State: A Survey Of Sovereign Wealth Fund Research







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Where We Are Heading? Talk Will Address Several Issues

- 1. What Are Sovereign Wealth Funds, How Are They Funded, And How Much Do They Invest?
- 2. What Caused SWFs' Rapid Rise To Global Financial Prominence, And Why Does This Cause Concern?
- 3. Survey Research Examining How SWFs Select Assets, Industries, Countries In Which To Invest.
- 4. Survey Research Examining The Impact Of SWF Equity Investments On Target Firms?
- 5. What Are The Lessons And Unresolved Questions Of Sovereign Wealth Fund Research?







What Are Sovereign Wealth Funds?

How Are They Funded, And How Much Do They Invest?



Sovereign Wealth Fund Definitions Vary—And Variations Matter

- Term Was Coined Only Recently (Razanov, 2005)
 First SWF: Kuwait Investment Authority, 1953
- Can Be Defined Very Broadly, As In Truman (2008): "A separate pool of government-owned or -controlled financial assets that includes international assets."
- Or More Narrowly As State-Owned Investment Funds, By Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (<u>www.swfiinstitute.org</u>)
 – 61 funds with AUM of \$7,257 Bn, July 2016
- Or Very Narrowly, By Sovereign Investment Laboratory
 - 35 funds with AUM of \$5,759 Bn, February 2016
 - Definition precludes HKMA, China's SAFE







The Sovereign Investment Landscape

Official Reserves/ Central Bank • External assets for directly financing international payment imbalances • Highly liquid, often OECD government bonds	 Stabilization Funds Funds to insulate budget and economy from excess volatility, inflation, Dutch disease, & other macro- economic threats Low-risk, liquid assets: cash government bonds 	 Pension Funds Investment vehicles to meet government's future pension obligations Funded and denominated in local currency Explicit liabilities 	 Sovereign Wealth Funds Sovereign owned Independent Limited explicit liabilities Investing for commercial return Significant investment abroad 	 Domestic Development Funds Owned by national or sub-national governments Focus on domestic investment Private equity style 	 State Owned Enterprises Companies in which the state has significant control May make investments in foreign assets
 State Administration of Foreign Exchange (China) Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency 	 Economic and social Stabilization Fund (Chile) Pula Fund (Botswana) Oil Stabilisation Fund (Iran) 	 California Public Employees' Retirement System (US) National Pension Service (Korea) 	 Abu Dhabi investment authority Government of Singapore Investment Corp. Qatar Investment Authority China Investment Corporation 	 National Development Fund of Iran Russian Direct Investment Fund Fondo Strategico Italiano Samruk-Kazynu (Kazakhstan) 1Malaysia Development Fund 	 CNOOC (China) Gazprom (Russia) SABIC (Saudi Arabia)
INVESTMENT	RISK				

Will Use the Sovereign Investment Laboratory's Definition of SWF

- SIL Defines A Sovereign Wealth Fund As A State-Owned Investment Vehicle Meeting Five Criteria. Must Be:
 - 1. An investment fund, not an operating company,
 - 2. Wholly owned by a sovereign government, but separated from central bank or finance ministry,
 - 3. That makes international and domestic investments in a variety of risky assets,
 - 4. Is charged with seeking a commercial return, and
 - 5. Is a wealth fund rather than a pension fund.
- Even This Must Be Modified for UAE Funds, Since These Are Organized at Emirati Level
- Two-Thirds Oil-Funded; Two-Thirds Started Since 2000








Sovereign Wealth Funds Data (SIL Classification) Largest Funds And Total AUM (February 29, 2016)

Country	Fund Name	Launch Year	Source of Funds	AUM US\$ Bn
Norway	Government Pension Fund – Global	1997	Commodity (Oil)	\$824.9
UAE-Abu Dhabi	Abu Dhabi Investment Authority +	1976	Commodity (Oil)	773.0
China	China Investment Corporation	2007	Trade Surplus	746.7
Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority Foreign assets	1963	Commodity (Oil)	623.3
Kuwait	Kuwait Investment Authority +	1953	Commodity (Oil)	592.0
Singapore	Government Investment Corp+	1981	Trade Surplus	344.0
Qatar	Qatar Investment Authority ⁺	1974	Commodity (Oil)	256.0
China	National Social Security Fund	2000	Trade Surplus	236.0
Singapore	Temasek Holdings	1974	Trade Surplus	193.6
UAE-Dubai	Investment Corporation of Dubai	2006	Commodity (Oil)	183.0
Russia	National Wealth & Reserve Funds	2006	Commodity (Oil)	139.2
UAE-Abu Dhabi	Abu Dhabi Investment Council	2005	Commodity (Oil)	110.0
Australia	Australian Future Fund	2006	Non-Commodity	95.0
Korea	Korea Investment Corporation	2006	Trade Surplus	91.8
Kazakhstan	Kazakhstan National Fund ⁺	1983	Commodity (Oil)	77.0
	Total AUM, All 35 Funds			\$5,758.9

[†] Estimate

Estimated assets in sovereignwealth funds

\$8 trillion




SWF Assets Grew Rapidly Until 2014, Then Leveled Off

> But Little Actual Contraction Since 1H2014

Source: Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, Reported in *Wall Street Journal* (Dec 22, 2015)

Though Absolutely Large, SWFs' AUM Only Small Fraction of Global Financial Assets (\$294 trn)




Source: McKinsey Global Institute, Haver, BIS, Deutsche Bank estimates

What Caused Sovereign Wealth Funds' Rise To Prominence?

Massive Accumulation Of Forex Reserves, Rising Oil Prices, New Resource Discoveries



Foreign Exchange Reserves Reached Massive Levels: Total Value \$12.618 Trillion YE 2013 (World Bank)



Quadrupling Of Oil Prices After 2002 Provided Funding For Oil-Based SWFs—Until 3Q2014



Source: Thomson Reuters

Setting Up SWF Became Reflexive Response When A Nation Found New Mineral Wealth


- 70 Countries Founded SWFs After 2005 (SWF Institute)
 - Includes now-huge funds of China, Russia, Australia
 - Newer funds in Nigeria, Angola, Ghana
- Identify Over 25 Countries Proposing SWFs Since 2008
 - First response when major new oil, gas discovery made
 - Often set up SWF before any revenues are received:
 Brazil, Greenland, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone
- Virtually All Try To Model After Norway's GPFG
 - Try to ensure new wealth preserved, invested wisely
 - Try to keep out of hands of entrenched elites, SOEs








Then The World Changed: Oil Prices Collapsed After 1H2014, Have Only Recovered Slightly During 2016



Then The World Changed: Foreign Exchange Reserves Peaked In 2014 And Have Declined Since



- FX decline since 2014: **\$318bn** (-16 %), primarily Saudi Arabia, China, and Russia
- Capital flight from EM and China forced FX liquidation to stem currency devaluation
- Estimated budget deficit in GCC in 2016: \$150bn, 10 % of region GDP

Why Did The Rise Of SWFs As Investors And Financiers Cause Alarm?

• They Became The Largest Single Group Of Net New Investors For Global Markets

Reached \$5 Tr quickly, seemed heading for \$10 Tr

• They Accounted For Bulk Of State-Backed Stock Investment Not Channeled Through SOEs

– More stock purchases than sales 2000-2012

Most Large Funds Owned By Non-Democratic States

Norway the only western democracy







The Economist

3AU UARY 1979-2579 2008

Romney's win in Michigan Cloned food Satellite wars The global inflation scare Democracy in retreat

Invasion of the sovereign-wealth funds

www.aconomist.com



How Sovereign Wealth Funds Were Originally Viewed (early 2008)

> Sung to the tune of Wagner's "Ride Of The Valkyries"

The Economist January 19-25, 2008

Reasons for Concern About SWFs, Responses By Governments & Funds

- Large and Growing Fast
- Biggest Funds Based In Non-Democratic Nations
- Most Cited Concerns:
 - Could be used for political purposes
 - Might induce volatility in financial markets
 - Could have a detrimental impact on governance
- Regulators, SWFs Responded To Concerns
 - Santiago Principles signed October 2008
- Market Meltdown Hit SWFs Very Hard
 - Not as long-term, stable investors as previously thought








Sovereign-wealth funds

Assets, December 2015*, \$trn

China United Arab Emirates Norway Saudi Arabia Kuwait Singapore Hong Kong Qatar Kazakhstan Russia United States Australia

Fund Institute



or latest available

SWF Holdings By Country, 2015

About \$5.4 Trn Assets **Controlled by Autocratic States**

Source: Economist (2016)


The Largest SWFs Are Mostly Non-Transparent, From Relatively Corrupt And Economically Unfree Nations

Country	Corruption Percept Index Value (Rank)	Economic Freedom Index (Rank)	Sovereign Wealth Fund Name	Fund Assets, US\$ Bn	SWF Score- board
Norway	85 (7)	68.8 (40)	Governmt Pension Fund–Global	\$654.8	97
New Zealand	90 (1)	82.1 (4)	New Zealand Superannuation	15.2	94
United States	73 (19)	76.3 (10)	Alaska Permanent Fund	42.3	92
Ireland	69 (25)	76.9 (9)	National Pension Reserve Fund	18.1	86
Australia	85 (7)	83.1 (3)	Australian Future Fund	83.0	83
Azerbaijan	27 (139)	58.9 (169)	State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan	33.2	76
Singapore	87 (5)	87.5 (2)	Temasek Holdings	161.6	73
Kazakhstan	28 (133)	63.6 (65)	National Fund	61.8	65
Singapore	87 (5)	87.5 (2)	Government Investment Corp	220.0	65
Kuwait	44 (66)	62.5 (71)	Kuwait Investment Authority	296.0	63
Korea	56 (45)	69.9 (31)	Korea Investment Corporation	43.0	57
UAE-Abu Dhabi	68 (27)	69.3 (35)	Mubadala Development Comp	53.1	59
UAE-Abu Dhabi	68 (27)	69.3 (35)	Abu Dhabi Investment Authority	450.0	58
China	39 (80)	51.2 (138)	China Investment Corporation	482.2	57
Russia	28 (133)	50.5 (144)	Natl Wealth & Reserve Funds	148.5	50
UAE-Dubai	68 (27)	69.3 (35)	Intl Petroleum Investment Comp	65.4	26
Qatar	68 (27)	71.3 (25)	Qatar Investment Authority	135.0	15

Sources: Transparency International 2012 Corruption Perception Index (<u>http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012</u>); Heritage Foundation 2012 Economic Freedom Index (<u>http://www.heritage.org/index/ranking?src=home</u>); SWF Scoreboard values from Truman (2010)

A hard habit to break


Saudi Arabia, government revenues, %



Source: Economist (2016)

Saudi Arabia Hopes To Create A \$2 Trillion SWF With Saudi Aramco Stock. Can They Do This?


Not A Chance! Aramco's Export Earnings Already Fully Committed To Funding KSA Government



Source: Bloomberg (2016)

How Do SWFs Select Investments?

Theoretical, Empirical Evidence In SWF Investment Strategies




Research Studies Examining How SWFs Should Select Asset Classes in Which to Invest

	Sample Description, Study Period, and	Summary of Empirical Findings and		
Study	Methodology	Conclusions		
Gelb, Tordo, and	Assess whether SWFs should be used to fund	Conclude that a well-governed SWF can improve the		
Halland (OECD	the infrastructure financing gap in developing	quality of a nation's public investment program, but		
2014)	countries. Propose a system of checks and	the critical issue will always be limiting the SWF's		
	balances to ensure SWFs do not undermine	investments to those proper for a wealth fund and		
	macroeconomic management or make	not to supplant infrastructure investment that should		
	politicized investments.	come from other state agencies.		
Bodie and Brière	Set out a new approach to sovereign wealth	Propose analytical framework for optimal ALM based		
(Jrnl Investment	and risk management, based on contingent	on analysis of sovereign balance sheet and extending		
Mgt 2014)	claims analysis (CCA). Note state must solve an	CCA theory to sovereign wealth. Suggest specifically		
	asset-liability management (ALM) problem	accounting for nation's financial, human, resource		
	between income and expenditures.	wealthand risks.		
Chambers, Dimson,	Discuss management, investment policies, and	Conclude that the GFPG is one of the world's best-		
Ilmanen (<i>Jrnl</i>	transparency of Norway's GPFG; assess	managed large pension and that "the Norway Model"		
Portfolio Mgt	whether fund has successfully achieved	of investing both successful and the antithesis of the		
2012)	objectives.	"Yale Model" of investing.		
Raymond	Analyzes whether SWFs are and/or should be	Gulf SWFs' interventions exerted stabilizing s-t effect		
(Economie	domestic investors of last resort (ILR) during	on local stock markets, though long-term impact		
Internationale	financial crises. Shows that such SWF	much less obvious. Note that SWFs, contrary to		
2010)	interventions occurred frequently after the	central banks, can easily provide long to medium		
	2008-09 Global Financial Crisis.	term financing to banking systems.		

Research Studies Examining How SWFs Should Select Asset Classes in Which to Invest (Cont.)

	Sample Description, Study Period, and	Summary of Empirical Findings and		
Study	Methodology	Conclusions		
Martellini and	Propose dynamic asset allocation framework	Optimal asset allocation of SWFs: should make state-		
Milhau (EDHEC-	for SWFs, modeled as large long-term investors	dependent allocations to (1) performance-seeking p/f,		
Risk 2010)	that manage fluctuating revenues emanating	often heavy with equities; (2) an endowment-hedging		
	from budget or trade surpluses with stochastic	p/f; and a liability-hedging p/f heavy with bonds to		
	investment opportunities. Suggest optimal	mitigate interest rate and inflation risks.		
	asset allocation.			
Scherer (Financial	Extend existing portfolio choice theories to	Optimal SWF portfolio should be split into speculative		
Market Portfolio	SWFs in a strategic asset allocation model.	demand as well as demand against oil price shocks		
Management	Changing the existing analyses from single to	and short-term risk-free rate. Oil-rich countries		
2009)	multi-period framework allows for three-fund	should hold bonds.		
	separation.			
Ang, Goetzmann,	Evaluate role of active management in	Active management has played very small role.		
and Schaefer	achieving superior long-term performance by	Performance is explained by exposure to systematic		
(NBIM 2009)	Norway's GPFG from 1998-2009. Also present	factors, and authors believe exposure to such factors		
	review of efficient market hypothesis and apply	is appropriate for a long term investor that can		
	lessons to evaluating GPFG's performance.	harvest illiquidity and other factor risk premiums over		
		time.		

Less Than 20% Of SWF Investment In Equity (Ex GPFG) SWF direct equity investments since 2000



- 186 deals worth \$48 bn in 2015
- 40% increase in the number of transactions and 23% decrease by value relative to 2014, lowest level since 2010
- Average ticket size drop to **\$355ml** suggesting a more conservative strategy


Source: Bernardo Bortolotti, Sovereign Investment Lab

Investment Statistics For SWFs In The SIL Laboratory Database (Through YE 2014)

Country	Fund # of		# of Value of		Fraction foreign deals		Largest deal,	Avg
Country	Name	Deals	deals, \$Mn	by # deals	by value	stake bought	\$Million	size, \$Mn
Qatar	QIA	153	\$123,480	85%	79%	40.8%	\$13,260	\$807.1
China	CIC	116	111,321	59%	50%	15.3%	20,000	959.7
Singapore	GIC Pte Ltd	326	94,108	98%	99%	30.9%	10,339	288.7
Singapore	Temasek	276	75,589	86%	91%	18.8%	5,672	273.9
UAE-Abu Dhabi	IPIC	44	38,080	82%	71%	32.6%	8,000	865.5
UAE-Abu Dhabi	Mubadala	56	36,743	71%	69%	34.0%	4,000	656.1
UAE-Abu Dhabi	ADIA	77	26,027	97%	99%	33.7%	7,500	338.0
Kuwait	KIA	55	24,563	89%	82%	37.5%	3,000	446.6
UAE-Abu Dhabi	ADIC	22	14,044	73%	32%	48.3%	8,000	638.3
Ireland	NPRF	4	13,239	25%	0.1%	97.4%	7,264	3,309.8
Malaysia	Khazanah	56	12,375	64%	82%	44.4%	2,787	221.0
Norway	GPFG	20	10,652	100%	100%	58.2%	1,500	532.6
China	NSSF	10	9,506	20%	3%	6.0%	2,200	950.6
UAE-Dhabi	ICD	5	6,572	100%	100%	31.6%	3,397	1,314.5
Total All Funds		1,634	\$601,542	82%	69.1%	7.9%	\$20,000 (dom)	\$368.4
Total Exc GPGF		1,225	\$593,622	76%	<mark>68.7</mark> %	16.3%	\$20,000 (dom)	\$485.0

SWFs Increasingly Prefer Safe Equity Investments SWF Investments In Safe Assets*, 2006-2015 (\$ Billion)


* Safe Assets includes Infrastructure & Utilities, Real Estate and Restaurants, Hotels, Motels sectors.



- Safe assets investments continue to grow: in 2015 they account a stellar 57% of total SWF investment
- Low risk asset-substitution (government bonds), inflation hedging in QE, illiquidity premia are driving enhanced exposure


Source: Bernardo Bortolotti, Sovereign Investment Lab

The (Very) Special Case Of Norway: The GPFG's Holdings In Global Equity & Debt Markets



Source: Norway GPFG Annual Report 2015

Factor Loadings Of Norway's GPFG: Equity And Fixed-Income Investments




Source: Norway GPFG Annual Report 2015

Empirical Studies Examining SWF Geographic And Industrial Investment Patterns

Study	Sample Description, Study Period, and Methodology	Summary of Empirical Findings and Conclusions
Murtinu and	Sample of 716 investments made by 22 SWFs	Find that SWF opacity positively impacts the use of
Scalera (<i>JIM</i>	from 13 countries over 1997-2013, study	vehicles, regardless the type of vehicle used. Bilateral
2016)	whether the use of investment vehicle is	political ties negatively impact only the use of corporate
	influenced by SWF opacity and presence of	vehicles and increase the likelihood that SWFs invest
	political ties between SWF's and target country.	through vehicles not located in the target country.
Ciarlone and	Use a specifically built proprietary dataset	Find SWFs prefer to invest in countries with higher
Miceli (WP	encompassing 1,903 equity acquisitions made	degree of economic development, larger and more
2014)	by 29 SWFs over the period 1995-2010 to study	liquid financial markets, better protection to investors,
	the determinants of SWF investment choices at	and more stable macroeconomic environments. SWFs
	macro level, with special emphasis on the	seem to engage in a "contrarian" behavior by increasing
	possible reaction to a financial crisis in a	acquisitions in countries hit by crises. Play a stabilizing
	potential target economy.	role on local markets during periods of financial turmoil.
Knill, Lee, and	Use 900+ target firm stock purchases 1984-	Political relations impact where SWFs invest, but less so
Mauck (Jrnl	2009 to test if bilateral political relations	how much. SWFs more likely to invest in countries with
Corp Finance	influence SWF investment decisions. Do political	which they have weaker political relations, suggesting
2012)	factors impact if SWFs invest and how much.	non-financial motives in investment decisions.
Knill, Lee, and	Use 900+ target firm stock purchases 1984-	Political relations impact where SWFs invest, but less so
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Corp Finance	influence SWF investment decisions. Do political	which they have weaker political relations, suggesting
2012)	factors impact if SWFs invest and how much.	non-financial motives in investment decisions.
Chhaochharia	Use sample of 29,634 equity investments by 27	SWFs show strong biases vs other investors. Tend to
and Laeven	SWFs and 38,880 stock investments by public	chase past returns, hold conservative p/f that are poorly
(WP 2010)	pension funds in 56 countries 1996-2008 to test	diversified geographically and industrially. SWFs prefer to
	if SWFs show systematic investment biases.	invest in countries with strong legal institutions.


SWFs Invest Overwhelmingly Abroad SWF investments at home/abroad, \$Billion, 2006-2015



 SWF invested **94%** abroad, aiming at intergenerational wealth preservation by global diversification of investments

Source: Bernardo Bortolotti, Sovereign Investment Lab

SWF Investments Concentrated In OECD Countries




Publicly available data for direct SWF equity & real estate deals, joint ventures and capital injections. Source: Sovereign Investment Lab, Bocconi University

Source: Sovereign Investment Lab

Sectoral Distribution Of SWF Investments


SWF Direct Equity Investments By Target Sector, 2006-2015 (\$ Billions)



- With **31** deals worth **\$23.4bn**, in 2015 RE accounts for **23%** of deal value, with a penchant for commercial property in US an London.
- In relative terms, increased exposure to **financial sector in EM**, notably Turkey (QIA), China (a global SWF alliance for HK CITIC), and India

Source: Bernardo Bortolotti, Sovereign Investment Lab


SWFs Also Divest Assets, Especially Recently SWF equity disinvestments by SWF home country and sector, 2015



- 70 equity disinvestments for a total of \$22.5 bn, quite evenly split by fund type
- Sales did not eclipse new investments: net acquisitions worth \$25.5 bn
- China, Singapore, and Kazakhstan most active in redemptions, heavily skewed in the financial and energy sectors

Source: Bernardo Bortolotti, Sovereign Investment Lab

Norway's GPFG Is Mostly Managed Internally--And At Very Low Cost



Source: Norway GPFG Annual Report 2015

What Is The Impact Of SWF Investments On Target Firms?

Survey Existing Empirical Evidence And Present Our Own



Empirical Studies Examining Impact of SWF Investments on Target Firm Performance

Study	Sample Description, Study Period, and Methodology	Summary of Empirical Findings and Conclusions
Bortolotti,	Construct a dataset of 1,018 investments by	They find that announcements of SWF investments are
Fotak, and	SWFs (or SWF-owned investment subsidiaries)	associated with significant mean abnormal returns of
Megginson (RFS	in publicly traded firms completed over 1980-	0.9% over (-1,+1), including investments by Norway's
2015)	2012 period. Generate "benchmark" control	GPFG, and 2.45% without Norway. However, these are
	sample of stock purchases by financial	significantly lower than the 5.02% mean abnormal
	investors from same countries as sample of	returns generated by the private benchmark investors,
	SWFs, targeted at firms headquartered in the	implying the existence of a sovereign wealth fund
	same countries as SWF investment targets,	"discount" due to their government ownership.
	and executed over the same time period	
Karolyi and Liao	Compare 4,026 cross-border acquisitions	Announcement return for private acquisitions (5.0%)
(JCF 2015)	1998-2008 by govt-controlled acquirers to	signif higher than for state acquirers (2.8%), and return
	127,786 deals by private acquirers and 733	around SWF/other funds investments (0.8%) much
	deals made by SWFs and other state-owned	smaller than either. Also find 3-yr mean and median buy-
	funds. Test if investments by govt acquirers	and-hold ER for SWFs/other funds (-50.3%; -62.8%)
	and SWFs/other funds yield different target	significantly lower than for private acquirers (-9.4%; -
	firm stock returns than do private acquisitions	40.3%) and state-controlled acquirers (-7.6%; -30.6%).
Borisova, Fotak,	Using sample of 6,671 credit spreads from	In the full 1990-2010 sample, they find that state
Holland, and	1,723 bonds issued by 244 firms from 43	ownership (0/1) is associated with significantly higher
Megginson (WP	countries over 1991-2010, examine the	(40 bp) cost of debt, and this is even larger during pre-
2014)	impact that state ownership (including 1,060	crisis period, 1990-2007. From 2008 on, basic cost of
	firm-years with SWF investment) of a firm's	debt rises sharply, and state ownership becomes
	stock has on that company's cost of debt, as	associated with significantly lower (18bp) cost of
	measured by the yield spread above	corporate debt. SWFs specifically are associated with a
	treasuries. Examine for full sample period and	higher cost of debt both before (46.7 bp) and after (26.1

Empirical Studies Examining Impact of SWF Investments on Target Firm Performance

	Sample Description, Study Period, and	
Study	Methodology	Summary of Empirical Findings and Conclusions
Knill, Lee, and	Use sample of 231 SWF listed stock	Target firm raw returns decline after SWF investment.
Mauck (Jrnl Fincl	purchases 1984-2009 to examine whether	Risk also declines, but find net reduction in payment for
Intermed 2012)	this investment significantly impacts the	risk over 5 yrs. Thus SWFs don't provide monitoring
	return-to-risk performance of target firms.	benefits offered by other institutional investors.
Bertoni and Lugo	Study impact of SWF investments on credit	Target's credit risk decreases after SWF investment,
(JCF 2014)	risk of targets by examining evolution of	especially for 1-year maturity CDS; suggests market sees
	credit default swap spreads (CDS) after 371	SWFs as investors that may help manage short-term
	SWF investments over 2003-10.	liquidity risk.
Dewenter, Han,	Analyze short and long-term impact of SWF	Find signif announcement ER for SWF stock purchases
and Malatesta	investments on targets using sample 227	(+1.52%) and divestments (-1.37%). Find signif negative
(Jrnl Fincl Econ	stock purchases and 47 SWF stock sales over	median 1-yr cumulative MAER (-4.5%), but significantly
2011)	January 1987-April 2008. Try to determine	positive median 3-yr (+7.3%) and 5-yr (+31.2%) returns
	whether there is a trade-off between SWF	for targets after SWF investments. Find SWFs are active
	monitoring and lobbying benefits and	monitors, with over half of target firms experiencing one
	tunneling and expropriation costs.	or more events indicating SWF monitoring or influence.
Kotter and Lel	Use sample of 417 SWF listed stock	SWFs prefer large, poorly performing companies, and
(Jrnl Fincl Econ	purchases 1980-Feb 2009 to examine SWF's	news of investments yields positive initial returns
2011)	impact on short and long term valuation and	(+2.25%) that are higher for more transparent funds.
	performance of targets. Also study which	Mean L-T returns positive, median returns insignificantly
	types of target firms attract SWF investment.	negative. SWFs are generally passive shareholders.

Our Empirical Study Of SWF Investments: Bortolotti, Fotak, Megginson (RFS 2015)

- Examine Wealth Impact of SWF Investment in Listed Firm Stock, 1980-2012 [SWF Sample]
 - Examine what type of firms selected, short and long-term financial impact
- Compare to Wealth Impact of Investments by Other Financial Investor from Same Countries [Benchmark]

- First study to make this control group comparison

• Both SWF and Benchmark Sample Drawn from SDC and Press Reports—then Verified







	SV	VF	Bench	mark
Year	Proportion	Ν	Proportion	Ν
1983	0.00%	0	0.02%	1
1985	0.10%	1	0.02%	1
1986	0.00%	0	0.13%	8
1987	0.20%	2	0.22%	13
1988	0.40%	4	0.22%	13
1989	0.10%	1	0.55%	33
1990	0.20%	2	0.50%	30
1991	0.60%	6	0.89%	53
1992	0.40%	4	0.85%	51
1993	0.30%	3	1.62%	97
1994	0.99%	10	1.89%	113
1995	0.20%	2	2.08%	124
1996	0.40%	4	2.28%	136
1997	0.50%	5	2.31%	138
1998	0.40%	4	1.59%	95
1999	0.40%	4	2.88%	172
2000	1.39%	14	2.68%	160
2001	1.39%	14	2.76%	165
2002	1.89%	19	3.75%	224
2003	2.28%	23	7.33%	438
2004	3.77%	38	5.94%	355
2005	3.87%	39	5.02%	300
2006	5.96%	60	6.28%	375
2007	12.61%	127	7.73%	462
2008	31.18%	314	8.27%	494
2009	17.58%	177	8.65%	517
2010	6.55%	66	8.92%	533
2011	5.16%	52	7.98%	477
2012	1.19%	12	6.64%	397

Time Series Distribution Of SWF And Benchmark Investments, 1983-2012

• SWF Investments heavily concentrated in years since 2005, especially 2007-09.

• Benchmark investments Spread much more evenly over 1995-2012, though also spike after 2002.

Industrial Distribution Of SWF And Benchmark Investments

	SV	VF	Benchmark		
Industry	Proportion	Ν	Proportion	Ν	
Oil and Gas	7.11%	72	3.51%	210	
Basic Materials	6.80%	69	13.88%	829	
Industrials	18.17%	185	19.02%	1136	
Consumer Goods	8.32%	85	12.01%	718	
Health Care	5.28%	54	4.10%	245	
Consumer Services	11.17%	114	11.51%	688	
Telecommunications	3.65%	37	1.11%	66	
Utilities	3.65%	37	1.58%	94	
Financials	29.54%	301	25.52%	1525	
Technology	6.29%	64	7.78%	465	
Missing	3.24%	33	0.37%	22	

• Both SWFs and benchmark investors target financial firm above all others. SWF investment even more concentrated in finance ex Norway's GPFG.

	SWF		Benchmark	
Country	Proportion	Ν	Proportion	Ν
Australia	1.88%	19	33.91%	2026
Canada	2.57%	26	0.77%	46
China	7.70%	78	13.32%	796
Hong Kong	2.37%	24	2.29%	137
France	1.78%	18	0.08%	5
Germany	1.09%	11	0.15%	9
India	4.54%	46	0.89%	53
Indonesia	1.88%	19	1.39%	83
Italy	1.68%	17	0.02%	1
South Korea	0.99%	10	13.21%	789
Malaysia	4.05%	41	10.18%	608
New Zealand	0.49%	5	0.74%	44
Norway	0.00%	0	5.51%	329
Qatar	1.68%	17	0.05%	3
Singapore	5.53%	56	9.24%	552
Thailand	1.09%	11	0.87%	52
UAE	1.48%	15	0.18%	11
UK	4.44%	45	1.27%	76
USA	44.32%	451	1.37%	82

Geographic Distribution Of SWF And Benchmark Investments

• SWFs invest primarily either in their home markets or in developed markets of EU and particularly US. However, GPFC highly concentrated in US

• Benchmarks far more likely to Invest domestically (83%) than SWFs (12%) and sample is heavy Australia, China, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore.

Event Study Results: The SWF Discount

All Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments

Interval	N	Mean CAR	Median CAR	Patell Z		General Sign 2	
(-1,+1)	796	0.89%	0.25%	<0.0001 *	* * *	0.0029	***
(-5 <i>,</i> +5)	799	1.09%	0.76%	0.0001 *	***	0.0001	***
(-10,+10)	799	1.18%	0.72%	0.0011 *	* * *	0.0001	***

Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments Excluding Norway

(-1,+1)	400	2.45%	0.60%	<.0001	***	<.0001	***
(-5 <i>,</i> +5)	403	2.44%	0.70%	<.0001	***	0.0018	***
(-10,+10)	403	3.27%	1.81%	<.0001	***	<.0001	***

Benchmark Sample Investments

(-1,+1)	4830	5.02%	1.29%	<.0001	***	<.0001	***
(-5,+5)	4843	7.96%	3.20%	<.0001	***	<.0001	***
(-10,+10)	4852	9.47%	4.69%	<.0001	***	<.0001	***

Announcement period returns (CARs) are positive for all investments, but far higher for benchmarks than for SWFs! There is an **SWF Discount**, regardless of measure.

Key Lessons Of Sovereign Wealth Fund Research

And What Are the Unresolved Research Issues?

Lessons Of Sovereign Wealth Fund Theoretical And Empirical Research

- Though Large, SWFS Not Especially Odd Or Frightening
 - Total value of financial assets worldwide=\$294Trn;
 Dwarfed by banks, mutual funds, insurance cos.
 - SWFs are too small, too politically constrained to be financial/geopolitical threats
 - SWFs operationally, financially similar to other IIs, but many are also "BDC" (big, dumb capital)
- SWFs Aren't Homogenous—But Also Not Idiosyncratic
 - Norway's GPFG stands alone among large funds
 - Differ based on funding source; democratic vs others
 - Some strive for transparency; others quite secretive

Lessons Of Sovereign Wealth Fund Theoretical, Empirical Research (Cont)

- SWFs Clearly Are State-Owned Funds And Often Make Politicized Capital Allocations
 - But no evidence of foreign political interference; so no reason to impose restrictions or regulations
 - Are willing, able, encouraged to pursue political objectives in domestic investments
- True Outliers Have Emerged—GPFG And QIA
 - GPFG has emerged as alternative to "Yale Model" of endowment fund management, investment policy
 - Qatar making very high profile RE, stock investments;
 played decisive role in XStrata acquisition

Lessons Of Sovereign Wealth Fund Theoretical, Empirical Research (Cont)

- While SWFs Are Here To Stay, They Are "Second Best" Organizational Form As Fiduciaries
 - State ownership inevitably constrains their ability to invest abroad, actively monitor target managements
 - Private funds out-perform SWFs across the board
 - Small staffs constrain a refined investment strategy
- But, Is There Any Real Alternative To SWFs in Societies Where State Plays A Dominant Economic Role?
 - Were set up because existing investment tools, SOEs were inadequate, corrupt, or already "captured"
 - GPFG is being viewed as model for 25+ new SWFs

Unresolved Issues And Questions To Be Addressed By SWF Researchers

- We Know Very Little About How/Where/Into What Large SWFs Invest (Except For GPFG)
 - Only observe listed stock deals (SDC), disclosed RE and unlisted stock purchases; miss bonds entirely
- Still Look At SWFs From Western Perspective
 - Haven't asked whether SWFs are a good idea
 - Don't know whether SWFs help or hinder domestic financial, industrial development
 - Unclear if they on net have increased or decreased state's influence over, role in domestic economy







Unresolved Issues And Questions To Be Addressed By SWF Researchers

- To What Should SWFs Be Compared? What Are their True Comparators/Benchmarks?
 - Our paper the first to compare to benchmarks
 - Clearly contradict positive conclusion of others
- Can/Should SWFs Truly Become Financing Vehicles For Economic Development?
 - Despite talk, funds mostly invest at home and in developed economies (especially UK and US)
- <u>Most Important</u>: Should A Country With Large, Perhaps Temporary Excess Cash Flows Set Up A SWF?







Thank You

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http://www.ou.edu/content/price/finance/faculty/billmegginson.html

