




Leading Research with Global Impact



Directors' Duties and Sustainable Corporate Governance

11 – 13 November 2020 | Online





european corporate governance institute

EUROPEAN COMMISSION STUDY BY ERNST & YOUNG (EY)

Directors' Duties and Sustainable Corporate Governance

11 - 13 November 2020 • Online Policy Workshop

Introduction

Marco Becht and Luca Enriques


1. Outline

1. General Policy Objective
2. Sustainable Finance Action Plan
 - Definition
 - Action 10
 - Impact assessments
3. Summary of the EY Report
4. Sustainable Corporate Governance Initiative (2021 -)

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS



25 September 2015



CAT warming projections

Global temperature increase by 2100

December 2019 Update

UNITED NATIONS
**PARIS CLIMATE
AGREEMENT**
SIGNING CEREMONY
— 22 APRIL 2016 —



High-Level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance (HLEG)

- At the **end of 2016**, the Commission appointed a High-Level Expert Group on **sustainable finance**. On 31 January 2018 the group published its report.
- In March 2018 the European Commission published an **action plan** based on the report.
Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth
(Brussels, 8.3.2018 COM(2018) 97 final)

<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0097&from=EN>


Action 10: Fostering sustainable corporate governance and attenuating short-termism in capital markets

1. To promote corporate governance that is more conducive to sustainable investments, by Q2 2019, the Commission will carry out analytical and consultative work with relevant stakeholders to assess: **(i) the possible need to require corporate boards to develop and disclose a sustainability strategy**, including appropriate due diligence throughout the supply chain, **and measurable sustainability targets**; and **(ii) the possible need to clarify the rules according to which directors are expected to act in the company's long-term interest**.
2. **The Commission invites the ESAs to collect evidence of undue short-term pressure** from capital markets on corporations and consider, if necessary, further steps based on such evidence by Q1 2019. More specifically, the Commission invites ESMA to collect information on undue short-termism in capital markets, including: (i) portfolio turnover and equity holding periods by asset managers; (ii) whether there are any practices in capital markets that generate undue short-term pressure in the real economy.

ESA's 2019 advice



18 Dec 2019



18 Dec 2019



18 Dec 2019

“Under the Action Plan ‘Financing Sustainable Growth’, in the beginning of 2019 the European Commission (Commission) invited the three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) to each develop a report presenting evidence and possible advice on potential undue short-termism. In its call for advice (see Annex I), the Commission asked the three ESAs to investigate potential sources of undue short-termism on corporations from the financial sector and provide advice on areas which regulators should address.”

ESMA Report

ESMA reviewed the relevant financial literature and identified six potential contributors to “undue short-termism”:

1. Investment strategy and investment horizon;
2. Contribution of disclosure of Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) factors to long-term investment strategies;
3. Role of fair value in better investment decision-making;
4. Institutional investor engagement;
5. Remuneration of fund managers and corporate executives; and
6. Use of Credit Default Swaps (CDS) by investment funds.

DG Justice and Consumers Conference "Sustainable Corporate Governance"

 24 January 2019

 Bruxelles/Brussel, Belgium

Academic input



**Towards Sustainability:
Clarifying the Role of the Corporate Board**

Professor Beate Sjøfjell, University of Oslo

Brussels, 24 January 2019

Sustainable Market Actors for Responsible Trade (SMART)

Corporate Governance for Sustainable Prosperity

William Lazonick

The Academic-Industry Research Network

(william.lazonick@gmail.com)

**Conference on
Sustainable Corporate Governance
European Commission DG JUST**

Brussels, January 24, 2019

A Union that strives for more

My agenda for Europe

By candidate for President of the European Commission

Ursula von der Leyen



**POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE NEXT
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2019-2024**

These Political Guidelines draw on the common ideas and priorities that unite us. They are not an exhaustive work programme but rather aim to frame our common work. Within each chapter you will find the policies I intend to use to help us deliver on our goals. The Political Guidelines focus on six headline ambitions for Europe over the next five years and well beyond:

- ✓ **A European Green Deal**
- ✓ **An economy that works for people**
- ✓ **A Europe fit for the digital age**
- ✓ **Protecting our European way of life**
- ✓ **A stronger Europe in the world**
- ✓ **A new push for European democracy**

The European Green Deal

2.2.1. Pursuing green finance and investment and ensuring a just transition

[...]

The private sector will be key to financing the green transition. Long-term signals are needed to direct financial and capital flows to green investment and to avoid stranded assets. The Commission will present a renewed sustainable finance strategy in the third quarter of 2020 that will focus on a number of actions.

First, the strategy will strengthen the foundations for sustainable investment. [...]

Sustainability should be further embedded into the corporate governance framework, as many companies still focus too much on short-term financial performance compared to their long-term development and sustainability aspects.

(bold italics added)



EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Europe's moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation

[...]

To help unlock the private investment needed, long-term certainty and predictability are essential. This underlines the importance of the Climate Law and the upcoming proposals for more ambitious emissions reduction targets for 2030. The EU sustainable finance taxonomy will guide investment in Europe's recovery to ensure they are in line with our long-term ambitions. This will be supported with a Renewed Sustainable Finance Strategy later this year. ***To ensure environmental and social interests are fully embedded into business strategies, the Commission will put forward a new initiative in 2021 on sustainable corporate governance.***


Brussels, 27.5.2020
COM(2020) 456 final

European Commission Better Regulation Guidelines: Impact Assessments

The questions an impact assessment should answer	
1.	<i>What is the problem and why is it a problem?</i>
2.	<i>Why should the EU act?</i>
3.	<i>What should be achieved?</i>
4.	<i>What are the various options to achieve the objectives?</i>
5.	<i>What are their economic, social and environmental impacts and who will be affected?</i>
6.	<i>How do the different options compare (effectiveness, efficiency and coherence)?</i>
7.	<i>How will monitoring and subsequent retrospective evaluation be organised?</i>

Source : Better regulation guidelines - Impact assessment

<https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/better-regulation-guidelines-impact-assessment.pdf>



Supply Chain Study

Consultation
30 July 2020 –
08 October 2020

Consultation
26 October 2020 –
08 February 2021

Sustainable Corporate Governance Initiative?

Proposal for a Directive (Q2 2021)

“Legislation on sustainable corporate governance will be proposed to foster long-term sustainable and responsible corporate behaviour.”

Commission Work Programme **2021**.
A Union of vitality in a world of fragility

Brussels, 19.10.2020
COM(2020) 690 final

Home > Consultations > Consultation on the renewed sustainable finance strategy

Consultation on the renewed sustainable finance strategy

8 April 2020 - extended to 15 July 2020



2. Summary of the EY Study's Findings and Recommendations

Starting Point

“The focus of corporate decision-makers on short-term shareholder value maximisation rather than on the long-term interests of the company reduces the long-term economic, environmental and social sustainability of European businesses.”

Report's Objective

“The objective of this study is to

- **assess the root causes of “short termism” in corporate governance**, discussing their relationship with current market practices and/or regulatory frameworks,
- and to **identify possible EU-level solutions**, also with a view to contributing to the attainment of the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the goals of the Paris Agreement on climate change.”

Abstract pg. i (without emphasis) and Executive Summary, pg. vi

Empirical Methodology

“[...] Short-termism can be assessed by looking at the evolution of the amount of net corporate funds being used for pay-outs to shareholders (in the form of dividends or shares buybacks) compared with the evolution of the amount used for the creation of value over the life cycle of the firm, namely through investment in infrastructure, workers training, Research and Development (R&D), and investments in sustainability.” (page 9)


Empirical Finding

“Data indicate an upward trend in shareholder pay-outs, which increased fourfold, from less than 1% of revenues in 1992 to almost 4% in 2018. Moreover, the ratio of CAPEX and R&D investment to revenues has been declining since the beginning of the 21st century.” (page vi)

EU companies tend to prioritise the short-term interest of their shareholders over the long-term interest of the company and fail to fully account of sustainability risks and impacts

CORE PROBLEM

Figure 16 – Problem tree



EU companies tend to prioritise the short-term interest of their shareholders over the long-term interest of the company and fail to fully account of sustainability risks and impacts

CORE PROBLEM

1

Directors' duties and company's interest are interpreted narrowly and tend to favour the short-term maximisation of shareholders' value

2

Growing pressures from investors with a short-term horizon contribute to increasing boards' focus on short-term financial returns to shareholders at the expense of long-term value creation

3

Companies lack a strategic perspective over sustainability and current practices fail to effectively identify and manage relevant sustainability risks and impacts

4

Board remuneration structures incentivise the focus on short-term shareholder value rather than long-term value creation for the company

DRIVERS

5

The current board composition does not fully support a shift towards sustainability

6

Current corporate governance frameworks and practices do not sufficiently voice the long-term interests of stakeholders

7

Enforcement of directors' duty to act in the long-term interest of company is limited

DRIVERS

Table 4 – Overview of the areas of analysis and the related sources of information

Areas of analysis	Factors	Literature review	State of play in 12 Member States	
			Legal review	Survey
Directors' duties and company's interest	Definition and interpretation of directors' duties and "company's interest"	✓	✓	✓
Pressures from investors	Changes in share ownership structures and emergence of activist investors	✓		
	Disclosure of quarterly returns and earning guidance	✓		
Sustainability strategy and estimation of sustainability risks and impacts	Existence of a sustainability strategy and targets	✓	✓	✓
	Estimation of sustainability risks and impacts	✓	✓	✓
Board remuneration	Directors' remuneration linked to financial performance	✓	✓	✓
	Directors' remuneration linked to sustainability metrics	✓	✓	✓
Board composition	Expertise of the board members	✓	✓	✓
	Independence of the board	✓		
Stakeholder involvement	Stakeholder involvement in corporate decision-making	✓	✓	✓
Enforcement	Stakeholder rights to hold the board or its members accountable	✓	✓	✓
Non-financial reporting	Disclosure of non-financial statements	✓	✓	✓

Report Summary: Drivers

"The study shows that, to some extent, corporate "short-termism" finds its root causes in regulatory frameworks and market practices. These trends work together to promote a focus on short-term financial return rather than on long-term sustainable value creation." (pg. vi)

“Drivers” and “Issues” associated with each Driver

1

Directors’ duties and company’s interest are interpreted narrowly and tend to favour the short-term maximisation of shareholders’ value

1.1

The formulations of director’s duties and “company’s interest” in which board members are required to act as part of their fiduciary duty/duty of care are unclear, and this leaves room for interpretations that tend to prioritise shareholders’ interests over long-term company’s objectives, in light of the prevalence of the shareholder primacy norm

1.2

The identification and mitigation of sustainability risks and impacts is rarely included in the board duties

2

Growing pressures from investors with a short-term horizon contribute to increasing boards’ focus on short-term financial returns to shareholders at the expense of long-term value creation

2.1

The growing importance of institutional investors with a limited length of share ownership and the rise of activist investors looking to maximise short-term share price create pressure on boards to focus on short-term market value of the shares

2.2

The disclosure of quarterly returns and earnings guidance tend to reinforce board members focus on the short-term financial performance

3

Companies lack a strategic perspective over sustainability and current practices fail to effectively identify and manage relevant sustainability risks and impacts

3.1

When present, sustainability targets included in sustainability strategies are not aligned with high-level objectives (such as SDGs) and are not systematically monitored through dedicated KPI

3.2

Companies show different levels of maturity as concerns the identification and management of sustainability risks and impacts, including along the whole value chain

4

Board remuneration structures incentivise the focus on short-term shareholder value rather than long-term value creation for the company

4.1

Share-based remuneration exacerbate executives’ focus on shareholder value maximisation

4.2


The integration of ESG metrics into board remuneration structures is still a limited practice

DRIVERS

ISSUES

Figure 18 below shows the structure of the options identified for each driver.


Figure 18 - Overview of the identified options



Policy Options for each of the 7 “Drivers” – Example Driver 2 Issue 2.1

4.4.2 Driver 2 – Growing pressures from investors with a short-term horizon contribute to increasing boards’ focus on short-term financial returns to shareholders at the expense of long-term value creation


Issue	High-level options	Options		
		Non-legislative/Soft		Legislative/Hard
		Option A1	Option B2	Option C2
<p><u>Issue 2.1</u>: The growing importance of institutional investors with a limited length of share ownership and the rise of activist investors looking to maximise short-term share price create pressure on boards to focus on short-term market value of the shares</p>	<p>Consider mechanisms to give longer term shareholders more control over companies or incentivise investors to take a longer-term approach, such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Setting voting rights proportional to the time of presence in a firm’s capital 	<p>M2.1: Commission green paper to stimulate public debate on how to foster long-term shareholder engagement and longer shareholding periods</p>	<p>M2.3: Commission recommendation for Member States to amend their national regulatory frameworks and provide for mechanisms to incentivise longer shareholding periods</p>	<p>M2.4: Commission proposal to amend the Shareholder Rights Directive II to introduce binding rules requiring Member States to introduce mechanisms to incentivise longer shareholding periods</p>



7 Drivers
 12 Issues
 36 Policy Options

Assessment of the options

- i) impacts, including expected degree of change in the national regulatory frameworks; impacts on companies; economic, social, and environmental impacts; impacts on fundamental rights; and impacts on public administrations
- ii) effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and proportionality



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3. The Sustainable Corporate Governance Initiative Consultation


(26 October 2020 – 08 February 2021)

Questions for the public (1)

1. Do you think companies and their directors should **take account of stakeholders' interests in corporate decisions** alongside financial interests of shareholders, beyond what is currently required by EU law?
2. Should the requirement **to act "in the interest of the company"** be clarified to **include the interests of employees, of customers, of persons and communities affected** by the operations of the co, of the **environment, of society**, or other?
3. Should companies **identify their stakeholders**?
4. Do you believe that corporate directors should be required by law to **set up adequate procedures** and where relevant, measurable (science-based) **targets** to ensure that **possible risks and adverse impacts on stakeholders**, ie. human rights, social, health and environmental impacts are identified, prevented and addressed?

Questions for the public (2)

5. Do you believe that corporate directors should **balance the interests of all stakeholders**, instead of focusing on the short-term financial interests of shareholders, and that this should be clarified in legislation as **part of directors' duty of care**?
6. Do you consider that **stakeholders**, such as for example employees, the environment or people affected by the operations of the company as represented by civil society organisations, **should be given a role** in the **enforcement of directors' duty of care**?
7. Should there be a legal requirement for companies to **establish and implement adequate processes** with a view to **prevent, mitigate and account for human rights** (including labour rights and working conditions), **health and environmental impacts**, including relating to **climate change**?
8. Do you believe that the EU should require directors to establish and apply mechanisms or, where they already exist for employees for example, use existing information and consultation channels for **engaging with stakeholders** in the area of sustainability?
9. Should **remuneration practices** be reformed to make them **consistent with the goal of sustainability**?
10. Should action be taken to **limit buybacks**?



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